

Edited by  
Jon Stewart



Miscellaneous  
Writings of  
G. W. F. Hegel



*Northwestern University*

SEPP Studies in

Historical Philosophy






MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS  
OF G. W. F. HEGEL

# SPEP Studies in Historical Philosophy

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## Editor's Introduction

For some time now, the anglophone reader has had access to all four of G. W. F. Hegel's major works in English translation: *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, the *Science of Logic*, the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, and the *Philosophy of Right*. The increasing interest in Hegel's philosophy in the English-speaking world over the past few decades has brought with it translations of several lesser known works as well. Although the task of translating Hegel into English is by no means finished, a more complete picture of him and his philosophical activity is available today than was the case thirty years ago. This anthology traces Hegel's development through a number of these lesser known texts. Specifically, the goal of the present collection is to bring together into a single volume the scattered translations which have appeared over the past several years. The hope is that these various texts will together constitute a useful resource for students and scholars.

The resulting anthology has no intrinsic continuity with respect to content or period. The texts featured here come from virtually every stage of Hegel's development and treat radically different issues. Moreover, the genre or status of the texts differs markedly: there are introductions, rough drafts, fragments, book reviews, poems, speeches, sermons, reports, and individual treatises. Finally, not all of the texts featured here are from Hegel's own hand; some are students' notes or other first-hand reports. But precisely by virtue of their heterogeneity, these diverse works help to bring out the full scope of Hegel's intellectual interests and activities. In his poems, for example, one meets a quite different Hegel from the one that the reader is familiar with from *The Phenomenology of Spirit* or the *Science of Logic*. One sees diverse, often surprising sides of Hegel's personality and intellectual character in texts where he plays the unaccustomed roles of a priest, educational reformer, polemicist, and so on. Moreover, these texts collectively help to fill in the gaps in our understanding of his intellectual development.

All of the translations collected here have appeared previously in other publications, and they are reprinted in most cases in their original

form, that is, with the original introductions and critical and explanatory notes by the translator or other commentator. (Data on the original publication of each translation in this volume is provided in the list of original sources that follows this introduction.) Each piece is intended to stand on its own, and apart from some standardizing of the regulative principles, little attempt has been made to change the language of the individual translations or to impose any forced unity on them as a whole. I have taken the liberty of changing a word here or there in order to make the translation of certain key terms consistent throughout the texts. Since most of the translations are accompanied by their own introduction and apparatus of notes, a detailed introduction to each work is superfluous here. In what follows I will, however, sketch briefly Hegel's philosophical career in order to locate the texts featured here with respect to his better-known works and to the main stages of his biography generally.

### Stuttgart (1770–1788)

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was born on August 27, 1770, in Stuttgart, which at the time was in the duchy of Württemberg. He was the oldest of three children, with a younger sister, Christiane (1773–1832), and a younger brother, Georg Ludwig (1776–1812). From a very early age Hegel attended a Latin school, and he later received a full classical education at the *Gymnasium*, or secondary school, in his hometown from 1777 to 1788. There his scholarly promise was recognized early on: he regularly received school prizes, and each year he was the first in his class. It was also there that he acquired an enthusiasm for the ancient world which he maintained throughout his life. Even at this early period, Hegel was widely read in the leading works of the Enlightenment. He kept a meticulous account of the courses he took and the works he read. Partly for this purpose, he kept a diary written in German and Latin during these years. Hegel graduated from the *Gymnasium* in 1788 and was the valedictorian of his class.<sup>1</sup>

From this early period comes the first work featured here, “A Conversation of Three: A Scene from *Julius Caesar*,” dated May 30, 1785. This short reworking of a scene from Shakespeare's famous historical drama is the earliest piece of writing by Hegel that survives. One can recognize in it Hegel's idealization of the Roman Republic and the theme of human freedom. The piece's dialogue between the members of the Second Triumvirate, Antony, Octavius, and Lepidus, might be compared with the mature Hegel's discussion of court culture in “The World of Self-Alienated Spirit” from *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. In the mutual disdain

of the three men, essential aspects of the dialectical relationship between the lord and the bondsman are anticipated.

In the second text featured here, “On the Religion of the Greeks and Romans,” which dates from 1787, the schoolboy Hegel begins to work out some of the basic outlines of his later philosophy of religion, and above all his understanding of the religion of the Greeks as the religion of beauty. This work represents the most significant of the essays preserved from this early period. Hegel discusses the origins of religious belief and practice generally, without entering into many details about the specific nature of Greek or Roman religion. Moreover, he analyzes religious belief, on the one hand, as a reaction to nature and, on the other hand, as a social institution closely connected to the state. Here emerges for the first time his notion of a *Volksreligion* (folk religion), which is contrasted to the Enlightenment conception of a rationalistic religious belief.

The final piece from this period, the school essay “On Some Characteristic Distinctions of the Ancient Poets,” dates from August 1788. This essay, which is largely derived from an article by the German philosopher Christian Garve (1742–1798),<sup>2</sup> represents Hegel’s first attempt at developing some basic ideas in the field of aesthetics. Here he argues for the superiority of the ancient Greek and Roman writers over modern authors. The literary works of the ancients, he claims, were closely bound up with the common beliefs, values, and institutions of the societies in which those works were born. By contrast, modern authors have become marginalized specialists, alienated from such common beliefs and values; they address a specialized public with an unnatural, often affected language. The piece ends with a brief descriptive account of the origins of Greek tragedy and comedy. All three of the essays featured here from the Stuttgart period are indicative of Hegel’s lifelong admiration of classical culture, and this may be regarded as their common theme.

## Tübingen (1788–1793)

After his graduation from the *Gymnasium*, the eighteen-year-old Hegel went to Tübingen to attend the distinguished theological seminary, or *Stift*, at the university there. The *Stift* was an institution for educating future members of the clergy and was home to several students who later became famous, notably Hegel, his fellow philosopher Friedrich Schelling (1775–1854), and the poet Friedrich Hölderlin (1770–1843). Hegel became close friends with both men, and the three were even

roommates for a time. They followed with keen interest the development of Immanuel Kant's philosophical idealism in the work of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814). It was also during this period that the French Revolution broke out in 1789. This event was the source of great agitation among both students and faculty at the highly traditional and conservative *Stift*. Hegel and his classmates followed with great interest the revolutionary events unfolding in Paris, and there are also reports of a clandestine political club among them. Amidst the turmoil, Hegel received the degree of master in philosophy in 1790 and graduated from the *Stift* as a candidate of theology in 1793.

The first document featured here from the Tübingen period is a collection of four sermons dating from Hegel's final years at the *Stift* (1792–93). They were a formal part of his studies for a degree in theology. These sermons are important texts in documenting the development of Hegel's early thought on Christianity and his relation to the philosophy of religion put forth by Kant and Fichte. Fichte's breakthrough book, *Attempt at a Critique of all Revelation*, appeared in 1792, and he himself visited Tübingen in June 1793. In the same year Kant published his main treatise on the philosophy of religion, *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*. The work of both men was much discussed among the students at the *Stift*. In the first sermon featured here, Hegel addresses the problems associated with the motivation for moral action in Kant's moral theory. He attempts to reconcile, on the one hand, Kant's claim that the moral agent must act out of respect for the moral law itself rather than for any heteronomous motive with, on the other hand, the Christian doctrine of the immortality of the soul, which seems to offer just such a motive. How can moral agents be said to be acting morally if their motivation is merely the self-interest of attaining immortality? In the second sermon, Hegel criticizes the conception of faith as the mere internalization of a handful of dogmas. He claims, by contrast, that true belief consists in an inward relation to the divine. Following the example of Christ, the individual believer can attain a communion with God. This participation in the Holy Spirit makes possible good works, which are not motivated by the simple memorization of dogma. This is for Hegel the true nature of faith. In line with the second sermon, the third criticizes the emphasis on outward ceremony and appeals to the inward life of the believer. This inward life is what characterizes the Kantian "kingdom of ends," which can be achieved on earth, provided that a reformation takes place in the inner disposition of believers. The theme of the fourth and final sermon is forbearance. As in the second sermon, Hegel here refers to communion with God in the Holy Spirit. He lists several examples of ways in which

the Holy Spirit supports and helps us to be better moral agents in our everyday life.

The other work from this period featured here, “The Tübingen Essay” of 1793, is a rough draft of what seems to have been planned as a long work treating the philosophy of religion and Christianity. Hegel is critical of Kant’s understanding of religion as performing primarily an ethical function in terms of guaranteeing the abstract moral law, and he instead tries to understand the social and historical role of religion and to see it as part of the web of customs, duties, and institutions of a people. Here he turns to the ancient Greeks as his model. He contrasts their concept of religion with abstract accounts in modern theology. Hegel makes a principal distinction between objective religion, which concerns the formal features of religious practice and belief—the dogmas, ceremonies, and practices that constitute public worship—and subjective religion, which concerns the inward religious life of the individual believer and thus primarily involves personal experience, emotion, and action. While the objective aspect is a necessary part of all religion, it is the subjective aspect which provides religion with its true value as a living entity, as a folk religion. This essay is important for an understanding of Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s ethics and philosophy of religion, as well as for Hegel’s own interpretation of the nature of religious experience in both the ancient Greek world and in Christianity.

## Bern (1793–1797)

Upon graduating from the *Stift* in 1793, Hegel received a post as house tutor for a noble family in Bern, Switzerland. Positions of this kind were quite common for academics at the time. His employer was Karl Friedrich von Steiger (1754–1841), a military officer and a member of the Bern council. By all accounts, Hegel’s time in Bern was not a particularly happy one. He was charged with the education of his patron’s children, and thus was more or less left to his own devices for intellectual stimulation. Although he had a good library at his disposal, he felt isolated and longed for the intellectual life of Germany. During this period he seems to have concerned himself primarily with the philosophy of religion and political philosophy. His treatise *The Life of Jesus*<sup>3</sup> and the essay “The Positivity of the Christian Religion”<sup>4</sup> date from this period.

“The Bern Plan” from 1794 is an important fragment which seems to be the outline for a longer work on the philosophy of religion. It gives an overview for a study of religion in connection with a number of other



topics, such as ethics, the state, and so on. It treats the respective roles of the church and the state in the moral life of a people. Here Hegel again takes up the distinction between objective and subjective religion, which he had discussed in the "Tübingen Essay." The goal of the state, he says, is to help make objective religion subjective; by virtue of just institutions, the state must allow for the free exercise of moral conscience. Here Hegel is still in a discussion with Kant's conception of the basic tenets of religion as postulates of practical reason.

In the short, fragmentary text "The Transcendental Idea of God," Hegel is concerned to respond to current ideas in the philosophy of religion by the leading philosophers of the day. This text is above all a response to Kant's interpretation of the moral function of religion. Hegel evaluates the conflict between inclination and Kant's moral law. The fragment is couched in the language of the ego and non-ego that was in vogue at the time due to the works of Fichte and Schelling, suggesting that it is perhaps a part of Hegel's reading notes for these authors. However, he organizes the thoughts in his own way, perhaps with an eye to a study of religion of his own.

Hegel's old school friend Hölderlin arranged a new post for him as a house tutor in Frankfurt. Hegel's poem "Eleusis" from 1796 is addressed to Hölderlin at the time when he was making inquiries on Hegel's behalf. The poem begins with a prologue in which Hegel, at night after a busy day, withdraws into himself to meditate. The scene is Lake Bienne and the surrounding hills, where the Steigers had a country estate which was their summer residence. Hegel nostalgically recalls his friendship with Hölderlin and their happy student days together in Tübingen; he then "yields to sweet hope," the prospect of being reunited with him in Frankfurt. Hegel then invokes the ancient Greek gods and refers to the temple at Eleusis, famous in the ancient world for its rites and mysteries. With a shift in perspective, he laments the demise of the ancient gods and ridicules the attempts of modern science, that is, history and philology, to recover their meaning. The poem ends with the claim that the true lovers of the Greek spirit are those who carry it with them in their hearts and express it in their works, as presumably Hölderlin did. Shortly after composing this poem, Hegel returned to Stuttgart in December 1796, and at the beginning of 1797 he went to Frankfurt, where he was in fact reunited with his friend from Tübingen.

The next text, "Fragments of Historical Studies," is a set of manuscripts which sketch a philosophy of history. The dating of these fragments is uncertain: Hegel's student and early biographer, Karl Rosenkranz (1805–1879), places most of them between 1795 and 1798,<sup>5</sup> where they have been put here, but Johannes Hoffmeister has put them with material

from the Frankfurt period (1797–1800).<sup>6</sup> It has also been claimed that they stem from the Jena period (1801–6).<sup>7</sup> It is likely that the fragments span at least two different periods, those of Bern and Frankfurt. These fragments constitute a very heterogeneous body of material, and the heading “Historical Studies” gives them a sense of unity that is rather illusory. The first fragment is an extended discussion of what Hegel calls “the Oriental character.” Some of the later fragments seem to be Hegel’s reading notes for specific texts such as Friedrich Schiller’s *History of the Thirty Years’ War* (2 vols., 1791–93) and Thucydides’ *History of the Peloponnesian War*.

Another document presumably from this period is the much-disputed text, “The Earliest System-Program of German Idealism,” which has also been attributed to Schelling and Hölderlin. Although some questions still remain, it is certain on the basis of handwriting analyses that the text is written in Hegel’s hand. Its dating, like its authorship, is uncertain.<sup>8</sup> It has been argued that the text stems from 1796 or from the first weeks of 1797, that is, immediately after Hegel had moved to Frankfurt from Bern.<sup>9</sup> This short, fragmentary text contains an entire plan for a philosophical system, including ideas on ethics, metaphysics, history, aesthetics, the philosophy of nature, and the philosophy of religion. It begins with a brief statement of ethics and morality, with an allusion to Kant, and indicates how this will lead to a physics, which in turn will lead to an anthropology, and so on. In short, it is a very ambitious and thought-provoking outline of a philosophical system.

## Frankfurt (1797–1800)

In 1797 Hegel moved to Frankfurt to take up another post as a private tutor. In Frankfurt, he continued his work on the philosophy of religion with the essay “The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate.”<sup>10</sup> It was also during this period that he began “The German Constitution,”<sup>11</sup> an essay which he completed later in Jena. In Frankfurt Hegel studied Kant’s political philosophy. Although little is known of Hegel’s personal circumstances during this period, he seems to have found Frankfurt more congenial than Bern. He was happy to be reunited with Hölderlin, who himself worked as a house tutor there.

The “Two Fragments on Love,” which are from the beginning of Hegel’s Frankfurt period, are essential documents for understanding the early development of his thought on religion and ethics. Both fragments concern, among other things, the problem of the unification of the

various oppositions and contradictions in the realms of spirit and nature. The notion of love is introduced as the means of effecting this unification. For the reconciliation or unification of human beings and God to take place, it is necessary that God become human in Christ, since love is only possible among equals. Thus, only through the agency of another finite human being are human believers united with God through love.

During his stay in Bern, Hegel had been able to observe the practices and workings of the Swiss aristocracy, and he became critical of the oligarchical system and the abuses of the patrician class. While there he encountered a book in French entitled *Lettres confidentielles* (1793; *Confidential Letters*), the work of an exiled lawyer, Jean Jacques Cart (1748–1813), who describes in it the oppression of the French-speaking part of the Swiss canton of Vaud by the ruling class in Bern. Vaud was one of Bern's holdings at the time, and it was subject to a number of abuses under Bern's rule, particularly after an uprising in 1791, in which the citizens of the canton expressed their solidarity with the French Revolution. The revolt was put down in 1792, and Bern's hegemony over the canton was reasserted. Hegel presumably knew Cart's book while he was still in Bern, and it was doubtless there that he started work on his German edition of it. This work, known as the *Commentary on the Bern Aristocracy*, is Hegel's first published text; it is Cart's book, which Hegel edited, translated, and published anonymously in Frankfurt in the spring of 1798. Since the book was published anonymously, it was not until the 20th century that Hegel's editorship of it was discovered. In the book, after translating individual letters by Cart, Hegel gives his own commentary on the political issues mentioned, and the story is told of how the government of Bern deprived Vaud of its political freedom. The *Commentary* is one of our first glimpses of Hegel's political thought. His consistent criticism of the heavy-handed policies of the Bern aristocracy seems to indicate that his goal in the book was to publicize the abuses of the Bernese administration of Vaud. In this text one sees Hegel as a young political pamphleteer at a time of great political turmoil in his native Württemberg.

In the fragment "Faith and Being" from early 1798, Hegel discusses the notion of the "union" or reconciliation with God. This text also shows his continuing dialogue with Kant's philosophy of religion. This difficult fragment can perhaps be best understood in the context of Hegel's essay "The Spirit of Christianity," in which he argues that Kant's rational conception of Christianity makes it into a religion of authority, or a positive religion.

The next set of documents is the "Four Early Poems" from the years 1798 and 1800. Only portions of these poems have been preserved by Rosenkranz, who cites their opening stanzas in his biography of Hegel.<sup>12</sup>

Some of the inspiration for these poems can doubtless be found in Hegel's close contact with Hölderlin during this period. The poems show Hegel's dedication to classical models and provide a stark contrast to contemporary Romantic poetry. Moreover, these four poems, like "Eleusis," show Hegel's continuing interest in ancient mythology.

The first of the two "Fragments on the Ideal of Social Life" represents a preliminary draft of the long essay "The German Constitution." But this fragment is by no means limited to political theory and often touches on the philosophy of religion and aesthetics. It discusses in some detail the split between nature and the life of spirit and examines the ways in which this split can be overcome. This was, of course, one of the central tenets of Friedrich Schelling's philosophy of identity, which was popular at the time. In his *System of Transcendental Idealism* (1800), Schelling aimed at uniting nature and spirit by reciprocally deducing the one from the other. When Hegel comes to mention the political situation in Germany in this fragment, he says that universal right has been reduced to thought and is no longer to be found in the realm of actuality. The second fragment contains key terms and headings for a political philosophy. It seems to be an outline for a work on political philosophy, and it shows his holistic thinking on the subject, since it contains such heterogeneous headings as "ethics," "family," and "faith." Thus, even here Hegel seems conscious of the need to integrate the various aspects of human life in a well-functioning state.

Finally, the "Fragment of a System" is the lone surviving piece of a longer manuscript that apparently dealt with the philosophy of religion. Hegel explores what will come to be one of the main themes of his philosophy, namely, the unification of opposites. He examines the notion of organic life in precisely these terms, claiming that an organism unites within itself contradictory impulses. Toward the end of the fragment, the proposed unification is seen to take place in religious belief. Of particular interest is the fact that, in contrast to his mature system, religion is here placed higher than philosophy. Only religion can ultimately resolve all oppositions and contradictions, whereas philosophy, as mere thought, stops short of the true, living unification in actuality.

## Jena (1801–1806)

When his father died in 1799, Hegel inherited a sum of money. (His mother had already died some fifteen years earlier.) This provided him with the financial means to embark on a university career, since entry-

level positions as a *Privatdozent* or lecturer were unsalaried at the time. So after taking leave of his duties in Frankfurt, Hegel began his academic career at the University of Jena, which was under the aegis of the court at Weimar. At the time, Jena was one of the foremost universities in Europe and home to many of the best-known intellectuals in the German-speaking world, including Fichte, Novalis (1772–1801), August Wilhelm von Schlegel (1767–1845), Friedrich von Schlegel (1772–1829), and Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805). Hegel's friend and former classmate, Friedrich Schelling, received a professorship there in 1798, and it was through his recommendation that Hegel was appointed in 1801.

Hegel's Jena period was an extremely fruitful one which culminated in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807). His first work after coming to Jena was a short book in 1801 entitled *Difference between the Systems of Fichte and Schelling*.<sup>13</sup> By this time Schelling was already an established figure in philosophical circles. He had published a handful of influential essays, and in 1800 a major work of his appeared, the aforementioned *System of Transcendental Idealism*. In his *Difference* essay, Hegel contrasts the philosophical views of Fichte and Schelling, who were the leading figures of the time. Hegel himself had yet to publish anything substantial and had no philosophical reputation to speak of. Many regarded him simply as a member of Schelling's school.

During Hegel's first year in Jena, and specifically on his thirty-first birthday, August 27, 1801, the public defense for his *Habilitationsschrift* was held. Writing and successfully defending a thesis of this kind is still a required qualification for obtaining a professorship at a German university. Hegel chose as his topic a theme from the philosophy of nature, and, as was customary, the work was written in Latin. This work, entitled *Philosophical Dissertation on the Orbits of the Planets*, is the next piece included in the present collection. Despite the importance of this text for Hegel's career, it remains rather poorly known in his corpus. It has, however, been responsible for much misunderstanding in the reception of Hegel's thought, for claims have been made that it contains an egregious attempt to prove *a priori* that there can be only seven planets. The rationalistic hubris of this assertion was then purportedly humbled when shortly thereafter the existence of an eighth planet was in fact discovered.<sup>14</sup> This is regarded as a good example of the dangers of an unbridled rationalism that goes to work in the absence of empirical observation. In reality Hegel argued against those who presented the mathematical scheme, known as Bode's Law, which they used to posit an eighth planet in the gap between Mars and Jupiter which we know today as the asteroid belt. Hegel played with the scheme and presented another one in order to show that there was no need to posit an eighth

planet *a priori* in this fashion. For all the misunderstanding this work has occasioned, it is nevertheless an important statement of Hegel's early philosophy of nature and for his criticism of Newton's mechanics.

The Jena period was also the most productive period for cooperative work between Hegel and Schelling. During 1802–3 they jointly edited a periodical called the *Critical Journal of Philosophy*. This journal was an important forum for philosophical discussion at the time, and both men contributed a number of articles to it. The "Introduction" to the *Critical Journal* is included as the next piece in this collection. Hegel seems to be the primary author of this text; Schelling, however, did make some revisions to it. As the full title of the piece indicates, Hegel takes up the question of the nature of philosophical criticism and of philosophy as a discipline. The subject matter of philosophy is said to be the Idea or the cognition of the Absolute, just as the subject matter of aesthetic criticism is the idea of beauty. Various notions of subjectivity or relativism in both fields are criticized, and the conception of a scientific philosophy or a systematic philosophy is asserted to be the only true one. The "Introduction" also gives a general assessment of the philosophical scene at the time.

One of the articles that appeared in the *Critical Journal* was a book review that Hegel wrote of the works of Wilhelm Traugott Krug (1770–1842), which has been included in the present collection. Krug was Kant's successor in the chair of logic and metaphysics at the University of Königsberg. He was a Kantian who was critical of the efforts of Fichte and Schelling to transform Kant's philosophy. In response to these challenges, Krug made a case for common sense—a course toward which Kant himself pointed in the last years of his life. The text in this collection represents Hegel's polemical response. It is a review of three different works by Krug, namely, his *Letters on the Science of Knowledge* (1800), *Letters on the Newest Idealism* (1801), and *Outline of a New Organon of Philosophy* (1801). The review is an important statement of Hegel's views on the relation of philosophy to common sense or "ordinary human understanding." Krug challenged transcendental idealism to present to him a deduction of his pen, that is, of the simplest empirical objects and their properties. Hegel's response is to try to show that philosophy is concerned with the analysis of concepts, and since empirical objects are not concepts, they are not in themselves the subject matter of philosophical investigation. Despite his polemical rhetoric in the review, Hegel took Krug's challenge seriously, and one can see the project of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in part as a response to it. The stated goal of that work is to justify to common sense the viewpoint of science,<sup>15</sup> and in order to do so, Hegel begins in the chapter "Sense-Certainty" with the view that particular objects

are immediately given and are what is true. Hegel's criticism of naive, common-sense realism in this chapter can be seen as an extension of his criticism of Krug in the review.

Cooperative work between Hegel and Schelling came to an end in 1803, when Schelling abandoned Jena in order to take up a new professorship at the University of Würzburg. From this point on, Hegel began work on his own philosophical system. Pressure was building on him to produce a major work in order to further his academic career. Evidence of an emerging system from this period can be found in the surviving manuscripts of the so-called *Realphilosophie*.<sup>16</sup> These manuscripts contain the outlines of a system of philosophy which in many ways foreshadows Hegel's later work, in particular the *Encyclopaedia*. During his final years at Jena, Hegel was hard at work on what would become perhaps his most famous book, the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. This was clearly the crowning achievement of the Jena period. Due to his contract with the publisher, he had to hurry to finish the manuscript. The situation was further complicated by the Battle of Jena in 1806, when Napoleon's forces took the city. The university was closed, and Hegel left the city, penniless. By then the text of the *Phenomenology* had been sent to the publishers in Bamberg, and after Hegel added a long preface to it, the book finally appeared in April 1807.

Apart from the works of this period already mentioned, a selection of the so-called "Aphorisms from the Wastebook" has also been included. These are a group of unrelated observations and thoughts that Hegel recorded in a notebook between the years 1803 and 1806. They consist of reflections on a number of different topics. It is a misnomer to refer to these short texts as "aphorisms" in the strict sense; they were merely scattered thoughts and reflections that Hegel wrote down primarily on the basis of his readings. These miscellaneous journal entries were intended for his own use and consideration, and were never conceived as aphorisms or intended for publication as such. While Hegel alludes to specific philosophers, such as Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, he discusses at most only isolated, individual points in their thought and then moves on. One dominant theme of these texts is the nature of philosophy, or what Hegel generally calls "science," and its role *vis-à-vis* common sense and everyday life. Pure thinking is often contrasted to ordinary thought, and the philosopher to the uneducated person; one can see the specter of Krug behind Hegel's reflections on this theme.

One aphorism of special interest is the "Fragment on the 'Life-Course' of God," which is included here as a separate entry. It is an important document in the development of Hegel's philosophy of religion and



contains one of his most extensive discussions of the influential mystic Jacob Böhme (1575–1624). Böhme's thought had become fashionable in Hegel's time, since many of the Romantics saw in it a useful opposing view to the Enlightenment's conceptions of rationalistic theology. In this fragment Hegel criticizes the mythological nature of Böhme's thought. He evaluates one of the central claims of Böhme's mysticism—that human beings can know God only through a mystical union brought about by the imagination. Hegel implicitly criticizes this view, which is based on intuition, by contrasting it with the scientific view based on reason. Scientific analysis of the development of the concept of the divine, of the “life-course” of God, claims Hegel, is the true pathway to knowledge of the divine. This scientific view takes its material from intuition and turns it into its essential truth, which is its truth for mind or spirit.

The final text from the Jena period is Rosenkranz's account of Hegel's original system. Here Rosenkranz explains Hegel's notion of “the divine triangle,” which is a diagrammatic representation of his dialectical thinking. In his account, Rosenkranz quotes what has come to be known as the “Triangle Fragment.” Like the “Fragment on the ‘Life-Course’ of God,” this text evinces Hegel's interest in Böhme's mysticism. According to Rosenkranz, Hegel, in line with Böhme and the mystical tradition, used the geometrical figure of the triangle to represent the persons of the Trinity. In order to portray the dialectical movement of the Trinity and to avoid the impression that it was a static entity, Hegel conceived of the “triangle of triangles,” which united the three individual persons of the Trinity into a single dynamic one. This is the movement of the divine that Hegel retains in his philosophy of religion, whereby God begins as a transcendent, external other in the abstract realm of the beyond, and then externalizes Himself in the concrete, empirical person of Christ, and finally, with the death of Christ, returns to the beyond to dwell in the Christian community as the Holy Spirit. Rosenkranz hints at a possible Platonic influence on Hegel with regard to his use of geometrical models as an analogy. The notion of the “triangle of triangles” seems in any case to be analogous to Plato's notion of the Idea of the Ideas.

## Bamberg (1807–1808)

With the University of Jena closed, Hegel found himself in a dire situation. He appealed to Schelling, who was then at the University of Munich, but his old friend was unable to help. Fortunately, through the intercession of his friend Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer (1766–1848), Hegel

was able to obtain a post in Bamberg as a newspaper editor. At the time, Bamberg was under French occupation after Napoleon's recent victories. Hegel enjoyed neither the daily burdens of the newspaperman's life nor the oversight of the governmental censors. After a short time, he became dissatisfied and turned once again to his friend Niethammer for help.

The first document from this period is the "Guidelines for the *Journal of German Literature*," which was an outline of goals and principles for a journal that never appeared. Already in his letters to Niethammer from Jena, Hegel had expressed his interest in obtaining an appointment at the University of Heidelberg and in founding an academic journal there.<sup>17</sup> The outline dates from the spring of 1807, presumably after Hegel had moved to Bamberg from Jena. The projected journal, like the *Critical Journal* in Jena, was intended to be an organ of philosophical criticism, and its "Guidelines," although of a more practical nature, are similar to the Introduction to the *Critical Journal* in Jena and serve to complement it. In this new prospectus, Hegel examines and once again expands upon the notion of criticism. Its main goal, he claims, is to expose and criticize the complacent academic viewpoints of the tradition which contemporary science has called into question. Criticism must help to bring about the demise of old concepts and views and to set the stage for new ones.

Hegel was in Bamberg when his first major work, the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, was published. On October 28, 1807, in a supplement to the *Jena General Literary Review*, there appeared the "Announcement of New Books" that Hegel wrote to publicize his book. Although short, this advertisement is an important document, since there Hegel explains the role the *Phenomenology* is supposed to play in his philosophical system as a whole. The announcement considers the *Phenomenology*, on the one hand, as "the *preparation* for science" and, on the other hand, as "the first science of philosophy." While it has been a matter of much discussion ever since, Hegel seems either not to notice or not to be worried by the contradiction or at least tension between these two conceptions.

Hegel's short essay "Who Thinks Abstractly?" has been placed here, although its dating remains uncertain. Rosenkranz thought that it belonged to Hegel's period in Berlin (1818–31).<sup>18</sup> By contrast, in his edition of Hegel's works, Hoffmeister says that it belongs to the Jena period (1801–6).<sup>19</sup> Finally, on the basis of handwriting comparisons, Heinz Kimmerle claims that it belongs to the Bamberg period, where it has been placed here.<sup>20</sup> The essay is a reflection on the nature of human cognition and explores the relation between abstract thinking and common sense. This is a somewhat odd piece, due to its uncharacteristically informal style and the series of strange images that Hegel uses by way of example. This enigmatic work stands unique in Hegel's corpus.

## Nürnberg (1808–1816)

After a year in Bamberg, Hegel was able to return to academia in a limited sense. Once again through the intercession of Niethammer, he was able to find a job, this time as *Rector*, or headmaster, of the *Gymnasium* at Nürnberg in 1808. Niethammer had outlined a reform plan for the school system in Bavaria which concentrated on the classical languages but made room for the introduction of new disciplines. The plan also called for instruction in philosophy and theology for the four highest classes. Hegel was a good candidate for implementing this plan in the capacity of headmaster. During this period, at the behest of Niethammer, he worked out for his students a kind of manual on philosophy and especially logic. This text is now referred to as *The Philosophical Propaedeutic*, or the *Nürnberg Propaedeutic*.<sup>21</sup> It is divided according to theme and class and includes, in addition to logic, such topics as ethics and the philosophy of religion. It was during this period that Hegel's *Science of Logic* was published in three installments in 1812, 1813, and 1816. This was clearly the most important statement of his philosophy since the *Phenomenology*, and was the beginning of the system of science for which the *Phenomenology* was a preparation.

In 1811 Hegel married Marie von Tucher (1791–1855), the daughter of a noble family in Nürnberg. Although the bride's father was reluctant to consent to the marriage because Hegel was not of sufficiently noble stock, he was won over by an assurance from Niethammer that a professorship for Hegel at Erlangen was all but a certainty, and that the official offer was imminent. This was apparently enough to appease the future father-in-law, and the marriage went ahead. In 1813 and 1814 respectively, the couple had two sons, Karl (1813–1901) and Immanuel (1814–1891). Despite Hegel's poor financial situation, given that his pay was often months in arrears, the marriage seems to have been a happy one.

"On Classical Studies," the sole text featured from this period, is an almost complete translation of a speech that Hegel gave in his capacity as headmaster of the *Gymnasium* at Nürnberg on September 29, 1809. This is one of six such speeches by him that survive. It can be seen as an enthusiastic affirmation of Niethammer's plan for school reform. The speech demonstrates Hegel's unwavering respect for classical education, but also shows his appreciation of the changed status of the classical languages in modern education. He salutes the introduction of new disciplines in the educational curriculum that are in keeping with the needs of modern society, but at the same time he praises the retention of instruction in Latin and ancient Greek, not as the mainstay of the curriculum but as one element among others. Moreover, Hegel argues that in the arduous

acquisition of the formal elements of classical languages, the student internalizes the very structure of logical thinking, which is a universal skill that can be transferred and applied in other areas.

### Heidelberg (1816–1818)

Hegel returned to a university setting in 1816 when he obtained a professorship at the University of Heidelberg. In 1817 his *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* was published. This text was written in the form of a compendium for use by the students attending his lectures. The *Encyclopaedia* is clearly the most straightforward statement of Hegel's mature philosophical system. The work treats logic in its first part, which is an abbreviated account of the material covered in the *Science of Logic*. The second part is dedicated to the philosophy of nature and represents Hegel's most extensive statement in this branch of philosophy. The third and final part covers the philosophy of mind, which includes psychology, anthropology, politics, and social theory; this part anticipates the *Philosophy of Right* and Hegel's later lectures on the philosophy of history. During this period Hegel also served on the editorial board of the journal *Heidelberg Yearbook for Literature*. He himself wrote two reviews for this journal in 1817. The first was a review of the third volume of the collected works of the philosopher Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743–1819), and the second was on the meeting of the Assembly of the Estates in Hegel's native state, the kingdom of Württemberg, in 1815 and 1816.<sup>22</sup>

### Berlin (1818–1831)

In 1818 Hegel received a professorship at the recently founded University of Berlin, which became the leading center of learning in Prussia. He had been offered a position there once before, in 1816, while he was still at Nürnberg, but at the time he chose to accept the post at Heidelberg instead. At a time of great political agitation, Hegel in 1821 published what was to be his final book, *Natural Law and Political Science in Outline: Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, which is known simply by its abbreviated title, the *Philosophy of Right*. It was during these years in Berlin that Hegel reached the zenith of his career. His lectures were popular and attracted many able students. Hegel lectured on the philosophy of history,<sup>23</sup> aesthetics,<sup>24</sup> the philosophy of religion,<sup>25</sup> and the history of philosophy.<sup>26</sup>

After his death, his students collected their notes for these lectures and published them in the first complete edition of his works.<sup>27</sup> In 1826 the first number of the journal *Yearbooks for Scientific Criticism* had appeared under Hegel's editorship. This journal was to become the rallying point for Hegelian philosophy, and it remained important even after his death, being referred to by critics simply as "the Hegel journal." At the height of his career, Hegel died suddenly in Berlin on November 14, 1831, presumably of cholera.

The first text from the Berlin period featured here was not written by Hegel himself. It is a series of student notes for three different introductory lectures to Hegel's courses in Berlin on his philosophy of right, which is translated here as the philosophy of law. These notes, by C. G. Homeyer (1795–1874), H. G. Hotho (1802–1873), and K. G. J. von Griesheim (1798–1854), constitute an important additional resource for those interested in the development of Hegel's views on law and politics. The first set of notes, dating from 1818–19, contains his criticism of the historicist approach to law.<sup>28</sup> Here Hegel declares that the philosophy of law is concerned with the development of the concept of freedom<sup>29</sup> and cannot regard historical tradition in itself as a justification for such a concept. The second set of notes, which is taken from Hegel's lectures in 1822–23, contrasts the laws of the state with the laws of nature.<sup>30</sup> Whereas the laws of nature seem to be fixed facts, juridical laws seem to be contingent and artificially constituted at the whim of specific lawmakers of specific peoples. Hegel argues that there is nevertheless an inherent rationality in the laws of the state which gives them a kind of necessity. It is the task of the philosophical science of the state to investigate this rationality. The final introductory lecture dates from 1824–25 and has as its main theme the conceptions of law as, on the one hand, natural and, on the other hand, positive.

The next text from the Berlin period, "On Teaching Philosophy at the *Gymnasium*," is a report that Hegel, as a member of the Royal Prussian Examinations Commission, issued in 1822 to the Royal Department of Religious, Educational, and Medical Affairs in Berlin. In this report he discusses the problems of philosophy instruction in secondary schools and makes suggestions for how young students might be better prepared for university education. Hegel argues that in the absence of any prior training in speculative thinking, students at the *Gymnasium* would not be in a position to profit from instruction on the history of philosophy, which should thus be deferred to the university level. The philosophical fields and themes which Hegel does recommend as appropriate for the *Gymnasium* are empirical psychology, basic logic, the proofs for the existence of God, and finally ethics. It is to logic, that is, classical rather

than speculative logic, that Hegel gives his highest recommendation, asserting that it should constitute the main philosophical subject matter at the *Gymnasium*.

The next text is a foreword that Hegel wrote for a work by H. F. W. Hinrichs (1794–1861) on the philosophy of religion. It is an important document for Hegel's views on religion and for his relation to the theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834), who was one of his colleagues at the University of Berlin. Hinrichs was one of Hegel's former students from Heidelberg who at the time was seeking a university appointment. On the strength of his book (which includes Hegel's foreword), *Religion in its Inner Relation to Science* (1822), he received a post at the University of Breslau. The foreword is one of Hegel's main statements about Schleiermacher's philosophy of religion as it appeared in *The Christian Faith* (2 vols., 1821–22). According to Schleiermacher, Christian belief cannot be a matter of reason or calculation, but rather must be essentially concerned with the unique inner life of the individual, with one's immediate religious feelings and emotions, and specifically with the feeling of helplessness and dependency on God. In his foreword Hegel criticizes Schleiermacher's theology of feeling with a *reductio ad absurdum*. He claims that according to this reasoning, "a dog would be the best Christian,"<sup>31</sup> since a dog has the highest degree of feeling and lives in a realm deprived of reason. Hegel sees a family resemblance between Schleiermacher's theology, which ultimately leads to the assertion of one's personal subjectivity as absolute, and Friedrich von Schlegel's Romanticism, which Hegel criticized, among other places, in the *Philosophy of Right*<sup>32</sup> and in his "Review of Solger's Posthumous Writings and Correspondence," which is treated below. Hegel tries to make a case for the unity of reason and faith, which is one of the fundamental themes of his philosophy of religion.

The last two pieces published in this collection are book reviews written by Hegel. The first is of the posthumous writings of K. W. F. Solger (1780–1819), whose works on aesthetics were of particular importance to Hegel. Solger was a professor of philosophy at the University of Berlin and was instrumental in Hegel's appointment there. The two men came to know each other after Hegel's arrival in the Prussian capital, and they remained on good terms until Solger's death only a year later. Solger is known primarily for his work on aesthetics, which he presented in his abstruse *Erwin: Four Conversations about the Beautiful and Art* (1815). After his death in 1819, his friends Ludwig Tieck (1773–1853) and F. L. G. von Raumer (1781–1873) published in 1826 a collection of his posthumous works along with his letters, supplemented by some of their own correspondence with him. Hegel's long review of this two-volume work is

important for a number of reasons. In his review he quotes with approval Solger's condemnation of the young theology student Karl Sand (1795–1820), who murdered the conservative German-born playwright and Russian noble August von Kotzebue (1761–1819) in the name of the student movement and German nationalism. The review is also an important source of information about Hegel's views on Romanticism. Since Solger was associated with the Romantic movement, Hegel has occasion to criticize specific aspects of his works, but he does so in a tone much softer than the one he reserves for the champion of Romantic irony, Friedrich von Schlegel. Finally, the review is an essential document for Hegel's views on irony, specifically his discussion of the irony of Socrates and the way in which it was appropriated by the Romantics. This discussion was later used extensively by the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard in his dissertation, *The Concept of Irony* (1841).

The final text collected here is Hegel's review of Karl Friedrich Göschel's *Aphorisms on Non-Knowledge and Absolute Knowledge in Relation to Christian Faith Knowledge* (1829). Hegel's review of this book first appeared in the *Yearbooks for Scientific Criticism* in 1829. K. F. Göschel (1781–1861) was a member of the Higher Regional Court in Naumberg at the time that he wrote his *Aphorisms*. Although he was a civil servant rather than a scholar, he became an important figure among the conservative Hegelian right. Göschel's book concerns the relation of philosophy to religion and the ever-returning question of faith and knowledge. The main claim that Göschel makes and which Hegel is anxious to endorse is that speculative philosophy and Christianity are ultimately in agreement. Göschel's polemic is primarily in defense of Hegel and against the philosopher F. H. Jacobi, who held that God is transcendent and unknowable. In his review, Hegel is enthusiastic in his endorsement of Göschel's view, an enthusiasm which he repeats in the third edition of the *Encyclopaedia* from 1830.<sup>33</sup> This review is a significant statement of Hegel's views on Christianity and the philosophy of religion.

It would be an error or exaggeration to regard the texts collected in this book as the most important ones in Hegel's corpus, but they do constitute a useful supplement to his best-known works. Indeed, they show sides of his intellectual activity, for example, as poet, editor, and literary critic, which are not customarily seen. Thus, the modest hope of this anthology is that its texts can be used to complement, rather than supplant, one's understanding of Hegel based on a reading of his major works. Moreover, these lesser-known works may help make Hegel's thought more accessible to people who might otherwise be intimidated by his more difficult main works, which offer no easy inroads to the general



reader. The texts collected here could thus serve as a kind of alternative to the standard introductions of Hegel's thought. In this way we can perhaps come a step closer to making Hegel better known and better understood in Anglo-American philosophy.

## Notes

1. Hegel's valedictory address can be found in G. W. F. Hegel, *Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung*, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Stuttgart: Frommann, 1936), pp. 52–54. It is also in Karl Rosenkranz, *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Leben* (1844; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1963), pp. 19–21.

2. Christian Garve, "Consideration of Some Distinctive Characteristics in the Works of the Earliest and of Modern Writers," in *Neue Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften*, vol. 10 (Leipzig, 1770), pp. 189–210.

3. In G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften*, ed. Herman Nohl (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, Paul Siebeck, 1907), pp. 73–136. Available in English in G. W. F. Hegel, *Three Essays, 1793–1795* ed. and trans. Peter Fuss and John Dobbins (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press 1984), pp. 104–165.

4. Available in English in G. W. F. Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, trans. T. M. Knox and Richard Kroner (1948; Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1975), pp. 67–181.

5. Rosenkranz, *Hegels Leben*, pp. 515–32.

6. Hegel, *Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung*, pp. 257–77.

7. See Gisela Schüler, "Zur Chronologie von Hegels Jugendschriften," in *Hegel-Studien* 2 (1963), pp. 111–59.

8. Ibid.

9. Otto Pöggeler, "Hegel, der Verfasser des ältesten Systemprogramms des deutschen Idealismus," in *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 4, *Hegel-Tage Urbino 1965* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1968), p. 18.

10. Available in English in Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, pp. 182–301.

11. This essay is available in English in G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel's Political Writings*, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon, 1964), pp. 143–242.

12. Rosenkranz, *Hegels Leben*, pp. 83–85.

13. This essay is available in English as G. W. F. Hegel, *Difference between the Systems of Fichte and Schelling*, trans. H. S. Harris and W. Cerf (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977).

14. See Bertrand Beaumont, "Hegel and the Seven Planets," in *Mind* 63 (1954), pp. 246–48; reprinted in *The Hegel Myths and Legends*, ed. Jon Stewart (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1996), pp. 285–88.

15. Compare *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977), §§ 26–28.

16. These works are available in German in *Jenaer Systementwürfe I–III*, vols. 6–8 of G. W. F. Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. Rheinisch-Westfälische Akademie der

Wissenschaften (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1968ff.). The English translations are as follows: G. W. F. Hegel: *The Jena System, 1804–5, Logic and Metaphysics*, translation ed. John W. Burbidge and George di Giovanni (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1986); *The Jena Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit (1805–6)*, in *Hegel and the Human Spirit*, trans. Leo Rauch (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1983); and *First Philosophy of Spirit*, in *Hegel's System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy of Spirit*, ed. and trans. H. S. Harris and T. M. Knox (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1979).

17. G. W. F. Hegel, *Briefe von und an Hegel*, 3rd ed., 4 vols., ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1969), no. 70.

18. Rosenkranz, *Hegels Leben*, pp. 355ff.

19. G. W. F. Hegel, *Berliner Schriften: 1818–1831*, vol. 11 (1956) of Hegel, *Sämtliche Werke*, 32 vols., ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg, 1952ff.), p. xiii.

20. Heinz Kimmerle, "Zur Chronologie von Hegels Jenaer Schriften," in *Hegel-Studien* 4 (1967), p. 173f. See also Anke Bennholdt-Thomsen, "Hegels Aufsatz: Wer denkt abstrakt?" in *Hegel-Studien* 5 (1969), pp. 165ff.

21. Available in English as G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophical Propaedeutic*, trans. A. V. Miller, ed. Michael George and Andrew Vincent (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).

22. G. W. F. Hegel, "Proceedings of the Estates Assembly of the Kingdom of Würtemberg, 1815–1816," in *Hegel's Political Writings*, trans. T. M. Knox, pp. 246–92.

23. The standard English translation is G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree (1857; New York: Prometheus, 1990).

24. The standard English translation is G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel's Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*, 2 vols., trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975). Cf. also the earlier translation: *The Philosophy of Fine Art*, 4 vols., trans. F. P. B. Osmaston (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1920). Also available is Hegel's *Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics*, trans. Bernard Bosanquet, ed. Michael Inwood (Hamondsworth: Penguin, 1993).

25. The standard English translation is G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, 3 vols., ed. Peter C. Hodgson, trans. R. F. Brown, P. C. Hodgson, and J. M. Stewart, with the assistance of H. S. Harris (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984–87). Also available is *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, 3 vols., trans. Ebenezer Brown Speirs and J. Burdon Sanderson (1895; reprint, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967).

26. The standard English translation is G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, 3 vols., trans. E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson (1892–96; reprint, Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1995).

27. G. W. F. Hegel, *Werke*, 18 vols., ed. Philipp Marheineke, Johannes Schulze, Eduard Gans, Leopold von Henning, Heinrich Gustav Hotho, Karl Ludwig Michelet, Karl Hegel, Ludwig Bumann, Karl Rsenkranz, and Friedrich Förster (Berlin, 1832–45).

28. See G. W. F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, ed. Allen W. Wood, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), § 3.

29. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, §§ 1–2.

30. Ibid., Preface pp. 13–14, addition.

31. G. W. F. Hegel, “Foreword to Hinrichs’ *Religion in its Inner Relation to Science*” in this volume on p. 348.

32. See Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, op. cit., § 140 remark, § 164 addition.

33. See G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind, Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, trans. William Wallace and A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon, 1971), § 564.

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- "Two Fragments of 1797 on Love," intro. H. S. Harris, trans. C. Hamlin and H. S. Harris, in *Clio* 8, no. 2 (1979), pp. 257–65.
- "Commentary on the Bern Aristocracy," intro. Z. A. Pelczynski, trans. Heinz Luegenbiehl, in *Clio* 8, no. 3 (1979), pp. 405–16.
- "The Frankfurt Sketch on 'Faith and Being' (1798)," in Harris, *Hegel's Development*, pp. 512–15.
- "Four Early Poems by Hegel," trans. Michael H. Hoffheimer, in *Clio* 13, no. 4 (1984), pp. 401–5.
- "Two Fragments on the Ideal of Social Life," trans. H. S. Harris, in *Clio* 10, no. 4 (1981), pp. 399–406.
- "Fragment of a System," trans. Richard Kroner, in G. W. F. Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, ed. and trans. T. M. Knox and Richard Kroner



MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS  
BY G. W. F. HEGEL






PART

1

STUTTGART, 1770–1788





# A Conversation of Three: A Scene from *Julius Caesar*

Translated by Christiane Seiler, with  
an introduction by H. S. Harris

The following dialogue by a fifteen-year-old schoolboy is dated May 30, 1785, and is the earliest writing of Hegel's to come down to us. It shows the influence of Shakespeare on the young Hegel, for it is essentially a rewrite of Act IV, Scene 1, of Shakespeare's historical play *Julius Caesar*. It is also a good example of how the young Hegel's interest in literature was wedded to an interest in history. A comparison with the Shakespearean original shows that his dialogue is more than a mere embellishment. Indeed, it represents a considerable development of the original (though much of this is achieved through explicit reference to earlier scenes in Shakespeare's play). Interestingly, it is possible to find in the dialogue an anticipation of an important aspect of the mature Hegel's dialectic of lordship and bondage and of "noble" consciousness. In this regard, however, Antony's characterization of Lepidus as a "natural slave" in the exact sense defined by Aristotle is taken over directly from Shakespeare. The principal dramatic idea that Hegel adds to the original is a concluding monologue in which Octavius, remaining alone, reveals a contempt for Antony to rival Antony's contempt for the just-departed Lepidus. Octavius' disdain for Antony contrasts strikingly with his previous deference in Antony's presence, and with his gracious effort to speak up for the poor Lepidus in the face of Antony's manipulative disdain for the man. Octavius' deference is thus revealed as a concealed arrogance. It is only outwardly, not essentially, that the courtier's consciousness differs from that of his lord, for the lord is the courtier's own suppressed, alienated self. The relation of Octavius to Antony is a matter of "noble" consciousness

assuming the mask of the “courtier.” The fact that the three men are equal allies surely helped Hegel develop his continuous dialectic of the servile and free consciousness. Since the courtly cover-up is omnipresent in Shakespeare’s historical plays, it is fair to assume that the young Hegel was using Shakespearean models in his own addition of the soliloquy. Thus we have here evidence that the stimulus for an important strand in Hegel’s dialectic of self-consciousness came originally from Shakespeare. And insofar as the theme of lordship and bondage is central to the dialectic and philosophical system of the mature Hegel, the present piece is a striking symbol of continuity between the early and late Hegel. This text is translated from G. W. F. Hegel, *Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung*, edited by Johannes Hoffmeister (Stuttgart: Frommann, 1936), pp. 3–6.

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### A Conversation of Three: A Scene From *Julius Caesar*

Antonius: Have you both thought over the plan I presented to you? Any conclusions yet?

Octavius: I have given it consideration and indeed much thought. If it is carried out as happily as is suggested by its wise and intelligent arrangement, something quite magnificent will come of it.

Lepidus: It impressed me the same way.

Octavius: Yes, but how? We must identify particulars of the matter and the obstacles ahead.

Antonius: After due thought, I have not found any special difficulties.

Octavius: But I have. Let me lay them out. Will the free Romans immediately agree to our rule? Brutus, Cassius and the others who helped kill the noble Caesar, will they silently assent? Will we be able to satisfy Sextus Pompeius?

Antonius: Have no such scruples, my good Octavius! Believe me, I have lived longer in this world and have more experience than you. Do you believe that in these Romans there still glows even a spark of patriotism? Not in the least! Through luxury and debauchery they have lost so much of their ancestral greatness of soul that liberty no longer means anything to them. Soon after Caesar’s murder, when Brutus and Cassius stood on the tribune and had inflamed such hatred against the great Julius that, out of madness, they would almost have profaned his sacred corpse, how much eloquence did I need to change their tone? They allow themselves to be blown to and fro like feathers. The soldier is used to shedding the blood of citizens

as much as that of the enemy. And the soldier we have safely on our side. For the vulgar mob a few words are sufficient. Some corn or money and public spectacles will do.

Lepidus: I will see to this.

Octavius: You're perfectly right, Antonius. *One* concern is now eliminated. Yet a Brutus or a Cassius is far above the sphere of the mob.

Antonius: But these two, my Octavius, have lost all public significance, all love and respect through Caesar's murder and my speech. The people are safely on our side. What can they possibly do? So far we've not heard a thing from them.

Octavius: Yet it's scarcely been four hours since I received letters indicating their most secret mobilization for defense. They fear us. I was going to tell you of the news at once, but you were neither at the Capitol nor at home.

Antonius: I was staying at my countryseat. But the fact that Brutus and Cassius are preparing war causes me no such great concern. We are warriors as well as they. We merely have to be on our guard, unite our forces and thus convene at once our legates and tribunes.

Octavius: But quite apart from these there are still many foes who, to be sure, show friendliness on their face, and yet conceal poisonous daggers in their hearts. They must be removed.

Antonius: So they must, my Octavius. We have discussed all this in our last meeting, have designated most of them by name and vowed their death. I have them recorded here. Read it through!

Octavius [*reads and suddenly exclaims*]: Even Cicero?

Antonius: Quite so, Octavius. At our last meeting we decided to leave it up to each to dispatch into the kingdom of the dead whomever he may have chosen. Cicero was my deadly enemy. His speeches and letters prove it only too well. Has not Lepidus ceded even his brother to you?

Lepidus: True, so have I done.

Octavius: My word once given can never be withdrawn, but I feel in very great pain over the man.

Antonius: Here, Lepidus, why don't you read this, too. At your behest even my uncle Lucius stands among the condemned. So it all evens out between us. Each has sacrificed to our common welfare a man who causes him pain. But let's turn now to another matter, the parceling out of lands.

Octavius: This is a matter, I think, we'd rather let lie for now. We don't want to resolve that until after subduing Brutus and Cassius. Yet we have seriously to consider countermeasures against these enemies.

Antonius: I thought you and I could leave Rome, muster our army and attack them in their provinces. Lepidus can hold the city. What do you say?

Octavius: Fine, perfect.

Lepidus: I am agreed. But I had best be off now to take the necessary steps.

[*Lepidus exits.*]

Antonius: So now you are off, you fatuous man! I want to talk openly with you alone, Octavius. Should we let this barren head take part someday in the domination of the world?

Octavius: But it was you who dragged him into this union. Matters can probably now never be undone. Yet I think in many places he has proven a brave soldier.

Antonius: Mark my word, I have come to know the man. He has no inherent merit, no mental capacities. He has ability only for the skillful execution of missions. Like a lifeless machine he has to be set in motion by others. Believe me, if he didn't have powerful friends it would have never entered my mind to take him in. For the present we need him. But once we reach our mark in life, once we find ourselves sufficiently strong, I say we should no longer wait to relieve him of his undeserved post of honor—we should fatten him with stubble or get rid of him altogether. We shall then feast on the ears which he has so thoughtfully planted and harvested for us.

Octavius: I leave it to your judgment. We can discuss the matter further after a favorable unfolding of our plans.

But right now, Antonius, we must take heed. Closer and more violent storms are gathering over our head. We want to ready our forces without delay so as to courageously defy the raging storm soon to descend.

Antonius: Yes, quite right. But before we leave I have to straighten out a few things. Perhaps we'll talk again tonight. Till then farewell.

[*Exits.*]

Octavius: No sooner does idiocy exit than wantonness follows right behind! What Antonius says about Lepidus is completely true. Antonius, however, is proud, imperious, voluptuous and cruel. When our enemies are defeated and Lepidus removed, Antonius, proud of his deeds and experience, will lead me as the younger man around at will. Yet in me he will find no Lepidus! My unslavish neck is not accustomed to bend under the defamatory glances of a ruler! He will toss about in voluptuousness. I will quietly tolerate it for a long

time. Only when his physical and mental faculties have slackened and he encounters disdain, will I want to raise my head and unveil to him my true dimensions. *Aut Caesar, aut nihil!* Either he will humble himself before me in the dust, or I shall prefer death to life without honor.

[*Exits.*]

# On the Religion of the Greeks and Romans

Translated by Christiane Seiler, with  
an introduction by H. S. Harris

**T**his text, which is dated August 10, 1787, is probably the most important of the essays that Hegel preserved from his last years at school in Stuttgart. The main line of thought here appears to be his own, though the concepts and categories come, of course, from his readings in contemporary literature of the Enlightenment.

The essay has both a short- and a long-term significance for the evolution of Hegel's thought. We can see in it the beginnings of his theory of the formation of folk religion, through the amalgamation of tribal cults into a divine pantheon for the whole people; and the roots of his philosophical critique of Christianity are evident in the lesson he draws from the critical reaction of the Greek philosophers to their own religious tradition. This lesson was immediately important to Hegel at the time of writing; a year later, in his essay on the ancient poets, we find him concentrating on the imaginative achievement represented by Greek polytheism. These two concerns come together in the essay on the ideal of folk religion which we call the "Tübingen Essay" (1793). Then the critical emphasis that is dominant in this essay becomes the controlling impulse in Hegel's first two years at Bern (1793–95); and the appreciation of imagination is the main theme of his last year at Bern, and the three years he spent at Frankfurt (1796–1800).<sup>1</sup>

Throughout this development, the Greek ideal remains the ultimate model of religious experience for Hegel. But the idea that the Greek poets were, after all, only idealizing the natural experience of man into the sensible form of beauty, and that this natural experience is essentially an alienated



one, an experience of fear and dependence, is clearly formulated in the essay. This pattern is what makes religion an instrument of government; and we can see that Hegel at age seventeen is intensely conscious of its ambivalence. His main emphasis is already on cultural comprehension. To understand is to forgive, and the *Pöbel* (mob) can only be controlled and civilized through fear. But the manipulation of men's fears is only justified if it leads to the development of reason. The philosophers, with their "more enlightened and sublime" concepts of human fate, are leading the way toward the foundation of human social existence in rational freedom. The young Hegel is extremely critical of philosophy, but he has already recognized its essentially critical function; and he has at least begun to recognize its essential superiority to the natural order of things. This recognition leads first to the primacy of the Kantian critical emphasis in his Bern essays, and then to the assessment of Lutheran Christianity, with its absolute emphasis on personal responsibility, as something altogether higher than the "relation of nature" even in its ideal Greek form (just as the transcendental or rationally free standpoint of Kantian philosophy is higher than the natural standpoint of Greek philosophy). This recognition is thus the driving impulse of Hegel's systematic philosophy in the Jena period. He has to rebuild the "transcendental" standpoint from its foundations because the subjectivity of Kant and Fichte involves the "death" of nature, and the acceptance of an alienated relation between man and nature (which the Greek religion of beauty overcame). But all the tensions of Hegel's mature work are present in this early essay in a raw (and hence easily recognizable) form; and his eventual reconciliation of nature and freedom involves exactly the doctrine of superior philosophical enlightenment as the means for the achievement of universal goodwill that we find expressed here for the first time.

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## On the Religion of the Greeks and Romans

As far as the religion of the Greeks and Romans is concerned, they have followed the way of all nations. —The thought of a deity is so natural to man that it has developed in all people. In their childhood, in the primitive state of nature, they imagined God as an almighty being who ruled them and everything merely by caprice. They formed their concept of god after the rulers they knew, after the fathers and princes of families who held entirely at their pleasure a power over the life and death of their subordinates, who blindly followed their rulers even in the case of unfair and inhuman commands. These rulers could as human beings become angry, act precipitously, and repent. That is exactly how they imagined

their deity, and the representations of God held by the majority of men in our own much-heralded era of Enlightenment are in no way different. Misfortune, physical and moral evil they regarded as punishment by the deity and concluded that they must have offended it and deserved its wrath, knowingly or unknowingly, owing to actions which displeased it. They now sought to mitigate the wrath through offerings, through the best they had, through first fruits, even through their dearest possessions, their children. These human beings did not yet understand that those evils were no actual evils, that luck and misery depended on themselves, that the deity never sends misfortune to the detriment of its creatures. They likewise failed to reflect that the supreme being cannot be won over by the gifts of human beings, that men can neither increase nor decrease its wealth, power and honor. —But how should they present those offerings to it? Because they saw that only things dissolved in smoke rise to the clouds, because they fancied that it lived there, they had its gifts smoked up to it in fire. This is the origin of the offerings which constituted a major part of religious worship among the Greeks and Romans as well as among the Israelites. Human beings, who can only conceive things by means of sensory representations, soon created physical images of the deity from clay, wood, or stone, everyone doing so according to the ideal he had formed of the most terrible being: thus originate the horrible shapes and figures of the gods among primitive peoples without sensitivity to beauty and without arts. Inevitably, everybody had to bestow a special name on his god.

When several tribes united in a common cause or were otherwise mingled, each one retained its god. However, in order to solidify the union, they had their special deities enter into a society, and they put them all together in a place where the entire people worshiped all of them in common. —Greece and Rome had their pantheon, and every city had furthermore its own tutelary god. The fact that these nations were a mixture of so many different peoples is the main explanation for their numerous deities and for the diverse legends and stories involving the same. Polytheism was moreover caused thereby. Since they did not consider the power of the divinity, which according to their concepts was restricted, great enough to master the entire extent of the universe, they assigned the government of an element, of certain institutional arrangements, etc., to a special deity. To be sure, they personified the elements, countries and other such great matters and attributed the effects and changes of these elements, countries, and objects to the gods as free-acting beings. Likewise it is known that they transferred worthy heroes after death to the realm of the gods and worshiped them as gods. This great confusion in mythology was enhanced further by the efforts of scholars to find out the meaning of each fable. Separate places

were chosen to exhibit the idols, and temples were built, all of which attained great holiness since it was believed that the god resided there. Hills and groves were doubtlessly preferred for this purpose because their appearance by itself has a certain sublimity and their apparent proximity to heaven could make them most likely abodes of the gods; but they were in part also chosen because the soul of a solitary human being of lively sensibility is nowhere as enchanted and lost in reverie, believing itself to have apparitions and to behold a deity, as in viewing a wonderful expanse, overlooking a large portion of beautiful creation, or in experiencing the stillness of dark forests.

A human being, full of fear of something, interprets all circumstances accordingly and is frightened by everything. Likewise those human beings without enlightenment, with a powerful imagination, filled with fear of their god and steadfast in the belief that he brings about directly all changes in nature and thereby makes known to them his will—those human beings declared all events occurring unexpectedly to be such manifestations. A superstitious Greek, therefore, did not cross a path if a weasel had jumped past him; he asked an astrologer for advice if a mouse had nibbled at his bag of flour. Even in our days one predicts from a comet the end of a monarch's life and from the cry of an owl the imminent death of a human being.

Connected with this was the human desire to look into the fate of the future. People believed that the gods on whom this fate depends, could indeed raise slightly the curtain for them and portend through certain signs, or could give them advance notice through human beings associated more closely with them.

The more astute and cunning people, chosen to serve the deity, now noticed all these inclinations. They saw that the people could be guided through nothing so willingly as through religion. Since they could not profit, satisfy their desires and passions, or work for the general welfare by anything else as much as by making use of this obedience, so they strengthened those inclinations, captivated the imagination, and nourished it along certain lines and occupied it by frequent, sensuous ceremonies aiming in this direction. They armed themselves against all possible rational attacks by connecting religion with all their actions, and thus sanctifying it. They partly removed the images of the gods from general sight and public approach and lent them by means of this mystery a greater dignity and sublimity, at once giving freer play to the imagination. Through oracles, the priests influenced all important matters. In Greece they also formed one of those ties whereby the jealous and disunited states were kept together and linked in a common interest.

Thus originated the religions of all peoples, so likewise the religion of the Greeks and Romans. Only if a nation reached a certain level of

education, could men of enlightened reason appear within it, or could they attain better concepts of the deity and convey them to others. Most writings which we have preserved from antiquity stem from these times. Earlier ones are at least important to us from this point of view because of the history of mankind. They always call on us to revere a providence and to obey its—to be sure not arbitrary—commands by which it rules everything wisely and has a good and beneficent effect. Correct ideas about the conditions of the entire folk religion cannot, however, be exactly obtained from their poets. They treated religion and the history of the gods as poets, each according to his design: they only had to take the general views as a basis. And this folk belief as to the properties and the government of providence was almost the same at all times. The masses of all peoples attribute to the deity sensuous and human properties and believe in arbitrary rewards and punishments. These beliefs are, moreover, the strongest rein on their passions; rational grounds and those of a more pure religion are not effective enough against these passions.

The wise men of Greece and their pupils, on the other hand, show us in their writings much more enlightened and sublime concepts of the deity, especially with respect to the destiny of mankind. They taught that it provided everybody with sufficient means and forces for his blessedness, and they established the nature of things in such a way that true blessedness could be attained through wisdom and moral virtue. —Most agreed with these principles. Only, in their speculations about the primordial being of the deity and about other things inconceivable to mankind, they have, to be sure, thought out quite different systems. Seen from these points of view, some things in the concepts of religion—and I have only stated a few—will never strike us as inconceivable or ridiculous if we consider that human beings, endowed with the same abilities as we, lost their way in the same manner, i.e. by developing these abilities through an irregular education and a distorted direction.

The manifold striving of these human beings to explore the truth convinces us of the *difficulty of arriving at the pure truth undistorted by errors*, and it makes apparent how man often stops halfway toward truth, though often he dares go on, often deviates from the right path, often, blinded by a deceptive shape, lays hold of a shadow instead of reality. The unfortunate as well as fortunate efforts constitute for us experiences which we have already made and which we, without being exposed to dangers, use to collect the good thereof and employ it and thus avoid going astray.

We learn from their history how common it is, through customs and the limitation of certain representations, to regard the greatest nonsense as rational, disgraceful foolishness as wise. *This will make us aware of our*

*inherited and propagated opinions, to examine even opinions concerning which we never had any doubts, the assumption that they might perhaps be completely false or only half-true never entering our mind.* We shall be awakened from our slumber and idleness which often make us indifferent toward the most important truths. —If these experiences have taught us to think it possible, indeed probable, that many of our convictions are perhaps errors and that many of those of another who thinks differently are perhaps truths, we will not hate him, not judge him unkindly. We know how easy it is to commit errors and therefore will seldom attribute these to malice and ignorance and thus become more just and more charitable toward others.

## Note

1. The whole evolution is discussed in detail in H. S. Harris, *Hegel's Development: Toward the Sunlight, 1770–1801* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972). The “Tübingen Essay” is translated in that book’s appendix (pp. 481–507) and is reprinted in this volume on pp. 44–71. The main documents of the Bern and Frankfurt periods can be found in G. W. F. Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, ed. and trans. T. M. Knox and Richard Kroner (1948; Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1975).

# On Some Characteristic Distinctions of the Ancient Poets

Translated by H. S. Harris

**H**egel wrote this essay during his last month of schooling at the Stuttgart *Gymnasium*. The manuscript, which Rosenkranz used in the composition of his biography (1844), was dated August 7, 1788 (a few weeks before Hegel's eighteenth birthday). All that remains to us now is an excerpt given by Rosenkranz in the following context:

The introduction, which expounds views of cultural history that had become quite general at that time, can be passed over. But the remainder is worthy of note in its own right as Hegel's first fairly comprehensive utterance about an aesthetic topic, and not just as part of the story of his intellectual formation. After Hegel has spoken of the uniting of the universal interest of mankind with their own local interest among the ancients and of the support that the poet derives from this source, he continues.<sup>1</sup>

Rosenkranz goes on to quote the passage. "The conclusion," he says, "which is rounded out into a paean of praise for the integral perfection of the Greeks, can here be omitted."<sup>2</sup> Actually, as the researches of Hoffmeister have shown, none of the essay is as original as Rosenkranz believed. The excerpt that he has transmitted to us is based largely on an essay by the German philosopher Christian Garve, "Consideration of Some Distinctive Characteristics in the Works of the Earliest and of Modern Writers," which appeared in the *Neue Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften*, vol. 10 (Leipzig, 1770), pp. 189–210.<sup>3</sup> Hegel's essay nevertheless deserves attention, as Rosenkranz believed,

because Garve's distinction between the formation of concepts from direct experience, and the acquisition of an abstract verbal framework, proved to be the seed of Hegel's own mature theory of *Vernunft* (reason) and *Verstand* (understanding) and of the corresponding distinction between "concrete" and "abstract" universals.<sup>4</sup>

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## On Some Characteristic Distinctions of the Ancient Poets

In our times the poet no longer has such an extensive sphere of influence. The famous deeds of ancient, or even of modern, Germans are neither woven into our political constitution, nor is the memory of them preserved by oral tradition. Only from the history books—partly the histories of foreign nations—do we learn of them; and even this knowledge is confined just to the more cultivated classes. The folktales that entertain our common people are traditions of adventure that belong neither to our religious institutions nor to our true history. Moreover, the concepts and culture of the higher and lower orders of society are too sharply distinct for a poet of our time to expect to be read and understood by all alike. Hence our great German epic poet<sup>5</sup> did not get his wisely chosen topic<sup>6</sup> into as many hands as would have happened if our social relations were like those of the Greeks. One part of the population has already far removed itself from the system of belief upon which the poem either as a whole, or in its particular sections, is based; the other part is too pressingly occupied with its care for the many and various needs and conveniences of life, to have either the time or the inclination to raise itself and approach the mental world of the higher orders. —The art of the poet is what interests us now, not his message, which often makes quite the contrary impression to that which he intended.

An especially striking quality of the works of the ancients, is what we call its *simplicity*, which is felt more strongly than can be clearly defined. But it consists precisely in this, the ancient writers set forth the image of their subject faithfully for us; they do not seek to make it more interesting through fine nuances, or learned allusions, or more brilliant and attractive through a slight departure from the truth, as we require these days. Any impression, even a compounded one, they express in its pure simplicity, without separating the many aspects within it, which the understanding can distinguish, from one another, and without analyzing what is obscure.

Further, since the whole system of their education and cultural formation was so constituted that each had gained his ideas from direct experience, and they knew nothing of “the cold book-learning, that does but express itself with dead sign in the brain,” but for everything they knew, they still could say: “How, where and why they learned it”;<sup>7</sup> for this reason each of them had to have his own peculiar form of the spirit of his community, his own system of thought, each had to be *original*. We learn from our youth up, the current mass of words and signs of ideas, and they rest in our heads without activity and without use; only bit by bit, through experience, do we first come to appreciate our treasure, and to think something with the words, though they are already there like forms for us, upon which we model our “ideas”; they already have their fixed range and limitation, and they are relations according to which we are used to view everything. —We may note in passing, that one of the great advantages of the *learning of foreign tongues* is founded on this fact, that we learn both to collect concepts together generally and to separate them. But it also results from this mode of self-development in our times that in many cases the series of ideas a man has assembled for himself and the verbal series he has learned run along *beside one another* without being bound up into a single system, often indeed without so much as touching one another or taking hold of one another in any way.

Something else that is characteristic is that the poets especially depicted those aspects of visible nature that strike on our senses from without. They were well enough acquainted with these, whereas we are better informed about the *inward play of forces* and generally know more about the causes of things than about how they look. Everyone learned from the ancient poets to appreciate the functions of other branches of society for himself, without ever having had any intention of learning this. Hence the vocabulary of art had not become common in any way. We also, certainly, have words to mark the fine shades in the changes of visible nature, but they are current only in “vulgar” speech or have become “provincial.” —We can see quite generally in all the works of the ancients that they surrendered themselves calmly to the flow of their own preconceptions, and completed their works *without deliberate concern about a particular audience*. In the works of our poets, on the other hand, it springs to the eye that they were written by their authors with the consciousness that they will be read and with the preconception that they must get into conversation with their readers, so to speak.

We can see likewise that in the forms of poetry then current, the social situation was what gave direction to the genius of the first great discoverer. Nowhere is this influence so markedly evident, as in the history of dramatic poetry. Tragedy has its origin in rustic festivities established



in honor of Bacchus, which were accompanied by singing and dancing (Tibullus, II. 157; Horace, *Ars poetica*, 220). It got its name from the prize awarded.<sup>8</sup> The festivities were at first interrupted by one actor only, who related old stories about the Gods. Aeschylus introduced two actors for the first time, and made a regular stage. Previously a hut (σκηνή) of tree-wattles was used instead of a stage; it was divided into several rooms to make possible the presentation of several scenes. The onlooker therefore had to pass from one room to another. With the establishment of a regular stage, the later poets eschewed this by accepting unity of place—a rule which they sacrificed only rarely to achieve exceptional beauties (for instance Sophocles in *Ajax*, 815ff.). From its first authentic creator too, the language of tragedy gained its solemn dignity which has always marked it in later history. From all this it is evident how the peculiar form of the Greek tragic drama arose, especially the peculiarity of the chorus. Had the Germans gradually civilized themselves, without foreign culture, their spirit would without doubt have taken another way, and we would have our own German drama—instead of which, we have borrowed our dramatic forms from the Greeks. —Their comedy had a similar origin from the obscene farces (φαλλικά) of the peasantry, the Roman Fescennina (Aristotle, *Poetics*, 2, 4; Horace, *Epistles*, II, 1, 139ff. with Wieland's note *ad. loc.*). Nature itself taught the most primitive men a kind of wild poetry, out of which art has then gradually made what is called poetry among more civilized peoples. Among the Athenians, of whom Juvenal says: "*Natio comoeda est*,"<sup>9</sup> this type of poetry was bound to be especially fortunate, whereas the serious Romans could have no real feeling for comedy as a fine art.

Only these two types of dramatic poetry were known to the ancients. Some transitional types which they happened upon in seeking to please the delicate taste of the audience (κατ' εὐχὴν ποιοῦντες τοῖς θεαταῖς, Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1453a, 34F) seem not to have maintained themselves for long.

## Notes

1. Karl Rosenkranz, *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Leben* (1844; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1963), pp. 458–59.

2. Rosenkranz, *Hegels Leben*, p. 461.

3. Hoffmeister's research on this fragment has recently been reexamined (and in places corrected) by J. M. Ripalda in his "Poesie und Politik beim frühen Hegel," in *Hegel-Studien* 8 (1973), pp. 91–118. Ripalda points out that in this essay

we can see the first beginnings of Hegel's concern for the founding of a new religion based on a "mythology of reason." This concern forms one of the focal themes of his work over the next fifteen years. One of the crucial documents for it is the so-called "Earliest System-Program of German Idealism" (translated in H. S. Harris, *Hegel's Development: Toward the Sunlight, 1770–1801*, pp. 511–13; reprinted in this volume on pp. 110–2), which was for a long time ascribed (mistakenly) to Schelling.

4. See H. S. Harris, *Hegel's Development: Toward the Sunlight, 1770–1801* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972), pp. 36–41.

5. I.e. F. G. Klopstock.

6. I.e. Klopstock's *Messiah*. That the reference here is to Klopstock's *Messiah* is confirmed (if any confirmation is held to be necessary) by what Hegel wrote about eight years later in Bern on this same topic. The two discussions deserve to be carefully compared in any case: see G. W. F. Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, ed. and trans. T. M. Knox and Richard Kroner (1948; Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1975), pp. 148–49; and G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften*, ed. Herman Nohl (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, Paul Siebeck, 1907), p. 217. This view of Klopstock's achievement was not expressed by Garve. It is not unlikely that Hegel is here echoing J. G. Herder. See Ripalda's discussion cited above.

7. The quotations are from G. E. Lessing's play *Nathan the Wise*, Act V, Scene 6. Hegel uses them again in the "Tübingen Essay" (see the translation in Harris, *Hegel's Development*, p. 495; reprinted in this volume on p. 58).

8. I.e., a goat.

9. "It is a nation of comedy."

PART

2

TÜBINGEN, 1788–1793





# Hegel's Sermons

Translated by Michael George

The four sermons by Hegel translated here were probably delivered to congregations consisting of fellow candidates and the tutors of the Tübingen *Stift*. They were given during the last two years of Hegel's studies at Tübingen, in 1792 and 1793. The fourth sermon was probably delivered as part of the consistorial examination that Hegel was obliged to take prior to receiving his license as a Lutheran minister. From the point of view of care of composition, it is certainly the most polished of the four and may well have been submitted to be marked as part of the graduation assessment. It is mercifully free from the bad habits all too common in the other sermons: the tendency to omit verbs, to write ungrammatical German, to string ideas together with dashes as he thought with pen in hand, and to reduce the text to a series of notes upon which he would extemporize for delivery. Nevertheless, as the reader will note, even this final sermon is far from perfectly constructed or executed.

The first three sermons also differ from the fourth in that they are based upon a biblical text—a text which Hegel may have had some leeway in choosing. The fourth sermon, though lacking a text, does have a discernible theme: namely, that of the nature of “forbearance.” It is, however, a theme which Hegel had almost certainly no say in choosing, though one which he was able to adapt to his own purposes, as we shall note.

The middle two sermons contain a short introductory prayer which is omitted in the case of the first sermon. It is therefore probable that the first

sermon was delivered by Hegel as part of a service at which he did not officiate as the minister throughout.

As a purely documentary source, these sermons are most revealing. Not only do they constitute a significant portion of the written evidence from Hegel's own pen for the time he spent at Tübingen, but, as the short analysis which follows seeks to demonstrate, they form a coherent unity in their own right; a unity, moreover, which is clearly indicative of a steady progression and development in his thinking about Christianity during this period. These sermons are translated from G. W. F. Hegel, *Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung*, edited by Johannes Hoffmeister (Stuttgart: Frommann, 1936), pp. 175–92. The sermons are presented chronologically, thus altering their order in the German edition.

### First Sermon

In his first sermon, Hegel considers two ideas and their relation to Kantian ethics: the nature and purpose of divine commandments and the nature of the morally good agent. Hegel is in fact confronting the same problems which had exercised Fichte in his *Attempt at a Critique of all Revelation*: namely, the problem of how to reconcile revelation with reason and how to combine the traditional Christian notions of God and immortality with the preeminent demand of the Kantian moral law that moral agents should act only from autonomous motives. The idea of God as moral legislator for the world and of immortality as his reward to the faithful and morally dutiful served only to undermine that “disinterested interest” which was at the foundation of Kantian ethics. If God ordained the moral law and provided inducements for its observation, then, while religion remained the dominant vehicle of ethical education, all moral actions must be regarded as suspect from a Kantian point of view, for they all stem from heteronomous motives.

Hegel was faced with the same dilemma, but formulated the problem in a somewhat different manner. The positive or ordained aspects of the Mosaic law made of Judaism an *external*, imposed moral code lacking both spontaneity and the free acceptance of an ethical life and its duties which spring from the inner goodwill of each and every citizen. For Hegel, therefore, the problem of transcending the Judaic conception of the moral law as a divinely given order and replacing it with a “spontaneous” morality freely willed by all was the problem of how to introduce into Judaism, and by implication into Christianity, the free spirit of a free people. Moral acts which stem from prescribed religious observances cannot be said to have the same moral quality—the same moral force—as moral acts done only out of a respect for the moral law. “Positive” religion, ordained and given to man via *revelation*,

must be replaced by the self-legislating moral individual acting in accordance with maxims founded solely upon his own innate *reason*.

Hegel therefore commences the first sermon by positing an identity between the moral law as commanded by reason and the law as prescribed by divine revelation. By thus uniting both reason and revelation, he overcame the first problem with which he was faced. By positing this identity, he was able to retain the respect for the magnificence and magisterial authority which God gave to the Mosaic law, while at the same time avoiding the charge that such respect provides an ulterior motive for moral action. Insofar as individuals respect the law of God, they respect something which also resides within themselves: the reason upon which the law is founded. The Mosaic law therefore takes on the form of a prior revelation of the Kantian law of reason.

In seeking to account for the necessity of this law originally having been given to man via revelation, Hegel has recourse to an argument from G. E. Lessing's treatise *The Education of the Human Race*. In his natural state man is, claims Hegel—following Lessing—subject to the sway of the senses. He is dominated by his passions and by the exigencies of the phenomenal world. In order for mankind to free itself from such tutelage, it was ordained that it should initially receive the law as an *external* “dam” to restrain the pernicious influences of these passions. Revelation must necessarily give way to reason, but the content of the moral law is not thereby altered—only the basis upon which humans act is changed. Thus, in obeying the moral law, human beings can be said to be obeying the dictates of their reason and to be following the commandments of God rather than vice versa.

Having thus harmonized God, revelation, and moral autonomy, Hegel turned to a parallel problem, that of the inducement of immortality. His solution is to postulate the idea of God as associating moral and immoral acts with temporal reward and punishment. To make such rewards and punishments a part of the phenomenal order would have undermined Kant's position as effectively as the idea of a reward or punishment to come in a future life. Hegel was too well versed in Kant's philosophy to be guilty of such an elementary error. The reward and punishment which Hegel associates with the moral law requires no constant conjunction of material happiness in the phenomenal world with right conduct in the noumenal moral sphere. Indeed, Hegel fully recognized, as had Kant, that in the world the morally good often suffer for their virtue and the evil prosper. Hegel suggests, therefore, another kind of reward and punishment, one which he feels is compatible both with Kantian principles and with the Greek ideal of virtue epitomized in the Stoic doctrine that virtue is its own reward.<sup>1</sup> God, he states, has associated the performance of good with an inner state of contentment and the performance of evil with an inner sense of disquietude,

discontent, and even a sense of self-loathing. The blessedness which the good man inherits, and which is his temporal reward, is a contented soul and a feeling of well-being resultant upon his knowledge of having acted in accordance with what is right. Though this reward is phenomenal, in the sense that it is described by Hegel as a "feeling," it is not something dependent upon any *external* agency or circumstances for its efficacy. Even where Hegel suggests that the disquietude felt by the evildoer stems from his fear of divine retribution, he refrains from stating that this is the result of a preordained ordering of the phenomenal world in accordance with the noumenal moral law. It is possible that Hegel was here going beyond Kant and toying with the idea that God has ordained that in the phenomenal world the virtuous man should be rewarded while still upon earth, but with the caveat that this reward is not to be expected in the form of material well-being, as the Jews believed. To discount entirely the possibility that such a divinely arranged correlation exists between virtue and happiness would leave Hegel faced with the problem of immortality and the heteronomous inducement to virtue which it provides: a problem Kant had failed to resolve, if one assumes that he was fully aware of it. The problem of how to combine some concept of temporal reward with righteous action while keeping such rewards free of the charge that they provide heteronomous motives for the performance of our duty, is a problem to which Hegel was to return in the years immediately following his graduation from Tübingen. Yet already in these sermons Hegel appears more aware than Kant of the problems posed by rewards for virtue, whether temporal or post-temporal, though he was satisfied here merely to raise the issue without providing a definitive resolution.

In his first sermon Hegel may be seen as confronting the problems posed by the Old Testament view of morality. His purpose is to go beyond the Mosaic law in order to fulfill it. God as lawgiver, judge, and redresser of injustice is a concept which fitted ill with the Kantian notion of man as a radically free being under the tutelage of no higher agency than his own conscience and the dictates of reason. By harmonizing revelation with reason and by relegating the idea of immortality to a secondary role, Hegel succeeds, to his own satisfaction, in grounding the possibility of a practical reconciliation of Kantianism with the tenets of the Christian faith. Though the sermon is hedged about with the restrictions placed upon him by his immediate circumstances, it is clear that Hegel is offering no orthodox interpretation of either the Christian or Judaic religions. He is quite clearly groping toward a reformation of the former by way of a reassessment of the latter in terms of Enlightenment and specifically Kantian premises.

In his second sermon, Hegel turns his attention to the New Testament and the problem of reconciling the teachings of Jesus with the Kantian system of philosophy.



## Second Sermon

Jesus, as the second person of the Trinity, had come to represent, so Hegel believed, one further positivistic element in the Christian creed. The reinterpretation which he now proffers of the purpose and the mission of Jesus rests, paradoxically, upon the reinterpretation of the third person of the Trinity—the Holy Spirit.

Traditionally, Hegel claims, faith is something which has depended upon the knowledge and understanding of memorized catechisms and half-understood dogmas. Yet no advance in such knowledge or understanding has brought about any concomitant improvement in the manners and morals of mankind. Knowledge alone of the Good is insufficient to make men good. Rather what is required is what Hegel himself terms “faith.” Real faith, he claims, resides in a true understanding of the relationship of Jesus to God and in the works which this produces. True faith depends upon the “Father’s indwelling in Jesus.” Christ’s union with God rests upon his partaking of one spirit with God: Christ’s will and that of the Father are one and the same. As with Jesus, so with men. Because Jesus attained union with God via a reformation of his ( Jesus’) will, so man is also capable of attaining, through the example of Christ, a similar union with the divine. The true Christian must attain for himself a communion with the same spirit which animates Jesus; a communion which must be unimpeded either by blind obedience to established religious orthodoxy or by subservience to priestly dogmas.

In ascribing Jesus’ sonship to God to Jesus’ partaking in the spirit of the Father, Hegel is following Lessing once again. Lessing, in his *Christianity of Reason*, locates the sonship of Jesus in his union with the *will of God*. This union is manifest in the spirit of Jesus, which is the working of the Holy Spirit through him. In his rejection of miracles, signs, and blind faith, Hegel is seeking to cleanse the Christian message of all supernatural and positivistic elements. In its place he offers what he terms a “true understanding” of the faith. It is an understanding which issues in good works and a faith which finds communion with the divine in and through communion with the life of Jesus, and not merely through the worship of him.

In this second sermon, Hegel has broken with the traditional view of Christ as God on earth and has substituted an essentially “humanized” Christ whose noteworthiness stems not from his privileged nature but from his communion with the divine. It is a communion that is radically open, in which all men might partake if they are willing to reform their own inner dispositions. The way is now clear for Hegel to advance to a more radical and more explicitly Kantian interpretation of both the life of Jesus and the true nature of Christianity. This task he undertook in the third sermon.

### Third Sermon

The third sermon is in many respects a synthesis of the first two sermons. It is also the most openly Kantian of the sermons so far, and the fact that it was delivered within six weeks of the previous sermon is an indication of the rapid development in Hegel's thinking.

Hegel begins by considering the "true Kingdom of God," its nature and the means of our entry into it. This Kingdom, he asserts, is something *internal* and not *external* to man. It is neither a political nor a transcendental entity, and it was Christ who "opened up for us the way which leads to it."

For Hegel, the Kantian Kingdom is one which manifests itself on earth and is present in the affairs of men—yet it has its foundation in the noumenal world. Even so this Kingdom cannot be declared transcendental, for only the condition of the possibility of that Kingdom lies outside the world. Man as a free being has it within his power to enter therein or not by an act of his will. Neither can the Kantian Kingdom be declared political, for it is not dependent on any particular polity for its realization. Hegel, like so many other of his contemporaries at the *Stift*, certainly considered the new Republicanism of the French Revolution to offer the most likely possibility for the realization of such a Kantian Kingdom on earth, though by 1793 his enthusiasm for the Revolution was probably waning. The earthly realization of the Kantian Kingdom of Ends depended, as Hegel recognized, upon the reformation of mankind on an individual basis, a reformation that is political only insofar as it is first moral. Hegel makes reference to the "visible church" and, by association, to the "invisible church" of true believers who will usher in the dawn of Kant's Kingdom of Ends. He goes on to castigate those who place their faith in "outward ceremonies" and the "letter" of the law rather than placing it in the spirit of Jesus' teaching.

Hegel certainly does not bother to hide his scorn for those who look to this world and its pleasures. Insofar as he was challenging this corrupt nature of the world, Hegel probably did not offend his tutors. Whether they recognized the covert political criticism contained within his references is a question we cannot now answer. In his call for the "putting-off of the old" and the "putting-on of the new," Hegel goes beyond a mere call for the rejuvenation of public morals: he challenges the whole political order under which he lives, and he castigates his orthodox teachers for failing to live in accordance with the message they preached.

The sermon continues with a reaffirmation of freedom from the Mosaic law which Christ brought and an exhortation to continue the struggle against the love of self, the lusts, and the appetites which beset mankind.

The sermon is concluded with lines from the Württemberg Hymnal that reflect the theme of the address. Hegel unambiguously places the stress in

these lines upon the need for both individual and collective reformation of the human soul. This reformation was to be achieved by a necessary second Protestant reformation along Kantian lines. The first two sermons established the basic framework for such a reformation and enabled Hegel to introduce in this third sermon the idea of a Christianity of the "spirit" which was to form the basis of his endeavor two years later to recast Christianity in a Kantian mold in his essay *The Life of Jesus*.

#### Fourth Sermon

This final sermon reflects the one which preceded it in many respects. Its content is less overtly political, however, and its tone less strident. Hegel confines himself to reemphasizing the need for union with God's "spirit" and to providing concrete examples of the way that "spirit" can serve as a practical guide in daily life. Into the theme of "forbearance" Hegel introduces the qualities of forgiveness, tolerance, and altruism as the true means of expressing the Christian life. Yet this forgiveness is conjoined with a strong emphasis on the "ethical life" and a tolerance that does not extend—Hegel is at pains to point out—to the surrender of all one's rights and property to the multitude.

This final sermon is the most optimistic and utopian of the four, constituting as it does Hegel's first attempt to provide a "practical" outline of his new perspective on Christianity. It cannot be said to constitute a manifesto, though it should be remembered that Hegel was about to leave the *Stift* and in all probability be obliged, whether he wished it or not, to enter the Lutheran ministry. It is thus not surprising that Hegel should have concerned himself toward the end of his residence at the *Stift* with the more practical aspects of his hitherto primarily theoretical studies.

It has been suggested that the four sermons comprise a unity insofar as they represent a discernible development in Hegel's thinking. The first sermon constitutes a wrestling with the Old Testament and the place of the Mosaic law within Christian ethics. The second sermon concerns itself with the New Testament and the problem posed by the deification of Jesus, and it attempts the first stage of a demythologizing of his role and significance within Christian belief. The third sermon continues this movement and places emphasis upon the nature of the kingdom which Jesus had come to proclaim and the pathway leading to it. In invoking the idea of a "spirit" of Christianity that is manifested in the life and teaching of Christ and in the translation of the Holy Spirit into an ethical disposition, Hegel succeeds in producing a synthesis of Kantianism with a reformed Christianity. The final sermon represents an exposition in "practical" terms of the demands made upon mankind by this second reformation of the Christian religion. This is

not to claim, however, that Hegel was following a predetermined path or plan and worked out each stage in succession. Rather, he is taking the first tentative move toward a form of Christianity which, in the light of the radical Kantian philosophy and the revolutionary politics of his day, he could publicly uphold and defend. The sermons are couched in terms which, if they cannot be said to offer a direct challenge to the prevailing orthodoxy of the *Stift*, at least cannot be dismissed as the mere first tentative steps of a student in his chosen career. Even though we may be reading into them a significance which is apparent only in light of Hegel's later development, it is significant that Hegel chose to preserve these writings from his time at Tübingen and did not discard them, as he most certainly did so many other papers from this period.

\* \* \*

### Sermon on Isaiah 61:7–8 (January 10, 1792)

For your shame ye shall have double; and for confusion they shall rejoice in their portion: therefore in their land they shall possess the double: everlasting joy shall be unto them. For I the LORD love judgment. I hate robbery for burnt offering; and I will direct their work in truth, and I will make an everlasting covenant with them.

*Isaiah 61:7–8*

Nothing is more consoling or more encouraging for our hearts than to occupy ourselves with reflection on the great attributes of God. They arouse our highest admiration, fill us with humility, and incite us to worship the greatness of the Creator. Such meditation, moreover, brings with it the most powerful motives for the joyful performance of our duties—because an infringement of these is at the same time an insult to our great Benefactor and an ingratitude toward Him. Finally, such meditation strengthens our fortitude in suffering and teaches us to bear it patiently—for we know that it is God who ordains it, and that all our destiny is in the hands of Him who intends our highest good.

In following my text, I shall speak of God's justice: (1) in its aspect of punitive, and (2) in its aspect of remunerative justice.

1. God, our Creator, has written into our soul an indelible Law, which is intended to be the fixed standard of our actions independently of our

sensual nature and of our circumstances. He has associated this Law with a feeling which rewards good and dutiful actions with contentment—but which becomes uneasy and disquieting in the case of actions of the contrary kind. This voice of conscience, on our behalf, acknowledges the deserved penalty when we infringe this Holy Law; it plunges us into fear of the ill consequences which never fail to follow, or else—supposing that we have nothing to fear from these—makes it unavoidable that we despise ourselves in our own eyes.

Besides this revelation which God has imparted to every man, God has proclaimed His will even more definitely and distinctly in various other ways. That voice of conscience often needs more forceful inducements if it is to become stronger and more developed in men. Already when men are in a state of nature, sensuality is so strongly predominant and so much more developed in them that they give little heed to the voice of reason and allow it no scope for development. How much the more is it with us, if from youth onward we become habituated to such manifold requirements; if so much that demands great effort for its acquisition and often at the great cost of trespassing on the rights of other men, becomes, in our eyes, indispensable for life! Then indeed, against this reinforced might of sensuality which has early planted itself in the soul, the inner feeling for right and wrong offers little resistance unless some other mightier dam is raised to stem the current of sensuality; and this is the legislation revealed to us by God which He has made known to us partly in the Old Testament and much more purely in His Son. —This Ordinance agrees in the most minute detail with that which our conscience tells us; and we are so strongly bound to that legislation that we feel ourselves unconditionally obliged to observe it—or else appear contemptible to ourselves, being convinced that we have deserved also the contempt of other men and God's displeasure and the forfeiture of our happiness. —But at the same time this legislation is so articulated that only by obedience to it shall the general well-being both of the human race and of each individual be most surely attained; only in the best possible observance of these divine laws can every man's wish to be happy, both here and later in that other world, be fulfilled: just as, on the other hand, he who strays away from the will of the Creator and from the noblest impulses of his own heart must expect the greatest measure of unhappiness. God, in accordance with His holiness and justice, has so instituted our nature and the disposition of all beings outside us that punishment follows upon transgression. Both on account of what it is and as a consequence of that divine institution, immorality must punish itself. We are bound to this earth by so many bonds, and so various are the modes of enjoyment which lie in wait for the senses, that when men let

themselves be too tightly bound by these bonds, when they inordinately abandon themselves to those enjoyments, they are destroying their own machines and making themselves inapt and ineligible for other and nobler pleasures; they are inviting into the body such enfeeblement and pain as will depress yet further the already distempered mind. For their minds are tortured by remorse and discontent, holding up to them only the image of their worthlessness, vexing them with the reminder that they have brought this agony on themselves and have not merely allowed the time which was given to them for better employment to pass them by without profit, but have spent it to their own injury. Other sins degrade them no less, causing them to lose the love and esteem of other human beings, depriving them of God's favor and blessing. These unhappy consequences are augmented by yet others. The vicious man, to be sure, often shares with the man who had good intentions in his efforts the ill success of his labors, and enterprises, but he lacks the latter's compensations for fruitless toil; indeed, besides his chagrin at seeing all his endeavors frustrated, he has the fear of undergoing punishment in the future.

Finally, to those who in spite of so many and various exhortations to goodness did not walk on the path which He prescribed for us, God had threatened more particular penalties, which He in His truthfulness will certainly one day exact. And God's actions are all the more just because He never stinted occasions nor encouragements for bringing men to goodness; for He published these warnings in advance, so that every man knows what destiny will overtake him: so that the excuse can never be made that the sinner knew nothing of the Law nor of the penalties which are its sanction.

So severe, however, as God appears when He has cause to punish, so brightly on the other hand shines

2. his rewarding justice, which proclaims itself as both inexhaustible and infinitely great. God repays us not according to our sins but according to His great mercy. The faithful performance of duty, though it be here and there imperfect, God rewards in this life with temporal felicity; the death of His Son has freed us from that fear of punishment to which every man was always subject because we have sinned. Now therefore joy and satisfaction can enter the heart of every man who fears God and, trusting in Him and His help, strives to do what is right. In all his undertakings, because he makes use of righteous means to his ends, such a man is accompanied by a happy success and blessing. Or, should he meet ill success, yet he is persuaded that his ends did not harmonize with the plan of Providence and that therefore it was more advantageous for him in particular that they remained unfulfilled. His serene conscience

permits him to participate in his pleasurable avocations, and sweetens his enjoyment of them. The last change, death, at which all men shudder, is to him only a passage to a further manifestation of the perfections of the Creation and the greatness of the Creator: a transition to the further development of his faculties, and to greater joy.

### Sermon on the Feast of St. Philip and St. James (May 1, 1793)

[“Philip saith unto him, Lord, shew us the Father, and it sufficeth us. Jesus saith unto him, have I been so long time with you, and yet hast thou not known me, Philip? He that hath seen me hath seen the Father; and how sayest thou then, shew us the Father?”] John 14:8–9

[“For as the body without the spirit is dead, so faith without work is dead also.”] James 2:26

For a true faith and for a perfect virtue, insofar as this is possible for men, long practice is necessary; the corrupt heart of man—the strength of sensuality. —An example in those apostles whose memory we celebrate today; they had enjoyed Jesus’ teaching into the third year, and yet they were capable of asking him questions which any one of us would have been able to answer for himself. The extraordinary nature of the incident: they saw him acting like an ordinary man; he dealt with them as with people like himself, though they saw that God supported him in a special way; they divined nothing of his future glory. —But they had not yet witnessed his Resurrection, the keystone of Christian belief. Although we know more of the person of Christ than the apostles knew when they conversed with him, nevertheless we must not suppose that if our memory contained more knowledge, our faith would be firmer, better, more lively; true faith must rest upon the Father’s indwelling in Jesus, —and then we shall discern the genuine fruit of faith.

What character the true faith must have: (1) to be founded on the conviction that Christ was the true Son of God; (2) to understand the nature of true faith in the light of the works which it produces.

Thou hast placed us, O God, in the situation that we are brought up from youth onward in Thy saving religion, so that we learn in our youth that Jesus is Thy only-begotten Son, whom Thou sent into the world to guide us along the way which leads to eternal life. —Grant that this knowledge may become a living faith within us, that it may become

rich in good fruit; lend us Thy Spirit, O God, that it may bring us into all truth and all goodness. Amen.

1. Why are we called Christians? —Not because we know that Christ is the founder of our religion, but because:
  - a. it is already a part of the true knowledge of God to see Christ in this way—this great institution and benefaction for mankind. —The greater the manifestation of His goodness, so much the greater our gratitude, the greater our love, the closer our association with Him. But *Christ* was the first to open up this access: Ephesians 2:18. [“For through him we both have access by one Spirit unto the Father.”]
  - b. *The demands made on us to regard Christ as such* [an access]. He must have known best whence he came—who He was who sent him, what commissions for man God gave him; our trust is in his assurances.
  - c. and not only assurances but (i) also his works [John] 15:24. [“If I had not done among them the works which no other man did, they had not had sin: but now have they seen and hated both me and my Father”]; and (ii) *the Father’s testimonies*—at his birth, his baptism, and also after [John] 12:28. [“Father glorify Thy name. Then came there a voice from heaven, saying, I have both glorified it, and will glorify it again”]; the greatest testimony: his awakening from the dead—the power of the Father—and finally his Ascension.
2. This faith is not merely a concern of the understanding:
  - a. but not a *superstitious belief in miracles*, as even now there are people who have been given occasion to so suppose by passages in the Gospel. —A misunderstanding—it concerns only the Apostles and the first age of Christianity, when there was need of extraordinary dispensations for the spread of the Christian religion. Our passage concerns the Apostles only, as also does Matthew 17:19–20. [“Then came the disciples to Jesus apart, and said, Why could not we cast him out? And Jesus said unto them, Because of your beliefs: for verily I say unto you, If ye have faith as a grain of mustard seed, ye shall say unto this mountain, Remove hence to yonder place; and it shall remove; and nothing shall be impossible unto you.”] —But even in the age of the Apostles such miraculous gifts were not always proofs of true belief: Matthew 7:22. [“Many will say to me in that day, Lord, Lord, have we not prophesied in Thy name? and in Thy name done many wonderful works?”] We are so addicted to



- confining ourselves to what is external—like the Jew we demand signs and wonders—and do not penetrate to the spirit, the power.
- b. What are fruits of faith? In their works etc.: Not praying or fasting—the Pharisee in Matthew 6:1–2 [“Take heed that ye do not your alms before men, to be seen of them: otherwise ye have no reward of your Father which is in heaven. Therefore when thou doest thine alms, do not sound a trumpet before thee, as the hypocrites do in the synagogues and in the streets, that they may have glory in men. Verily, I say unto you, They have their reward.”] The *intention* of doing good—not praying in order to boast, Matthew 6:5. [“And when thou prayest, thou shalt not be as the hypocrites are: for they love to pray standing in the synagogues and in the corners of the streets, that they may be seen of men.”] Altogether nothing external. God looks into the heart. —The widow who cast a farthing into the treasury. —If we *think* that we are rendering a service to God by glorifying Him, —He remains as He is. It is easier to tame our appetites, our beloved inclinations, the evil desires of our heart. —Corrupt human nature—the flesh lusteth against the spirit. —The spirit is weak. —The commandment of love.
- c. If we make an effort, God comes to the aid of our weakness: He supports us with His Spirit, which will abide with us that we may be one with Him as Christ is one with Him, —that we may become perfect, as Christ was perfect. —Friendship, freedom, sonship to God.

## Sermon on Matthew 5:1–16 (June 16, 1793 The Second Sunday after Trinity)

[“And seeing the multitude, he went up into a mountain: and when he was sat, his disciples came unto him: And he opened his mouth and taught them, saying: Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of Heaven. Blessed are they that mourn: for they shall be comforted. Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth. Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall be filled. Blessed are the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy. Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God. Blessed are ye, when men shall revile you, and persecute you, and shall say all manner of evil against you falsely, for my sake. Rejoice, and be exceeding glad: for great is your reward in heaven: for so persecuted they the prophets which were before you. Ye are the salt of the earth: but if the

salt have lost its savor, wherewith shall it be salted? It is henceforth good for nothing, but to be cast out, and to be trodden underfoot of men. Ye are the light of the world. A city that is set on a hill cannot be hid. Neither do men light a candle, and put it under a bushel, but on a candlestick: and it giveth light unto all that are in the house. Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father which is in heaven.”] Matthew 5:1–16

Our text is taken from the Sermon on the Mount, that sum of duties which Christ demands of his true disciples; in it he describes in full the spirit by which a true fellow-citizen of God’s Kingdom must be animated. —Elsewhere also most of the teaching of Jesus—the many beautiful parables which the Gospel has preserved for us—have the purpose of preparing his disciples, and us, for the true concept of God’s Kingdom, and of training and forming us to become citizens of that Kingdom. Let us now speak of the Kingdom of God and show: (1) that it is something not external but internal; (2) that Christ has opened up for us the way which leads to it.

But Thou, only begotten Son of the Heavenly Father—whom the power of God has raised to be Lord over all, to be Ruler and King of this spiritual, this heavenly Kingdom—and Thou, Spirit of the Son, pitch Thy dwelling in our hearts, that we may learn to despise what is earthly and become children of God, heirs of light—hear and receive our daily petition that Thy Kingdom may come to us also, and that Thy Will may be done on earth as it is done by Thy saints in Heaven. Amen.

1. Jesus came into the world in order to call sinners to repentance, to announce to them that the Kingdom of God was at hand—he comes into the world to win for us entry thereinto—and to teach the way by which we must become worthy citizens of this Kingdom.
  - a. This Kingdom is not a temporal state—as was hoped by his disciples and contemporaries. —But on the contrary his whole doctrine is contained in his form as a servant; he stripped himself of the power with which he could have instituted a Kingdom, and he announced in clear terms before Pilate: My Kingdom is not of this world; What is deemed great in this is not so in God’s Kingdom.
  - b. Nor is it the visible Church. —We are all Christians. —The Christian religion is spread widely over the earth; today in all the pulpits half-round the world Christ’s teaching is proclaimed, his name everywhere exalted. —Before his majesty knees are bowed worship is paid to him. —Is this the Kingdom of God? Do

we become citizens of God's Kingdom through our fellowship with this Church? Is it enough that we make an outward confession, are baptized in his name, say Lord! Lord!, attend his Last Supper?

- c. God's Kingdom does not manifest itself in outward ceremonies—nor the worship of God in external religious services (Luke 17:20–21): [“The Kingdom of God cometh not with observation. Neither shall they say, Lo here! or Lo there!”]. —Baptism, participation in Holy Communion, oral confession: these do not make us children of God. The spirit of Christ must dwell within us; it is this that must teach us how to pray to God. —The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life; we must be born again through God's grace John 3:3; 1 Peter 1:22–23: Putting-off the old man and putting-on the new. Ephesians 4:22–24. The putting-on of Christ. Romans 13:14. If so, we are born of God and have become new men, i.e. if we are dead to sins—and have mastered our sensuality, if our hearts are made better by love of God and Christ, so that we willingly and gladly fulfill His commandments, then we are citizens of His Kingdom, then has the Kingdom of God come into us, then also we are certain of our future blessedness.

This Spirit of God brings it about that we are poor in spirit and humble, —peaceable, cheerful in suffering—for He gives us the sure hope that we shall be comforted in the future—that we are called God's children and shall see God.

- 2. a. That it is difficult—should any think it easy, —either mere ignorance and insouciance in the recognition of our duties and of what is required for perfection—or, very often, complacency or pride; such will not recognize the innate corruption of the human heart nor the might of the world with its pleasures—its customs and favorite inclinations. —Too strong a bent for the treasures of this earth—Matthew 19:24. [“It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God.”]
- b. Difficult though it is, yet God gives encouragement, Matthew 19:26: [“With men this is impossible, but with God all things are possible.”] —If sin is mighty, God's grace is yet mightier. —God expects from men no more than they can bear. —He has opened up for us in Christ a spring of salvation and of blessedness. —Christ has freed us from servitude to the Mosaic Law, so that we may now expect from God not punishment but help and salvation. —But we are still in the service of sin—and in the superstitious service of words. —Nor can we make ourselves free of it except by a firm faith in God's grace and promises and in the merit of a . . . <sup>2</sup>

This confidence, this faith which is supported by the Spirit of God; But men must not be idle. They must never weary in their struggle against their self-love, their lusts, their appetites; only then can that true faith be born which is fruitful in good works, a faith which renders man peaceable-humble, merciful, cheerful in suffering. —When we have such a faith, we are children of light, i.e. we hate the works of darkness, of evil which has to hide itself; we love truth, which can show itself openly and freely in the eyes of men. —Then we are sons of God; i.e. we have a childlike trust in Him. As a child expects good gifts from his father, so we hope—and also receive—everything that is good from Him—so God’s Spirit dwells in us, so we are citizens of God’s Kingdom, i.e. citizens, fellow-citizens, of that realm where God, as highest Lawgiver and Ruler, is worshiped by us in spirit and in truth—not by shouting Lord! Lord! but by imitating Him according to our human weakness—by rendering to Him that most acceptable worship of God which is being good and righteous. —Then are we also inheritors of His blessedness—which He has prepared for all those who quit the broad highway of vice and enter into His Kingdom by the narrow and contested gate of Christian virtue, and who in Heaven shall be well recompensed.

How blest the man who, born of Thee  
 Receives from Thee a heart new-wrought;  
 Elected Thine alone to be,  
 He’ll sin no more in deed or thought.  
 How joyful is his life who can  
 Be called Thy chattel and Thy child,  
 The veritable<sup>3</sup> Christian!

[*Württembergisches Gesangbuch*, p. 263]

### Sermon on Forbearance (September 1793)

One of the most eminent merits of the Christian religion, and one of its most important benefactions, is that it has taught us to recognize true virtues and to learn to distinguish them from false ones. All the resounding virtues with which men often dazzle others, and often cheat themselves and their own consciences, lose their speciousness as soon as they are seen to flow from a source which is not the right one, not having the love of God and the love of their fellowman as their motive. Only he who acts from these motives is to be called a true Christian; only he acts in the spirit of the teaching of Jesus. There are many virtues which

are easily practiced and readily attract attention, but what gives them a value in the eyes of God, and what often is the very hardest to fight for and win, is namely a total alteration and improvement of the heart. Such a state of mind, which has been purified from the passions of sensuality and is exclusively pervaded by love of God and His laws, and by love to all men: this alone is susceptible of that virtue which is to be the object of our further consideration. Now therefore, following the guiding thread of the Holy Gospel, I shall speak of *forbearance*, and (1) *of what nature this must be* if it is to be of the right kind, and (2) *that only then can we be firmly assured of pardon for our own sins, when we possess this virtue.*

May the God of love and peace fill our hearts with His Spirit, and make us ready and able to fulfill His commandment, which commands us to be long-suffering toward the faults of our fellowmen, to forgive our persecutors, and to love those that hate us! Amen.

Before we proceed to consider what character forbearance must have, let us first search out the springs from which *irreconcilability* arises. a) *Self-love*, which seduces us into so many errors and faults, has a prominent share also in this vice. We often see among men, often even among friends, that when one has offended another, though both might often be inclined to a reconciliation, yet in the end pride—self-love—will allow neither to take the first step; and that the originator of the injury, even if he feels himself to be in the wrong, finds it disagreeable to go to his brother and say to him: “I did you wrong. Forgive me.” Not seldom, however, we see that lower instincts—instincts more degrading to a human being—have some part in this mood of the soul; *vindictiveness, hatred and resentment* are often the factors which make us wholly disinclined to forgiveness and shut the heart against the voice of humanity, against the call of God.

Men who have bitterness and hatred in their hearts are as much to be pitied as those who have to do with them; they embitter other people's lives which ought to make a source of pleasure for themselves, they increase the suffering which they ought to alleviate and to help one another to bear, and they make themselves incapable of enjoying with gratitude and contentment even those good things which God permits to accrue to them. Because inner peace does not dwell in their hearts, they are also averse to doing good to others. Benefits bestowed on them by other men, bestowed on them by God, no longer make much impression on them or move them to kindness and consideration toward other men. Such an instance of hardness of heart is given to us in today's Gospel,<sup>4</sup> in which Christ shows us a king, who, being touched by the misery which he would cause by strictness, forgave one of his servants a very considerable debt more than the latter could ever have expected from him; he might as

well have hoped from his master's goodness that he would remit a part of the debt or have patience with him for a time until he had put himself in a position to be able to discharge the debt without incurring the ruin of his domestic affairs. —But this good fortune, instead of making him milder and more considerate, produces rather the effect of making him harder and less merciful. For immediately after this incident he meets one of his fellow-servants who owed him a small sum, small especially by comparison with the one which his master had forgiven him a short time before; he demands this sum with the extremest severity and thereby plunges the man and the family into misfortune; his other fellow-servants, indignant at such iniquity, reported the incident to the master, who thereupon punished the man according to his deeds. —Let us now *apply this example to ourselves* and see whether we too do not often find ourselves in a similar case. Every man will acknowledge that he commits wrongs for which he requires the forgiveness of others; only pride and vanity can persuade him of the contrary. But if he wishes others not to proceed against him with severity, he too must be lenient and considerate to others; he must bear their shortcomings with love, gladly pardoning them for their offenses. He will be yet more convinced that he does not need to be harsh and merciless to others, however, if he reflects how patient and long-suffering God has been in his own case. If we deal honestly with ourselves, our conscience will soon certify to us that we are not worthy of God's manifold mercies and that therefore, by being incapable, we act against both his law and, as has been manifested to ourselves, His example, the imitation of which ought to be our supreme endeavor and our greatest pride. An intransigent frame of mind is the clear contrary of the *Spirit* with which *true Christianity* fills us; it is the opposite of that conduct of life in which, according to the express pronouncement of Jesus, his true disciples are to be trained: Love one another, he says to them; by this shall all men know that ye are my disciples.<sup>5</sup> —It is such a Christian love alone that makes us capable of forgiving our enemies from our hearts. When therefore *men do us wrong*, when they injure our honor or whatever else we hold precious, this Christian love enjoins us not to requite those offenses with offenses, even though we were in a position to avenge ourselves and inflict as much injury upon them as they inflicted on us; the Christian suppresses the appetite for revenge, which is "sweet" only to uncultivated men. But if such forgiveness is to be perfect, it is also requisite that we do not afterward retain in our hearts any resentment against the offender, so that even if we cannot love them we nevertheless do not hate them but rather bestow on them our compassion. Besides open revenge, the retaliation of evil for evil, there is also a more secret kind of revenge which is less dangerous for him who

practices it but often more wounding for the man against whom it is put into practice: I mean *backbiting* and *slander*. Such a slanderer often gives himself the appearance of magnanimity; he says that he will not pay back what the other did to him, but at the same time he perfidiously destroys the other's good name, often injuring him thereby more than a real revenge. Of such a proceeding, however, only mean and cowardly souls are capable; they are despised by a man who takes forgiveness seriously and, by contrast, does good to his enemy, not withholding his pity and his help even when he sees him in misfortune. —He is far from making the wretched man who once wronged him feel now that it is in the power of the other injured party to repay like with like. He is equally far removed from *another false virtue* which often assumes the semblance of generosity and forbearance: I mean when one *forgives* one's enemy but at the same time *hopes* and *wishes* that things may of their own accord turn out ill for him in the future, thus misapplying that expression in Holy Scripture of "casting one's burden on the Lord": then, if a misfortune actually befalls the man, one taunts him with "you have deserved it, for you once did it to me." Malice of that kind does not dwell in a heart purified by the love of God, which rather abhors the *actions* of wickedness while at the same time feeling compassionate with regard to other men's *failings* and *weaknesses* which causes no personal disadvantage to himself. These he does indeed strive to amend and to guide toward the Good, but rather by his example than by useless admonitions; he is cautious about passing judgment, for he is conscious that human beings are too shortsighted to see through the hearts of others that the omniscience of the Creator would be needed to assess actions in the light of their true inner worth, and that to Him alone are known all the motives from which an action flows, and the powers which are granted to men, and the circumstances which exert a formidable influence on even the most tested souls. Those evil motives, moreover, which we impute to the actions of others flow not seldom from our own corrupt heart, which is aware of having acted in similar cases with no better intentions. Anyone who is truly concerned for the Good will not content himself with looking for faults in other men and raising a hue and cry about them; on the contrary he searches in his own bosom, confesses his own faults to himself and tries to correct them, suffers the follies of others and *never* wearies of forgiving them. It is not enough to fancy one has done great things by once or twice overlooking some encroachment of the offender but then, should the injustice be frequently repeated, waxing indignant. When Peter asked his Master whether it was enough if he forgave his enemies 7 times, Jesus answered him: not 7 times only but unto 77 times shalt thou forgive him:<sup>6</sup>

thy forbearance, thy love of men, shall not be exhausted by injuries oft repeated.

But, it might be thought, does not the Christian religion require me then to let my fortune or my honor be invaded by others? Must I suffer myself to be plunged into destitution and want without undertaking—any action to prevent it, and offer not even the slightest resistance to the insolence and injustice which robs me of what is mine? Then Christianity makes too severe demands on us. —It would be a misapprehension of Christ's meaning if one supposed that this is what Jesus requires. On the contrary, we ought to protect it from unjust claims. But if what is ours has been torn away from us, Christian love requires us to go no farther in the prosecution of our rights than the recovery of that precise amount of which we were deprived; and in so doing we must refrain from any kind of revenge.

Yet, although the Gospel inculcates *indulgence toward the faults of others*, we are to be *all the less indulgent toward ourselves*. It might easily occur to someone to suppose that, because he has been considerate to others by overlooking their faults, it is reasonable to hope that others will likewise extend forbearance to ourselves. Such slackness would be directly contrary to the endeavor to become continually more perfect and to advance ever farther in goodness. —But least of all can such a compact of mutual indulgence be made with God; the true Christian must be severe with himself but patient with others.

The sublimest model of such forbearance, that of a heart entirely free from resentment and bitterness toward its persecutors and filled only with pity and love for them, is *set up before us by Christ in his own person*. Sent to the world to teach his fellowmen the truth, to proclaim to them salvation and eternal blessedness, he is rejected by them and requited by ingratitude. —Fruitless though his exertions are in respect of the great multitude, he is not weary of forgiving them for all their offenses against him. As he journeyed toward his Passion in Jerusalem and saw that the city sunk in perdition before him, there came into his mind not what he had suffered there and must yet suffer; no, an innermost feeling of compassion causes him to shed tears, not such as impotent rage might weep, but tears of grief. With profoundest sadness he predicts the misery which will befall the city—without wishing it upon the city and without the least pleasure in its calamities such as many would feel it if they could foretell with certainty that their enemy would one day fall upon misfortune.

When Peter considered himself strong enough to demonstrate his devotion to Jesus even while suffering and unto death, his Master predicted to him, with love, that he would shortly deny his Lord three times;



subsequently, when Peter himself felt that he was unworthy of his Master, Jesus does not withdraw from him his love and trust, does not repel him as many a man would have done a friend who deserted him in his need, but has compassion for him and for the weakness of human nature.

Finally, Jesus gave the most sublime example of love for his persecutors when he was mocked, smitten and then nailed to the cross. —He surveys the whole crowd of his murderers, their coarse rage and spiteful glee over their victory; but this spectacle brings no enmity into his heart. In the hour of his death, when often a man drops for the first time the mask by which he has deceived others throughout his whole life, he displays the same serenity. Amid the most terrible torments that his enemies had devised for him, penetrated by compassion, he begs his heavenly father: "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." Let us not, my friends, allow this great example to be set up before us for our emulation in vain. By unremitting vigilance over the stirrings of our heart's evil tendencies, let us strive to attain that high degree of love and forgiveness which Jesus has exemplified with supreme purity, so that neither self-love and pride nor base vengeance may make us unwilling to forgive, and so that our hearts may be filled with only benevolence and joy in the happiness of mankind.

It remains for me to indicate, very briefly, that only by sincere forbearance can we be assured of God's pardon for our sins. When John the Baptist appeared among men, he summoned them to do penance and abandon sin. —Jesus gave us a new commandment; he taught man that it does not signify much to avoid conspicuous sin, to prevent crude outbursts of passions; he required rather, in order to be well-pleasing to God, a heart entirely pure and filled with love. He gave us a new commandment, the commandment of love which Paul, in the spirit of Christ, describes in I Corinthians 13. Only on such a love can the true faith be founded, a faith which in all vicissitudes relies with childlike trust on God, expects all happiness from His goodness, and bears misfortune with patience because it is encouraged by the thought that this too comes from the Father's hand and will work out for the best. It is not the faith which confesses Jesus with the lips without showing the true fruits of faith, but only that which springs from a love of Jesus, that can become capable of the benefits which God makes available to the human race through Christ. With this faith and this love is intimately bound up *forbearance*, which is the true distinguishing sign of the right faith. How can love of God exist with hate and cruelty to men? In a heart that is full of thoughts of God, and of reverence for the most exalted Being, no room can be reserved for low passions, for malice, for hardness of heart. A man with

such a heart regards all men as sons of one Father, loves them as his brothers, is ready to show understanding for their weaknesses and to forgive their shortcomings; he can then be assured that Jesus will not leave unfulfilled that promise which he has imprinted on such forgiveness: "For if ye forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you."<sup>7</sup> Only then can we hope that God will harken to our daily petition in the Lord's Prayer: "Forgive us our debts as we forgive our debtors." Here we ourselves pronounce the verdict of our condemnation, insofar as we ourselves ask God to remit our debts but at the same time promise thereby that we on our part will practice love toward our neighbors. My friends, let us walk in this God-given spirit; let us follow the behest and example of Christ in order that we too may have hope of partaking in that blessedness which he has won for us by his suffering and his death; that we may enter into the mansion of peace where there shall be no more injustice or injury for us to forgive—but where also so much will need to have been forgiven us, ere we enter, by God.

By kindness, not by vengeful strife,  
Shalt thou o'ercome thy foe.  
Hatred would banish from thy life  
The joy that Christians know.  
Forgiving, thou shalt pardoned be,  
Vengeance is God's 'tis not for thee.

Lord, I obey Thee. I forgive  
Nor seek another's pain.  
In patient hope my soul shall live  
To see Thy justice reign.  
Oh may Thy grace on us down flow  
Till hearts of grace are ours below!

[*Württembergisches Gesangbuch*, p. 436]

## Notes

1. I am indebted to Professor H. S. Harris for the connection to Stoicism. His suggestion of an attempt by Hegel to combine Stoic and Kantian doctrines of virtue is worthy of more detailed consideration than can be given in the space available here.

2. The letters "ei" are followed by a dash. Hegel frequently failed to finish words in the manuscript.

3. Hegel added the word "veritable" himself.

4. The Holy Gospel referred to is probably Matthew 18:22–35, not that of Luke where the same parable is recounted (7:41–42).

5. John 13:35.

6. Cf. Matthew 18:22.

7. Matthew 6:14.

# The Tübingen Essay

Translated by H. S. Harris

Religion is one of the most important concerns of our life—already as infants we were taught to lisp our prayers to the divinity, shown how to place our hands together in order to raise them to the Supreme Being, and had our memories burdened with a heap of then still-unintelligible formulas intended for our future use and comfort in life.

As we grow older, the business of religion occupies a great part of our life, indeed for many the whole cycle of their thoughts and inclinations turns on it—even as the outer rim of a wheel turns on the hub. —Apart from other feast days in between, we devote the first day of every week to it, and from our youth up that day shines with a more beautiful, more festal light than all the others. We see among us a special class of men, who are called exclusively to the service of religion; a religious element is mingled in all the more important events and activities of the life of man, those on which his personal happiness depends, such as birth, marriage, death and burial.\*

But then, when he is older, does man reflect upon the nature and attributes of this Being to which all his feelings are directed, and especially

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\* [*The following sentence was canceled by Hegel.*] The sick and the afflicted are supported by the comfort of religion, which sustains and enlivens their hope—how many still sentiments of thanks and compassion rise up to God—feelings that are known only to the soul who prays and to God.

upon the relation of the world to it? —Human nature is so constituted that the practical aspects of the doctrine of God, the aspects that can become mainsprings of action, sources of the knowledge of our duties, and sources of solace, quickly present themselves to the uncorrupted mind, and the instruction that we are given about this from youth up, the concepts, and all the external trappings pertaining to it which make such an impression on us, are of the sort that can be grafted on to a natural need of the human spirit—often immediately, but all too frequently alas, it is attached only by bonds rooted in arbitrariness, and not in the nature of the soul, or in truths engendered and developed from the concepts themselves.

*[Here there is a lacuna of four pages in the manuscript. The inner half of Hegel's first folded quarto sheet is missing.]*

. . . to set [the whole] of human life in motion. —The sublime demand that reason imposes on mankind, whose legitimacy we recognize with whole heart whenever our heart is filled with it, and the alluring descriptions of guiltless or wise men which a pure and beautiful fancy may produce—these must never overpower us so much that we begin hoping to find many such men in the actual world, or begin believing we can see and catch hold of this beauteous cloud picture as a solid reality here or somewhere else; dissatisfaction with what we do find, and ill-humor will less often cloud our minds. —Hence we shall not be shocked when we are obliged to admit that sensibility<sup>1</sup> is the principal factor in all the action and striving of men; how hard it is to decide whether mere prudence or actual morality is the determining ground of the will. If the satisfaction of the drive toward happiness is taken as the highest goal of life, then if one only knows how to calculate the means to it properly, the same pattern of action will result to all outward appearance, as if the law of reason were determining our will just as, on the one hand, pure morality must in the abstract be sharply distinguished from sensibility in a system of morals, since sensibility is placed far below it—even so, on the other hand, in dealing with human nature and human life in general we must take particular account of man's sensibility, his dependence on external and internal nature, upon his surroundings and the environment in which he lives, and upon sense impulses and blind instinct—the nature of man is, as it were, only pregnant with the ideas of reason—just as salt permeates a dish, and if it be well prepared, never reveals itself all in a lump, but spreads its savor through the whole, or as the light penetrates and fills all spaces and has its effect throughout the whole of nature; yet it cannot be conceived as a substance, and still it gives objects their shape and is reflected from each differently, and from the plants it evolves wholesome air, even so the ideas of reason enliven the whole web of his<sup>2</sup> feelings, even

so as a result of their influence his actions appear to him in a special light, they themselves<sup>3</sup> seldom reveal their essence, but still their operation penetrates everything like a subtle matter and gives a peculiar tinge to every inclination and impulse.

It is inherent in the concept of religion that it is not mere science of God, of His attributes, of our relation and the relation of the world to Him and of the enduring survival of our souls—all of this might be admitted by mere reason, or known to us in some other way, but religion is not a merely historical or rational knowledge, it is a concern of the heart, it has an influence on our feelings and on the determination of our will, partly because our duties and the laws make a stronger impression on us when they are presented to us as the laws of God, and partly because the image of the sublimity and the goodness of God toward us fills our hearts with wonder and with a sense of humility and gratitude.

Thus religion gives to morality and its motive powers a new and a more exalted light, it furnishes a new and a more solid barrier against the might of the sensual impulses. For men whose experience is all at the level of sense, religion also is at that level—the religious motives to good action must be sensible in order that they may work upon the senses; because of this, of course, they generally lose some part of their proper worth as moral motives—but they have thereby taken on such a human aspect, they are so exactly adapted to our feelings that we are led on by our hearts and beguiled by the beauty of fancy, and we frequently and easily forget that a cool reason disapproves of picture images of this kind or even forbids saying anything about them.

Where we speak of public religion—we mean to include in it the concepts of God and immortality and all that goes with them, so far as they make up the conviction of a people, and so far as they influence the actions and mode of thought of that people, and further there belongs to it also the means whereby these ideas are, on the one hand, taught to the people and, on the other hand, enabled to penetrate their hearts—this operative aspect involves not merely the immediate consequence that I do not steal because God has forbidden it—the more distant consequences should be given special consideration, and have often to be accorded the most weight. These more distant consequences are, above all, the elevation, the ennobling of the spirit of a nation, the fact that the all-too-often slumbering sense of its dignity is awakened in the soul, that the people does not degrade itself or allow itself to be degraded, that it does not merely feel itself to be human, but also that gentler tints of humanity and goodness are brought into the picture.

The principal doctrines of the Christian religion have indeed remained the same since the beginning, but, according to the circum-

stances of the time, one doctrine would be pushed completely into the shadows while another was specially emphasized, and placed in the limelight, and distorted at the expense of the eclipsed doctrine, being either stretched too far or restricted too narrowly.

The whole mass of religious principles, and of feelings that spring from them, and particularly the degree to which they can influence how men act, is the main thing in a folk religion. Religious ideas can make but little impression upon an oppressed spirit which has lost its youthful vigor under the burden of its chains and is beginning to grow old.

The youthful genius of a people—in contrast with one that is growing old—the former senses itself and rejoices in its strength, it falls ravenously upon anything new and is most vitally concerned with it, but turns again perhaps and leaves it to seize on something else, but never can this be something that would put fetters on its own proud and free neck; the aging genius is marked out particularly by firm adherence to tradition in every respect, it gets its fetters from there like an old man with the gout, grumbling about it but unable ever to have done with it; it allows itself to be pushed around as its ruler wills, but it takes its pleasures only semiconsciously, not freely and openly, with the more serene and beautiful joy that invites the sympathy of others—its festivals are gossip times, like an old man it does not get beyond a quiet chat, no loud outcry, no full-blooded enjoyment.

### Exposition of the Distinction between Objective and Subjective Religion; the Importance of this Exposition in the Context of the Total Problem

Objective religion is *fides quae creditur*,<sup>4</sup> the understanding and the memory are the powers that are operative in it, they examine evidences, think it through and preserve it or, if you like, believe it. Practical evidences may also form part of objective religion, but then they are only an unemployed capital fund—objective religion suffers itself to be arranged in one's mind, organized into a system, set forth in a book, and expounded to others in discourse; subjective religion expresses itself only in feelings and actions—if I say of a man that he has religion, this does not mean that he has much knowledge about it, but rather that he feels in his heart the deeds, the miracles, the nearness of the Deity, his heart knows and sees God in its own nature, in the destinies of men, that he casts himself down before God, gives praise and thanks to him in his own deeds—that in his actions he does not merely consider whether some course is good or

prudent, but also the thought “It is pleasing to God” is a motive for him—and often his strongest motive; when he feels happy or when he has good fortune he looks also to God and gives Him thanks for it. —Subjective religion is alive, it is effective in the inwardness of our being, and active in our outward behavior. Subjective religion is something individual, objective religion is abstraction: the former is the living book of nature, plants, insects, birds and beasts, as they live with one another and upon one another, each living its life and getting its pleasure, all mixed together, so that one comes across all kinds everywhere—the latter is the cabinet of the naturalist wherein the insects have been killed, the plants dried, the animals stuffed or pickled, and the things that nature divided are put side by side, all organized for one single end where nature had interlaced an infinite variety of ends in a friendly bond.

The whole mass of religious evidences that go to make up objective religion may be the same for a great people, in principle they might be the same over the whole earth; it is interwoven in subjective religion, but makes up only a small and rather ineffective part of it; it takes a different form in every man—the most important point at issue in subjective religion is whether, and to what extent, the mind is disposed to let itself be controlled by religious motives—how far it is susceptible to religion; and further what kinds of images make a special impression on the heart—what kinds of feelings have been most cultivated and are most easily produced in the soul—the one man has no sense for the gentler images of love; motives derived from the love of God do not strike upon his heart; his organs of feeling, being coarser, are only stirred up by the arousing of fear, by thunder and lightning; the strings of his heart sound not at the gentle touch of love; other ears are deaf to the voice of duty; it is useless to draw their attention to conscience, to the inward judge of actions who has set up his court right in the heart of man—this voice never sounds in them; self-interest is the pendulum whose swinging keeps their machine going.

Upon this disposition, upon this receptivity depends the character that subjective religion takes on in each particular person. We are taught objective religion in the schools from our youth up; they stuff our memories with it quite early enough, so that often the still immature understanding, the fair and delicate plant of the free and open mind, is borne down by the burden, or just as roots work their way through a light soil, and are entwined in it and get their nourishment from it, but are turned aside by a stone and seek another path, so the burden laid on the memory remains lying there unbroken until the mature intellectual faculties either shake it right off or let it lie on one side and draw no nourishing sap from it.



Nature has buried in every man a seed of the finer feeling that springs from morality, it has placed in him a sense for what is moral, for ends that go beyond the range of mere sense; to see that this seed of beauty is not choked, that a real receptivity for moral ideas and feelings actually grows out of it, this is the task of education, of culture; religion is not the first thing that can put down roots in the mind, it must have a cultivated plot there before it can flourish.

Everything depends on subjective religion; it is this that has true and genuine worth—let the theologians contend about the dogmas, about all that belongs to objective religion, about the more precise interpretation of the propositions; a few fundamental propositions lie at the base of every religion; they are merely modified or deformed to a greater or lesser degree in the different religions, expressed more or less purely—they constitute the basis of all the faith and all the hopes that religion offers to us. When I speak of religion here, I abstract absolutely from all scientific or, more precisely, metaphysical knowledge of God, and of our relation to Him, or that of the whole world, etc. Evidence of this sort, with which only the discursive understanding is concerned, is theology, not religion any longer. I include here under religion only such knowledge of God and immortality as the need of practical reason demands, and all that stands in an easily perceived connection with it. Thus more precise deductions about special arrangements of God for the benefit of man are not excluded.

I am concerned with objective religion only in as much as it constitutes one factor in subjective religion.

It is not my object to investigate what religious doctrines are most appealing to the heart or most apt to elevate and give comfort to the soul—not how the doctrines of a religion should be constituted in order to make a people better and happier—but rather to inquire what institutions are requisite in order that the doctrines and the force of religion should enter into the web of human feelings, become associated with human impulses to action, and prove living and active in them—in order that religion should become wholly subjective; when it is subjective it does not manifest its presence merely in putting the hands together, bending the knees, and abasing the heart before that which is holy; rather it spreads out into every budding branch of human impulse (without the soul being even quite aware of it) and is everywhere active, though only indirectly—it is active *negatively*, so to speak, in the gay fulfillment of human joys or in the doing of high deeds and the exercise of the gentler virtues of benevolence; even if it does not operate directly here, still it has this subtler influence that at least it lets the soul express itself freely and openly and does not distort the longing of its activity—the expression of a human capacity, be it courage

or compassion, is like gaiety and enjoyment of life—it involves freedom from an evil disposition of the soul toward envy—and things of that sort, it involves innocence and a clear conscience, and religion helps to foster these two qualities.<sup>5</sup> In the same way, too, religion has an influence such that innocence when combined with it knows precisely how to recognize the point at which gaiety passes over into debauchery, and courage and resolution into aggression against the rights of others.\*

## Subjective Religion

If theology is a matter of the understanding and the memory—no matter where it originates from, even from religion itself—while religion is a matter of the heart, important on account of a requirement of practical reason, then it is self-evident that different psychological faculties are operative in religion and in theology, and that different mental preparation is required for each of them. In order to justify the hope that the supreme good, of which the realization of a constituent part is laid upon us as our duty, will be realized as a whole, practical reason requires faith in a Deity and in immortality.

This is at least the seed from which religion springs—and conscience, the inward sense of right and wrong and the feeling that punishment must attend upon wrongdoing and happiness upon righteousness, is analyzed into clear concepts in this deduction of religion only in its essential structure. Whether the idea of a mighty, but invisible Being was generated in the soul of man through some fearful natural phenomenon, whether God first revealed Himself to men in the tempest where everyone senses the near proximity of God, or in the gentle murmur of the evening breeze, the idea linked itself to that moral sense, which found it wholly concordant with its own requirement.

Religion becomes mere superstition if one derives one's determining grounds for action from it in situations where simple prudence ought to be one's guide, or if the fear of God causes one to do certain actions

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\* [*Here follows a canceled heading and two subheads:*]

How Religion acts

- a. What the mind must be like for religion to gain entry to it,
- b. How it acts when it gains entry.

through which one believes his displeasure can be averted. This is precisely the character of religion among many sense-oriented people. Their image of God and of His dealings with man is restricted to the fact that He acts according to the laws of human sensibility and only upon our sensible nature, and the moral element in this concept is very slight. But the *concept* of God and of devoting oneself to Him (worship) is already rather moralized, i.e. it points already more toward the consciousness of a higher order directed to ends greater than those that are determined by sense—and though indeed the superstition referred to above is mixed in with it, yet the feeling that everything depends on God's decisions goes along with questioning Him about the future, or calling upon Him to aid the success of an undertaking, and in general there lies at the root the faith that God allots happiness only to the just, and ordains unhappiness for the unjust and the overweening—or at least this faith has its place beside the faith in destiny, and natural necessity—wherever moral motives for action are derived from religion.

In good people subjective religion is very nearly the same, while their objective religion may be of almost any stripe—"What makes me to you a Christian, makes you to me a Jew," says Nathan<sup>6</sup>—for religion is a matter of the heart which often acts in a way inconsistent with the dogmas that are accepted in the understanding or the memory; the men most worthy of veneration are indeed not always those who have speculated most about religion, for all too often they transform their religion into theology, i.e. they often substitute frigid arguments and verbal exercises for the full and heartfelt experience of faith.

Religion gains very little from the understanding, whose operations, whose doubts, are on the contrary more apt to numb the heart than to warm it; and the man who has discovered that the ways in which other nations, the heathens as they are called, represent [their religious beliefs] contain much that is absurd, and for this reason congratulates himself heartily upon his own higher insights, his understanding which allows him to see further than\* the greatest men saw—that man does not know what religion is. The man who calls his Jehova "Jupiter" or "Brahma," and is a true worshiper of God, brings his thanks and his offering as childlike as the true Christian. Who is there that is not moved by the beautiful simplicity with which innocence is mindful of its greatest benefactor amid all the good things that nature supplies, and offers him

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\* [Here Hegel has deleted the word:] Theseus.

the best, the most spotless, the first fruits of corn and flock—who does not admire Coriolanus, who feared Nemesis at the height of his fortune, and besought the gods to humble him and not the spirit of Roman greatness, just as Gustavus Adolphus humbled himself before God at the Battle of Lützen.

Signs of this kind are for the heart and are to be appreciated by the heart in simplicity of spirit and of feeling, not coldly and critically evaluated by the understanding. —Only the self-conceit of a sect, which accounts itself wiser than all men of other parties, can let the guiltless last wish of Socrates to offer a cock to the god of health, his noble sense that he should thank the gods for his death, which he saw as a healing, go unappreciated, and produce the ugly comment that Tertullian makes about it in Chapter 46 of the *Apologeticum*.<sup>7</sup>

Where the heart does not speak louder than the understanding, as it did for the Friar in that scene from *Nathan* from which our earlier quotation was borrowed, where it remains closed, and leaves the understanding time to syllogize about an action—such a heart is not worth much, love does not dwell in it. Nowhere is the voice of the pure heart and of uncorrupted feeling more beautifully set against the righteousness of the understanding than in the story in the Gospel where Jesus accepted with love and goodwill the anointing of his body by a woman who had formerly lived a life of ill-repute, accepting it as the free outpouring of a beautiful soul pierced by repentance, faith, and love, and not allowing itself to be turned aside by the surrounding company, while some of his apostles were too cold-hearted to empathize with the depth of her womanly feeling, her beautiful offering of faith, and made marginal comments in which their coldness was bedecked with a pretended concern for charitable purposes. —What a cold and unnatural comment is the good Gellert's remark somewhere that a small child today knows more of God than the wisest pagan; just like Tertullian with his *deum quilibet opifex* in the *Apologeticum* chapter 46.<sup>8</sup> As if the compendium of morals that I have here on my bookshelf, which I may use, since I have it at hand, as the wrapping for a stinking cheese, had more worth than the perhaps sometimes unrighteous heart of a Frederick II; for the difference between Tertullian's craftsman or Gellert's child who has been imprinted with the catechism, stuffed with the theological sourdough, and the paper, on which the morality is printed, is on the whole not very great from this point of view—both of them lack precisely and almost to the same degree the consciousness that is acquired through experience.

[Here sheet d ends. The next sheet in the manuscript that we have is marked f. Thus sheet e, if there was one, is missing.]

## Enlightenment—the Intent to Work through Understanding

The understanding serves only objective religion. —To clarify the principles, to set them forth in their purity—it has brought forth noble fruits, Lessing's *Nathan*, and it deserves the eulogies which are continually offered in its honor.

But it is never through understanding that the principles are rendered practical.

The understanding is a courtier who adapts himself complaisantly to the caprices of his lord. It knows how to scare up justifying arguments for every passion, and every undertaking—it is especially a servant to self-love, which is always on the lookout for ways to set faults already committed or about to be committed in a good light, and often takes credit for the fact that it has thus found a good excuse for itself.

Enlightenment of the understanding makes us cleverer certainly, but not better. And if we reduce virtue to prudent cleverness, if we reckon it up that man cannot be happy without virtue, the reckoning is too cold and too hairsplitting to be effective in the moment of action or in general to have influence on our lives.

Anyone who picked up the best manual of morality, made himself conversant with the most exact definitions both of the general principles and of the particular duties and virtues, and then wanted to reflect on this heap of rules and exceptions at the moment of actual decision, would produce a tangled pattern of behavior which was in perpetual anxiety and inner conflict. Even the author of a moral manual would not expect to find a man who would either learn the book by heart, or consult his manual about everything he did or every impulse that he had to see whether it was ethical or whether it was permitted. And yet it is precisely this demand that one makes upon the reader of one's manual. No printed manual can bring it about that evil impulses should never arise at all, or that they should not develop to any great extent; no enlightenment of the understanding can achieve this—this negative effect—Campe's *Theophron*<sup>9</sup>—a man must act for himself, do his own work, make up his own mind, not let others act for him; for then he is no more than a piece of machinery.

When we speak of "enlightening a people" that presupposes that errors are prevalent among them, popular prejudices, errors in the matter of religion—and for the most part they are more or less of the character that they are based on sensibility, on the blindly irrational expectation that something will happen which has absolutely no connection with the cause which is supposed to bring it about as an effect; among a people that has many prejudices, the concept of cause seems mainly to be based

still on the concept of mere succession, for [not] infrequently too, when they speak of causes they leave out and fail to notice the intervening links in the chain of causal succession. —Sense and fancy are the source of prejudice, and even right opinions are prejudices in the popular mind if they are held prior to investigation by the understanding, inasmuch as people can only have faith in them since they do not have any cognitive grounds for them.

Thus prejudices can be of two kinds:

a. actual errors,

b. beliefs which are actually true, but which are not grasped as truths, not known by reason simply but recognized by faith and taken on trust—and in this case no greater benefit comes to pass on the subjective side. —Since we are not here discussing prejudices of the practical sort, i.e. those that influence the basic orientation of the will, and have quite different origins and consequences, popular enlightenment, the removal of popular prejudices means so forming the popular understanding in respect of certain objects that, on the one hand, it is actually set free from the belief in and subjection to errors, and, on the other hand, it is given grounds for its convictions of actual truth. But in the first place, what mortal man can definitively distinguish what is true? Well, let us grant here, as we must if we are going to speak of human knowledge in a concrete sense, and one must grant it simply from the political point of view too, if human society is to be establishable, that there are universally valid principles which are not only evident to common sense, but which must also lie at the basis of every religion that is worthy of the name, even though they may be rather deformed.

α. It is certain, then, that there are only a few of them, and that just for this reason, since for one thing they are so general and abstract, and for another if they are to be set forth purely, as reason demands, they do not [agree] with experience and sense appearance, since they are not a rule for sense appearance but can only agree with an opposed<sup>10</sup> order of things; they are not easily adapted for a living recognition on the part of the people, and even if they have been learned by heart, they still do not form any part of the spiritual system of human desires,

β. Since it is impossible to constitute a religion for the general populace out of universal truths, which only outstanding men in every age have arrived at and have grasped with whole heart and cloven to with love so that, on the one hand, additional elements always have to be mixed in which have to be taken on trust as matters of faith or the pure

principles must be made coarser, embedded in a sensible shell, if they are to be understood and made palpable to the senses, and, on the other hand, religious practices must be introduced, whose necessity or utility is persuasively established by the sincerity of faith once more, or by habituation from youth upward: because of this it is evident that a folk religion whose doctrines are to be effective in life and work (which is something that is already involved in the very concept of religion) cannot possibly be founded on mere reason. —Positive religion rests necessarily on faith in the traditions through which it has been transmitted to us—and so with its religious practices, it is only on this same ground that we can be convinced of our obligation to perform them, or have the faith that God requires them of us as duties because they are pleasing to Him. But from the point of view of reason pure and simple, we can only say this much about them, that they serve to arouse and build up the sense of holiness, and their aptness for this purpose can be investigated. And as soon as I have become convinced that God is not really honored by these practices, by our “service,”—that right action is the service that is most pleasing to Him, though I am still aware that these practices serve the purpose of edification, yet even so these practices have lost a great part of the influence that they could formerly have had on me.

Since religion in general is a thing of the heart, the question might be raised, how far abstract argument can be involved in it if it is to go on being religion at all. When one thinks a lot about the genesis of one’s emotions, about the practices that one must join in, and through which feelings of holiness are to be aroused, about their historical origin, about their aptness to their purpose and so forth, they are certainly deprived of the aura of sanctity, within which we were ever wont to view them, just as the dogmas of theology lose their authority when we examine them in the light of Church history. How little such cold reflection helps to sustain men, we see frequently enough where they get into situations where the heart is rent and needs a stronger staff, where despair often then tries to seize once more on that which gave it comfort of old, and to which it cleaves all the more tightly and anxiously now, so that it shall not be deprived of it again, and shuts its ears diligently against the sophistries of the understanding.

Wisdom is something different from enlightenment, from abstract argument. But wisdom is not science—it is an elevation of the soul, which has raised itself above dependence on opinions and upon the impressions of sensibility through experience conjoined with reflection, and if it is practical wisdom and not mere self-satisfaction or ostentation, it must necessarily be accompanied by a quiet heat, a gentle fire; it argues little, and it does not begin from concepts with a “mathematical method,” and

arrive at what it takes for truth through a string of syllogisms like *Barbara* and *Baroco*,—it has not purchased its conviction at the general market where they give out knowledge to everyone who pays the fair price, nor would it know how to pay for it in the current hard cash that gleams on the counter,<sup>11</sup>—it speaks rather from the fullness of the heart.

The cultivation of the understanding and its application to the objects that attract our interest to themselves—for this enlightenment remains a great advantage, as does clear knowledge of duties, enlightenment about practical truths. But these types of enlightenment are not the kind of thing that can make men moral; they stand infinitely far below goodness and purity of heart in moral worth, they are [not] properly *even commensurable* with it.

To be cheerful is a basic trait in the character of a well-natured youth; if circumstances hinder its expression so that he has to withdraw mainly into himself, and he makes the resolution to mold himself into a man of virtue, and he has not yet enough experience to know that books cannot make him one, then, perhaps, he may take Campe's *Theophron* in hand, with the idea of making these counsels of wisdom and prudence the guideline of his life, he reads a section of it night and morning, and thinks upon it all day long—what will the result be? Actual perfection of character perhaps? Knowledge of men? Practical competence? For these the experience and usage of years is needed—but the meditation on Campe and Campe's straight-edge will become intolerable in a week! Gloomy and anxious he goes out into society, where no one is welcome save he who knows how to be amusing, hesitantly he tastes of some pleasure which satisfies only one who brings a cheerful heart to it. Pierced right through by the sense of his own imperfection, he abases himself before everyone. The company of the other sex does not amuse him, because he is afraid that the light touch of some girl or other may set a blazing fire coursing through his veins, and this makes him stiff and gauche—but he will not put up with it for long, he will shake off the control of this surly tutor and will find himself better off as a result.

If enlightenment really does produce all that its greatest encomiasts claim for it, if it does deserve its praises, then it is true wisdom, but otherwise it is usually sham wisdom that gives itself airs, and plumes itself upon its *manières* in which it supposes itself to have the advantage over so many weaker brethren. This conceit is commonly found in most youths or men who get new points of view from books, and are beginning to give up the beliefs that they formerly shared with most of the people around them—vanity often plays an especially important part here. The man who can talk at length about the unbelievable stupidity of men, the man



who demonstrates to one with absolute precision that it is the very height of folly for a people to have such-and-such a prejudice, the man who is always throwing around such terms as “enlightenment,” “knowledge of men,” “history of mankind,” “happiness,” “perfection,” is nothing else but a gossip of the Enlightenment, a market huckster crying stale panaceas for sale—these people feed one another on cold words, and overlook the holy, delicate web of human feeling. Everyone, perhaps, has heard chatter of this kind going on around him; and many, probably, have found themselves involved in it personally, since this trend of culture is very widespread in our hyper-literary times. —If one or another learns through life itself to understand better something that previously lay in his soul like unemployed capital, yet still in every stomach there remains a clutter of undigested book learning, and since this gives the stomach quite enough to do, it gets in the way of any more healthy nourishment, it will not let any nourishing sap flow to the rest of the body—the swelled-up appearance gives perhaps the illusion of health, but in every limb a sapless phlegm cripples free movement.

It is one task of the enlightening understanding to sift objective religion. But just as the power [of understanding] is of no great moment where human betterment, education to great and mighty dispositions, to noble emotions, to a resolute independence is what is at issue, so likewise the product, objective religion, has little weight in this connection.

It flatters the human understanding to look upon its work—a great high edifice of divine knowledge and of the knowledge of human duties and of nature. And, to be sure, it has, itself, assembled the building materials and equipment for this; it has made a building with them, and it goes on ornamenting it all the time, and even making florid designs on it; but the more extensive and the solider the building becomes, on which humanity as a whole is working, the less it belongs to each single individual privately. —The man who only copies this universal building, and simply gets material from it for his own use, the man who does not build in and from his own personality, a little house of his own to dwell in, so as to be at home within his own walls and under his own roof, where if he has not hewn every stone from the rough himself—at least he has turned it over in his hands and laid it in its proper place—this man<sup>12</sup> is a man-of-the letter [*Buchstabenmensch*]<sup>13</sup> who has not lived his own life and woven his own character.

The man who builds himself a palace on the model of the great house lives in it like Louis XIV in Versailles. He hardly knows all the rooms in his property, and occupies only a very small sitting room—whereas the father of a family is better informed in every way about his ancestral home, he knows every screw and every tiny cupboard and can explain its use and

tell its story. —Lessing's *Nathan*—"In most cases I still can tell how, where, and why I learned it."<sup>14</sup>

Religion must help man build his own little house, a home which he can call his own, but how much can it help him in this?

Given that the difference between pure rational religion, which worships God in spirit and in truth, and makes his service consist only in virtue, and the fetish faith that believes it can gain God's love for itself through something [other] than a will that is good in itself is so great that the latter<sup>15</sup> is of absolutely no worth as against the former, the two of them are of quite distinct species, and it is quite crucial for mankind that it be led up ever closer to rational religion and that fetish faith should be got rid of; and since a universal Church of the spirit is only an ideal of reason, and it is not really possible that a public religion should be established which removed every possibility of reviving a fetish faith from it; the question arises as to how a folk religion has to be set up in order (a) negatively, to give as little occasion as possible for cleaving to the letter and the ceremonial observance, and (b) positively—that the people may be led to rational religion, and become receptive to it.

When the idea of holiness is set up in moral philosophy as the ultimate apex of ethical conduct and the ultimate limit of all striving, the objections of those who say that such an ideal is not attainable by man (which our moralists themselves grant anyway), but that, apart from pure respect for the law, he needs other motives, motives which affect his sensibility—these objections do not so much go to show that man ought not to strive to come ever closer to that ideal even for all eternity, but only that in savagery and when there is a powerful propensity toward sensibility—we frequently have to be content to produce only a law-abiding habit in most men, and no purely ethical motives, for which they have little sense, are required to produce this (compare Matthew 19:16)<sup>16</sup>—and that it is already a gain if grosser sensibility is merely refined, or at the lowest just if concern for something higher is awakened, and in place of strictly animal drives, feelings which are more apt to come under the influence of reason, and closer in themselves to moral feelings are awakened, or merely those whose presence makes it possible for moral feelings to germinate as well, once the loud outcry of the senses is somewhat damped down—in short, sheer culture is already something gained; they<sup>17</sup> claim just this much, that it is certainly not probable, that anywhere on this earth, either mankind generally or even any individual man could altogether dispense with non-moral motives—and in our nature itself<sup>18</sup> this kind of feeling is woven, feelings, which though they are not moral, do not spring from respect for the law, and hence they are neither quite fixed and reliable nor do they

have a worth in themselves so as to be themselves deserving of respect, yet they are worthy of love, they inhibit evil tendencies and they further the highest development of man—of this type are all benign tendencies, such as compassion, benevolence, friendship, etc. To this empirical character, enclosed within the circle of the inclinations, the moral feeling also belongs, which must send out its delicate threads through the whole web; the fundamental principle of the empirical character is love, which has something analogous to reason in it, insofar as love finds itself in other men, or rather by forgetting itself, puts itself outside of its own existence, and, so to speak, lives, feels, and acts in others, just as reason as the principle of universally valid laws knows itself again in every rational being, recognizing itself as fellow citizens of an intelligible world. The empirical character of man is certainly affected by desire and aversion, —love, even if it is a pathological principle of action, is disinterested, it does not do good actions, because it has calculated that the joys that arise from its actions will be less mixed and longer lasting than those of sensibility or those that spring from the satisfaction of any passion—thus it is not the principle of refined self-love, where the ego is in the end always the ultimate goal.

In the establishment of principles, empirical evidence is certainly not worth anything at all; but when we are discussing how to influence men, we must take them as they are, and seek out all the good impulses and sentiments through which their nature can be ennobled even if their freedom is not directly increased. In a folk religion particularly, it is of the greatest moment that heart and fancy should not go unsatisfied, that fancy should be fulfilled with great and pure images, and that the more beneficent feelings should be aroused in the heart. That both should be well directed is all the more important in religion, whose object is so great and so sublime, where both can all too easily make their own way, or let themselves be led astray, either because the heart, misled by false opinions or by its own convenience, hangs upon externals or nourishes itself on base feelings of mock-humility, and believes it is serving God thereby—or because the fancy connects things as cause and effect, whose sequence is merely accidental, and promises extraordinary effects that are against nature. Man is such a many-sided being that one can make anything of him, the web of his feelings is interwoven in so many ways with so many loose ends that anything can be tied on to it—if not in one place then in another. That is why he is capable of the most stupid superstition, of the most abject ecclesiastical and political slavery. To weave these beautiful threads into a bond concordant with his nature—this must be the special task of folk religion.

Folk religion is distinguished from private religion particularly in the fact that inasmuch as it powerfully affects the imagination and the heart, its aim inspires the whole soul with power and enthusiasm—with the spirit that is indispensable for greatness and sublimity in virtue. The development of the individual in accord with his character, instruction about cases of conflict of duties, the particular means for the advancement of virtue, comfort, and support in particular states of suffering and calamity, these things must be left to private religion for development; that they do not qualify as part of a public folk religion is plain from the following considerations:

- a. Instruction about cases of conflict of duties—these are so various that I can only help myself out of them in a way that satisfies my conscience either through the counsel of just and experienced men or through the conviction that duty and virtue are the supreme principle—a conviction which has in any case been firmly established already and made capable of becoming the maxim of my action through public religion: public instruction like instruction in morality—discussed above—is too dry and just as incapable as moral instruction of controlling with its rules of casuistry the way we make up our minds at the moment of action; or else an endless train of scruples would arise, which is absolutely opposed to the resolution and strength that is requisite for virtue.
- b. Since virtue is not a product of teaching and preaching, but a plant which—though it needs proper care—develops in its own direction and under its own power, therefore the manifold arts which have supposedly been discovered for producing virtue in a greenhouse where it virtually cannot fail, do more to corrupt it in man than if it were left to grow wild.<sup>19</sup> Public religious instruction essentially involves not just the enlightening of the understanding about the idea of God and our relation to Him, but also an attempt to deduce all other duties from the obligations that we have to God, an attempt to make us feel them more keenly, to bring their binding force before our eyes. But this deduction has already something *recherché*, something far-fetched about it, it is the sort of tie where only the understanding perceives the connection which is often very artificial or at any rate not apparent to ordinary, common sense; and what usually happens is that the more moving grounds one adduces for a duty, the cooler one becomes toward it.
- c. The one true comfort in suffering (for sorrows there is no comfort—against them one can only set strength of soul)<sup>20</sup> is trust in the providence of God, all the rest is empty preaching that slides off of the heart without affecting it.

How must folk religion be constituted? (Folk religion is here taken objectively.)

- a. With respect to objective doctrines
- b. With respect to ceremonies
  - A. I. Its doctrines must be grounded on universal reason.
  - II. Fancy, heart, and sensibility must not thereby go empty away.
  - III. It must be so constituted that all the needs of life—the public affairs of the state are tied in with it.
  - B. What must it steer clear of?

Fetish faith—under this head especially the faith so common in our word-rich epoch that one has done enough to meet the requirement of reason through tirades about enlightenment etc., so that men are forever at loggerheads about dogmas and do less than no good to themselves and others in the process.

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Even if their authority rests on a divine revelation the doctrines must necessarily be so constituted that they are authorized really by the universal reason of mankind, so that every man sees and feels their obligatory force when it is drawn to his attention—for, moreover, such doctrines,<sup>21</sup> apart from either furnishing us with a special means of obtaining God's goodwill, or else promising to provide us with some special higher knowledge, more precise information about unattainable objects, and that too for the purpose of reason, not just those of fancy—apart from sooner or later becoming an object of critical attack for thinking men, and an object of controversy, which always means the loss of their practical import or the setting up of precise, intolerant, symbols on account of the controversy since their linkage with the true needs and requirements of reason remains always unnatural and they give easy occasion for misuse even where this connection has been firmly fixed by custom—they can certainly never acquire in our feelings the significance of a pure and authentic practical moment that has direct bearing upon morality.

But these doctrines must also be simple, for if they are truths of reason, they must be simple on that account alone since as such they cannot be in need either of a scholarly apparatus or of a great display of laborious proofs; and by reason of this property of simplicity they will exercise all the more power and impact upon the mind, and upon the determination of the will to action; being thus concentrated they will have far more influence, they will play a much greater part in the formation

of the spirit of a people than if the commandments are piled high, and artificially organized and precisely for that reason need an ever-increasing number of exceptions.

These universal doctrines must at the same time be humane—a requirement which is both important and hard to satisfy—they must be humane in the sense that they are appropriate to the spiritual culture and stage of morality that a people has reached. Some of the most sublime ideas, and those which are of the greatest import for humanity, are just the ones which are hardly in any way fit to be adopted as universal maxims—they appear rather to be the private possession of a few men who have proven themselves and forced their way through to wisdom over long experience, and for whom these ideas have come to be not a quaking conviction but a firm faith, a faith that is operative in just those situations where it ought to be. Of this kind particularly is the faith in a wise and clement Providence, which is bound up with complete resignation to God's will whenever it is a genuine living faith.

Certainly this doctrine and everything that goes with it is a basic one within the Christian community, since all that is ever talked about within it reduces to the surpassing love of God and it all comes out to that; and furthermore God is presented to us year in, year out, as ever near and ever present, as the agent in all that happens around us; and certainly the doctrine is not just presented to us as something that is necessarily connected with our morality and with the things that are holiest for us, but is also rendered perfectly certain by heaps of assurances from God Himself and by other deeds of His which ought to convince us of it incontrovertibly—yet we see in experience among the masses that a stroke of bad weather, a night frost, will suffice to bring this trust in Providence and patient resignation to the will of God to a very low ebb, that it is in general the part of a wise man to put aside impatience, vexation over frustrated hopes, and low spirits in misfortune.

The sudden downfall of trust in God, and rapid transition to dissatisfaction with Him, is made all the easier by the fact that the Christian congregation is not merely accustomed to pray incessantly from youth up, but also the attempt is always made to persuade them of the supreme necessity of this practice by promising them the fulfillment of their prayers.

Furthermore such a heap of reasons for comfort in misfortune has been brought together from all corners of the earth for the use and benefit of suffering humanity that it might well be a cause for grief to one in the end that one does not lose one's father or mother or is not stricken with blindness every week; the argument has here taken the tack of following out physical and moral effects to the limit with incredible

precision and in hairsplitting detail; and since these effects are then set out as the goals of Providence, the belief that we have thereby achieved clearer insight into God's plans, not only for mankind generally, but even for particular individuals is fostered.

In this connection, as soon as we are no longer content to put our finger to our lips and keep silence, full of reverential awe, nothing is more common than for the most arrogant knowingness to put itself forward, presuming to be master of the ways of Providence, a tendency which is strongly reinforced, though not indeed among the common people, by the many idealistic notions that are current. All of which has very little to do with the furtherance of resignation to God's will and of contentment. It would be very interesting to compare this with the faith of the Greeks. On the one hand, they had the basic faith that the gods are gracious to the good man and subject the evildoer to the terror of Nemesis—built upon the deep moral need of reason, and enlivened with love through the warm breath of their feelings, not on the cold conviction, deduced from particular cases, that everything will turn out for the best, a conviction which can never be brought into real life. On the other hand, misfortune for them was misfortune, sorrow was sorrow—something that had happened and could not be altered; they could not puzzle over the inner meaning of these things, for their μοῖρα, their ἀναγκαῖα τύχη was blind, but they submitted willingly and with all possible resignation to this necessity, and gained at least this advantage, that men can more easily bear what they have been accustomed to regard as necessary from youth up, and that, apart from the sorrow or suffering to which it gives birth, misfortune does not also bring forth that multitude of heavier, more intolerable anger, sullenness, discontent. This faith, since it is reverence for the flow of natural necessity, on the one hand, and at the same time the conviction that men are ruled by the gods according to moral laws seems to be humanly appropriate both to the sublimity of the deity, and to man's weakness, his dependence upon nature, and his limited range of vision.

Simple doctrines founded on universal reason are compatible with every level of folk-culture, and the culture will gradually modify the doctrines in accord with its chances, though mainly in respect of their outward expression, all the imaginative paintwork of the fancy.

These doctrines, if they are doctrines founded on universal human reason, must be characterized by reference to no other aim than this, that they affect the spirit of the people only in great matters, partly directly, and partly through the wonder of profoundly impressive ceremonies that are bound up with them so that they neither are involved in the practice of civic justice nor presume to become a private code of judgment, nor

easily give occasion for strife about their interpretation since they are formulated simply—and since they require and establish but little in the way of the positive, the lawgiving of reason being only formal, the thirst for power of the priests in a religion of this sort is limited.

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Every religion that is to count as a folk religion, must necessarily be so constituted as to keep heart and fancy occupied. Even the purest religion of reason becomes embodied in the soul of the individual man, still more in that of the people, and it would surely be a good thing to link myths with the religion itself from the start in order to avoid adventurous roving of the fancy by showing it at the least a beautiful path for it to strew with flowers. —The doctrines of the Christian religion are for the most part bound up with history or set forth in history, and the theater is this earth, even if the actors in the play are not mere men; thus an easily comprehended goal is here presented in fancy, but there remains still plenty of spare room to allow it free play, and if it is tempered with black gall it can paint for itself a fearful world, but on the other side it falls easily into childishness, for it is just the fair and lovely colors derived from sensibility that are excluded by our religion—and we are generally too much men of reason and of words to love beautiful images. As far as ceremonies are concerned, on the one hand, a folk religion is quite unthinkable without them, and, on the other hand, nothing is more difficult certainly than to prevent them from being taken as the essence of religion by the general populace.

Religion is made up of three elements, (a) concepts, (b) essential practices, (c) ceremonies. If we regard baptism and the Eucharist as rites, to which certain extraordinary benefits and graces are attached, the performance of which is laid upon us as a duty in itself, and makes us more moral and more perfect as Christians, then they belong to the second class. But if we regard them merely as means, the purpose and effect of which is only the arousing of pious feelings, then they belong in the third class.

Sacrifices too belong here, but they cannot properly be called ceremonies since they are essential to the religion with which they are connected; they belong to the structure itself, whereas ceremonies are only the decorations, the formal aspects of the structure.

Still sacrifices too can be considered from a double point of view.

a. In part they were brought to the altars of the gods as atonement offerings, indulgence fees, commutations of a physical or moral punishment that was feared into a money payment, or as a way of sneaking



back into the lost good graces of the overlord, the dispenser of rewards and punishments—from this point of view the irrational absurdity and the perversion of the concept of morality is properly condemned in judgments of the unworthiness of any such practice, but at the same time it must be remembered that the idea of sacrifice has never in fact existed anywhere in such an utterly crass form (except perhaps in the Christian church),\* and then too the worth of the feelings that were at work in it should not go quite unrecognized, even if they were not quite unmixed—the reverent awe before the holy Being, the humble prostration and contrition of the heart before Him, the trust that drew the oppressed soul, yearning for peace back to this harbor. A pilgrim borne down by the burden of his sins, who leaves comfort, wife and child, and the soil of his fatherland to wander barefoot through the world in a hair shirt, who seeks trackless regions to make torments for his feet and bedews the holy place with his tears, seeking peace for his strife-torn spirit, with every tear shed, with every penance, with every sacrifice he is solaced, and by the thought that here has Christ passed, here was he crucified for me he is cheered, he regains a little strength, a little confidence in himself—should such a pilgrim as this with his simplicity of heart call forth in us the response of the Pharisee: “I am wiser than such men as he”? Just because a way of life such as his is no longer possible for us on account of the different intellectual climate of our time should his holy feelings be an object of scorn for us? Such penances as his are a subspecies of the type of sacrifices to which I was referring here, sacrifices which are offered in the very same spirit as that in which those penances were performed.

**b.** Another, gentler, form in which sacrifice appears, and one that sprang up in a milder climate, is probably more primitive and more universal—it is founded on thankfulness and goodwill where there is the sense of a Being that is more exalted than man—the consciousness that we have to thank it for everything, and that it does not disdain anything that we offer it in a spirit of innocence, and the disposition to implore its aid first at the inception of every undertaking, to think of it first in every joy, and in every achieved good fortune, of Nemesis first before every allotted pleasure, to it the first fruits, the first flower of every good is offered, this Being we invite, and we hope that it will tarry with us men

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\* [*Hegel added here the following marginal note:*] “Outside the Christian church it was at the most a drop of balsam for the soul of the transgressor (for certainly no example of the moral corruption of a whole people in this way can be given), and his conscience was not set at rest by this means alone.”

in amity; the disposition in which a sacrifice such as this was offered was far removed from the thought of having done penance for some part of one's sins and the punishments that they deserve, nor did conscience persuade him [who made the sacrifice] that by this means Nemesis would be satisfied, and would surrender its claims on him for this reason, and suspend its laws by which moral equilibrium was maintained.

The essential practices of religion, such as this, do not have to be more closely concordant with it than they are with the spirit of the people, and it is from the latter that they really ought to spring; otherwise they are gone through without life, coldly, without force, the emotions to which they give rise are artificially pumped up, or there are practices which are not essential to the folk religion, though they may be essential to private religion—thus the Eucharist in the form that it now has among Christians in spite of its original character as a meal to be enjoyed in company.

Necessary properties of the ceremonies of a folk religion are:

a. and in chief, that they give as little as possible occasion for fetish worship, that as far as possible they are not so constituted that the outward act, the mechanical performance, stands by itself and the spirit disappears. Their purpose must only be to enhance devotion and heighten pious feelings—and as one such pure means, which is only minimally capable of misuse, but produces this effect, sacred music and the song of a whole people is perhaps all that there is, or perhaps also there are folk festivals, in which religion should be involved.

### III

As soon as there is a dividing wall between life and doctrine or even just a severance and long distance between the two of them, there arises the suspicion that the form of religion is defective—either it is too much occupied with idle word-games, or it demands a level of piety from men that is hypocritical because it is too high, it is in conflict with their natural needs, with the impulses of a well-ordered sensibility—τῆς σωφροσύνης—or it is a case of both together. If the joys, the gaiety of men have to be ashamed before religion, if one who makes merry at a public festival must sneak into the temple unobtrusively, then the form of religion is too gloomy on its outward side to dare give any pledge that men would surrender the joys of life in response to its demands.

It must abide in amity with all the emotions of life and not want to force its way in, but rather be everywhere welcome. If religion is to be able to work on the people it must go along with them amicably everywhere, stand beside them in their business and on the more serious

occasions of life as well as at their festivals and rejoicings—but not so that it appears to be intruding or is like a harsh school-governess, but rather as if it were the ringleader urging things on. The popular festivals of the Greeks were indeed all religious festivals in the honor of a god or of a man who had been deified because he had deserved well of the state. Everything, even the excesses of the Bacchants, was sacred to a god, even their public theatrical performances had a religious origin, which was never disavowed in their later development. Agathon did not forget the gods when he gained the prize for tragedy at one of them—the next day he held a festival for the gods. *Symposium*, p. 168.<sup>22</sup>

Folk religion, which generates and nourishes noble dispositions, goes hand in hand with freedom.

Our religion aims to educate men to be citizens of heaven whose gaze is ever directed thither so that human feelings become alien to them. At our greatest public festival, one draws near to enjoy the heavenly gifts, in a garb of mourning and with lowered gaze—at the festival, which ought to be the feast of universal brotherhood, many a man is afraid he will catch from the common cup the venereal infection of the one who drank before him, so that his mind is not attentive, not occupied with holy feelings, and during the function itself he must reach into his pocket and lay his offering on the plate—whereas the Greeks with the friendly gifts of nature, crowned with flowers and arrayed in joyful colors, radiating gaiety from open faces that invited all to love and friendship, approached the altars of their benevolent gods.

The spirit of the people, its history, its religion, the level of its political freedom cannot be treated separately either with respect to their mutual influence, or in characterizing them—they are woven together in a single bond as when among three expert colleagues none can do anything without the others, but each gets something from the others. To form the moral character of individual men is a matter of private religion, of parental training, of personal effort, and of particular circumstances; to form the spirit of the people is in part again a matter of the folk religion, in part of political relations.\*

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\* [The following paragraph was canceled by Hegel some time after he had written it:] The father of this Genius is Cronos, on which he remains dependent in a way all his life (the circumstances of the time); his mother the *politeia*, the Constitution; his midwife, his wet-nurse, Religion, who took into her service to aid in his education the fine arts, and the music of physical and spiritual motion—an ethereal being—he is drawn down to the earth and held fast by a light bond which resists through a magic spell all attempts to break it, for it is completely intertwined in his essence. This bond, whose main

Ah yes! From the far-off days that are gone a radiant picture shines for the soul that has a feeling for human beauty, for greatness in great men—the picture of a Genius among the peoples, a son of fortune and of freedom, a pupil of beautiful fancy. The brazen bond of his needs also fetters him to Mother Earth, but he worked over it, refined it, beautified it with feeling and fancy, twining it with roses by the aid of the Graces, so that he could delight in these fetters as his own work, as a part of himself. His servants were joy, gaiety, and grace; his soul filled with the consciousness of its power and its freedom, his more serious companions at play were friendship and love, not the woodland faun, but the sensitive and soulful *Amor* adorned with all the charms of the heart and of sweet dreams.

From his father, a darling of fortune and a son of force, he received as his heritage faith in his fortune and pride in his deeds. His indulgent mother, no scolding, harsh woman, left her son to the education of nature, and did not swaddle his delicate limbs in tight bands, and like a good mother she fell in with the whims and humors of her darling more than she repressed them. In harmony with her, the wet nurse could not rear the child of nature, or seek to bring him up to adolescence with the fear of the rod or of a ghost in the dark, nor on the sour-sweet sugar-bread of mysticism that weakens the stomach, nor did she keep him in the leading reins of words, which would have made him forever a minor, but rather she gave him the cleaner more wholesome milk of pure feelings to drink—with the aid of fancy, fair and free, she adorned with its flowers the impenetrable veil that withdraws divinity from our view—by enchantment she peopled the realm behind it with living images from which he carried forward the great ideas of his own heart with all the fullness of higher and more beautiful feelings. —As the nurse in a Greek household remained in the family circle and was a friend to her charge all his life, so was she<sup>22</sup> ever his<sup>24</sup> friend, and he offered her his thanks and his love with unspoiled spontaneity, he shared his joy and his games with her as a friendly comrade and was not kept from his joys by her, but she kept her dignity inviolate, and his own conscience punished every slight to it; she kept her authority always, for it was founded on love and gratitude, on the noblest emotions of her charge; she flattered his finery, heeded

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foundations are our needs, is woven together from the manifold threads of nature; and because he binds himself more firmly to nature with every new thread, he is so far from feeling any constraint, that he rather finds an amplification of his enjoyment, an extension of his range of life in this voluntary augmentation, this multiplying variety of the threads. All the finer and fairer feelings have developed within him, and they bring a thousand differing shades of delight to experience and joy.

the humors of his fancy, but she taught him to respect iron necessity, she taught him to follow the path of unalterable destiny without grumbling.

We know this Genius only by hearsay, only a few traits of his character are we permitted to gaze on in love and wonder in surviving copies of his form, which merely awaken a sorrowful yearning for the original. He is the beautiful youth, whom we love even in his thoughtless moments, along with the whole company of the Graces, and with them the balsam breath of nature, the soul, which is inspired by them, he sucked from every flower, he is flown from the earth.\*

## Notes

This essay, originally written in 1793, has been translated from G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften*, ed. Herman Nohl (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, Paul Siebeck, 1907), pp. 3–29.

1. I.e. the needs and pleasures of the senses.
2. I.e. man's.
3. I.e. the ideas.
4. "The faith that is believed."
5. I.e. innocence and freedom from evil tendencies.
6. G. E. Lessing, *Nathan the Wise*, Act IV, Scene 7.

7. The remark to which Hegel refers is as follows: "He ordered a cock to be sacrificed to Aesculapius, at the very last, I think for the honor of Aesculapius's father, because Apollo prophesied that Socrates was the wisest of all. Oh heedless Apollo! He awarded the palm of wisdom to that fellow who denied that the gods existed!" (No doubt this chapter of Tertullian was excerpted in Hegel's collection under the heading: "Socrates' Cock.") See H. S. Harris, *Hegel's Development: Toward the Sunlight, 1770–1801* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972), pp. 14–15.

8. This is another reference to the same source (and probably to the same excerpt): "Any Christian craftsman both finds God and points him out . . . although Plato can assert that the creator of the universe is not easy to find and is

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\* [Hegel began the following paragraph but canceled it in midsentence, leaving the above as his peroration:] A different Genius of the nations has the West hatched; his form is aged; beautiful he never was, but some slight touches of manliness remain still faintly traceable in him; his father is bowed with age; he dares not stand up straight either to look round gaily at the world nor from a sense of his own dignity; he is short-sighted and can see only little things one at a time, without courage, without confidence in his own strength, he hazards no bold throw, iron fetters raw and . . . [Here the manuscript ends.]

difficult to describe once he is found.” (This passage identifies who the “wisest pagan”—of Gellert’s poem “Der Christ”—was in Hegel’s mind.)

9. Hegel read J. H. Campe’s *Theophron, or the Experienced Adviser for Inexperienced Youth* (1783) while he was at the *Gymnasium* in Stuttgart. His note here probably indicates that, in trying to use it as a guide to life, he intended to appeal to his own experience as an example when he filled in the brief outline given here. Compare what he writes a little further on. See *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften*, ed. Nohl, pp. 15–16.

10. I.e. non-sensible.

11. Nohl rightly detects here an echo of *Nathan the Wise*, Act III, Scene 6: “. . . I came prepared / For money, and he asks for truth—for truth! / And wants it paid in ready cash, as though / The truth were coinage!” (G. E. Lessing, *Nathan the Wise*, trans. W.A. Steel [London: Everyman, 1930], p. 165).

12. I.e., one who has not built for himself.

13. Literally “man-of-the-letter.” The term was coined, or at least was first used in print, by Moses Mendelssohn. The implicit contrast is with a “man-of-the-spirit” and the underlying reference is to St. Paul’s remark that “the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.”

14. Lessing, *Nathan the Wise*, Act V, Scene 6. In this scene Nathan’s adopted daughter Recha is discussing with Saladin’s sister, Sittah, the way Nathan brought her up. She has not learned to read well because “My father loves not much / That cold book learning, which dead letters cram / Into the brain.” But she knows many things “from his mouth . . . and of most of them etc.” She thinks Sittah also has not read much because she is genuine and unaffected, and “Books, you know, / Too seldom leave us so, my father says.” All this occurs in the context of Recha’s newly made discovery that Nathan is *not* her father in the literal sense (Steel, pp. 210–11).

15. I.e. fetish faith.

16. The reference here is to the story of the young man who asked Jesus what he must do to gain eternal life. Jesus said first that he should keep the commandments, and when he claimed that he was already doing this, instructed him to sell all he had and give to the poor and then come and follow him. The way Hegel here assimilates Jesus’ instructions to the Kantian distinction between *Legalität* and *Moralität* shows that he was already interpreting the Gospel in rather narrowly Kantian terms before he left Tübingen.

17. I.e. the objectors.

18. I.e. our character as *rational* beings.

19. In the excerpts that he printed in 1842, Rosenkranz here inserted the following sentence, which does not appear in the manuscript as we have it: “Men bathed early in the dead sea of moral preachments, go forth again invulnerable like Achilles, certainly, but their human power has been drowned in it as well.” (Karl Rosenkranz, *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Leben* [1844; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1963], p. 467.) He probably found this sentence in a sheet that is now lost. See also Harris, *Hegel’s Development*, p. 132 note 1.

20. The opposition between *Leiden* and *Schmerzen* here is not easy to interpret,

since it is not referred to elsewhere in this essay. Lacorte takes it to refer to a contrast between mental distress [*Leiden*] and physical pain [*Schmerzen*]. It seems more likely to me that the contrast is between two ways in which the will of the sufferer is related to its suffering generally. There is “suffering” which is perceived as imposed simply by external power, and “sorrow” which arises from a spontaneous emotional commitment on the part of the sufferer. (If my interpretation is right, Hegel’s thoughts have already begun to move along the lines that led to his theory of “spirit” and “fate” in the Frankfurt period.) Hegel still seems to regard the term “*Schmerz*” as something for which there is no legitimate form of comfort or consolation. What he says during the Frankfurt period is natural and consistent with my interpretation of the concept here but cannot be said to require it: “Where the *Trennung* between impulse and actuality is so great that actual *Schmerz* arises, union [*die Vereinigung*] is impossible, and if man has still strength enough to bear this *Trennung* he sets himself against fate without submitting to it; if he has not the strength, he posits this *Vereinigung* in a future state, and hopes to get it from an alien unifying object . . .” (circa July 1797).

Some time later (about a year, as in the case of the fragment on “Love”) Hegel rewrote the passage as follows: “Where the *Trennung* between impulse and actuality is so great that actual *Schmerz* arises, he posits an independent activity as the ground of this suffering [*Leiden*], and enlivens it, but since union with the *Schmerz* is impossible, since it is suffering [*ein Leiden*], so also is union with that cause of suffering impossible, and he sets it over against himself as a hostile being; had he never enjoyed any favor from it, he would ascribe to it a hostile nature that never changes; but if he has already had joy from it, if he has loved it, then he must think of the hostile disposition as merely transient, and if he is conscious of any guilt within himself, then he recognizes in his *Schmerz* the punishing hand of God, with whom he lived once in amity. But if he is conscious of his own purity and has strength enough to bear this complete *Trennung*, he confronts an unknown power, mighty over his fate, in which there is nothing human, without submitting to it, or finding any other kind of union with it, since union with a mightier being could only be slavery of some sort” (*Hegels theologische Jugendschriften*, ed. Nohl, p. 377). See also the undated “historical” fragment “Klageweiber bei der öffentlichen Totenfeier” (Bern, summer 1796?), in G. W. F. Hegel, *Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung*, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Stuttgart: Frommann, 1936), pp. 262–63.

21. I.e., the doctrines of a folk religion.

22. Hegel’s reference is to the introductory discussion of the dialogue in the Stephanus edition. The clearest evidence on this point in the text itself is at p. 173 a: “It was given, I [Apollodorus] told him [Glaucón], when you and I were in the nursery, the day after Agathon’s celebrations with the players when he had won the prize with his first tragedy.” Socrates himself (p. 174 b–c) compares the party to a Homeric celebration after a sacrifice.

23. I.e. religion.

24. I.e. the Greek spirit’s.





P A R T

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BERN, 1793–1797





# The Bern Plan

Translated by H. S. Harris

α. Under the heading, “objective religion” I take to be included this whole system of the connection of our duties and wishes with the idea of God and of the immortality of the soul—and thus it may also be called “theology,” as long as “theology” does not merely concern itself with the knowledge of the existence and attributes of God, but deals with this problem in relation to men and to the needs of their reason.

β. So far as this theory does not merely exist in books, but embraces the actual concepts of men, love of duty and respect for the moral law, so far as they are enlivened by the idea—so far as they are actually felt, to that extent religion is subjective. —But now since the public legal system does not have morality, but only legality as its immediate purpose—and no specific institutions are established with a view to the advancement of respect for the moral law and of the disposition to fulfill the laws in spirit—since this is rather to be regarded as belonging also to religion, we do not want to separate these topics<sup>1</sup> from one another here, but to treat morality in general as the purpose of religious institutions, not just the advancement of morality through the idea of God.

γ. Not all the instincts of human nature, for instance the reproductive instinct and so on, have morality as their purpose, but the supreme purpose of man is to be moral, and among the tendencies that contribute to this end, his tendency toward religion is one of the most important. —Of its own nature, the knowledge of God cannot be dead; it has its origin in the moral nature of man, in his practical needs, and from it

in turn springs moral life—or if the spreading of the name and fame of Christ or Mohammed ought to be its ultimate purpose, then Orpheus and Homer deserved to be celebrated and honored in Greece just as much as Jupiter and Pallas—and they<sup>2</sup> have reason to be most proud of Karl the converter of Saxony—or the Spanish missionaries in America, or the Jew-seeker Schulz—or should the ultimate purpose of religion be the absolute authority of the name of God? In that case there would be no better Christians than the hymn-singing zealots of the Brigitte order—and the Pope at High Mass in St. Peter's would be a more worthy object of God's favor than the corporal (*Waldemar*)<sup>3</sup> who saved thirteen persons in the shipwreck by the sacrifice of his own life, and died with the fourteenth in the service of mankind.

δ. To make objective religion subjective must be the great concern of the state, the institutions must be compatible with freedom of moral dispositions, they must not do violence to conscience and freedom, but must operate indirectly on the determining grounds of the will—how much can the state do? How much must be left to every man?

ε. Advancement of morality, this purpose of religion is achieved (a) through its teachings (b) ceremonies. Every religion has always had a care for both of these and always involves a tendency toward both—the state through the constitution, through the spirit of the government.

ζ. How far is the Christian religion qualified for this purpose? The Christian religion is originally a private religion, modified according to the requirements of the circumstances of its establishment, the requirements of men, and the requirements of prejudice.

a. [With respect to teachings]:

α. Its practical teachings are pure and have the advantage of being expressed mainly in examples—for where in Matthew 5:6ff. the spirit of morality is expressed in universal terms, and the expression is not limited to the formal aspect but contains material prescriptions, it is subject to misunderstandings and has in fact been misunderstood.

β. Historical truths upon which it is founded—therein the miraculous element is always subject to incredulity; as long as it is a private religion, it remains open to everyone to believe or not, but as a public religion there are always bound to be unbelievers.

γ. Not designed for the imagination—as with the Greeks—it is sad and melancholy, oriental, not grown on our soil, it cannot be assimilated therewith.

b. [With respect to ceremonies]: The ceremonies appropriate to it as private religion have quite lost their sense and spirit, since it has become

a public religion—apart from their function as means of grace—they are not fraternal in a spirit of joyfulness—for then they would be public—but they could have been promoters of tolerance if they had not been bound up by force with exclusive hypotheses—now, alas, they are distinguishing marks for sects, when they could have been just the opposite.

c. Other commands concerning the way of life:

α. Withdrawal from public affairs.

β. Distribution of alms—the collecting together of a common fund possible in a private religion, not feasible in the state—also what was once a work of piety—now bound up with public honor.

## Notes

This work, originally written in 1794, has been translated from G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften*, ed. Herman Nohl (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, Paul Siebeck, 1907), pp. 48–50.

1. I.e. subjective religion and moral education.
2. I.e. the Christians.
3. I.e. in Jacobi's novel.

# The Transcendental Idea of God

Translated by Michael H. Hoffheimer

The following is a translation of a manuscript by Hegel from 1795.<sup>1</sup> It was first published in 1907 and has not been translated previously. Following current convention, I identify it by the initial words (of the German text) “*Die transzendent[ale] Idee von Gott.*”<sup>2</sup>

The manuscript comprises a series of notes that record Hegel’s responses to leading ideas in the works of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling. The organization of these notes in the form of an outline suggests that Hegel was contemplating a far more sustained treatment of its ideas. This outline has been recognized as recording an important stage in the evolution of Hegel’s religious thought, and it sheds important light on the place of *The Life of Jesus* in Hegel’s intellectual biography. We know that Hegel engaged in a close study of Kant’s *Critique of Practical Reason* in Bern,<sup>3</sup> and the discussion in the manuscript attests to Hegel’s close study of that part of the *Critique* that treated the postulates. Haering interprets the manuscript as marking a critical departure from Kant’s rational religion.<sup>4</sup> Harris suggests that the manuscript may have been part of the study that Hegel referred to in a letter to Schelling of August 30, 1795: “I was once on the point of making clear to myself in an essay what it might mean to approach God. I at that point thought I had found how to satisfy both the postulate according to which practical reason governs the world of appearances and the remaining postulates as well.”<sup>5</sup> Harris speculates that Hegel postponed this project in favor of the more derivative *Life of Jesus*, but resumed work on the project outlined in this manuscript in the early positivity study, “*Ein positiver Glaube.* . . .”<sup>6</sup>

In focusing on the relationship of “The Transcendental Idea of God” to Hegel’s religious thought, commentators have tended to read the passage that treats law as subordinate to its principal ethical concerns. The biographical context, however, suggests that the manuscript expressed Hegel’s growing interest in the specifically political consequences of moral philosophy, and thus the treatment of law and custom may reveal his growing interest in specifically legal institutions—albeit considered in an extraordinarily abstract fashion. Its most extended discussion addresses the issue of whether the *Sittengesetz* (law of custom) can revoke rights—or laws—that it has conferred. This discussion treats, in language derived from Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, issues encountered in Kant’s moral philosophy. Hegel grapples with the problem of whether the ascetic renunciation of pleasure on grounds of duty is consistent with the Kantian doctrine that reason posits happiness as the goal of the world. In opposing the *Sittengesetz*, the internal standard that actually regulates behavior, to happiness, *Sittengesetz* might be translated as “ethical law.” But “*Sitten*” (for Kant as well as Hegel) denotes general social standards of behavior in the sense of convention or custom, as distinct from morality. Furthermore, in 1795, under the influence of J. W. von Goethe and J. G. Herder, Hegel came increasingly to identify *Sitten* with custom in the historical sense.<sup>7</sup> Accordingly, *Sittengesetz* might be rendered as “law of custom” or “customary law.” It will be of lasting significance for Hegel’s philosophy of law that he associates descriptive and positive “law” (*Gesetz*) with custom. In 1795 he already distinguishes custom from law (*Recht*) and legal rights (*Rechte*)—and attempts to derive legal right from custom.

The manuscript can be dated reliably to 1795. (It quotes Schelling’s essay *On the Possibility of a Form of Philosophy in General* [1794], which Hegel first received in February 1795 and had read by April of that year.)<sup>8</sup> The manuscript should be read together with the closely contemporaneous remarks that Hegel made in a letter to Schelling of April 16, 1795: “From the Kantian system and its highest completion I expect a revolution in Germany. It will proceed from principles that are present and that only need to be elaborated generally and applied to all hitherto existing knowledge.”<sup>9</sup> Correspondingly, in “The Transcendental Idea of God” Hegel literally proceeds from established Kantian doctrine to a critique of laws, outlining just the program he described to Schelling. Moreover, the manuscript reveals a close study of the writings of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling on practical reason, and Hegel refers in his letter to Schelling to a “recent study of the postulates of practical reason” in writings by Fichte and Schelling.<sup>10</sup>

In 1795 Hegel read Schelling’s recent work as effecting the “completion” (*Vollendung*) of a science that “*will* give” results. The process was obviously incomplete, just as the *Vollendung* of Kant’s *system* has not yet but will produce a revolution in Germany. For Hegel this historical process was philosophical—

requiring a completion of Kant's system. But he already viewed it in 1795 as a political process. Thus he observed to Schelling:

The consequences that will result from it [recent philosophical development] will astonish many a gentleman. Heads will be reeling at this summit of all philosophy by which man is being so greatly exalted. . . . The philosophers are proving the dignity of man. The peoples will learn to feel it. Not only will they demand their rights, which have been trampled in the dust, they will take them back themselves, they will appropriate them. . . .<sup>11</sup>

Hegel's intense interest in and first sustained studies of political and legal philosophy date from as early as 1795. He followed contemporary politics closely, and in the April 1795 letter to Schelling, he explained a delay in writing as "due . . . in part to distractions caused by political festivities celebrated here." He writes,

Every ten years about ninety new members replenish the *conseil souverain*, replacing those who have departed in this period. I cannot describe to you how all-too-humanly this is done, or how all the intrigues involving cousins and so on at princely courts are nothing compared to the schemes concocted here. A father nominates his son, or perhaps the son-in-law who adds the largest marriage portion, and so it goes. To get to know an aristocratic constitution one must have lived through a winter such as is encountered here before these vacancies are filled during the Easter holidays.<sup>12</sup>

Hegel studied in depth the economic and constitutional organization of Bern during his stay there.<sup>13</sup> He read and took notes on three French titles, *L'Etat et délices de la Suisse*, *Système abrégé de jurisprudence*, and *Du gouvernement de Berne*.<sup>14</sup> And he probably began the study of J. J. Cart's *Lettres confidentielles* (1793)—a critical exposition of the decline of traditional, constitutional liberties in the canton of Vaud under the oligarchical government of Bern. Hegel's first published work would be a German translation of Cart's letters, which appeared in 1798 after he moved to Frankfurt.

Likewise, Hegel was following political events in Württemberg closely. He had a personal stake in the academic politics of Württemberg because in 1795–96 he was still considering a return to the Tübingen seminary as a teaching assistant. Through Schelling, he remained in close touch with events at the seminary. Both he and Schelling associated the conservative theologians at the seminary with the absolutist reigns of the Württemberg dukes Karl Eugen (d. 1793) and Ludwig Eugen (d. 1795).<sup>15</sup> Hegel wrote bitterly in the summer of 1795 that hypocrisy and cowardice, engendered by despotism, still influenced the selection of teaching assistants at the seminary.<sup>16</sup>



The initial religious theme and the opacity of the following text should not, therefore, conceal its importance as a rich source of information about Hegel's early thinking about law and policy. The treatment of law in part C anticipates the language, imagery, and technical arguments that would appear many years later in Hegel's published work. For example, he would elaborate the state of law in the *Phenomenology* as the establishment in actuality of "what was called the hidden divine law in the world of order based on custom."<sup>17</sup> So too, he would write of law and the legal person as becoming actual only by means of the act of renunciation, and he would characterize the person as acquiring validity through the process of becoming recognized.<sup>18</sup>

While this early document contains hints of important and original themes found in Hegel's later philosophy of law, the text also reveals far more clearly than do his later writings the Kantian and theological parentage of those ideas. It also offers a remarkable view of the method by which Hegel developed his own thinking about law. Much of the text comprises direct quotation or close paraphrase of material from Kant, Fichte, and Schelling. Hegel's purpose was not to excerpt this material so as to preserve it for later use. Rather, he selected passages that contained especially important ideas and placed them in a sequence that assumed for him a particular importance—an importance illuminated, I think, by reference to his vision of the "completion" of Kantian philosophy. His own thought thus appears as a process of absorption, assimilation, and recapitulation.

\* \* \*

## The Transcendental Idea of God

I

If speculative reason were capable of demonstrating the reality and existence of the transcendental idea of God in the form of the most real essence of all, or even able to produce only a belief in this existence of God, this idea in itself would still remain completely unrecognizable by us and would not be able to be determined exclusively from its own properties if we did not avail ourselves of the consideration of nature and the concept of a final goal of the world. But this attempt by speculative reason to attain its ideal, that seemed achieved, would be vain to the extent that this ideal is a matter of human interest and not just logic. The attempt to confer essentiality and determination would be disappointed even if reason made use of the consideration of nature. And thus only practical reason can provide the basis of a belief in a God.<sup>19</sup>

## A

Practical reason produces a law by its own activity which appears in the form of the higher faculty of desire as a fact.<sup>20</sup> Schelling p. 32.<sup>21</sup> Representation in the practical meaning, unmediated determination of the ego contained in representation by means of the absolute ego (and cancellation of the non-ego contained in representation to the extent the non-ego in it is presented under the form of something determinate).

## B

Inclination [is] determined by non-ego—sensual faculty of desire, to classify by means of reason the matter of volition of animal faculty of desire.

## C

Freedom of will determining itself into obedience or disobedience of the law by absolute independence—into two contradictorily counterposed ways of acting; or is freedom only cancellation of the determination of the non-ego, determining itself into satisfaction or non-satisfaction of a demand of the faculty of desire? (Fichte called such freedom the freedom of arbitrary choice.)<sup>22</sup>

Inclination determined or restricted by law of custom [*Sittengesetz*] is legal (morally possible) and if inclination commanded the world of appearances even something lawfully merited (morally actual). Can the law of custom revoke all the rights it conferred? If one voluntarily renounced all demands of inclination, would the rights remain? If a man for the enjoyment of wealth were able to maintain a happy marriage only upon the condition of disobeying the law of custom, and he preferred to renounce it,<sup>23</sup> then he would also lose all the rights that he had in it. Can the man who has renounced the enjoyment of happiness be considered, as if he had only postponed it, i.e. making his right valid, in order to do it in another life? Nature can require reason to make its law valid in the kind of man whose legal inclinations could not effectuate their law due to nature or to human malice, but not in the kind of man who has renounced inclinations themselves. As the final goal of the world, reason posits the highest good, order based on custom and, commensurate with it, happiness<sup>24</sup>—but does reason itself posit this final goal? Reason requires its actual coming into being thus by an other essence,<sup>25</sup> but in any event not by men, by the causality of reason to the extent it is restricted by sensuality.

## D

The divinity—the power—the laws which reason has bestowed—to effectuate these and make them valid, this determination must determine the recognition of all its other properties.

## Notes

1. For the German text of this manuscript, see G. W. F. Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. Rheinisch-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1968ff.), vol. 1: *Frühe Schriften 1*, ed. Friedhelm Nicolai and Gisela Schaler (1989), pp. 193–96; and G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften*, ed. Herman Nohl (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, Paul Siebeck, 1907), pp. 361–62. I thank the Akademie and Meiner Verlag for permission to translate their text.

2. Editorial amplification is required in rendering the text due to Hegel's abbreviations. For example, Nohl rendered the opening line "*Die transzendente Idee . . .*" ("The transcendent idea"). I have consulted both of the above-mentioned editions, drawing on them both. The manuscript also contains numerous deletions and corrections that Hegel made while composing it. These occasionally help to clarify the meaning in a way that assists translation. (Hegel's substitution of "*Glückgütern*" for "*Besitz*," for example, supports rendering the former as "wealth.") I have altered punctuation. Hegel employed dashes throughout. I have substituted periods and occasionally introduced a new sentence. Where his dashes promote a fluid, equivocal meaning that promotes multiple readings, I have tried to avoid the temptation to clarify and have retained them (as in the last sentence). But I make no effort to identify all such editorial choices. Suffice it to say that daunting translation problems persist even after the German editors have produced a clean text. There are two insightful commentaries on this manuscript: H. S. Harris, *Hegel's Development: Toward the Sunlight, 1770–1801* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972), pp. 190–94; and Theodor Lorenz Haering, *Hegel: sein Wollen und sein Werk*, 2 vols. (1929; Aalen: Scientia, 1963), vol. 1, pp. 198–206.

3. Karl Rosenkranz, *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Leben* (1844; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1963), pp. 86–87.

4. Haering, *Hegel*, vol. 1, p. 206. Harris is certainly right in reading the descriptive exposition of ideas throughout the manuscript as expressing an equivocal relationship to Kant and, I might add, Fichte: see *Hegel's Development*, p. 193.

5. G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel: The Letters*, trans. Clark Butler and Christiane Seiler (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 41. See Harris, *Hegel's Development*, p. 204 note 2.

6. Harris, *Hegel's Development*, p. 226.

7. See Hegel, "Die Staatsverfassungen," in *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 1, pp. 124–26. This fragment is dated by the editors to 1793 or 1794. It is translated in G. W. F. Hegel, *Three Essays 1793–1795: The Tübingen Essay, Bern Fragments, The Life of Jesus*,

ed. and trans. Peter Fuss and John Dobbins (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), p. 67.

8. Hegel remarked in mid-April that though he lacked time to study the work as he would have liked, he had nevertheless assimilated its main ideas: G. W. F. Hegel, *Briefe von und an Hegel*, 3rd ed., 4 vols., ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1969), vol. 1, p. 23; and *Hegel: The Letters*, p. 35.

9. *Hegel: The Letters*, p. 35.

10. In addition to the strong internal evidence that supports dating the manuscript to around April 1795, analysis of handwriting in the text dates it to April 1795. See editors' note, *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 1, p. 489.

11. *Hegel: The Letters*, p. 35.

12. *Ibid.*

13. Rosenkranz described the detailed character of his study of finances. See *Hegels Leben*, p. 61. Documents that Rosenkranz had at hand have been lost. Though Rosenkranz assumed that they dated from the Bern period, Harris questions Rosenkranz's dating, observing (rightly) that Rosenkranz dated other later writings to the Bern period. See Harris, *Hegel's Development*, p. 417. But Hegel's preoccupation with details of Bern policy provide compelling corroboration of the dating of several of his studies.

14. See Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 3 (1991): *Frühe Exzerpte*, ed. Friedheim Nicolin, pp. 223-33.

15. See especially their association of a literal-minded interpretation of Scripture with despotism in letters in 1795: *Hegel: The Letters*, pp. 37-38, 42.

16. *Hegel: The Letters*, p. 42.

17. From my translation of *Rechtzustand*: "Two Hegel Texts on Law," *University of Toledo Law Review* 24 (1993), pp. 933-42.

18. Hoffheimer, trans. *Rechtzustand*, p. 937.

19. This paragraph summarizes Kant's principal arguments in chapter 3 of the "Transcendental Dialectic" in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, focusing on the criticism of the proof of God. Kant had described the method by which reason defined the attributes of God, observing that the ideal of pure reason was the object of transcendental theology. But Kant objected, "In any such use of the transcendental idea we should, however, be overstepping the limits of its purpose and validity": *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's, 1965), p. 493. And he proceeded to show the futility of the three traditional proofs of the existence of God—the ontological proof, the cosmological proof, and the physico-theological proof.

20. Though the editors of *Gesammelte Werke* (vol. 1, p. 620) identify Fichte as the target of Hegel's discussion, Hegel seems to be summarizing the opening argument in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, where Kant defined principles of practical reason as propositions that contain a general determination and that legislate objective, or practical, laws, when the condition applies to all rational beings. See *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), pp. 17-20. Kant distinguished the lower and higher faculties of desire and observed that "if there were no purely formal laws of the will

adequate to determine it, we could not admit [the existence of] any higher faculty of desire," p. 21.

21. Hegel cites Schelling here: *Ueber die Möglichkeit einer Form der Philosophie überhaupt* (Tübingen, 1794), p. 32 note. (Citation taken from the editor's note in Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 1, p. 620.) The citation actually designates the source of the material that follows it in the manuscript. See *Schellings Werke nach der Originalausgabe in neuer Anordnung*, ed. Manfred Schröter (Munich: C. H. Beck'sche, 1927, reprint 1938), vol. 1, p. 60, note 1: "Representation in the *practical* meaning is nothing other than unmediated determination of the ego contained in representation by the absolute ego, and cancellation (*Aufhebung*) of the non-ego contained in representation to the extent the non-ego is present in representation under the form of something *determinate* (*Bestimmen*). . . ." (Though Hegel complained that he did not have sufficient time to study Schelling's work [*Letters*, p. 33], the quoted passage lies in the middle of a long footnote that appears in the second half of the essay.) Schelling here applies to the ego Kant's observation that the opposite of the *Realität* of transcendental affirmation is negation that "represents the abrogation (*Aufhebung*) of all thinghood": *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 490 (A474).

22. Hegel wrote "(even the dog)" in the margin here. This seems to refer most closely to the "freedom of arbitrary choice."

23. I.e. marriage.

24. The editors of *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 1, p. 621, point out that this passage echoes the *Critique of Practical Reason*: "Inasmuch as virtue and happiness together constitute the possession of the highest good for one person, and happiness in exact proportion to morality [*Sittlichkeit*] (as the worth of a person and his worthiness to be happy) constitutes that of a possible world, the highest good means the whole, the perfect good. . . ." (*Critique of Practical Reason*, p. 115). But see also Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. J. H. Bernard (New York: Hafner, 1951), § 83, pp. 279–80.

25. The apparent incongruity of this passage leads Harris to assume that a negative has been omitted. He suggests that it should read: ". . . it does [not?] posit this ultimate aim itself—it requires the realization of the aim, therefore from another Being, but certainly not from man, or from the causality of reason, so long as it is limited by sensibility" (*Hegel's Development*, p. 193).

# Eleusis

Translated by Gustav Emil Mueller

*To Hölderlin, August 1796*

About and within me is tranquillity—busy mankind's  
uneasy worry sleeps, they give me freedom and  
leisure—thank you my emancipating night!  
The moon with pale white mist outlines the shape of distant  
hills; kindly gleams the light-stream from over the lake  
—the day's monotonous noises distance remembrance, as  
if long years lay between it and now; your image, beloved friend,  
and the delight of vanished days move before me; but soon  
remembrance yields to sweet hope—  
Already I yearn with pain, for the fiery embracing scene,  
then for the questions, upon the mysteries of the observed  
mutual presence, which by the attitudes, expressions, and  
dispositions of a friend are changed since that time—  
the known pleasure of old comradeship, which no oath seals,  
only to live eternal truth—peace never, never penetrated by  
the law which regulates opinions and impulse.  
Now with the inert barrier wrangles desire which carries  
me easily to you over mountain and rivers. —But this  
discord soon forces a sigh, and with it  
flees the sweet fanciful dream.

My eyes rise to the eternal heavenly dome, to you,  
O glimmering spangled night, and all desires, all hopes  
to forget drift down from your eternity;  
sense loses itself in intuition;  
what mine I called vanished; I gave myself to the infinite,  
I am in it, am all, am only it.  
The reappearing thought alienates.  
It is frightened before the infinite, and amazed by  
the deep view, which it does not comprehend.  
The mind approaches the image of eternity, blending  
it with shape—I welcome you sublime spirits, high.  
It fears not—I feel: it is my home-aether, the seriousness,  
the splendor, which surrounds you.  
Ha! If now the doors of your own sanctuary opened,  
O Ceres, you enthroned in Eleusis!  
I yet feel the intoxicating spirit, the thrill of  
your nearness, understand your revelation,  
I perceive the image of high meaning, I hear the  
hymns played by the gods,  
the great verdicts of your councils.

But your temples are silenced, O Goddess!  
Fled are the gods! Circle back to Olympus  
from the blessed altars,  
flown from the profaned grave of humanity is the innocent  
genius which conjured you here!  
The wisdom of your priests is silent, delivering not a  
tone of the holy initiations to us—and researcher's  
curiosity seeks in vain—more than love of wisdom  
(the seekers seem to possess it and despise you)—  
In order to master it they dug after words in which  
your higher meaning seems coined. In vain!  
They caught only some dust and ashes, to which  
your life, your eternity never returns for them.  
Yet under fashion and death the eternal dead ones  
please themselves! the frugal!—in vain—there  
remains no sign of your festive life, no trace of your image.  
To the son of consecration was the high wisdom filled  
with unspeakable feelings, much too holy, than that  
dry signs should satisfy him of your worth.  
Thought did not bind the soul, which sunk in the  
infinite presentiment of its infinity forgot itself, and

now awoke again in time and space to consciousness.  
Who would speak to another of all this, though he spoke  
with angel tongues, would feel the poverty of words;  
He is horrified that the gods are so little remembered,  
though words have become so small that to speak of them be  
sinful, so that he must live with closed mouth.  
What the consecrated himself forbade, a wise law to the lowly  
spirits forbade, that there be no desecration of what he  
saw, heard, felt in the holy night—  
that their disorderly noises should not disturb the better  
contemplation—that their hollow word trade should not  
tempt him to hate the holy itself, this must not be dragged  
through the dirt, entrusting it merely to memory—it shall  
not be sold for playthings by a sophist, shall not become  
the eloquent hypocrite's coat, or a rod for happy boys, and  
so become empty at last, that its life finds roots only in  
the echo of strange tongues. Your sons, O Goddess, do not  
peddle your praises in lane and market, but await you in  
the inner sanctuary of their breast.  
Therefore, you do not live by their lips. Their lives honored  
you. In their works you yet live. Also in this night,  
Holy Goddess, I understand you. You reveal often to me  
your children's lives. I feel the soul of their deeds!  
You are the high meaning, the true faith,  
A deity, which, though all sinks, is shaken by nothing.



# Fragments of Historical Studies

Translated by Clark Butler, with an introduction  
by H. S. Harris

The fragments translated here were published by Hegel's student Karl Rosenkranz in the appendix to his biography of Hegel.<sup>1</sup> The general principle of his arrangement of the "sources" which he printed in this appendix is plainly "chronological order." Since he placed these "historical fragments" between a group of "theological fragments" from the years 1795–98 and the last of Hegel's dated manuscripts from Frankfurt (the revised introduction to "The Positivity of the Christian Religion," dated September 24, 1800, by Hegel himself), it is clear that most of them belonged, in the opinion of Rosenkranz, to the years when Hegel was a resident tutor in the Gogel household at Frankfurt (1797–1800). For this reason Hoffmeister naturally assigned them to the Frankfurt years when he reprinted them in his *Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung*.<sup>2</sup>

Since all of the manuscripts from which these fragments were excerpted have been lost (unlike the theological manuscripts of Hegel's early years, which have for the most part survived), we have no way of checking or improving upon Hoffmeister's general hypothesis. But two facts need to be kept in mind. In the first place, Rosenkranz was quite mistaken in several of his basic assumptions about the chronology of Hegel's manuscripts; and in the second, even if he knew that a particular piece came from a lecture course at Jena, this would not have prevented him from printing it in this group.

I am inclined to suspect that some of these fragments may in fact come from Hegel's lectures at the University of Jena in the years 1801–3. For we know that Rosenkranz had many manuscripts from that period which are

now lost; he discusses and quotes from them quite copiously in the biography itself. Yet in his appendix of “Sources” there is nothing specifically ascribed to the Jena period except a group of short “aphorisms.” It is also plain that the internal arrangement of the excerpts comprising the “Fragments of Historical Studies” was suggested by Rosenkranz’s knowledge of Hegel’s mature philosophy of history, not by any ideas that he had about the context in which they were written. Thus the first fragment deals with the “Oriental spirit”; and from that we pass to Greece, Rome, the origin of Christianity, the medieval world, the modern world, and modern historians; and finally we arrive at a piece of revolutionary oratory in French which was almost certainly not written by a Frenchman. It is hard to believe that this last was excerpted from a printed source; and if it was not, then the most plausible hypothesis regarding its origin is that it was written by Hegel himself (as Rosenkranz believed) or by some other member of the “Jacobin Club” at Tübingen in 1792 or 1793. In that case it is certainly the earliest piece in the group.

If we accept the hypothesis—merely for the sake of argument—that the last piece is the one product of Hegel’s own revolutionary student eloquence that has come down to us, it will serve as a perfect example of what Rosenkranz himself was obviously aiming to illustrate: the perennial, abiding character of many of the themes of these historical reflections throughout Hegel’s life. We can hear the echo of this piece as we read the grim pages on “Absolute Freedom and Terror” in the *Phenomenology*; and we hear it again in the evocation of that “glorious dawn” in the *Philosophy of History*. In a similar fashion, we find in other fragments echoes of the themes of lordship and bondage; of religious, political, and economic alienation; of the Hellenic ideal; and of many aspects of modern freedom of thought and action. It is precisely because these were the continuing concerns of Hegel’s lifelong speculation that the fragments are virtually impossible for a modern student to date. My own scattered notes on individual pieces will serve better to illustrate this point than to settle the actual date and provenance of any of them. I cannot date them, in short, because they are not “dated” in themselves. The themes that were of continuing interest to Hegel are of perennial interest to us.

\* \* \*

## Fragments of Historical Studies

1. *The Spirit of the Orientals*: Reverence for the actual in its actuality and embellishment of it in fantasy.<sup>3</sup> The Orientals have fixedly determinate characters. They never again change from the way they first are; they do not depart from the direction of a path once embarked upon. What

lies outside their path is not present to them, but whatever impedes them along that path is hostile. Once firmly established, their character cannot depart from itself; it is incapable of taking up and reconciling itself with what stands over against it. The one side becomes dominant, the other dominated. Might is the concept in which all beings are equal. Force is their relation to one another: force of strength, genius, or speech. A fixedly determinate character allows nothing apart from itself except what it dominates, or what dominates it in the same manner as it would dominate. For there are limits, actual facts in it that cannot be transcended [*aufgehoben*], which, [in order to] exist beside other contradictory facts, beside what is hostile, can stand in no other relation. Since the limits of character yield facts which love cannot unite, these limits must be bound *objectively*; in other words, they must stand under law. The equality of the actual is necessity; it is, consequently, the law which governs all. That is why in the Oriental character two apparently contradictory determinations are so intimately bound up with each other: *the will to power over all and voluntary surrender to every form of slavery*. Both conditions, domination as well as slavery, are legitimate here because the same law of force rules in both. In the Orient that man is happy who has the courage to subjugate what is weaker than he and the *cleverness* not to attack but at once to subjugate himself to what is stronger. In the Orient he is *wise* who withdraws from actual facts and is active in speech and dicta. *Noble* is the man of greater cultivation, who knows how to discriminate, who enslaves only insofar as he has met resistance, who posits the equality of the vanquished with himself by recognizing the law of necessity ruling over both, and who honors in himself the actual victor a possible vanquished and in the one enslaved a possible ruler.<sup>4</sup> This possibility of the *opposite*, this possibility of the infinite manifoldness of actual beings as possible rulers or vanquished, this might which appears in the *transitions* of the negative to positive and positive to negative, is the infinite divinity of the Orientals. Events are woven on the loom of its will and government, and out of the fount of its command flow the streams of epochs and centuries into the abyss of its power.<sup>5</sup>

In the fixed determinateness of the Oriental character the relations in which man stands are very few, and all that presents itself soon receives its place. The man of fixedly determinate character has no dealings with whatever is not of the same kind as he. Most of what may impinge on him he brushes aside. The rest he fights and masters, or he subjects himself to its power, but his claims remain the same. This immutability, this inability to be moved in manifold ways through the many-sidedness of things, secures for the Oriental his repose. Because the world to him is a collection of facts which appear only in their naked power as mere opposites devoid of a soul and spirit of their own, he must, in order to

help them over their deficiency, seek to make up for what they lack in inherent content by means of a *foreign, borrowed brilliance*. The Oriental always adorns what is actual with imagination. He envelops each thing in images. These images are indeed also images of actual facts, and there is a poverty in them which seems incapable of imparting any brilliance to the first facts, which, however, through their connection to these other facts become poetic. The uniting of what is unlike in kind produces the appearance of life, which lies in the likeness of the things connected. The respect in which one knows these things to be like oneself emerges into consciousness only darkly because the diversity is of kinds so unlike, but the things connected cannot venture to allow a form of pure life to step forth. The noble splendor of their images astounds; the sun-like brilliance of their pictures blinds. But it is precisely because one feels violence in the connection of things so unlike in kind that one is astounded.<sup>6</sup> Because one can make no claim to the splendor of this objective being, one is blinded. Because love has not done the connecting, feeling goes out empty,<sup>7</sup> and the delicacies, the pearls of the Oriental spirit, are but a wildly beautiful monstrosity. But where the objectivity of life steps forth as unity stripped of the manifold, this unity can be only a concept, a universal with which the manifold's pictures are entirely filled.

The determinateness of character permits no great manifoldness of characters. The manifoldness of determinatenesses would destroy itself. But what is beyond these determinatenesses, what indeed in the nature of the matter is of the same kind as they but of greater and deeper force, must operate miraculously as something invisible and higher. In the mode of composition of the Oriental empires, enduring or ephemeral, in the system of obedience and subordination in such untamed masses, the might is clearly displayed which Oriental characters—characters thus similar and yet bound by strength, depth and stubbornness—practice on other Orientals, the blind passivity, verging almost on annihilation, of the latter against the former. There arises also therefrom the *importance* and thus *economy* of *oratorical solemnity*, of the utterance of an invisible and in itself unknowable life.

As the Orientals adorn the naked reality of other things with fantasy, so must they, who have such imperfect consciousness of themselves and who in the exposition of their nature can find no satisfying unity, overload themselves so much with foreign ornamentation. Their adornment cannot be clothing which receives its form and beauty from the human form in its own proper free play, but rather from completely foreign things. There is here no natural whole which one puts on more out of love, thus adorning oneself more with one's own feeling, but rather dazzling things stripped of a life of their own and of a form shaped by life—gold dressed perhaps in borrowed forms, jewelry united in flowers, and so on.

Among the Orientals nature was driven right out of what is natural and appeared for itself merely as something common and vanquished. Womanly feeling and the *love of women* alone remained a passion the enjoyment of which was not domination. In many Oriental nations it is a great dishonor to mention women and what relates to them, especially in the company of persons of distinction; either because here even the bravest did not feel themselves to be masters and thereby were reminded of their weakness; or rather because no one was ashamed of this weakness before himself and merely held the mention, the enunciation of all that relates to this side of human nature, to be a disgrace, because they honored the feminine as something foreign to the remainder of their spirit, as something superior to them, something which they shied away from transferring into the remaining class of common things through mention of it. Because they feel that the relation to women can never be what the relation to all other things is, can never be lordship or bondage, because women unlike other things are to them something which does not admit of being manipulated, and of which they can never become assured, they know no other counsel *than to seclude them!*

The Jews lacked this timidity. They spoke of sexual relations freely and without embarrassment, but all that is connected with such relations is to them, like everything, something merely real, unpenetrated by the spirit of love.<sup>8</sup> This spirit thus fails to govern them in their treatment of this matter as well, and this is why this treatment in their own laws and books, which contain the sum of their education, is so shocking, abject, and shameful. For the holier and purer the soul-giving essence, the more detestable it is to represent and treat the organs and expressions of this essence as mere things.

Among the Orientals a beard is very sacred. Among the Jews no shearing knife was permitted to fall on the head of a Nazarene or anyone consecrated for holy orders. In every seventh year consecrated to God, or even today perhaps every fiftieth year, no field was to be cultivated, no grape vine cut, no vintage stored away. Bondsmen, cattle and wild beasts were to freely partake of the spontaneous fruits of the earth. To let a beard grow is a great act of arbitrariness. A beard is to be sure, although to a very small degree, a bodily organ, and in this respect cutting one's nails is just as great a mutilation, while the practice of circumcision which is so widespread in the Orient and is commanded among the Jews is surely an even greater one. Preservation of the beard thus cannot be seen as a form of respect for the perfection of the human form, which respect, moreover, absolutely contradicts concealing this form by means of tasteless clothing and overloading it with shiny and multifarious adornment. An arbitrary act which one lays upon oneself is asserted with all the greater stubbornness, just as sacrifice is all the more meritorious,

the greater the arbitrariness of the act to which one subjects oneself. But why did the Orientals impose precisely this act upon themselves? Why is such importance attached to it that the beard is even holy? Because in the Oriental mind all worth and value lie in the Infinite Object,<sup>9</sup> because it can attach no value to something existing for itself and having its own life in itself, it must doll itself up from the outside by means of tinsel in which there is no life; it must despite everything make itself into something too, and thus also must seek to hold on most dearly to the beard, which is least essential to its organic totality; it must honor most highly what in itself is most indifferent.

2. *Memory* is the gallows tree from which the gods of Greece hang strangulated. To display a gallery of gods thus hanged, to propel them around in a circle by means of the wind of wit, to lead them to pester one another and to blow into all sorts of groupings and contortions is often called "poetry." Memory is the tomb, the guardian of the dead. The deceased rests therein as deceased. The tomb is pointed out like an assortment of stones. Putting things in order, going over them, powdering them, all these occupations indeed have a relation to the deceased, but are independent of him. But to babble unintelligible prayers, to read masses, to recite rosaries, to practice ceremonies of religious worship empty of meaning, this is the conduct of the dead. Man tries to turn completely into an object, to subject himself entirely to the rule of what is alien. Such service is called devoutness. Pharisees!<sup>10</sup>

3. On the women who sang dirges at the public funeral ceremony for those who fell in the first year of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides, Book II, Paragraph 34: "and the female relatives are there to wail at the burial."<sup>11</sup> The greatest alleviation of grief<sup>12</sup> is to cry out with it, to have spoken it squarely in its entire compass. Through expression the pain is made objective and the balance between the subjective, which is alone present, and the objective, which in pain is nothing, is produced. Only through expression does the pain enter consciousness, and what has come to consciousness has passed by. It is brought into the form of reflection and is through succeeding determinations pushed away. But if the heart is still full, if pain is still entirely subjective, there is room in it for nothing else. Even tears are such a discharge or expression, an objectification of the pain. The pain, since it is subjective and has also become objective, has made itself into the image. But because pain is by nature subjective, it is very contrary to its nature for it to go outside itself. Only the greatest urgency can drive it to do so. But when the need is passed, when everything is lost and pain has become despair, it closes itself in upon itself, and here it is most beneficial to draw it out. This cannot be

effected by anything heterogeneous. Only by being itself given to itself does the pain have itself as itself and yet as something in part outside itself. A painting fails to achieve this effect. The pain here only sees, but does not move, itself. For what is subjective, speech is the purest form of objectivity. It is still nothing objective, and yet it is movement toward objectivity. Lamentation in song has at once, what is more, the form of beauty, since it moves itself according to rule. Songs of lamentation by women called upon for the purpose are thus the most human response to pain, to the need to discharge oneself of oneself, in that one develops the pain most deeply for oneself and holds it up to oneself in its entire compass. Only this holding up is the balm.

4. Thucydides, Book 11, Paragraph 36: "There are few parts of our dominions that have not been augmented by those of us here."<sup>13</sup> Thus only the popular assembly of a small free state can pass judgment. Before it and from its mouth "we" carries full truth. In larger republics popular assemblies are always very restricted. The greater the number of fellow citizens becomes, the more alien is "we" to those who pronounce it. The participation of each individual in the act is so small that he can hardly speak of it as his deed. Participation in the fame of one's nation is greater, but this only means "I belong to the nation," not "I am the nation." This whole exercises dominion over the individual who stands under it. A large but free people is to this extent a contradiction in terms.<sup>14</sup> The people is the totality of all individuals, and each and every individual is ruled by the whole. His deed, that which is the deed of *each*, is an infinitely small fragment of any national action.

5. Before Lycurgus, after an absence of ten years, returned to Sparta in order to carry out his completed plan of legislation, he inquired of the Delphic oracle about it. Pythia christened him in the name of Apollo a friend and favorite of the gods. She told him that he was more a god than a man. She explained that Apollo approved the plan which he had drawn up. If he could bring about acceptance of his laws, there would be in all the world no better-instituted republic than the Lacedaemonian. But after he had gradually introduced his laws he returned once more to the oracle, which issued the pronouncement that he had adequately taken care to make the Lacedaemonians as happy as virtuous, and that if they would permanently maintain his laws they would enjoy an eternal fame and fortune. Had the Lacedaemonians and the other Greeks been capable of subjecting themselves to positive divine laws, had they even been capable of conceiving such laws, should not the Lacedaemonians have obliged the other Greeks and preached to them likewise to accept the Spartan constitution which a pronouncement of the universal oracle

had given out to be the most perfect? Would not the others, in order to be logical, have had to accept the same constitution? But the Greeks were a free nation *which allowed laws to be given to it by no god*. This motive, confirmation through divinity, was alien to them.<sup>15</sup>

6. After the downfall of Roman and Greek freedom, as dominion over objects by means of ideas was taken away from men, the genius of mankind suffered division. The spirit of the corrupt *crowd* said to the objects: "I am yours, take me away!" Throwing itself into the current of objects, it allowed itself to be torn away from itself by them, and thus went under in their interchange. The spirit of the *Stoics* did the opposite. It said: "You objects are alien to my being, which knows nothing of you. I rule over you in idea. You may well be as you wish, it is a matter of total indifference to me. You are to me too contemptible for me even to want to lay a hand on you." Other spirits felt that the objects ought to be otherwise, but lacked the courage to lay hold of them and give them form. The superior strength of the objects weighed down on them, leaving them only the feeling of their impotence. One portion of these spirits built in their minds invisible objects for themselves, which they found ready at hand in popular illusion, transferring to objects the ideas of the people, and imploring these objects: "Take me up into your being, appear to us, reveal yourself to us, draw us to yourself, rule over us!" These go by the name of *Theurgists*. Another portion of these spirits heard of a similar new object, fled from external objects which were denied to them, threw themselves into the arms of their faith that that invisible being would rule over both themselves and external objects. These were called *Christians*. The developed church has united both the wish of the *Stoics* and of those inwardly broken spirits.<sup>16</sup> The church permits man to live in the whirl of objects and at once promises by means of easy exercises, sleight of hand, lip movements and so forth a way for him to rise above objects. The wish of the *Theurgists* really only occasionally entered the heads of so-called Christian *enthusiasts*. This unification, unlike the other, really never became a more general calling.

7. In the series of revelations of God, or in the successive derivation and generation of His forms the revelation of Him as the sun, stars, sea, air, and love preceded His revelation as man. This last form was necessary in the successive stages of His generations.<sup>17</sup> Nature came, through the establishment of the Roman state which took liberty away from almost the entire known earth, to be subjected to a law alien to man, and interdependence with nature was torn apart. The life of nature turned to stone and wood. The gods turned to created and serviceable beings. Where power stirred, where benevolence revealed itself, where mere magnitude ruled, there was the heart and character of man. To



the Athenians Theseus became a hero only after his death. To Demetrius and Antigone they made offerings only as departed. The Roman caesars were deified. Apollonius of Tyana performed miracles. Greatness was no longer supernatural but rather unnatural, for nature was no longer divine, thus no longer beautiful, no longer free. In this *separation of nature and the divine* one man became the connector of both, and thus the reconciler, the savior. The Judaic people, however, has traveled in the madness of hate the path to hell. What later tottered on of this people on earth has remained as a sign. Just as the newer peoples must have all types of humanity among themselves, though admittedly the noble types only in time of suffering, so this people even today remains among them as the very model of what is most rejected. In Homer's world manifoldness encompasses at the bottom rung Thersites, who had only a useless tongue. Yet, after he is beaten, a tear falls from his eye. Full of fear and in silence he sits down and wipes the tear away. His fear and silence give recognition to mightier circles of men. At least sensitivity for what is better thus had to remain even to the worst of Homeric men. But in a new world of men one sees, next to Amelia's heavenly pure souls, scoundrels roasting children in fire; and as the gang leader, becoming conscious of his fate, threatens the thieves with a fearful inspection, they take it that he is today in a bad mood. In such a confusion of different species as are together called "man" by systematists, the Jew has his place. One man among the Jews has had God good-naturedly say: "He who does not keep my commandments I will punish until the third and fifth generation." But the Furies of their religion are lashing out at them already in their hundredth generation. Yet they perhaps do not believe themselves to be punished if Christ throws them down the stairs because they are Jews, if they for the sake of a few farthings have treated one another basely for hours and begin chattering away even a third hour, and if they come back for another day of the same.

8. What educated taste and unprejudiced reason, which know how to appreciate the nobility of the Greek spirit in its entire range, in all its modifications, still display is the *ignobility in the passion of love*, a passion which, among the nations of German derivation in modern history, has acquired an entirely different and more sublime form. Should not this phenomenon also stand in connection with the spirit of their free life? If a knight from the age of chivalry recounted to an *Aristides* the deeds which he had performed for his loved one, the adventures which he underwent for her, the long succession of years, every moment of which was devoted with iron patience entirely to the one end which his beloved had surrendered to him, and if such a man left *Aristides* in *doubt* as to what the object of this activity was; or if a noble young man portrayed the beauty of his love object with all the fire of imagination in precisely the

same indeterminate way, describing to him the deep reverence which he felt for it, the holiness and purity of his sentiment, his enthusiasm in the proximity of the beloved, describing how it was the one interest of his life to work and breathe for the beloved, would not Aristides, not knowing to whom all this show of sentiment, deeds and enthusiasm was devoted, would not he reply somewhat in the following way: "I devoted my life to my fatherland. I knew nothing higher than its freedom and welfare. For this I labored without any claim to distinction, power or wealth, but I am conscious that I have not done so much for it, nor felt so exclusive and deep a reverence. I doubtless know other Greeks who did more, who had greater enthusiasm, but I know none who has achieved this height of self-sacrificial sentiment on which you stand. But what was the object of your exalted life? It must be infinitely greater and more worthy than the highest which I am capable of thinking, greater than fatherland and liberty."<sup>18</sup>

9. The unbridled *imagination of women in the Middle Ages* raged about in the ghastliness of *witchcraft*, in the attempt to practice petty envy and revenge on others, and has brought them to the funeral pyre. To Greek women in the *Bacchanalian* festivities a permissible room for free play was allowed. After the exhaustion of body and imagination there followed a quiet withdrawal into the circle of ordinary feeling and traditional life. The wild maenad was for the rest of the time a reasonable woman. On the one hand witches, on the other maenads; in the one case the object of fantasy is a devilish grimace, in the other a beautiful, vine-bedecked god; in the one socialized satisfaction of envy, of the desire for revenge and hate, in the other nothing but purposeless pleasure often verging on raving madness; in the one progress from individual attacks of insanity to total and enduring derangement of the mind, in the other withdrawal into ordinary life; in the first case the age did not consider this displaced madness as an illness but a blasphemous outrage which could be atoned only with the funeral pyre, in the second the need of many female fantasies and temperaments was something holy, the outbreak of which gave occasion for holidays, something which was sanctioned by the state and thereby given the possibility of being innocuous.<sup>19</sup>

10. *Contempt for men*. Everyone is used to judging others according to the rule which he has himself made for *mankind*, and to demand that man be so. Only long experience with the world or an abundance of good-heartedness brings us back from this. This demand is especially characteristic of the Europeans. It is a kind of willfulness. It is thus also a sign of our times and nothing more—not high culture, not approach toward the end of mankind, to perfection—to find public judgment of characters, for example, of a Rousseau, according to the rules of reason.

Beyond the fact that everyone should first search his own heart, it is self-legislating *virtue* alone which can judge and make demands. But *no man* has the right over against others to assume the standpoint of virtue and, representing the person of the others, to make demands on them. Each can reply to such a one: virtue has the right to demand this of me, but not you.<sup>20</sup>

11. In the *states of the modern world security of property is the pivot* around which all legislation turns, and to which most rights of citizens relate. In many free republics of antiquity the strict right of property, which is the preoccupation of all our governing bodies, the pride of our states, is already encroached upon by the constitution of the state. In the Lacedaemonian constitution security of property and industry was a point which hardly came into consideration, which, one might almost say, was forgotten. In Athens the wealthy citizens were customarily robbed of a part of their property. Yet one used a respectable pretext for the person whom one wanted to rob: one assigned to the person an office which demanded a huge outlay of money. Whoever in the tribes into which citizens divided was elected to a costly post could look around among the citizens of his tribe to see if he did not find anyone richer. If he believed he had found such a person and this person claimed to be less rich, the first could then propose to the person in question an exchange of estates which the latter could not refuse. How dangerous the disproportionate wealth of certain citizens is to even the freest form of constitution and how it is capable of destroying liberty itself is shown by history in the example of a Pericles in Athens; of the patricians in Rome, the downfall of whom the menacing influence of the Gracchi and others in vain sought to retard through proposals of agrarian laws; of the Medicis in Florence. It would be an important topic of investigation to see how much of the strict right of property would have to be sacrificed for the sake of a durable form of republic. We have perhaps not done justice to the system of sansculottism in France in seeking the source of its demand for greater equality of property solely in rapacity.<sup>21</sup>

12. In *Italy*, where political freedom had displayed itself in purer forms and more beautiful features but was lost somewhat earlier than in Germany, jurisprudence arose in Bologna earlier than poetry, and the noblest portion of the people rushed to that city from all sides, contenting themselves with being learned and precise judges in their fatherland, for only on *the tribunal were they still servants of an idea, of laws*, for elsewhere they were only servants of a man. In the middle history of middle and upper Italy we find the connection of men to states most imperfect, and the bonds most loose. The history of Italy in this period is really not so much the history of a people or several peoples as rather that of a *crowd of*

*individuals*; and because in this picture, except for short periods, no great masses arise (because such masses are immediately reduced to dust), it is extremely difficult to find general viewpoints on this history. All the more interesting is the history of individual men, since their individuality did not go under along with the general form of the state and constitution. It is typically only an interest of the moment which unites men. Seldom do we see a union which would have an enduring interest as its basis. All conflicts concerned the rights of individual families and men, and they could never be brought to give up something of their rights for the betterment of social cohesion. Living together in cities was more a matter of being next to one another in the same space, within the same walls, than of subjection to the same laws. The power of the governing authority was weak. Rule was exercised in no way by ideas. Not only was the flat land covered with a countless number of castles which each had built for his own safety, but every palace belonging to families even in the city, where they laid siege to one another, was fitted out with turrets and otherwise fortified. The exercise of justice was only the victory of one faction over the other.<sup>22</sup>

13. *Public capital punishment.* Montesquieu remarks respecting the Japanese that the multitude of public and at once cruel executions have made the character of the people savage and indifferent to such punishment, as also to crime itself. But how is it that this phenomenon brings about precisely the opposite of the end which legislators and judges had in mind in the matter of public punishment? Is it merely habit, which robs death by the hangman, the fearful preparations thereto, the fear of death and the general scorn—or, what would to many be even more oppressive, general compassion—of what is nauseous, grisly and horrible about it? Habit would result only in indifference, as in the case of the warrior to whose right a thousand and to whose left ten thousand fall. What is it in an execution that immediately strikes the eye, and what sensation is occasioned by this phenomenon? What strikes us is an unarmed, bound man, surrounded by numerous guards, who is held by disreputable henchmen, who is brought out completely defenseless amid the summons and prayer of clericals who cry out to the offender in order to drown consciousness of the present moment. This is how he dies. The soldier who is mowed down beside another, or who, met with invisible lead, falls to the ground, does not awaken in us the same sensation which execution of the offender brings about. I think that in this last moment what we sense is that a man's *right of defending himself for his life* has been taken away from him. The man who dies in battle with another can be pitied by us, but such death does not vex us like death by execution, for one who dies in battle has exercised his natural right to defend his life.

Moreover, he fell only because the other man asserted the same right. The feeling of indignation upon seeing a defenseless man executed by, even worse, a superior number of armed men fails to be transformed among the witnesses into rage only because the *pronouncement of the law is sacred* to them. But this representation is not capable of entirely repressing that feeling, which arises as a first impression. If hangmen are admittedly servants of justice, still this bare representation has been incapable of suppressing the general feeling which has branded with *dishonor* the calling or station of these men who are able to kill in cold blood a defenseless man here before the gaze of the entire people, who perform their service here just like unseeing tools, similar to the wild animals to which criminals formerly were thrown. Enlightened understanding may ever so insistently decry as prejudice this voice of the people and the dark feeling on which it is based; it may repeat to the people ever so insistently that it finds in analyzing that feeling no rational ground, and may on the contrary compare the hangmen, as servants of the state and justice in the performance of their duty, to other officials of the state; yet, as it fares with the understanding in the case of still many other feelings, it will not here be able to repress this feeling. One who considers the matter fairly, however, will always know how to distinguish the man himself from the calling which arouses such indignation, and would only be doing him justice by wishing him another calling, just as in other situations when convinced of the scandalousness of a custom or habit of a people, one would not take an individual with whom he has dealings for a scoundrel. There is a striking observation to be made of men of this station, namely that on the whole they are quiet, upright and often pious people. Is it that their occupation, which shows them most immediately the wages of crime, has this effect, or is it not far more a case of self-esteem directed against the contempt which is shown toward men of their station, to permit them to save their individuality; is it the feeling that the dignity of a person is independent of the honor or dishonor of his station? Among the Greeks I do not know public executions to have existed.<sup>23</sup> Socrates at least drank of the poisonous cup in prison, and Orestes, according to Euripides, is said also to have himself consummated his self-chosen method of death. Should anyone today propose that the public character of the death penalty be abolished, he would call down upon himself the cry of a thousand tongues that a chief goal of punishment, which is to serve as *an example for others*, would then be lost. It appears that the Greeks did not think of this goal of punishment, and that their lawgivers did not hold it necessary to shock feeling and imagination with a gruesome spectacle and thereby replace what inner morality and reverence for the laws could not accomplish. The asserted necessity of cruel and public penalties proves

on the whole nothing more than the little confidence which the lawgiver and judge could place in the ethical feeling of their people. One would cry out just as loudly against such a proposal that if death sentences were not publicly carried out, the restraint on unscrupulous judges would be less. Despotism would murder more undauntedly in the dark than it dares in public. (Were all executions in Venice carried out in private, or only those of political criminals?) To citizens of a state who would have this to fear and who would bring forth this objection nothing is to be said; and, generally speaking, in any state in which a court not chosen from amidst the people passes judgment behind closed doors on the life of a fellow citizen, nothing is so much to be wished for the subjects than that this shadow of importance attached to the voice of the public be retained, for the court justifies itself prior to public execution in the eyes of the public as if because of the sentence it has already passed, which is read off along with the grounds. But in states in which the citizen has the right to be judged before his peers, where everyone enjoys free access to the courtroom, this inconvenience would fall away.

14. Hume distinguishes himself as a historian of modern times at once through the character of the historical event itself. The object of his history is a state of modern times whose inner relations are not only, as with the ancients, legally determined, but rather have durability more through legal form than through the unconscious free life inhering in those relations. Legality, consciousness of the universal and at once of opposition, of particularity, does indeed assign their place to the various estates, but men do not act as whole men out of an idea which would ensoul all. Their force and might is to be sure invisibly this idea, but what comes to consciousness is immediately their external relation to those who co-act with them as issuing commands or *giving obedience* in various levels and forms of the transaction. The men who stand at the top and whose deeds history gives us as events always have the state, with all the manifoldness of its relations, above them and outside them. The state is present in them as thought. It determines them. They calculate according to it, they let it pass by before them in consciousness, and thus it is not so much character which we see acting immediately but rather the considerations according to which character acts. Its actions are in the greatest part either commands or acts of obedience. Beyond the fact that the state as thought is what is determinative, no one has totally performed any action. Because the whole of an action, of which only a fragment belongs to each actor, is split up into so many parts, the entire work is thus a result of so many individual actions. *The work is not done as a deed but as a result which is thought.* Consciousness of the deed as a whole is present in none of the actors. The *historian* knows the work by the

results and is made attentive to what the deed brings about as something already present in what has preceded. Only those who command and who have influence of some kind on those who command can be seen as actors. The others contribute by their orderliness. Because everything is ordered and the *power of this order* rules, most step forth only as cogs in the machine. What has life, the transformation in the organization of this order, is small, gradual and invisible. Because all here is determined, peoples are incapable of attaching themselves to any great man, as the Sicilians to Timoleon; thus no one can make such total plans peculiar to himself as did Alcibiades, Themistocles, and others, plans which made the great man; but everyone's action is rather only conduct within a definite, given sphere.<sup>24</sup>

15. p. 519: "But Johann Georg's subsequent conduct unmasked the motives which had held him back from using his advantage over the Emperor and advancing the plans of the King of Sweden expediently and efficaciously."<sup>25</sup> The greatest part of the sentence is governed by "advancing," while the purpose of the sentence is to convey the contrary. This contrary lies in the phrase "held back," which is supposed to bring about the negative sense of the whole, the greatest part of which, however, embraces the whole expressed positively.

p. 504: "Where the path of righteousness (leading namely to the conversion of the Protestants) was not fruitful, one called upon soldierly assistance to frighten the lost sheep back into the fold of the Church."<sup>26</sup> In this observation the method of conversion is the main idea. This method is specified as either righteousness or soldierly assistance. Despite the fact that the idea, whose method of execution is given here, must already have been expressed beforehand and is very prominent, its expression nonetheless takes once again in this observation almost the entire greater half of the whole. The expression of the main idea stands all the further in the background. Through both circumstances the mode of expression rises above the main idea, the method of conversion, and is what sticks in mind. The expression "frighten" by itself still has a connection to the method of conversion and mitigates the mistake somewhat in that it reproduces the main idea once more. The second sentence after the present one has again for its conclusion: "to preach the Gospel to the heretics." It obliterates historicity to some extent, bringing the main idea, which has already been adequately expressed, once more before the reader. And the next sentence proceeds still again with: "In order to impose his aim."

The *character portraits* are excellent. For them, large sentences in which many *traits* are gathered together into unity are the most suitable. This becomes a mannerism, however, when Schiller uses it for the exposi-

tion of a *situation* which is composed of many external circumstances, and especially when it is a situation which is not a circumstance coordinated, as an interdependence of cause and effect in space and time, with a *single* deed. The traits are then too externally separated from one another, too diverse. Their unity is only a point to which they are related as past. For example, p. 501: "strengthened by the troops which came over to his side from the enemy garrison, the Saxon general von Arnheim directed his march toward Lusatia, a province which an imperial general, Rudolf von Tiefenbach, had overrun with an army in order to chastise the Saxon Elector for having gone over to the side of the enemy."<sup>27</sup> How disparate are the things here brought together. "Crossing over to the enemy" should all the more come before "strengthened" because the latter is merely incidental. The crossing over of the hostile garrison from Leipzig then stands immediately beside directing the march toward Lusatia, while the sentence ends with the imperial general disciplining the Elector: matters which lie quite remote from one another. The grammatical interconnection exists only for the understanding, not the imagination. The interconnection which is true and in natural agreement with the succession of events consists in placing sentences without relative pronouns after one another. The Romans in their style of history writing often leave many sentences in the *infinitive*.

p. 508: "This unexpected, inexplicable lack of resistance aroused Arnheim's mistrust all the more because the hasty approach of relief from Schlesia was no secret to him, because the Saxon army was too insufficiently supplied with equipment for laying siege, and was far too weak in numbers to storm such a large city. *Afraid* of a trap. . . ."<sup>28</sup> Arnheim's mistrust is the main idea, which is heightened by means of the grounds for this mistrust. These grounds are *thoughts* in Arnheim's soul. But through their enumeration they become for us events and circumstances. We forget to see them merely in Arnheim's soul and come to see them for themselves, thereby losing sight of the main idea, of Arnheim's mistrust, which should thus stand in the background. Often, in order to describe the situation of a hero, the most disparate things are thus posited together in the unity of his thought as ends and means. The Greeks talk on telling a story. One sees only the external action of the actor, not the action as his thought, as his aim. But *whether the deed was purposeful* and, what is more important, *whether the purpose was great*, is always very well characterized. It is seen from the deed. If the end was great and the action small, the man is of little spirit. The fact that sentences are stuck inside one another by means of the relative pronoun displaces the natural sequence in the order of sentences, partly due to



the helplessness of the relative pronoun, and partly to the lack of the absolute pronoun, and so on.<sup>29</sup>

16. In monarchy the people was an active power only in the moment of battle. Like a mercenary army, it had to keep order not only in the fire of battle, but also had to return at once to perfect obedience after victory. We are accustomed by experience to see a mass of armed men enter upon command into a regulated fury of carnage, into lotteries of life and death, and then return equally upon command to calm. The same was asked of a people which had armed itself. The command was liberty, the enemy tyranny, the supreme commanding authority a constitution, subordination obedience to one's representatives. But there is a great difference between the passivity of military subordination and the rage of insurrection; between the order of a general and the flame of enthusiasm which liberty establishes through all the veins of a living being. It is this sacred flame which strained all nerves; it is for this flame, it is to enjoy it, that they exerted themselves. These efforts are the enjoyments of liberty, and you wish the people to renounce them. These activities, this endeavor on behalf of the public, this interest is the active principle, and you wish the people to throw itself more into inaction and torpor.<sup>30</sup>

## Notes

1. Karl Rosenkranz, *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Leben* (1844; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1963), pp. 515–32. (Actually Rosenkranz originally published these sixteen fragments, with one more, in the *Literarhistorisches Taschenbuch* for 1843.)

2. G. W. F. Hegel, *Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung*, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Stuttgart: Fromann, 1936), pp. 257–76.

3. If this heading comes from Hegel's own manuscript, as the quotation marks of Rosenkranz seem to imply, then this fragment almost certainly comes from a larger continuous manuscript with marginal divisions or subheads. (Compare "The Positivity of the Christian Religion," in G. W. F. Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, trans. and ed. T. M. Knox and Richard Kroner [Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1975], pp. 67–145.) Hegel's object is to place his particular conception of the Jewish spirit within his wider conception of Oriental culture. This, together with the many echoes of themes and languages from the Frankfurt years, makes it virtually certain that what we have here is part of a late draft of Hegel's reflections on "the Spirit of Christianity." I take it to be part of the manuscript which Hegel completed on September 14, 1800 (for which, see Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, pp. 309–19) and which he referred to as his "system" in the letter to Schelling of November 2, 1800.

4. Hegel first became concerned about domination and servitude when he was trying to characterize the Jewish spirit in 1797. His remarks about the voluntary acceptance of serfdom by Oriental peoples fit perfectly into this context: compare Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, pp. 182–91; a number of relevant but untranslated fragments are discussed in H. S. Harris, *Hegel's Development: Toward the Sunlight, 1770–1801* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972), pp. 278–91. But this comment about the *noble* (i.e. Greek) attitude toward enslavement by conquest looks forward to the theory of the “struggle for recognition” which Hegel first formulated clearly in the “Philosophy of Spirit” of 1803–4 and which gives servitude a focal importance in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

5. The divine abyss [*Abgrund*] is a motif derived from Jacob Böhme which plays a small but noticeable role in the identity philosophy of Schelling and Hegel at Jena from 1801 to 1804. Compare, for instance, Hegel's *Difference between the Systems of Fichte and Schelling*, trans. H. S. Harris and W. Cerf (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977), pp. 88, 140; and his *Faith and Knowledge*, trans. H. S. Harris and W. Cerf (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977), p. 190.

6. Compare the remark about the “orientally beautiful threat” with which Moses sealed his legislation, in Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, p. 195.

7. About the end of 1797 Hegel developed a theory of “love” as the power by which the imagination *enlivens* nature (and its various elements) so as to be able both to recognize and to be united with the divine in them. Most of the relevant fragments have not yet been translated (see Harris, *Hegel's Development*, pp. 294–316), but the most important one is in Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, pp. 302–8.

8. This comment on Jewish extremism is echoed in an as-yet-unpublished fragment of 1798 (“*Die Schönen ihrer Natur nach*”; see Harris, *Hegel's Development*, pp. 290–91).

9. The many ceremonial prescriptions of Judaic law are similarly accounted for in Hegel's essay on the “Spirit of Judaism.” See Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, p. 191.

10. The distinction of verbal memory from living imagination was one of the earliest important distinctions that Hegel made (see Harris, *Hegel's Development*, pp. 36–39). As he developed his mature system at Jena, he came to see the death-dealing power of *Gedächtnis* as the necessary condition and source of the “resurrection” of all experience as truly human or spiritual memory [*Erinnerung*]. The present fragment is closer to the beginning of this process than to the end. Its affinity with the previous fragment is obvious. Compare also Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, pp. 203–4 (Knox shows, in his note, that the source of Hegel's conception of the Pharisees is Josephus).

11. Thucydides, *The Complete Writings*, trans. J. H. Finley, Jr. (New York, 1951), p. 102. Hegel cites Thucydides both here and in fragment 4 in the Greek.

12. “*Schmerz*”: Hegel was concerned about the relieving of grief or sorrow from his Tübingen days onward (see Harris, *Hegel's Development*, pp. 498–99); and he had certainly studied Thucydides carefully by 1793. Among his early

manuscripts was a translation which Rosenkranz believed to belong to the Bern period (1793–97). The language here is more that of the Frankfurt period (when Hegel was much interested in Judaism as a religion of grief), and the doctrine of “consciousness” is as sophisticated as that which Hegel developed at Jena. In fact, this fragment illuminates some difficult passages in the *System of Ethical Life* (1802) and the first “Philosophy of Spirit” (1803–4).

13. Thucydides, *The Complete Writings*, p. 103.

14. The theory of the *Volk* is the central problem of Hegel’s political thought from 1793 onward. He formulated the conception of the Greek *polis* that is stated here in his “Tübingen Essay” (see Harris, *Hegel’s Development*, pp. 505–7) and never abandoned it afterward. The problem of “a large but free people” remains central even in the *Philosophy of Right*. But the present passage is particularly helpful toward an understanding of the difficult concept of the “intuition of the *Volk*” in the *System of Ethical Life* (1802).

15. The conclusion suggests an implicit contrast with the Jews’ dependence on the declared will of their God. But Hegel continued to be troubled by the problem of Greek dependence on the oracle, which is not properly solved here. In the *Phenomenology* he solves it by emphasizing the enigmatic character of oracular utterance. The Greeks knew that the right interpretation of the mysterious wisdom of the God was a strictly human task (compare *Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller [Oxford: Clarendon, 1977], §§ 696, 737).

16. The way Rosenkranz speaks in his own introductory comment upon this fragment suggests that at least some of “these fragments” (including this one) were already fragmentary and disordered when they came to his notice. (In that case his opinion about their time of origin must be regarded with considerable reserve.) Hegel’s earliest dated reflections on the “boredom of the world” from which Christianity emerged belong to 1794 (see Harris, *Hegel’s Development*, pp. 182–83; compare also the essay of 1796 in Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, pp. 145–67). But the view expressed here about the relation of Stoicism to the newborn religion anticipates the *Phenomenology*, and is not found anywhere else in Hegel’s manuscripts before 1806. (Compare *Phenomenology*, § 754, with *Early Theological Writings*, p. 160.)

17. It is possible that fragments 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, and 12 all belong to the manuscript of 1800 to which I have already tentatively assigned fragment 1. The focal contrast between Jews and Greeks supports this for 6 and 7; the appeal to Hellenic experience as a standard points this way less definitely in 8 and 9. The best support for the inclusion of 8, 9, 11, and 12 is to be found in the fragment of 1800, which Rosenkranz placed next after these “fragments of historical studies” (see Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, pp. 168–69). We might argue that Hegel was there summing up the results he had achieved in the big manuscript which he had only just completed; and in that light his reference to the “Italian states in the finest period of their licentious freedom in the Middle Ages” is suggestive. But if we accept this hypothesis, we shall have to admit further that that manuscript must already have contained much of the “history of God” which we know that Hegel expounded during his early years at Jena.

18. Hegel's concern with the theory of love in the Frankfurt period has already been mentioned. But interest in the ideals of medieval romance (and its excesses) can only be reliably documented in the Jena years. The conclusion of the fragment seems to show that his attitude toward the *sublimity* of the ideal of love in modern Romanticism is ironical (compare his *Faith and Knowledge*, pp. 145–46).

19. Hegel arrived at this view of the bacchanalia as early as 1793 (see Harris, *Hegel's Development*, p. 505); and he reasserts it in the *Phenomenology* (see § 726). His only early reference to witches is in connection with *Macbeth* (Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, p. 205; compare also *Phenomenology*, § 737). But the view of witchcraft expressed here is repeated in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree (New York: Willey Book Co., 1944), pp. 425–26.

20. This fragment sums up perfectly the relation between Hegel's ethics and that of Kant. Many of the most paradoxical aspects of the dialectic of conscience in the *Phenomenology* (see §§ 640–70) become clearer if we view them in the light of what it entails. The view expressed by the dialectic resulted from Hegel's struggle at Bern to reconcile the Greek conception of virtue with the Kantian conception of morality. (Compare in particular Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, pp. 143–45, 164.)

21. This fragment can plausibly be taken as a reflection of Hegel's interest in economic problems in the Frankfurt years. Almost every vestige of the direct record of his early economic studies has perished. (Lukács was the first to recognize the important place that economic problems played in Hegel's earliest reflections on politics and society. See Georg Lukács, *The Young Hegel*, trans. Rodney Livingstone [London: Merlin Press, 1975.]) But since the problem of economic control in a "durable form of republic" continued to fascinate Hegel throughout the Jena period (see Shlomo Avineri, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972], chap. 5), we cannot be at all certain when the present fragment was written.

22. Hegel became very interested in the parallel history of Italy while he was writing and revising his essay on "The German Constitution" (1798–1802). (The essay is translated by T. M. Knox in *Hegel's Political Writings* [Oxford: Clarendon, 1964].) His earliest reference to the parallel is in a fragment of 1798 (see Harris, *Hegel's Development*, p. 439).

23. The initial reference to Montesquieu (see *The Spirit of the Laws*, Book VI, 13), together with this appeal to Hellenic experience as a standard, are the principal grounds for assigning this fragment to the Frankfurt period. According to Rosenkranz, Hegel was much interested in the reform of the Prussian criminal code at this time (*Hegels Leben*, pp. 85–86); and the general problems of the philosophy of punishment arose for him in that connection. The present fragment fits neatly enough into that context. But (like fragment 10) it is important in itself, apart from any context.

24. If it did not appear in this group, I doubt whether this fragment could be plausibly dated at all. Hegel might have written it at any time (after about 1795). The Greek ideal of the organic society, and its opposite, the machine-State, are

both present here in much the same way as they remained influential in Hegel's mind throughout his life.

25. See Friedrich Schiller, *History of the Thirty Years' War*, trans. A. J. W. Morrison (New York, 1883), p. 302. (The page references given by Hegel in the text are from the first complete German edition of 1793.)

26. Schiller, *Thirty Years' War*, p. 295.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 293.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 298.

29. In view of the general importance of Schiller in Hegel's development, we may surmise that he obtained and read the *History of the Thirty Years' War* soon after it was published. We cannot say when he undertook this close stylistic study, but it is not the date that matters here. Since Hegel is generally considered to have no sense of style at all, it is peculiarly important to those of us who regard him as an extremely self-conscious and deliberate writer to have this evidence of how conscious he was of the way that written language produces its effects. Hegel's own philosophy of language needs to be more carefully examined in relation to his practice. When this is done, both the horrors and the felicities of his writing (and every work of his offers both to the eye immediately, though in differing proportions—Rosenkranz selected these fragments mainly for their felicities, we should remember) will be found to have been carefully adapted to his purpose.

30. Rosenkranz excerpted this passage from the end of a longer manuscript in French, which he himself described (in the *Literarhistorisches Taschenbuch* for 1843) as "an essay on the changes that arise in military organization [*Kriegswesen*] because the constitution of a state passes over from the monarchic to the republican form." He printed it for its interest as "a small proof of Hegel's own French style." See further the introduction to the fragments in this chapter. The Jacobin Club at Tübingen is discussed in Harris, *Hegel's Development*, pp. 63–65, 113–15. But after reassessing all the evidence, I believe that I was unduly skeptical there about Hegel's own reputation as a revolutionary orator. (The conception of life in a monarchy expressed here should be compared with the comments on Hume's *History of England* in fragment 14.)

# The Earliest System-Program of German Idealism

Translated by H. S. Harris

. . . *an Ethics*. Since the whole of metaphysics falls for the future within *moral theory*—of which Kant with his pair of practical postulates has given only one *example*, and not *exhausted* it, this ethics will be nothing less than a complete system of all ideas or of all practical postulates (which is the same thing). The first idea is, of course, the presentation of *myself* as an absolutely free entity. Along with the free, self-conscious essence, there stands forth—out of nothing—an entire world, the one true and thinkable creation out of nothing. —Here I shall descend into the realms of physics; the question is this: how must a world be constituted for a moral entity? I would like to give wings once more to our backward physics, that advances laboriously by experiments.

Thus, if philosophy supplies the ideas, and experience the data, we may at last come to have in essentials the physics that I look forward to for later times. It does not appear that our present-day physics can satisfy a creative spirit such as ours is or ought to be.

From nature I come to the *work of man*. The idea of mankind being premised—I shall prove that it gives us no idea of the *state*, since the state is a mechanical thing, any more than it gives us an idea of a *machine*. Only something that is an object of *freedom* is called an *idea*. So we must go even beyond the state! —For every state must treat free men as cogs in a machine; and this it ought not to do; so it must *stop*. It is self-evident that in this sphere all the ideas, of perpetual peace, etc., are only *subordinate*

ideas under a higher one. At the same time I shall here lay down the principles for a *history of mankind*, and strip the whole wretched human work of state, constitution, government, legal system—naked to the skin. Finally come the ideas of a moral world, divinity, immortality—uprooting of all superstition, the prosecution of the priesthood which of late poses as rational, at the bar of reason itself. —Absolute freedom of all spirits who bear the intellectual world in themselves, and cannot seek either God or immortality outside themselves.

Last of all the idea that unites all the rest, the idea of *beauty* taking the word in its higher Platonic sense. I am now convinced that the highest act of reason, the one through which it encompasses all ideas, is an aesthetic act, and that *truth and goodness only become sisters in beauty*—the philosopher must possess just as much aesthetic power as the poet. The philosophers-of-the-letter of our times are men without aesthetic sense. The philosophy of the spirit is an aesthetic philosophy. One cannot be creative in any way, even about history one cannot argue creatively—without aesthetic sense. Here it ought to become clear what it is that men lack, who understand no ideas and who confess honestly enough that they find everything obscure as soon as it goes beyond the table of contents and the index.

Poetry gains thereby a higher dignity, she becomes at the end once more, what she was in the beginning—the *teacher of mankind*; for there is no philosophy, no history left, the maker's art alone will survive all other sciences and arts.

At the same time we are told so often that the great mob must have a *religion of the senses*. But not only does the great mob need it, the philosopher needs it too. Monotheism of reason and heart, polytheism of the imagination and of art, this is what we need.

Here I shall discuss particularly an idea which, as far as I know, has never occurred to anyone else—we must have a new mythology, but this mythology must be in the service of the ideas, it must be a mythology of *reason*.

Until we express the ideas aesthetically, i.e. mythologically, they have no interest for the *people*, and conversely until mythology is rational the philosopher must be ashamed of it. Thus in the end enlightened and unenlightened must clasp hands, mythology must become philosophical in order to<sup>1</sup> make the people rational, and philosophy must become mythological in order to make the philosophers sensible. Then eternal unity reigns among us. No more the look of scorn,<sup>2</sup> no more the blind trembling of the people before its wise men and priests. Only then does the equal development of all powers await us, the development of what is peculiar to each and what is common to all. No power shall any longer be

suppressed for universal freedom and equality of spirits will reign! —A higher spirit sent from heaven must found this new religion among us, it will be the last, greatest work of mankind.

## Notes

For the curious background of this piece, which is dated to 1796, see H. S. Harris, *Hegel's Development: Toward the Sunlight, 1770–1801* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972), chap. 3 appendix, p. 249. It has been reprinted among the works of Hegel (*Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung*, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister [Stuttgart: Frommann, 1936], pp. 219–21); the works of Hölderlin (*Sämtliche Werke: Große Stuttgarter Ausgabe*, ed. Friedrich Beißner [Stuttgart: J.G. Cotta, W. Kohlhammer], vol. 4, pp. 297–99); and those of Schelling (*Stuttgarter Gesamtausgabe*, ed. Karl Friedrich August Schelling [Stuttgart and Augsburg: Cotta, 1856–61], vol. 1, ed. H. Fuhrmans, pp. 69–71). The present translation has been made from Fuhrmans's text because the meticulously exact "*Lesarten*" of Beißner (vol. 4, pp. 801–2) show that Fuhrmans's text is in letter-perfect accord with the manuscript.

1. Here I read "*um*" in place of the MS. "*und*." The correction was proposed by Ludwig Strauss, and the reasons for adopting it are obvious enough. But, of course, I do not believe, as he did, that it is a *copying* error (or at least not one that arose from the difficulties of copying from *someone else's* script). See further, Harris, *Hegel's Development*, p. 255 note 2.

2. I.e. of the enlightened philosopher looking down on the mob.



P A R T

4

FRANKFURT, 1797–1800





# Two Fragments on Love

Translated by C. Hamlin and H. S. Harris, with  
an introduction by H. S. Harris

**T**he two fragments translated here were written by Hegel in the early summer of 1797 shortly after his move from Bern to Frankfurt, where he came once more into the company, and under the influence, of the poet Friedrich Hölderlin, who was his classmate and close friend at the Tübingen seminary from 1788 to 1791.

The first of these fragments marks the birth-moment of the philosophical concept of “love” that Hegel—inspired undoubtedly by Hölderlin—developed in this period. Because of the contrast between the first fragment’s two halves, and the opening of a new topic with the heading “Religion, founding a religion,” Dieter Henrich has suggested that we are really dealing here with two fragments, the first of which continues along the established path of Hegel’s reflections at Bern, while the second (a little later) marks the dawning of a new project.<sup>1</sup> But Henrich admits that this hypothesis helps but little in understanding what he regards as the stark contrast, and the startling novelty, with which we are presented in this piece. I do not think that the project is new, for I believe that all of Hegel’s “early theological writings” are best viewed as conscious contributions toward the “founding of a religion.” So I have tried to argue, elsewhere, that the contrast is less stark and the novelty less startling than Henrich believes. All the same, the novelty is real, and the reader will now be able to decide for himself how great the contrast is.

Hegel’s longest fragment on this topic attracted more notice and was translated by T. M. Knox in his pioneering volume of Hegel’s *Early Theological*

*Writings*.<sup>2</sup> It was the only piece that he took from Hermann Nohl's *Anhang*. But the two fragments translated here make the theological purpose of Hegel's concept much plainer, and it can plausibly be argued that they are more important. In any case, they must be studied along with the more celebrated fragment "On Love," with the poem "Eleusis,"<sup>3</sup> with "The Earliest System-Program of German Idealism,"<sup>4</sup> and with certain of the "Fragments of Historical Studies"<sup>5</sup> if we are to understand the "Fragment of a System,"<sup>6</sup> which gives us our clearest insight into Hegel's philosophical position during the Frankfurt period. At this stage in his development, Hegel was convinced that we make an intuitive leap out of the endless dialectical contradictions of philosophical reflection into the communal experience of religion. "Love" in all its forms is what we need to reflect upon, in order to accept this leap; otherwise we shall never see how to escape from a society typified by bondage into a genuinely free community. The limit of rational aspiration must remain a rationally justified state of social subjection.

Of course, this exaltation of "love" over reason—as "a miracle which we cannot grasp"—was only a transitional phase in Hegel's thought. But it is a vitally important one, because he never changed his conception of "reflective reason"; his mature conception of "speculative reason" grew out of the "comprehension" of the "miracle" which he here identifies. Thus, the long-term significance of these two fragments is enormous. There are perhaps no texts of this length in the whole Hegelian corpus that are more significant than these. I have tried to point out some of the bases for this grandiloquent claim in my notes. The translation of these fragments was made from Hermann Nohl's edition of Hegel's early theological writings, *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1907), pp. 374-78.

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### The First Fragment: *Positiv wird ein Glauben genannt . . .*

We call that faith positive in which the practical is theoretically present—what is originally subjective only as what is objective, a religion which establishes representations of something objective, which cannot become subjective, as a principle of life and action. Practical activity acts freely, without the unification of something opposed, without being determined by this—it does not bring unity into a given manifold but is unity,\* which

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\* [marginal note:] Theoretical unity is empty, meaningless without a manifold, only conceivable in relation to this.

only rescues itself against that which is opposed and manifold, which always remains unconnected with regard to the practical capability; the practical unity may thus be claimed in that what is opposed is totally resolved [*aufgehoben*].<sup>7</sup>

All moral laws are commands to assert this unity against impulses; they are only different in so far as they are directed against different impulses—this unity is imagined.

What is: concept of morality? The moral concepts do not have objects in that sense in which theoretical concepts have objects. The object of moral concepts is always the self; the object of theoretical concepts is the not-self. —The object of the moral concept is a certain determination of the self, which in order to become a concept, in order to be known, in order to become an object, is opposed to the self as otherwise determined, regarded as an accidental property of the self, excluded from the determination of the self which is at that instant knowing. —For a concept is a reflected activity. A moral concept, which does not develop in this manner, a concept without activity is a positive concept; yet it should be practical at the same time; it is merely something known, a given, something objective, and receives its force, its power, its effectiveness only through an object which awakens respect or fear, in face of which we would have to pass away and to which we would have to surrender, if through those concepts the path were not opened for us to that object, to the hope of being spared, if unification were not thereby possible.<sup>8</sup>

The positive moral concept is capable of losing the character of positivity if the activity which it expresses is developed itself and receives power,<sup>9</sup>—but that which is normally called positive is so constituted that it is not a reflected activity of ourselves, but rather something objective and can never abandon this character.

That which is moral can indeed become objective as well, in that it is imagined and comprehended, but consciousness is always connected to it or can at once be established, so that we ourselves, our own free power and activity are the object of the act of knowing. What is moral and what is objective in the normal sense are directly opposed to each other.

The infinite object and its mode of action are also positive for our cognitive faculty; miracles, revelations, visions.

For intuition there should not be given any totality, the cognitive faculty should surrender in part the laws of its being to imagine itself a totality—be aware of a passivity and the same quantity of activity should not be given to it in appearance, and intuition should never think of its activity as such a totality. The activity, the cause should be something unknown, the one limb of reciprocal interaction no object, no not-self, and also no self, not as with the effects of men, where a limb is a self.<sup>10</sup>

The essence of the practical self consists in the going-out of the ideal activity beyond the actual and in the demand that the objective activity should be equal to the infinite—practical faith is faith in that ideal—now faith is positive if that going-out also exists as the demand of equality—this demand can only be made through a powerful and commanding objective (authority), which, however, along with its mode of action, cannot be comprehended by us; were we to comprehend it, it would be determined by us; its modes of operation must be a miracle for us, which are impossible for us, i.e. they presume an activity which we do not acknowledge as the activity of a self, and thus they differentiate themselves from those actions which we acknowledge as actions of free beings, that they are actions of a self.

With the moral purpose which we ascribe to the providence of God, we do not reflect upon its remaining and to us unknown nature, but here rather we judge that its activity to this extent is the activity of a self.

### Religion, Founding a Religion

The other extreme from that, from dependence upon an object, is this: fearing objects, flight from them, fear of union, the highest subjectivity.

#### Objective

1. the actual in space,
2. inner determinations objectively with consciousness so that they are inner determinations,
3. inner determinations without consciousness so that they are inner determinations.

Religion is free veneration of divinity. Mere subjective religion without imagination is uprightness.

To comprehend is to command. To enliven objects is to make them into gods.

To observe a stream, how according to the laws of gravity it must fall to deeper regions and be limited and pressed in by the ground and its banks, is to comprehend it—to give it a soul, to take part in it as in one's equal—is to make a god of it. Yet because a stream, a tree can at the same time also be an object subjected to sheer necessity, just as deified men also may be differentiated from that condition since they were merely demigods, not the eternal, necessary ones. Where subject and object—or freedom and nature are thought as united, so that nature is freedom, subject and object are not to be separated, there is the divine—such an ideal is the object of every religion. Divinity is at once subject and object,

one cannot say of it that it is subject in opposition to object or that it has an object.

The theoretical syntheses become quite objective, completely opposed to the subject—practical activity annihilates the object, and is completely subjective—only in love alone is one at one with the object, it does not command and is not commanded. This love, made by the imagination into an entity, is the divinity; separated man then has reverence, respect for it, for love united within itself; his bad conscience—consciousness of separation—instills fear of it in him.

That unification can be called unification of subject and object, of freedom and nature, of the actual and the possible. If the subject retains the form of the subject, the object the form of the object, nature is still nature, no unification is thus achieved. The subject, the free entity, is the superior power and the object, nature, the one which is ruled.

In the olden times the gods walked among men; the more separation, distance, increased, the more the gods also detached themselves from men, for that they gained in sacrifices, incense and service—became more feared, until separation had gone so far that unification could only occur through force. Love can only take place against its equal, against the mirror, against the echo of our existence.<sup>11</sup>

## The Second Fragment: *so wie sie mehrere Gattungen . . .*

. . . as they<sup>12</sup> become acquainted with more tribes, who are not hostile to them, they accept more gods into their Pantheon.<sup>13</sup> —Your god shall be our god too, or in other words, let us not any longer regard ourselves as sundered but as united. —A people, that despises all alien gods, must bear hatred for the whole human race in its breast.

Where the division between impulse and actuality is so great that actual grief<sup>14</sup> arises,\* he<sup>15</sup> posits a really independent activity as the ground of this passion, and enlivens it; but since unification with the grief is impossible, because it is a passion, so too, unification with that cause of

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\* [*canceled.*] in this situation unification is impossible, and if man has enough strength to endure this separation anyway, he sees himself as in conflict with his fate, but not as overcome by it; if he has not this much strength, he posits this unification in a future state, and hopes to receive it from an alien uniting object. For he posits nothing in his object, that is not in him. Where man unites what cannot be united, there we have positivity.

his passion is impossible, and he posits it as a hostile essential being over against himself; had he never enjoyed any favor at this being's hands, he would ascribe to it a hostile nature that does not change; if he has already had joy from it, if he has loved it, then he must think of the hostile disposition as only transient; and if he is conscious in himself of any guilt, he recognizes in his grief, the punishing hand of the divinity with whom he lived aforetime in amity. But if he is conscious of his own purity and has strength enough to bear this complete separation, he sees himself opposed by an unknown might, in which there is nothing human, and which is master of his fate, without submitting himself to it and without reaching any other unification with it, since a union with an essential being more mighty than himself could only be a form of bondage.

If unification comes into being, where there is eternal separation in nature, if what cannot be united is united, there we have positivity. This united thing, this Ideal, is here an object, and there is something in it which is not subject.<sup>16</sup>

We cannot set up the Ideal outside of ourselves, or it would then be an object—and not in ourselves alone either, for then it would be no Ideal.<sup>17</sup>

Religion is one with love. The beloved is not opposed to us, he is one with our essential being; we see only ourselves in him—and yet also he is still not we—a miracle, that we cannot grasp.

"The initiate (Plato, *Phaedrus*)<sup>18</sup> who has once enjoyed the full sight of the eternal beauty, when he beholds a godlike face, that is a good copy of Beauty or of any other incorporeal idea, is at first all a shudder, and something of the former awe seizes him; but then he looks more closely and reverences it like a god; and did he not fear the cry of 'madness!' he would sacrifice to the beloved as to a sacred statue and a god."

## Notes

1. See "Some Historical Presuppositions of Hegel's System," in D. E. Christensen, ed., *Hegel and the Philosophy of Religion* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), pp. 39, 44 note 24.

2. G. W. F. Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, ed. and trans. T. M. Knox and Richard Kroner (1948; Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1975), pp. 302–8.

3. Translated by C. E. Mueller in his *Hegel: The Man, His Vision and Work* (New York: Pageant, 1968), pp. 60–62. Reprinted in this volume on pp. 86–8.



4. Translated by H. S. Harris in his *Hegel's Development: Toward the Sunlight, 1770–1801* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972), pp. 510–12. Reprinted in this volume on pp. 110–2.

5. Translated by Clark Butler in *Clio* 7 (1977), pp. 113–34. Reprinted in this volume on pp. 89–109. See especially fragments 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, and 14. Most of these fragments, notably the first, almost certainly belong to 1797–1800. (The discussion by Otto Pöggeler, “Hegels praktische Philosophie in Frankfurt,” in *Hegel-Studien* 9 [1974], pp. 73–107, has now convinced me that it is more probable that all of the fragments belong to the Frankfurt period than that any of them originated during the following years when Hegel was at Jena. The echoing of themes is evidence, at least, of the continuing importance of the problem of “comprehending love” which Hegel raises for the first time in the two fragments published here.)

6. Translated by Richard Kroner in *Early Theological Writings*, pp. 309–19. Reprinted in this volume on pp. 151–9.

7. At this date Hegel is—in his own way—a *philosophical* disciple of Kant. He is here contrasting the activity of *theoretical* reason, which unifies the “manifold” of sensation into an *a priori synthesis* of concept and intuition, with *practical* reason which is from the beginning a unity of concept and intuition—hence an “intellectual” or self-constituting intuition. Practical reason can constitute, and achieve or realize, its own *ideals*. It does not need the *data* upon which theoretical reason is dependent, or at least it is not dependent on the *given* content of intuition in the sameway. It contains this given content—natural needs, desires, fears, etc.—only in a superseded (*aufgehoben*) form. (This interpretation of practical reason as “intellectual intuition” was actually inspired by Fichte. But Hegel continues at this stage to use only Kantian terminology, and to insist that the experience of “resolution” (*Aufhebung*), which transcends that terminology, thereby transcends the bounds of reason itself.)

8. We can see here why the “Unhappy Consciousness” became the crucial moment, or turning point, in the “phenomenology” of the Spirit. Kant’s own “religion within the bounds of reason alone” must be called a *positive* religion, by the criterion here laid down; and Hegel says this explicitly at the end of the “Frankfurt Sketch on Faith and Being: *Glauben ist die Art*,” written only a few months after this fragment (see Harris, *Hegel's Development*, p. 515). But he continues until 1801 to work on the assumption that Kant has correctly defined the boundaries of all theoretical reasoning.

9. We should note that the abstract possibility of transforming positive morality into free morality is clearly asserted in the first half of the fragment. This is a point against Henrich’s view that the second part of this fragment is an unforeseeable breakthrough.

10. It is not perfectly clear whether this paragraph should be read simply as a factual analysis of how religious consciousness becomes *positive*, or whether Hegel is himself also *rejecting* Fichte’s terminology, and keeping faith (in his own way) with the ban on all cognitive use of the ideas of reason (such as “totality”) promulgated by Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. It is clear, at least, that he

regards Kant's analysis as appropriate to the contemporary situation of Western culture. The model of social reciprocity (*Wechselwirkung*) in which the limbs (*Glieder*) are truly human is the Greek *polis*.

11. Looked at from the standpoint of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, what stands out about this project for the founding of a new religion is its exclusively Hellenic inspiration. The enlivening of the whole natural environment in myth—that same phenomenal order that is given for cognition—is what Hegel's attention is focused on. He has already identified the experience of “suffering” (*Leiden*) and “grief” (*Schmerz*) as the crucial moment in the formation of *positive* religion; and he seems to have recognized that Kant's critical philosophy was a cognitive advance over Greek ethics (see Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, p. 143). But there is no sign of any consciousness, as yet, that the religion of “infinite grief” was the spiritual doorway for “absolute knowledge.” His struggle with the “fate” of Jesus' gospel of “absolute love”—the struggle that is just now beginning—is what leads him to that insight in the Jena period.

12. I.e. the *natural* peoples, and perhaps specifically the earliest Hellenes.

13. The fragment is the inside half of a folded sheet. Thus at least two pages are missing at the beginning. Hegel is clearly talking about the evolution of human society in its “natural” state. The way the fragment ends suggests that he may be speaking directly about the evolution of the Greek pantheon of the Twelve Olympians. But this is not the only possibility. He also has the unnatural (or *positive*) evolution of the Jews in mind, so the explicit contrast here may be between Abraham and the nature religions that he turned away from. The point is not vitally important, since the Hellenic inspiration of Hegel's “natural state” or “Golden Age” is plain enough in any case.

14. The immense significance that this experience will eventually reveal has been pointed out in note 11. What we should notice here is that Hegel presently seems to regard suffering and misfortune only as a test of human capacity. The resolute maintenance of human dignity—as in the story of Job or the philosophy of Stoicism—is seen as the way by which the “fall” into “positivity” and dependence on the Lord's will can be avoided. That this “fall” may itself prove to be a “fortunate” one is not yet envisaged.

15. I.e. man.

16. Presumably this is where the revision ended. (As published in Hermann Nohl's edition, *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften* [1907], we cannot be perfectly certain how much of the final text was a part of the first draft.)

17. This is the reason why Fichte's terminology of ego and non-ego was unsatisfactory for Hegel's mature purposes. His concept of Spirit resolves this conflict of subject and object, and formulates the speculative union between human experience and absolute being.

18. Plato, *Phaedrus*, 251 a–b.

# Excerpts from the *Commentary on the Bern Aristocracy*

Translated by Heinz Luegenbiehl, with  
an introduction by Z. A. Pelcynski

In 1793 the young Hegel, recently graduated from the Tübingen Seminary, became a private tutor to the family of Karl Friedrich von Steiger in Bern. Although he does not seem to have enjoyed the experience, the three years Hegel spent with the Steiger family were important ones in his development. In the Steigers' country seat at Tschugg he found an excellent library, where he immersed himself in historical literature particularly. He also pursued his religious studies intensively, writing numerous drafts and sketches; the long manuscript, subsequently given the title "The Positivity of the Christian Religion," was composed in Bern. Hegel was also able to observe, at close quarters, the local political situation. His employer belonged to the small patrician class that ruled the city of Bern and its dependent territories, and in a contemporary letter to Schelling, Hegel claimed to have gained "a real understanding of an aristocratic constitution"<sup>1</sup> by observing political events in the city. He found them a highly unedifying spectacle, and his lifelong dislike of aristocratic forms of government was doubtless acquired at this time. In his essay on the English Reform Bill, written just before his death in 1831 and containing a scathing critique of the English aristocracy, he mentioned corruption in Bern as a typical feature of aristocratic government.<sup>2</sup>

Between the tutorship in Bern and a similar post in Frankfurt, Hegel spent the later months of 1796 at home in Stuttgart. It was a period of great political excitement in the duchy of Württemberg, reflected in numerous polemical and reform tracts, and it stimulated him to try his hand at political pamphleteering. Cautiously, he began by a translation of someone else's

work. In 1793, the same year Hegel went to Bern, Jean Jacques Cart, an exiled lawyer from the canton of Vaud (a territory over which the city of Bern had exercised ancient suzerainty), published in Paris some letters on the condition of his native land under the title *Lettres confidentielles* (*Confidential Letters*). In this book Cart bitterly condemned the oppression of Vaud by the Bernese oligarchy and traced in detail the loss of Vaud's original privileges and traditional liberties. This oppression worsened after Vaud's French-speaking inhabitants launched an unsuccessful uprising against Bern in 1791, and it indirectly led to a French invasion and the annexation of Vaud by the French Republic in 1797. Hegel must have read Cart's book while still in Switzerland and perhaps even did a translation there. He also read a number of books on Bernese history, administration, and finances. In Stuttgart he edited Cart's book, omitted two letters, added his own preface and several comments, and found a publisher for it in Frankfurt, where it appeared anonymously in 1798. This book is known as the *Commentary on the Bern Aristocracy*. It was listed under Hegel's name in a lexicon of German literature for 1805, but Hegel's editorship subsequently went unnoticed until the publication of an article by Hugo Falkenheim in 1909.<sup>3</sup> The extracts on which the present English translation is based were published in G. W. F. Hegel, *Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung*, edited by Johannes Hoffmeister (Stuttgart: Frommann, 1936).

Men often reveal themselves by their first public act. A politician's first speech or a writer's first novel can tell us much about them and give us an insight into their mature character or outlook. How revealing are the comments on Cart's text, which are Hegel's first published utterances? Two things seem striking to me. The first is Hegel's political passion. He chose to involve himself in the affairs of Vaud not for any academic reasons but for practical ones, in order to draw the attention of his German contemporaries to a glaring case of oppression and its consequences. One sees a burning desire to influence—not merely to understand reality, but to do what one can for a cause that one feels is worth supporting. The passion to influence events never quite left Hegel—as his later tracts on the German Empire, on Württemberg, and on Britain testify. The message of the Vaud events, which Hegel spells out in his preface, is that traditional civil and political arrangements lose force when claims of justice are raised against them. These claims must be considered and met through reforms, for otherwise internal violence or foreign intervention will put the political community in jeopardy, and this is both foolish and wrong. Other political attitudes, which became manifest in Hegel's mature writings, are already apparent in the *Commentary*: an admiration for political liberty in England (qualified by an appreciation of English abuses), a belief in the value of representation, and a concern with good laws and fair judicial procedures. In a negative sense, Hegel's discovery

of oligarchic governments' bias toward personal gain, private self-interest, or blatant "particularity" doubtless contributed to his later appreciation of the merits of an independent, professional, university-educated civil service—the "universal class" of the *Philosophy of Right*.

The other striking thing about Hegel's comments is what one might call his evident empirical passion. He is not satisfied with generalizations or universal principles. On the contrary, he shows tremendous interest in concrete reality, the basic raw material of history and politics. He pursues the analysis of the Vaud-Bern situation down to the minutest, almost trivial details. The underlying attitude seems to be that this is the only way to get a sound grasp of reality, to understand a situation completely. It is not enough to size it up quickly, intuitively, and to subsume it under some general abstract category. Whatever else one does, one has to immerse oneself first in specific facts, particular events, legal and institutional details. This empirical passion also characterized Hegel's later work as a philosopher of history, a political philosopher, and a metaphysician. Experience remained the basis of his most elaborate and far-reaching speculation, and he regarded it as the inescapable fate of true philosophical thought and as the foundation of all genuine knowledge.

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Excerpts from the *Confidential Letters on the Former Constitutional Relation of Wadtland (Pays de Vaud) to the City of Bern: A Complete Exposé of the One-Time Oligarchy of the Bern Estate*, from the French of a Deceased Swiss [Jean Jacques Cart], Translated and Accompanied by Notes [by G. W. F. Hegel], Frankfurt am Main, in the Jäger Bookshop, 1798

[Hegel's Preface]

The letters of which this translation provides an extract have as their author Cart, an attorney from Lausanne who has since died in Philadelphia. When they first appeared in print they were at once forbidden by the Bern government with a heavy fine, for they generally contain a documented exposition of the political rights of Vaud; a comparison of how Vaud should have been constituted according to its ancient rights with the condition to which it was relegated through the dominion of the people of Bern; especially, a story of the ephemeral victory of this government in the year 1791 over the newly revived need in the people

of Vaud to see their constitution restored—a victory which was a defeat of the Vaudois' still-remaining rights, and which, moreover, added to their wish for freedom the deepest embitterment of all souls against their oppressors. Since this exposition is given in letter form, it at the same time contains the sentiments which originated in those incidents and circumstances; and as much as many who demand only pure historical data in order to be all the freer in their judgments and feelings may easily become suspicious about the credibility of the matter, this consequence is, on the one hand, less to be feared here since the rights are demonstrated in documents and in the legal code, and since the events took place before the public. On the other hand, for a great many people an expression of sentiment is necessary because only thereby do they first become aware of the importance of the matter, an importance which they would not have felt through a dry narrative statement of what has occurred and the circumstances involved, either because they had never found themselves in a similar position or because they generally live in an untroubled insouciance and are unable to imagine how one can lose patience over certain things, so that even if they are well acquainted with the state of the matter they are still greatly astonished about the results.

From a comparison of the contents of these letters with the most recent events in Vaud, from a contrast between, on the one hand, the peace enforced in 1792, the pride of the government in its victory and, on the other hand, the real weaknesses of that government in this country, the land's sudden defection from this peace, many practical applications could be derived. However, the events speak loudly enough for themselves. It can only be a question of becoming acquainted with them in their full extent; their cry is heard around the world: "*Discite justiciam moniti*," but the deaf will be harshly dealt with by their fate.

The notes are new and contain many in-part yet unknown data for an understanding of the statistics and constitution of Bern.

[1. *Cart*, p. 71<sup>4</sup>.:] "It is a very great mistake to measure the excellence of a constitution according to whether one pays more or less taxes under it. If this were the case, the constitution of England would be the worst of all, for nowhere does one pay so many taxes. And yet there is no people in Europe which enjoys a greater apparent well-being and so much individual and national esteem. —Because the Englishman is free, because he enjoys the rights inherent in freedom, in one word, because he taxes himself."

[*Comment by Hegel*, p. 81ff.:] The author did not live to see how much in the past few years, due to the powers conceded to the collectors of increased taxes, the security of property has in many regards been endangered

and how much domestic rights have been diminished, and how in part personal freedom through the suspension of the constitutional law and in part civil rights through positive laws have been curbed. How striking it has become that a minister is able to defy public opinion by placing a parliamentary majority in his pocket, that the nation is so incompletely represented that it is unable to make its voice heard in Parliament, and that its security depends more on the fear of the people's unconstitutional power, on the prudence of the ministers, or on the discretion of the upper classes. Through this insight and those facts, the esteem of the English nation has consequently declined even among many of its strongest admirers. The current inadmissibility of this example has, however, no connection with the principle that the excellence of the constitution of a country is not to be appraised according to the size of the tax which one pays in it.

The fact that, when the question arose of the bad form of government of the canton of Bern, one usually received the reply that the subjects pay almost no taxes, and thus praised them as blissful and to be envied, proves only how much less importance was attached to the fact that one enjoyed no civil laws at all than to the possibility of the loss of a few thalers yearly. The rate of taxation, which the English parliament set on the tea to be imported by America, was extremely slight, but the feeling of the Americans that with the sum, in itself wholly insignificant, which the rate of taxation would have cost them, they would also have lost their most precious rights, caused the American Revolution.

[2. *Cart*, p. 91:] "I do not believe that a higher degree of morality prevailed in Vaud than in the German part of the canton; yet one will find ten Germans for each person from Vaud in the penitentiary. Could this perhaps be a result of the fact that the provincial governors exercise criminal jurisdiction in one land and not in the other?"

[*Comment by Hegel*, p. 116ff.:] Vaud has in this regard many privileges as compared to the German part of the canton. The criminal courts of Vaud prepare the case for trial and judge in the first instance; the Smaller Council in Bern has the *jus aggratiandi* and *aggravandi*; only in Lausanne does the Smaller Council have the sole right to grant a pardon. In the German canton (with the exception of a few cities), on the other hand, criminal justice is completely in the hands of the government. It interrogates those accused of a criminal offense, interrogates the witnesses, and conducts the entire judicial inquiry. No legal counsel is given to the accused. Records of the inquiry are sent to the Smaller Council, which passes sentences of life and death in the first and last resort on the basis of the records and on the basis of a report about the

case made by the Criminal Commission, which consists of the three most junior members of the Council. There exists no higher power that would have the right to pardon. In the city it is the Great Bailiff (*Grand Sautier*, a member of the Greater Council, a judge in police and civil matters up to a certain jurisdiction, and at the same time an attendant to the Greater and Smaller Councils) who conducts the criminal investigation. He deposits the results in the Chancellery for the inspection of members of the Greater Council. The Smaller Council now judges in the first instance, and the Greater Council increases, lessens, or confirms this first sentence, whereby the Great Bailiff, who has conducted the criminal inquiry, now appears as the official counsel for the defense. It is easily understandable how little care is taken for the offender in the course of this defense; he presumably seeks to conceal as much as possible in his hearing, and consequently will also often conceal many a circumstance which would lessen his crime. This alone explains the well-known story of a girl who was sentenced to death as a child murderess. It was only when she was supposed to be led to the place of execution that she declared to the clergyman that she felt sorry for the child which she carried in the womb. When examined more closely she was then indeed found to be still pregnant with the child because of whose murder she was supposed to die in a few hours. Upon being questioned why she had not spoken earlier, she answered that she had not had the heart to contradict the kind gentlemen who had interrogated her.

In the year 1794 a peasant quarreled with a gentleman from Bern while they were settling accounts for a load of wine. The peasant had references of good conduct from his community, which stated that he had never taken to drinking, and that he was moreover known to be a humble man. However, on this occasion he had drunk more than he was otherwise used to. The peasant believed that he had suffered an injustice at the hands of the gentleman, and in his drunken state moved from an exchange of words to abuses of the whole class of such distinguished gentlemen, and to expression of the wish that they should for once be humbled by the French. The man from Bern accused him of these abuses before the provincial governor. The peasant, whom one had told that he would not aid his case through the excuse of drunkenness, concealed at the hearing this circumstance which would presumably have excused his talk, and was sent to the penitentiary (the house of correction for more serious crimes) for six years. The poor fellow, who had become ill as a result of the judgment, was finally released through the intercession of the village officials and of his relatives, and was then sentenced not to leave his village for one year.



From these precipitous judgments, which became accidentally known only through their correction, I do not want to conclude that there are many cases which have not become known. One may judge for oneself whether the legal procedure described does not justify such a conclusion.

A custom which some time ago was still the norm in many provincial towns suggests that at one time the countrymen were still allowed to have a defender in a criminal case. For on the day designated for the execution, the village officials met at a public square under the chairmanship of the provincial governor. First a prosecutor appears. Then follows a defender, who, in the presence of the offender, to whom one had already announced the death sentence a few days before, strains his lungs in order to vindicate the accused. After this the provincial governor has the death sentence, which had been pronounced in Bern, publicly announced, and the evildoer is led off to his execution. This custom, which was completely revolting due to having become a mere formality, was done away with a few years ago. However, thereby even the last remaining shadow of one of the most precious rights of citizens of civilized countries was eradicated.

I also do not want to decide how much of what I will say is to be blamed on the legal procedure\* in criminal cases, which is actually no legal procedure at all; or whether it is to be completely blamed on the immorality of the people or, if one wishes, on the depravity of human nature that, as Cart says, one finds ten Germans for each person from Vaud in the penitentiary. It is my conviction that in no country with which I am familiar will one find so much hanging, breaking on the wheel, decapitation, burning at the stake, as in this canton, when one takes into account the relative size of the country. Perhaps it would be better not to make this claim at all without the authentic records to support it. The purpose of bringing it before the public here was to make it a challenge, for the sake of the public, to publish the list only of those who have been executed in the canton in the last ten years. Through such a list alone the assertion can be overthrown.

The government itself has felt these deficiencies for a few years, has received suggestions for remedies, and has even set a prize for a plan for suitable improvements.

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\* [Note at bottom of previous page, relevant to procedure] "Whereby it is still to be mentioned (a) that torture is still practiced in Bern and (b) that the confession of the offender is not necessary for the passing of the death sentence."

[3. *Cart*, p. 103, regarding military billeting in Vaud (1791-92):] "Not because a father of a family has many rooms does one billet ten, fifteen, twenty soldiers with him, or drive him out of his house in order to make a military hospital out of it, but rather because he is a patriot; and the aristocrat is spared for the opposite reason."

[*Comment by Hegel*, p. 121f.:] The quartermasters brought along from Bern registers of the inhabitants of the cities in which the troops were to be quartered. The fathers of families who were suspected by the government were marked on this list with an M (*mauvais*), or an MM, or even an MMM, and the quartermaster determined in accordance with these marks how many soldiers were to be quartered in a house. The soldiers themselves also felt this differentiation and behaved accordingly. In this way these suspected citizens saw themselves punished even before the beginning of any kind of inquiry, for the sole reason that they were suspected.

[4. *Cart*, p. 113, says that not even the slightest appearance of a crime of high treason would be present in cases where people of Vaud were thrown into jail.]

[*Comment by Hegel*, p. 122:] The deeds responsible for the verdict were signs; they could be seen as signs of joy regarding the successful effort of the French people to obtain freedom, as signs indicating a wish to enjoy equal freedom, as signaling the decisions to uphold once more one's legitimate but lost rights, as signifying the intention to attack the legal power of the government in an illegal manner: it appears that the government decided that the last intention had taken place.

[5. *Note to the 9th letter*, p. 163f.:] The aristocracies, says Montesquieu, have to fear those patricians who are unable to participate in the government; to keep them in check the terrible inquisitional tribunal in Venice must especially have been necessary. The government of Bern satisfies its overnumerous patricians in part through the many positions in the canton required for state administration, in part it also got rid of them, mainly through military service in foreign lands. Because of the cessation of such service and the claims of Bern's lesser citizenry on so-called bourgeois positions, access to which has become more difficult to the class not belonging to the governing families, the government has found itself in a quandary with such persons due to the increased competition of distinguished patricians.

[6. *Note to the 10th letter*, p. 169ff.:] The parsonages in the German canton are of two types, rank benefices and credit benefices. The former are bestowed on the candidates according to their age, the latter, as is already indicated by the name, according to the degree of credit which the competitors have through family relationships, etc. All those whose revenues

are slight, few, or moderate are entitled to rank benefices. Among the credit benefices are many whose yearly receipts can run to 3,000 thalers and more. Of course these go to Bern citizens, the most lucrative to the younger sons of aristocratic families, sons-in-law, and councillors, etc. For those who want to enter the ministry in the German canton, to which only the citizens of the cities have a right, there is in Bern a theological institution. The three years which are set for the study of theology need not, however, necessarily be spent by the candidate in studying. He needs only to let the three years go by and then let himself be examined, for he can get permission to be simultaneously a private tutor and consequently be absent for half and whole years. He can even take a teaching post in the country for the three full years, and after their passage merely present himself for examination.

[7. *Cart*, p. 178:] “The provincial governorships are dependent on the drawing of lots or on rank, and very often men receive them who know neither our laws, nor our customs, nor our circumstances.”

[*Comment by Hegel*, p. 194ff.:] Only a member of the Greater Council is entitled to become a provincial governor. The Greater and Smaller Councils together consist, when numerically complete, of 299 members, and are not allowed to fall below 200. The Smaller Council is filled by the Greater Council from its own ranks each time a member steps down by means of voting and balloting. The Greater Council is again made numerically complete only if the number of remaining members comes close to 200, and this usually happens every ten years. The electors are the Smaller Council (with the two presiding officers, twenty-seven men), and also sixteen members (*Seizeniers*) from the Greater Council who have already had a provincial governorship (old provincial governors). Among those old provincial governors who belong to the same guild—and all citizens of Bern must be members of some guild (society)—it is decided by lot who is to become an elector. Among those who are able to become *Seizeniers* there are often 15, 12, often also only one or two, in one guild. Since this drawing of lots takes place only on the Wednesday before Good Friday (on which vacancies in the Greater Council are filled), and since the number of all old provincial governors in, for example, 1795, amounted to seventy, all seventy are beforehand the object of visits, intrigue, and calculation; one can understand how manifold the combinations must be which a candidate has to make in order to assure himself the votes in any eventuality. The election of members into the Greater Council actually occurs through majority vote; however, each of the electors nominates one candidate; or, in a sense, two candidates as a result of the common agreement that everyone gives a vote to one client common to all electors. As for the rest of the candidates, the importance

of their families and a thousandfold other considerations determine the vote. The one who knows how to most impress the rest, the one who, if the others did not wish to do his bidding, the most obstinately threatens denial of his vote for their favorites, will have the most influence. Since each of the electors has himself to nominate (*namsen*) one or two new members, the father thus names his son, or his two sons, or his brother; if he has a daughter, he selects for himself a rich son-in-law, etc. If a family has a number of young men all old enough to enter the Council, but believes that it will only be able to bring one in, then the one who wishes to put himself up as a candidate buys off the rest so that they do not also compete; in short, among the ninety-two members who were received into the Greater Council in 1795, it was said of only one that his merits had in some respect contributed to his election. One can see from what has been said the general character of this election; but in order to get a total picture of the flurry of activity which goes on before the election; of the intrigues which are brewed in connection with it; of the manifold combinations concocted in order to reconcile the manifold of interests present; of the passion with which everything is carried on; or of the feelings which follow upon the fortunate or unfortunate outcome; of the force of these hopes, this fear and anxiety, of the strength of this joy or despair: in order to get a total picture, I say, of all this, one must have seen it all for oneself. There are instances where men who beforehand were already certain of their election (as on the whole only very few are ever in doubt), nevertheless went berserk for a few days over the now-achieved reality of it. But anyone who is excluded, for whom all worry and exertion fail, is forever dejected in spirit; he carries forever a gnawing worm inside, for such election is to the distinguished citizens of Bern the sole highest path in life. If he is unlucky in this, his soul can never be completely fulfilled by anything else.

The provincial governorships are raffled off among those who have come into the Greater Council in the same year. The oldest classes have the choice as to whether they want to lay claim to a provincial governorship. If there are none among the senior classes who want to lay claim, the governorships are then allotted among the more junior classes. Consequently, those who are otherwise wealthy can dispense with a provincial governorship the longest and then receive the best ones. This is why in Romain Motiers (the example which Cart cites on p. 178f.) so many old officers became provincial governors one after another; they had very lucrative positions as commanders of regiments in foreign service, and returned only at advanced age so that, after having perhaps attended one Council session after their election to the Greater Council, they could attend another session in which, on grounds

of seniority, they took for themselves the best provincial governorships without competition.

## Notes

1. H. S. Harris, *Hegel's Development: Toward the Sunlight, 1770–1801* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972), p. 158.

2. G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel's Political Writings*, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon, 1964), p. 297.

3. Hegel, *Hegel's Political Writings*, pp. 9–12; Harris, *Hegel's Development*, pp. 154–59, 419–27. Cart, who is mentioned as dead in the title and the preface, was in fact alive at the time. After completing the preparation of Cart's letters for publication, Hegel wrote a pamphlet about the domestic situation in Württemberg. However, his Stuttgart friends dissuaded him from publishing it, and only a fragment of it has survived.

4. All page numbers refer to the original pagination in Hegel's translation and edition of Cart.

# The Frankfurt Sketch on Faith and Being

Translated by H. S. Harris

Faith is the mode, in which the unity, whereby an antinomy has been united, is present in our representation. The union is the activity; this activity reflected as object is what is believed. In order to unite, the terms of the antinomy must be felt as conflicting, their relation to one another as an antinomy must be recognized; but what is conflicting can only be recognized as conflicting because it has already been united; the union is the standard against which the comparison is made, against which the opposites appear as such, appear as unsatisfied. So if it is shown that the opposed limited terms could not subsist as such, that they would have to cancel themselves, and that even to be possible they presuppose a union (just to be able to show that they are opposed, the union is presupposed) then it is thereby proven, that they have to be united, that the union ought to exist. But that the union itself does exist, is not thereby proven, rather this mode of presence of the representation of it is believed; and it cannot be proved, since the opposites are the dependent terms, and in respect to them the union is what is independent; and to prove means to show the dependence; what is independent in respect to these opposite terms may certainly be in another respect a dependent term, an opposite, in its turn; and then there has to be once more a progression to a new union which is now once more what is believed.

Union and being are synonymous; in every proposition the copula “is” expresses the union of subject and predicate—a being; being can only be believed in; belief presupposes a being; it is therefore contradictory

to say that in order to believe in something one must first be convinced of its being. This independence, the absoluteness of being is what people stumble over; the independent being is certainly assumed to exist, but just because it exists on its own account it need not on that account be for us; the independence of being is assumed to consist precisely in the fact that it *is*, be it for us or not, being is supposed to be something that may be utterly sundered from us, something in which there lies no necessity that we should enter into relation with it; how far can something be, of which it would yet be possible that we did not believe in it? i.e. it is something possible, thinkable, which yet we do not believe in, i.e. which is still not on that account necessary—from thinkability being does not follow; the thinkable something exists indeed so far as it is something thought of; but something thought of is a sundered thing, opposed to the thinker; it is no existent being. Only through this can a mistaken view arise, that there are different modes of union, of being, and hence that one can in virtue of that say: “there is something, but it is not on that account necessary that I should believe in it”—along with one mode of being it is not *eo ipso* entitled to acquire another mode of being; furthermore, faith is not being, but a reflected being; and in virtue of this one may say that that which is, still is not on that account bound to be reflected, it is not bound to come to consciousness. That which is, does not have to be believed in, but what is believed in does have to be. Thus, what is thought of as a sundered thing must become something united, and only then can it be believed in; the thinking is a union and is believed, but what is thought of is not yet.

The sundered thing finds only in *one* being its union; for a distinct being in *one* respect presupposes a nature, which would also not be nature, hence a contradiction; a union could in the same respect also not be a union; thus a positive faith is a union of the sort that in the place of the one and only possible union sets up another one; in the place of the one and only possible being it puts another being; and thus it unites the opposites in a mode whereby they are indeed united, but incompletely, i.e. they are not united in the respect in which they ought to be united.

In positive religion any union is supposed to be something given; what is given, that one still does not have until one receives it; and after the reception something given is still supposed to be able to remain on the one side. But from this point of view something given is nothing else but an opposed term, and consequently the union would be an opposed term, and that too just so far as it is united, which is a contradiction. The contradiction arises from an illusion: these are less complete modes of union, which in another respect are still opposed, an imperfect being is substituted for the being which in the respect in which it is supposed to be

united is perfect, and one mode of being is substituted for another. The different modes of being are the more complete or incomplete unions. In every union there is a determining and a being determined, which are one, but in positive religion the determining factor is supposed, even so far as it determines, to be determined; its doing is not supposed to be an activity, but a suffering; but the determining factor, whereby it suffers, is again something united, and in this union the doing might have been active; but this is a lower form of union; for in the deed, which is done out of positive faith, that which has been united is itself once more an opposite, which determines its opposite, and so there is here only imperfect union, since both terms remain opposed, the one is the determining factor and the other the determined; and the determining factor itself exists, *qua* active, but the form of the activity is determined by another; i.e. what has been given, the active factor, so far as it is active, is supposed to be a determined factor; that which determines the activity must, as an existent being, have previously been united, and if in this union too the determining factor is supposed to have determined, then it was determined by another and so on, and the positive believer would have to be an exclusively passive thing, an absolutely determined factor, which is contradictory. —Hence all positive religions set up a more or less narrow boundary within which they confine activity; they allot certain unions to it, e.g. intuition; they concede a certain being to men, e.g. that he is a being that sees, hears, moves, is an agent, but with an empty activity, in every determinate activity the active factor has not determined, but since it is active only up to a point it is a determined agent.

The determining factor is a power, through which the activity receives its direction, its form; even if there is believing and doing on the basis of trust—trust is identity of person, of will, of ideal, with difference of accidental aspect. If I, in the case where I am not he and he is not I, believe in him and act according to his will, then I am determined, he is a power facing me and I assume a positive relation in the face of him.

Positive faith requires faith in something that is not—that which is not can only either come to be—or not come to be—the factor that is determined is so far no existing being, but since it is supposed to be believed in, it is supposed nonetheless to be an existing being. A power is felt, one suffers in the face of it, and it does not exist in this feeling, but in the sundering of the feeling, in which the suffering party, which in this passive mode becomes object, is opposed to the party that produces the suffering (which becomes from this point of view subject).

All positive religion starts from something opposed, a thing that we are not, and we ought to be; it sets up an ideal prior to its own being; in order for faith in the ideal to be possible, it must be a power—in



positive religion the existent thing, the union is only a representation, a something thought of—"I believe that it is" means "I believe in the representation," "I believe that I am representing something to myself," "I believe in something that has been believed" (Kant, divinity); Kantian philosophy—positive religion. (Divinity, holy will, man absolute negation; in the representation it is united, representations are unified—representation is a thinking process, but the thing thought of is no existent being.)

## Note

In the translation of this piece, which is dated to 1798, I have received much helpful advice from my colleague, Dr. Walter Beringer, with whom I have discussed the text at length. But he cannot be held responsible for any mistakes that there may be in my interpretation, since his own views about the argument of the sketch are in many respects different from mine. This text is translated from G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften*, ed. Herman Nohl (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, Paul Siebeck, 1907), pp. 382–85.

# Four Early Poems by Hegel

Translated by Michael H. Hoffheimer

Hegel wrote more than a dozen poems which have been preserved, and it is likely he wrote others that are now lost. The five poems composed between 1796 and 1800 are the most significant, stemming as they do from perhaps the most dynamic period in Hegel's personal and intellectual development. They are also evidently his most serious efforts at poetry; the earlier mottos jotted in fellow students' *Stammbücher* and the later love poems to his fiancée are clearly occasional pieces of the sort frequently written at that time and are of no great value for understanding the distinctive features of Hegel's thought.

The poem "Resolution" (*Entschluß*), written in Jena in 1801, is perhaps Hegel's last serious poetic effort.<sup>1</sup> Hegel's first important poem that survives, entitled "Eleusis," was written in 1796 while he was a tutor in Bern. The surviving text, while apparently complete, is evidently of an early draft; "Eleusis" was dedicated to Hegel's good friend, the master German poet Friedrich Hölderlin, to whom the finished draft was doubtless sent.<sup>2</sup> Hegel wrote at least four poems in Frankfurt; while the original manuscripts are lost, his early biographer, Karl Rosenkranz, cited the opening stanzas of three of them, and evidently published one complete. Judging from the common lengths of poems of their type from the time, as well as from the more complete "Eleusis" and "Sketch of a Festive Poem" (*Entwurf eines Festgedichtes*; 1800) that survive, we can surmise that the lost portions are extensive.

Hegel's poetry is of admittedly limited literary value. Although various writers have claimed a place for Hegel in the history of German literature on the merits of his prose compositions, no such claims have been advanced on behalf of his poetic talents. Nonetheless, Hegel's poems are of some historical interest and significance for an understanding of his intellectual evolution. In the first place, these concrete artistic efforts confirm Hegel most definitively as a partisan of Classicism in the arts and demonstrate his distance from the Romantic movement, which is readily apparent in his more theoretical writings. This is not just a matter of tone or style. The Romantics, like the Schlegel brothers, Novalis, Ludwig Tieck, and others, radically challenged the very concept of poetry adopted by the Classicists. This split involved fundamental aesthetic and epistemological issues. The poems by Hegel translated below are exactly contemporary with the *Athenaeum*, the literary organ of the Romantic movement gathered around the Schlegels.<sup>3</sup> The contrast between them is unmistakable.

In the second place, these poems are of direct value for understanding Hegel's theoretical perspective in Frankfurt, since this was interrelated with the Classical world-view and aesthetics espoused by him at that time. The kind of literary dichotomy between discursive and non-discursive thought which arises with Romanticism is inimical to the viewpoint of the Classicists. Classical poetry had, or was intended to have, an immediate didactic function. Even the critic J. G. Herder, who in so many other respects prefigured the Romantics, approvingly cited the dictum, "what is nonsense in prose must also be nonsense in poetry."<sup>4</sup>

Though an extensive use of Masonic symbolism and a problematic narrative perspective present difficulties to the reader of "Eleusis," no such problems are presented by the following poems. The Frankfurt poems here translated thus do not require extensive analysis and lend themselves to literal prose rendition. As regards their subjects, it should be noted that they reflect Hegel's ubiquitous preoccupation with nature and natural phenomena in this period and demonstrate his use of nature, especially organic nature, as a model for the harmonious resolution of antagonistic forces. The sense of loss and separation from nature, which pervades the other fragments dating from this period, was also expressed most profoundly in Hölderlin's "*An die Natur*" (1795) and in numerous poems of Schiller with which Hegel was most certainly familiar.

## Distichs on a Pet Dog (December 19, 1798)

He runs in broad circles on the plane, we are his point of return;  
He searches in the earth, he catches sight of me and already frolics  
    back to me. Where does he stay?  
Now he has found playmates. They taunt, run from, and search for  
    each other;  
He who hunts is hunted in turn. But look, they now run too far away.  
Here! The word tears him loose from instinct and compels him to  
    return to his master.  
But a bitch pulls him off again to the right. Halt!  
Come back! He does not hear. The cane awaits you. I no longer  
    see him.  
He sneaks along the hedge, bad conscience slows his pace.  
To me! You circle widely around me, and wag your tail, he must—  
Do you still not see what “must” means? Now you see it. He cannot  
    help it.  
You cry at the blows: Obey the commands of the master.<sup>5</sup>

## A Poem in the Style of an Ode (December 12, 1798)

Your friends mourn, O Nature!  
Thousand-formed Proteus  
Has abandoned you his power to change,  
And a lifeless bellow  
Lies the aged earth's hide  
Whose pores once spat out wind and soul  
But in the cloudless  
Overarching Blue  
Travels in undimming brightness,  
The sight of the world,  
Smiles friendly to the bride. . . .<sup>6</sup>

## Moonshinebath (August 21, 1800)

Against the pressing waves of the stream  
I work to maintain my place,  
And, enveloped by its surrounding cool,  
Strengthened in the struggle against it,  
Dripping, I step onto shore.

But yonder Diana, with drunken face,  
 Protrudes through the mist.  
 Does the heated struggle redden her cheek above the earth and fog,  
 Or does she blush virgin-like, uncovering herself to the mortal race?  
 Down to us and our fields, trees,  
 She flatteringly sends her beams,  
 For the immortals, becoming not poorer,  
 Nor baser, give themselves to the earth and live with her. . . .<sup>7</sup>

### Part of a Poem on Spring Interlaced with Allusions to the Ceres Myth

Spring threatens! It presses life to come out,  
 As the bud expands to it,  
 Revealing itself to humans, too.  
 The sun waxes and loudly and wildly  
 Strives toward every sense!—  
 There you place in us still an image  
 Of something higher than nature's figures,  
 Holding fast the inner which wants to flee.

Well should spirit unite itself with nature,  
 But not too hastily nor unconsecrated,  
 Thus is severed by your severity,  
 High Priestess, what was to be bound.

Only when received as family by the mother,  
 Only when free of guilt before the queen,  
 Might Love, now purified, glow in you,  
 Paying you homage—only thus can Love's luck flourish.

The high head, free of the surrounding bands,  
 Now adores the diadem, from above and  
 Below spring forth full locks,  
 Bright is the sight; In the chariot high above,  
 The figure pulls majestically through the bustling crowd. . . .<sup>8</sup>

### Notes

1. A translation of one of Hegel's love poems to his fiancée can be found in Franz Wiedmann, *Hegel: An Illustrated Biography*, trans. Joachim Neugroschel

(New York: Pegasus, 1968), p. 46. One of Hegel's mottos entered in the *Stammbuch* of a friend is translated in H. S. Harris, *Hegel's Development: Toward the Sunlight, 1770–1801* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972), p. 68. A translation of the brief poem "Entschluß" is in G. W. F. Hegel, *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, trans. and ed. Gustav Emil Mueller (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959), pp. 14–15.

2. For a discussion of "Eleusis," see Harris, *Hegel's Development*, pp. 244ff. One recent study has seen Hegel's intellectual evolution as a consistent retreat from the revolutionary idealism and Romanticism of his youth as typified by the viewpoint expressed in this poem: see George Armstrong Kelly, *Hegel's Retreat from Eleusis: Studies in Political Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978). The political presuppositions of such an interpretation are problematic. The characterization of the young Hegel as a Romantic represents either a misunderstanding or a use of "Romanticism" in an extremely broad sense.

3. There have been repeated attempts to assimilate Hegel and the Romantics. These attempts are given a certain credibility by the fact that Hegel and the Romantics shared a common language and used many metaphors drawn from the general knowledge of the time, which can obscure the profound differences in viewpoints which characterize the two. For instance, A.W. Schlegel invoked a triadic, naturalistic hierarchy (of mechanics, chemistry, and organics), which was also central to Hegel's systematic thought; Schlegel further established a parallel between the organization of nature and consciousness. Nonetheless, Schlegel's personalistic glorification of genius and the non-rational life is in striking contrast to Hegel's notion of reason, with its firm roots in the German *Aufklärung*. Schlegel generally expressed himself in aphorisms: "Understanding is mechanical, wit chemical, and genius organic Spirit" (*Athenaeum: Eine Zeitschrift*, vol. 1, no. 2, 1798).

4. See J. G. Herder, *God, Some Conversations*, trans. Frederick H. Burkhardt (Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1940), p. 112. Although Hegel was to criticize Jacobi for overapplying discursive thought, the critique was fundamentally rationalistic rather than Romantic.

5. Karl Rosenkranz, *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Leben* (1844; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1963), p. 83. Rosenkranz remarks that Hegel, like every proper Faust, had at the time a pet poodle. Mephistopheles, it will be remembered, makes his entrance in *Faust* as a poodle.

6. Rosenkranz, *Hegels Leben*, pp. 83–84. The myth referred to by this poem is not immediately apparent, but is most probably the abduction of Persephone. Cf. Schiller's poem "*Klage der Ceres*."

7. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 84–85. The reference to the abduction of Persephone is unmistakable here. The central figure of the sun in this, and the second poetic fragment above, is to be noted.

# Two Fragments on the Ideal of Social Life

Translated by H. S. Harris

Hegel wrote the first fragment here translated either late in 1799 or early in 1800, while he was a house tutor at Frankfurt. It is one of several abortive beginnings (the second that we know of) for a political pamphlet which eventually took shape as the essay we call “The German Constitution.”<sup>1</sup> But among his political drafts from this period, it is almost unique because the speculative ideal of his Frankfurt “system” is so clearly visible in it. In this earliest Hegelian system, the goal of human existence is taken to be the fullest and most spontaneous expression of human nature in harmony with nature as a whole. The regulative ideal of life, or the supreme cognitive value, is beauty, and “the highest act of reason is an aesthetic act,” as Hegel put it in the so-called “Earliest System-Program of German Idealism” just three years earlier.<sup>2</sup> The present fragment is the first, and almost the only, surviving example of how Hegel applied this thesis to politics. It shows us how and why the rational poet and the philosopher endowed with aesthetic sense (i.e. Hölderlin and Hegel, to give them their concrete historical identities) must collaborate for the creation of the new religious consciousness, which is the necessary condition for a truly successful (or humanly satisfying) political revolution.

Religion as “the elevation of finite life to infinite life”<sup>3</sup> is the highest (and the only fully satisfying and complete) mode of experience. Hence, as Hegel wrote in the *Difference* essay a year later, “both art and speculation are in their essence divine service—both are a living intuition of the absolute life and hence a being at one with it.”<sup>4</sup> By this time (1801) Schelling had

convinced him that philosophy could effectively transcend the “reflective” standpoint to which Hegel had restricted it in the “Fragment of a System” of 1800. Because of this, the “highest act of reason” becomes self-contained and self-sufficient, and the philosopher need not suffer if he fails to change the world. But the goal of the philosophical system continues to be the intellectual intuition of “infinite life” (as can be seen both in the *Difference* essay and in the concluding paragraph of the *Natural Law* essay).<sup>5</sup> It was only after he gave up his attempt—in the *System of Ethical Life* (1802)—to expound the ideal of “nature” as a whole that is speculatively complete, that Hegel finally progressed beyond the Romantic conception of “life” or “nature” as a goal for which philosophical comprehension is the essential instrument.

The same view of nature as a practical ideal or goal was formulated by Hölderlin at this time. His novel *Hyperion* can, and should, be read as a poetic *Darstellung*, or representation, of the doctrine formulated here (and particularly of the lesson about “violence against one’s own destiny” through a political revolution that is ideologically unripe). Hegel and Hölderlin clearly influenced one another more than either was influenced at this stage by Schelling’s first steps in *Naturphilosophie*.<sup>6</sup> But it is idle for us to try to decide “which of them started it” or “who the real leader was here.” They would not have known what to say in response to such an inquiry themselves, and would have thought laughter the only appropriate response (*à la* Shaftesbury). The real origin of their shared conception was undoubtedly Schiller’s *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man*, which they both read independently in Schiller’s journal, *Die Horen* (1795–97), as fast as the installments appeared.<sup>7</sup>

The second fragment is the plan for a discussion of the patterns of “living opposition” in society. The outline is nowhere used or developed in our surviving manuscripts, and the best date that can be given for it is “before May 1801.” This *terminus ad quem* is securely fixed, because after he wrote the plan Hegel used the same sheet of paper to copy out excerpts from two imperial decrees (of April 3 and 7, 1801) for use in revising his essay on “The German Constitution.” How long the second fragment had been among his papers when he did this we cannot be sure. Hoffmeister thought the handwriting belonged to the period 1798–99, but there is too little of it for reliable judgment, and such a long interval is not very probable. The plan could have been formed in 1801 (in connection with the “German Constitution” essay). But it could also have been with the “Constitution” essay papers because it belonged to the earlier phase from which the first fragment, “*Der immer sich vergrößernde Widerspruch*,” has survived. The plan’s close affinity with the theory of “living opposition” in the “Fragment of a System” of 1800 supports this view. Hegel seems in it to be tracing a circle of connected social contrasts (beginning with diametric extremes).



First Fragment: *Der immer sich vergrößernde Widerspruch . . .*

The ever self-augmenting contradiction between the unknown, which men are unconsciously seeking, and the life, which is offered and allowed to them and which they have made their own, and on the other side the yearning toward life of those who have elaborated nature within themselves to the level of the Idea, contain the striving toward reciprocal approach. The need of men generally to gain consciousness of what holds them prisoner, and get the unknown which they crave, comes together with the need of these others to pass over from their Idea into life. They cannot live alone, and man is still alone even when he has displayed his nature to himself in an external image, has made this image-display his comrade, and enjoys in it his own self; he must still find what is displayed as a living thing. The state of the man whom the time has driven back into an inner world can be either just a perpetual death if he is willing to maintain himself within this inner world, or if nature drives him toward life, it can only be a struggle to overcome [*aufheben*]<sup>8</sup> the negative of the existing world, in order to find and enjoy himself in it, and so be able to live. His suffering is bound up with consciousness of the restrictions on account of which he despises such life as would be allowed to him, he wills his suffering; while on the other hand, the suffering of the man who is without reflective awareness of his destiny is involuntary, since he respects the negative, he views the restrictions only under the aspect of their legality and established authority as unassailably fixed, takes his determinations and their contradictions as absolute, and sacrifices both himself and others to them even at the point where they violate his own impulses.<sup>9</sup>

The overcoming of what is negative with respect to nature, but positive with respect to the will, will not be brought about through violence, neither through the violence that one does to one's own destiny, nor through that which it undergoes from without; in both cases destiny remains what it is, the determination—the restriction is not sundered from life by violence; alien violence is a matter of particular against particular, the theft of someone's property, a new suffering; the arousing of one who is in bonds is a more fearful moment for himself, a moment in which he loses himself, and only finds his consciousness again in the determinacies which were forgotten but were not yet dead.<sup>10</sup>

The feeling of the contradiction between nature and the existing life is the need for its removal; it becomes this need whenever the existing life has lost its authority and all of its worth, when it has become a pure negative.

All the phenomena of the present time show that satisfaction is no longer to be found in the old life; it was a restriction to a perfectly

orderly lordship over one's property, a contemplation and enjoyment of one's perfectly obedient world, and then also a self-annihilation and exaltation up to heaven in thought, that reconciles this restriction.<sup>11</sup> On one side the necessity of the time has attacked that property, and on the other side its bounty has overcome the restriction in luxury, and in both cases the time has made man the master, and his authority over actuality supreme. Under this arid life of understanding, on the one side the bad conscience of making one's own property, mere things, into absolutes has become more intense, and thereby on the other side the suffering of men has grown too; and no better life has inspired this present time.<sup>12</sup> The drive of a better life is nourished through the action of single men of great character, through the movements of whole peoples, through the displaying of nature and destiny by poets; by means of metaphysics the restrictions get their bounds, and their necessity in the systematic connectedness of the whole. As might, the restricted life can only be attacked with might as an enemy by the better life, when it too has grown into a might, and has to fear violence. As particular against particular, nature in its actual life is the unique assault upon, or refutation of, the worse life, and such an assault cannot be the object of an intentional activity. But what is limited can be attacked by its own truth that lies within it, and can be brought into contradiction with this truth; it grounds its lordship, not on the violence of particular against particular, but upon universality; this truth, the right which it claims for itself, must be taken from it and given to the part of life that is demanded. This dignity of a universal, of a right, is what makes the demands implicit in the suffering of the impulses that come into contradiction with the existing life which is vested with that honor, so timid (as being contrary to conscience). Its own truth—that right must be done—gets left on the side of the positive of the existing order which is a negation of nature.

In the realm of Germany the universal sovereign power has disappeared as the source of all rights, because it has isolated itself, and turned itself into a particular. The universality is therefore present now only as a thought, no longer as an actuality. Clearly or obscurely public opinion has come to a decision about this through the loss of confidence, and there is little point in making a clearer consciousness of it more general. Yet all existing rights have their ground only in this connection with the whole, and since the connection has long ceased to exist, it has let them all become particular rights.

Now either we can make a start from the truth which even what exists concedes; and then the part-concepts, which are contained in the concept of the state as a whole, are grasped as universal in thought, and their universality or particularity in actuality is set up alongside them;

if such a part-unit shows [itself] as a particular, then the contradiction between what it wants to be, what is demanded for it exclusively, and what it is, comes before our eyes.<sup>13</sup>

Or else [*here Hegel broke off; the sheet is not full.*]

## Second Fragment: *Menschenliebe /Freundschaft* . . .

§ a. Love of men<sup>14</sup>

Friendship<sup>15</sup>

§ b. Doing the right thing

Revolution

§ c. Consciousness of having done one's duty, guiltlessness

Fame<sup>16</sup>

§ d. Gratefulness

Independence, freedom

§ e. Faith

Enlightenment<sup>17</sup>

§ f. Family, happiness, Status

Social loyalty

§ g. Love

Patriotism<sup>18</sup>

## Notes

1. The first fragment was first published—not quite completely or accurately—by Karl Rosenkranz (*Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Leben* [1844; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1963], pp. 88–90), and edited in full from the manuscript by Georg Lasson (G. W. F. Hegel, *Schriften zur Politik und Rechtsphilosophie* [Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1913], pp. 138–41). It can now be found most readily in G. W. F. Hegel, *Theorie Werkausgabe*, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971), vol. 1, pp. 457–60. For a discussion of the fragment in its immediate political context, see H. S. Harris, *Hegel's Development: Toward the Sunlight, 1770–1801* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972), pp. 440–45.

2. A critical edition of the text of this crucially important fragment is in Rüdiger Reinhardt Bubner, "Das älteste Systemprogramm: Studien zur Frühgeschichte des deutschen Idealismus," in *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 9 (Bonn: Bouvier), pp. 263–65. A translation will be found in Harris, *Hegel's Development*, pp. 510–12. Reprinted in this volume on pp. 110–2.

3. See the "Fragment of a System" of this same year (1800) in Hegel, *Theorie Werkausgabe*, vol. 1, pp. 421, 423. This fragment is translated by Richard Kroner

in G. W. F. Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, trans. and ed. T. M. Knox and Richard Kroner (1948; Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1975), pp. 311, 313. Reprinted in this volume on pp. 151-9.

4. See G. W. F. Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. Rheinisch-Westfälischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1968ff.), vol. 4, pp. 76, 78; G. W. F. Hegel, *Difference between the Systems of Fichte and Schelling*, trans. H. S. Harris and W. Cerf (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977), p. 172.

5. Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 4, pp. 484.18-485.5; G. W. F. Hegel, *Natural Law*, trans. T. M. Knox (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1975), pp. 132-33.

6. Thus from the higher standpoint of "Religion" in 1800, "nature" is stigmatized as "not itself life, but a life fixated by reflection, though treated in the worthiest possible way" (Hegel, *Theorie Werkausgabe*, vol. 1, p. 420; Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, p. 311). But Schelling himself shared the conception of human nature as a *practical* ideal. See especially section 3 of the essay "On the Relation of Nature-Philosophy to Philosophy in General," in Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 4, pp. 274-76. (Schiller is the common source of this practical ideal in all three of them.)

7. Schiller's *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man* appeared in three parts during the first six months of 1795. (The presence of Schiller's distinctive terminology in our fragment is pointed out in the following notes.)

8. The use of "*aufheben*" in this fragment is strictly negative (like Schiller's employment of the term in the *Aesthetic Letters*). It was probably from this source that the concept entered Hegel's philosophical vocabulary.

9. From a Kantian point of view, the fact that one's social duty may require the sacrifice or violation of some natural *Trieb* (impulse) is scarcely a reason for the astonishment that is here expressed. So we can only make sense of Hegel's argument by supposing that he is speaking of the *Triebe* which Schiller defines as essential to human nature as such. In his use it embraces the highest human aspirations as well as the most primitive natural "drives." The highest ideal of life is an aesthetic harmony of natural (*Stofftrieb*) and moral impulse (*Formtrieb*) in the *Spieltrieb*.

10. This paragraph now appears to me to be Hegel's first philosophical critique of the excesses of the Revolutionary Terror of 1793 (a fact which was not clearly apparent to me in writing *Hegel's Development*; see p. 442). The full *display* of human nature requires specialization of social functions in a class system. Hence this destiny reasserts itself when the drive toward "absolute freedom" violates it. (The apparent contradiction that arises below when Hegel says that the natural revolution involves a battle of "particular against particular" is obviated by his general theory that *Schicksal* is *one's own* action turned against one. It *appears* as an alien might but it is not really alien.)

11. Since determinate specification (social classification) is part of "destiny," the reconciliation of universal nature with this "restriction" is always necessary. This is the social function of religion. But in the "new life" the "exaltation of finite to infinite life" will not involve an authoritative religion. Religion is precisely the

sphere where class distinction is transcended. It ought not to be (what Hegel goes on to show that it presently is) an instrument for class domination. When the aspect of *otherworldly* promise is removed from it, it will not be *capable* of serving that function.

12. This is Hegel's earliest analysis of the economic dialectic that produces class struggle. It is considerably refined in his Jena manuscripts (see, for instance, G. W. F. Hegel, *System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy of Spirit*, ed. and trans. T. M. Knox and H. S. Harris [Albany: State University of New York Press, 1979], pp. 168–71, 247–50). But as a close examination of these later passages will show, the basic doctrine is already stated here.

13. In this paragraph the social system is thought of as an abstract legal entity, or machine, just as it is in the "Earliest System-Program of German Idealism." Presumably Hegel was about to consider it in the alternative way as a "living whole" when he broke off. In his commentary on Kant's *Rechtslehre* of 1798, he rejected the "separation of church and state" because "the principle of the State is a self-sufficient whole, so that Church and State cannot possibly be separated. What for the State is the sovereign power, recognized by reflection, that same thing is for the Church a living whole, set forth by the fancy. This living whole of the Church becomes just a mere fragment, if man in his wholeness is shattered into the two distinct roles of citizen and churchman" (Rosenkranz, *Hegels Leben*, p. 88). The task of poet and philosopher together, as envisaged in this fragment, is to integrate state and church into the *vollständiges Ganze* that is their principle.

14. Johannes Hoffmeister, who first printed this fragment in the notes to his *Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung* (Stuttgart: Frommann, 1936, p. 467) gives the heading "*Ich*" and reads the first couplet as the antithesis "a. *Menschenliebe / Feindschaft*." The *Theorie Werkausgabe* (vol. 1, pp. 445–46, note 6) follows Hoffmeister. But Kimmerle (who overlooked Hoffmeister's printing of the piece, probably because it is buried in the notes) gives the *incipit* as "section a. *Menschenliebe / Freundschaft*" (see item 7 in his chronological catalog of the Jena writings, in *Hegel-Studien* 4 [1967], p. 138). His reading is more likely to be reliable; and it is logically preferable (see the next note) if the fragment belongs to 1800–1.

15. This couplet refers to the original "identity" of human feeling in the "state of nature" of a "happy" people (compare "*so wie sie mehrere Gattungen*," in *Clio* 8 [1979], pp. 261–63). Hoffmeister's reading "*Menschenliebe / Feindschaft*" fits in with the contrast of Hellenic and Jewish culture (in the period to which he wanted to assign the fragment). But it does not fit the rest of the fragment (which contains no simple antitheses). However, if he is right about the heading "*Ich*," the question needs reexamining. For then the series could be read as a ladder from the "subjective reflection" of philosophy to the "infinite life" of religious experience (the first rung being Kant's conception of human nature as "unsocial sociability").

16. After the initial "identity" the pattern seems to be a *square* of objective and subjective terms. This first quartet is the one discussed in the "First Fragment: *Der immer sich vergrößernde Widerspruch*," where the social situation has reached the opposite extreme from the original harmony of natural feeling. Society is

objectively divided between the good citizens who do their duty and know they have done it, and the revolutionaries who are conscious of the “drive of a better life” as the urge for “fame” (since the revolutionary upheaval cannot be the objective of a properly ethical intention).

17. This quartet identifies the four corners of the same social square at the level of religious consciousness. The “good citizen” is properly “thankful” to God for all the benefits of life and has “faith” that its restrictions will be canceled in the other world; while the revolutionaries proclaim the need for independence of thought and freedom from clerical domination, and spread “enlightenment” in the place of “faith.”

18. This quartet appears to represent the goal of social revolution. In civic relations, private happiness and recognized status are harmoniously controlled by the sense of social unity; and in religious consciousness, the ideal of God’s love is the inspiration of patriotic commitment.

# Fragment of a System

Translated by Richard Kroner

**T**he manuscript from which the “Fragment of a System” survives apparently consisted of forty-seven sheets, of which only the thirty-fourth and forty-seventh survive. It is dated to 1800. In both of these surviving sheets Hegel seems to be dealing with problems similar to those treated in “The Spirit of Christianity,” especially with the problem of unifying opposites eternal and temporal, God and man, subject and object, etc.—opposites which reflective thinking has been unable to unite. The key to their union he finds in his conception of life. He holds that religion in its highest form conceives of God not as a mere object separated from man but as infinite life united with men who, as living beings, share in that life and can rise to its level in religious experience. Since these philosophico-religious problems occupy the whole of the extant manuscript, the title given to it by Nohl is somewhat misleading. It contains some of the seeds of the later system, but there is nothing to indicate that Hegel was writing the sketch of a system rather than a theological essay. The fragment has been translated from G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften*, ed. Herman Nohl (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, Paul Siebeck, 1907), pp. 345–51.

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## Fragment of a System

*Absolute* opposition holds good.<sup>1</sup> One kind of opposition is to be found in the multiplicity of living beings. Living beings must be regarded as organizations. The multiplicity of life has to be thought of as being divided against itself; one part of this multiplicity (a part which is itself an infinite multiplicity because it is alive) is to be regarded purely as something related, as having its being purely in union; the second part, also an infinite multiplicity, is to be regarded as solely in opposition, as having its being solely through a separation from the first. Therefore the first part<sup>2</sup> can also be defined as having its being only by means of separation from the second one. The unity is called an organization or an individual. It is self-evident that this life, whose manifold is regarded purely as being related and whose very existence is exactly this relation, can also be regarded as being differentiated in itself, as a mere multiplicity, because the relation between what is separated is not more intrinsic to it than the separation between that which is related. On the other hand, it must also be considered as capable of entering into relation with what is excluded from it, as capable of losing its individuality or being linked with what has been excluded. Similarly, the manifold itself, excluded from an organic whole and existing only as thus opposed to it, must nevertheless be conceived, in itself and in abstraction from that organization, not only as absolutely manifold, yet at the same time itself internally related, but also as connected with the living whole which is excluded from it.

The concept of individuality includes opposition to infinite variety and also inner association with it. A human being is an individual life in so far as he is to be distinguished from all the elements and from the infinity of individual beings outside himself. But he is only an individual life in so far as he is at one with all the elements, with the infinity of lives outside himself. He exists only inasmuch as the totality of life is divided into parts, he himself being one part and all the rest the other part; and again he exists only inasmuch as he is no part at all and inasmuch as nothing is separated from him. If we presuppose life undivided as fixed, then we can regard living beings as expressions or manifestations of that life. Precisely because these manifestations are posited, the infinite multiplicity of living beings is posited simultaneously, but reflection then crystallizes this multiplicity into stable, subsistent, and fixed points, i.e. into individuals.

If, on the contrary, we presuppose individual lives, namely, ourselves, as the spectators, then that life which is posited outside our own restricted spheres is an infinite life with an infinite variety, infinite oppositions, infi-



nite relations; as a multiplicity, it is an infinite multiplicity of organizations or individuals, and as a unity it is one unique organized whole, divided and unified in itself—nature. Nature is a positing of life, for reflection has applied to life its concepts of relation and separation, of the self-subsistent particular (something restricted) and the unifying universal (something unrestricted), and by positing these has turned life into nature.

Now because life, as an infinity of living beings or as an infinity of figures, is thus, as nature, an infinitely finite, an unrestricted restrictedness, and because this union and this separation of the finite and the infinite are within nature, nature is not itself life but is only a life crystallized by reflection, even though it be treated by reflection in the worthiest manner.<sup>3</sup> Therefore life in thinking and in contemplating nature still senses (or however else one may describe the mode of apprehension involved) this contradiction, this one opposition which still exists between itself and the infinite life; or, in other words, reason still recognizes the one-sidedness of this mode of treating life and of this mode of positing. Out of the mortal and perishable figure, out of what is self-opposed and self-antagonistic, this thinking life raises that living being, which would be free from transience; raises a relation between the multiplex elements which is not dead or killing, a relation which is not a bare unity, a conceptual abstraction, but is all-living and all-powerful infinite life; and this life it calls God. In this process it is no longer merely thinking or contemplating, because its object does not carry in itself anything reflected, anything dead.\*

This self-elevation of man, not from the finite to the infinite (for these terms are only products of mere reflection, and as such their separation is absolute), but from finite life to infinite life, is religion. We may call infinite life a spirit in contrast with the abstract multiplicity, for spirit is the living unity of the manifold if it is contrasted with the manifold as spirit's configuration and not as a mere dead multiplicity; contrasted with the latter, spirit would be nothing but a bare unity which is called law and is something purely conceptual and not a living being. The spirit is an animating law in union with the manifold which is then itself animated. When man takes this animated manifold as a multiplicity of many individuals, yet as connected with the animating spirit, then these single lives become organs, and the infinite whole becomes an infinite totality of life. When he takes the infinite life as the spirit of the whole and at the same time as a living being outside himself (since he himself is restricted), and when he puts himself at the same time outside his

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\* [*Here Hegel had added, and later canceled:*] "but worshipping" [its object].

restricted self in rising toward the living being and intimately uniting himself with him, then he worships God.

Although the manifold is here no longer regarded as isolated but is rather explicitly conceived as related to the living spirit, as animated, as organ, still something remains excluded, namely, the dead, so that a certain imperfection and opposition persists. In other words, when the manifold is conceived as an organ only, opposition itself is excluded; but life cannot be regarded as union or relation alone but must be regarded as opposition as well.<sup>4</sup> If I say that life is the union of opposition and relation, this union may be isolated again, and it may be argued that union is opposed to non-union. Consequently, I would have to say: life is the union of union and non-union. In other words, every expression whatsoever is a product of reflection, and therefore it is possible to demonstrate in the case of every expression that, when reflection propounds it, another expression, not propounded, is excluded. Reflection is thus driven on and on without rest; but this process must be checked once and for all by keeping in mind that, for example, what has been called a union of synthesis and antithesis is not something propounded by the understanding or by reflection but has a character of its own, namely, that of being a reality beyond all reflection. Within the living whole there are posited at the same time death, opposition, and understanding, because there is posited a manifold that is alive itself and that, as alive, can posit itself as a whole.<sup>5</sup> By so doing, it is at the same time a part, i.e. something for which there is something dead and which itself is something dead for other such parts. This partial character of the living being is transcended in religion; finite life rises to infinite life. It is only because the finite is itself life that it carries in itself the possibility of raising itself to infinite life.

Philosophy therefore has to stop short of religion because it is a process of thinking and, as such a process, implies an opposition with non-thinking processes as well as the opposition between the thinking mind and the object of thought. Philosophy has to disclose the finiteness in all finite things and require their integration by means of reason. In particular, it has to recognize the illusions generated by its own infinite and thus to place the true infinite outside its confines.

The elevation of the finite to the infinite is only characterized as the elevation of finite life to infinite life, as religion, in virtue of the fact that it does not posit the reality of the infinite as a reality created by reflection, be it objective or subjective, i.e. it has not simply added to the restricted that which restricts. If it had done so, the latter would be recognized again as something posited by reflection and thereby itself restricted and would now again seek what restricts it and would postulate a continuation

in such a way *ad infinitum*. Even this activity of reason is an elevation to the infinite, but this infinite is a\* [false one.]

. . . objective center.<sup>6</sup> For all nations this center was the temple facing the east, and to the worshipers of an invisible God it was nothing but this shapeless special room, nothing but a place.<sup>7</sup> But this mere opposite, this purely objective and merely spatial center, must not necessarily remain in this imperfection of entire objectivity. It can itself, as being self-sustained, revert to its own subjectivity by becoming configured. Divine emotion, the infinite sensed by the finite, is not integrated until reflection is added and dwells upon it. But the relation of reflection to emotion is only the recognition of it as something subjective, is only consciousness of feeling, in which reflection reflects on emotion but each is separate from the other. The pure spatial objectivity provides the unifying center for many, and the objectivity configured is at the same time what it ought to be, namely, not an actual but only a potential objectivity because subjectivity is now linked with it. This objectivity configured may be thought as an actual objectivity, but this is not necessary, because it is certainly not pure objectivity.

And thus, just as the antinomy of time was posited above<sup>8</sup> as necessary, namely, the antinomy between a moment and the time needed by life, so now the objective antinomy with respect to the thing confronting us is posited. The infinite being, filling the immeasurability of space, exists at the same time in a definite space, as is said, for instance, in the verse:<sup>9</sup> "He whom all heavens' heaven ne'er contained / Lies now in Mary's womb."

In the religious life both man's relation to objects and also his action were interpreted as a preservation of the objects in life or as an animation of them, but man was also reminded of his destiny, which demands of him that he admit the existence of the objective as objective or even that he make the living being itself into an object. It may be that this objectification would last only for a moment and that life would withdraw again from the object, free itself from it, and would leave the oppressed<sup>10</sup> to its own life and to its resuscitation. But it is necessary that life should also put itself into a permanent relation with objects and thus maintain their objectivity even up to the point of completely destroying them.

Even in all the increased religious union disclosed by the above-mentioned acts of integration hypocrisy may still exist, namely, owing to one's retention of a particular property for one's self. If he kept things firmly in his own grasp, man would not yet have fulfilled the negative prerequisites of religion, i.e. would not yet be free from absolute

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\* [The manuscript breaks off here, at the end of sheet 34.]

objectivity and would not yet have risen above finite life. He would still be unable to unite himself with the infinite life because he would have kept something for himself; he would still be in a state of mastering things or caught in a dependence upon them. This is the reason why he gives up only part of his property as a sacrifice, for it is his fate to possess property, and this fate is necessary and can never be discarded. In God's sight man destroys part of his property.<sup>11</sup> The rest he destroys to some extent by taking away as far as possible its character as private property and sharing it with his friends. The destruction of property is an additional negation of private ownership because such destruction is useless and superfluous. Only through this uselessness of destroying, through this destroying for the sake of destroying, does he make good the destruction which he causes for his own particular purposes. At the same time he has consummated the objectivity of the objects by a destruction unrelated to his own purposes, by that complete negation of relations which is called death. This aimless destruction for destruction's sake sometimes happens, even if the necessity of a purposive destruction of objects remains, and it proves to be the only religious relation to absolute objects.

It only needs to be briefly mentioned that the remaining external surroundings,<sup>12</sup> as necessary confines, should not so much entertain by their useless beauty as hint at something else by purposive embellishment, and further that it is the essence of worship to cancel the intuitive or thoughtful contemplation of an objective God, or rather to blend this attitude with the joyful subjectivity of living beings, of song, or of motions of the body, a sort of subjective expression which like the solemn oration can become objective and beautiful by rules, namely: dance; or offer words with a manifold of observances, the due ordering of offerings, sacrifices, and so on. Moreover, this variety of expressions, and of those whose expressions they are, demands unity and order which come alive in someone who orders and commands, i.e. a priest, who himself has a separate position of his own if man's external life has been split into separate compartments for the fulfillment of his many needs. There is no need to mention other consequences and the means of completely realizing them.

This more perfect union in the realm of religion is not absolutely necessary because it consists in such an elevation of finite life to infinite life that as little as possible of the finite and restricted, i.e. of the merely objective or merely subjective, remains, and that every opposition springing from this elevation and integration is reintegrated. Religion is *any* elevation of the finite to the infinite, when the infinite is conceived

as a definite form of life. Some such elevation is necessary because the finite depends on the infinite. But the stage of opposition and unification on which the determinate nature of one generation of men persists is accidental in respect to indeterminate nature.<sup>13</sup> The most perfect integration is possible in the case of peoples whose life is as little as possible separated and disintegrated, i.e. in the case of happy peoples. Unhappy peoples cannot reach that stage, but they, living in a state of separation, must take anxious care for the preservation of one member, i.e. for their own independence. They are not permitted to abandon the quest for this independence; their highest pride must be to cling to separation and maintain the existence of the unit.<sup>14</sup>

One may consider this situation from the side of subjectivity as independence, or from the other side as an alien, remote, inaccessible object. Both seem to be compatible with one another, although it is necessary that, the stronger the separation is, the purer must the ego be and the further must the object be removed from and above man. The greater and the more isolated the inner sphere, the greater and the more isolated is the outer sphere also, and if the latter is regarded as the self-subsistent, the more subjugated man must appear. But it is precisely this being mastered by the immeasurably great object which is steadily retained as man's relation to the object; it does not matter what mode of consciousness man prefers, whether that of fearing a God who, being infinite and beyond the heaven of heavens, exalted above all connection and all relationship, hovers all-powerful above all nature; or that of placing himself as pure ego<sup>15</sup> above the ruins of this body and the shining suns, above the countless myriads of heavenly spheres, above the ever new solar systems as numerous as ye all are, ye shining suns.<sup>16</sup>

When the separation is infinite, it does not matter which remains fixed, the subject or the object; but in either case the opposition persists, the opposition of the absolutely finite to the absolutely infinite. In either case the elevation of finite to infinite life would be only an elevation over finite life; the infinite would only be the completely integrated in so far as it was opposed to the totality, i.e. to the infinity of the finite. The opposition would not be overcome in a beautiful union, the union would be frustrated, and opposition would be a hovering of the ego over all nature, a dependence upon, or rather a relation to, a Being beyond all nature. This religion<sup>17</sup> can be sublime and awful, but it cannot be beautifully humane. And hence the blessedness enjoyed by the ego which opposes itself to everything and has thus brought everything under its feet is a phenomenon of the time, at bottom equivalent to the phenomenon of dependence on an absolutely alien being which cannot become man,

or if it did become man (namely, at a point in time) would, even in this union, remain something absolutely specialized, i.e. would remain just an absolute unit. Nevertheless, this blessedness may be man's worthiest and noblest achievement if the union with the temporal were ignoble and ignominious.<sup>18</sup>

## Notes

1. The first sentence is fragmentary; the restoration of what is lost is purely conjectural. The first paragraph deals with the problem of life as a multiplicity of individual organisms, separated and yet united.

2. I.e. the unity.

3. This seems to refer to Schelling's philosophy of nature, which was in the focus of German Idealism during 1797-99. For Schelling nature was of equal rank with Fichte's supreme principle, the absolute ego. He understood nature not as a mechanical system, but as a creative organism animated by a world soul, and to that extent he dealt with it "in the worthiest manner." But, even so, Hegel hints, Schelling was unable fully to unite the infinite and the finite. This criticism anticipates ideas Hegel expressed in *Difference between the Systems of Fichte and Schelling*.

4. We may think of the opposition between unity and manifold as overcome by the concept of the manifold organized into unity. But the opposition of life and nonlife, or of the organic and the inorganic, persists—an opposition presupposed by the very concept of life.

5. This statement, almost as dialectical as Hegel's later method, forecasts what Hutchison Stirling calls "the secret of Hegel"—the reconciliation of understanding with life. But still he believes that this reconciliation is reserved to religion. Philosophical reflection always "kills" life by distinguishing oppositions, and it cannot give up those distinctions without killing itself. Desperately but as yet unsuccessfully, Hegel gropes after a method which would understand life by both positing and uniting opposites. Nowhere else can the fountainhead of Hegel's dialectic be better studied than in the intellectual struggle reflected in this paper.

6. Sheet 47, the conclusion of the original manuscript, begins in the middle of a sentence, and the interpretation of the first few paragraphs is hard because we have no clue to what immediately preceded. But some light may perhaps be found elsewhere. In a fragment which Nohl prints in his *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften*, appendix, p. 367, Hegel writes: "If a spectator visits a temple and, without any feeling of piety, regards it purely as a building, it may fill him with a sense of sublimity; but then its walls are too narrow for him. He tries to give himself space by stretching his arms and raising his head to infinity. The confines of the building which had roused the sense of sublimity thus lose their importance for him, and he demands something more, namely, infinity." In "The Spirit of

Christianity" (in G. W. F. Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, trans. and ed. T. M. Knox and Richard Kroner [1948; Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1975], p. 192), there is a reference to the Holy of Holies in the Temple at Jerusalem. There was no concrete shape or figure to be an object of religious feeling, but only what Pompey regarded as an empty room. With these two passages in mind, we may perhaps conjecture that in this fragment Hegel is contrasting the worship of God as an object with the worship of Him as an infinite life in which the worshipers share. At the same time Hegel may be contrasting the temple or church as a mere object, four bare walls, with worship as a living whole, articulated into its elements—the worshipers themselves, their devotion, and the external forms of their devotion, ritual, and architecture. Hegel's point seems to be that worship cannot be focused on God unless it is carried on in some specific place devoted to him. But this place will be formless and unadorned so long as God is conceived abstractly as merely an invisible infinite object. If instead God is conceived as infinite life, then the place changes its character; it loses its bare objectivity because the worshipers express their devotion by adorning it (e.g., with images of the divine), and the act of worship becomes a union of object with subject—a union achieved in the religious feelings of the worshipers as a union between man and God.

7. Churches are oriented to the site of the original temple, which is thus a unifying center for all Christians, even though for the Jews the Holy of Holies was only an empty room, in contrast with Greek temples adorned by statues of the gods.

8. I.e. in the part of the manuscript which is lost.

9. Taken, with a slight change, from a hymn by Martin Luther, beginning "*Gelobet seist du, Jesu Christ.*"

10. I.e. the living being, oppressed by being treated merely as an object.

11. I.e. on the altar.

12. I.e. the temple or church where worship is carried on.

13. Religion raises accidental features of experience to the level of absolute significance. Peoples still living in paradisaical unity with "indeterminate" nature are free to select any features of their finite experience for religious exaltation and sanctification. Their status is that of the mythological consciousness.

14. This contrast between happy and unhappy peoples may refer to that between the Greeks and the Israelites.

15. The two imperfect types of integration between infinite and finite which Hegel distinguishes here are (a) Judaism (for which see § 1 of "The Spirit of Christianity") and (b) Fichte's philosophy of the pure ego.

16. Quoted from J. G. Fichte: *Appellation, Sämtliche Werke*, 8 vols., ed. I. H. Fichte (Berlin: Veit, 1845–46), vol. 2.3, p. 237.

17. I.e. Christianity as inheriting Judaism and as contrasted with the beautiful union in Greek religion. Or the contrast is perhaps between the beauty of the teaching of Jesus (especially as interpreted in "The Spirit of Christianity") and the renewed outbreak of oppositions in the development of the Christian church (see the close of "The Spirit of Christianity").

18. The meaning of these somewhat obscure words may be as follows. The “blessedness enjoyed by the ego” refers to Fichte’s philosophy of the absolute ego. Hegel characterizes this philosophy as “a phenomenon of the time” rather than an eternal truth. Fichte’s position with its total separation of ego and world resembles biblical theism. The overcoming of this separation by the Incarnation is confined to the historical Jesus and fails to achieve the absolute union of time and eternity. Should this unification by means of an all-embracing speculative system be impossible, then Fichte’s system would be the worthiest achievement of the human mind.



PART

5

JENA, 1801–1806





# *Philosophical Dissertation on the Orbits of the Planets and the Habilitation Theses*

Newly translated, with introduction and notes,  
by Pierre Adler

Although all bodies generated by nature are perfect in their genus in that they express the splendor of the universe, they are not self-sufficient with respect to the first force of nature, namely, gravitation, and they perish, suppressed by the force of the whole. The celestial bodies are an exception, however; as they are not bodies of glebe and bear their center of gravity more perfectly within them, they proceed through the light air like the gods: no other expression of reason is more sublime and purer than this living thing which we call the solar system. Nor is any expression of reason worthier of philosophical contemplation. . . . nature meant the system of celestial bodies . . . to be a living expression and an image of reason. . . .

—Hegel, *Philosophical Dissertation on the Orbits of the Planets*

A Translation of the *Dissertatio Philosophica  
de Orbitis Planetarum*?

Why should one wish to publish this cryptic, seldom read, discussed, or studied text of Hegel's, this scandalous piece of writing, which was withheld from the German paperback edition of Hegel's works?<sup>1</sup>

One may offer several reasons:

1. It is his *Habilitationsschrift*, namely, the thesis required in Germany of candidates wishing to qualify for lecturing at a university. The thesis, which in Hegel's time had to be written in Latin, is the first requirement for qualification, the second being a disputation or defense of the thesis (the disputation is a debate between two teams).
2. In his dissertation, Hegel formulates for the first time some elements of a *Naturphilosophie*, or philosophy of nature. *Naturphilosophische* considerations formed a vital and intrinsic constituent of Hegel's thought at its very inception.
3. Hegel's understanding of Isaac Newton's ideas about matter and motion does not undergo any significant change in his later writings from that exhibited in the dissertation.
4. The text serves as a reminder that Hegel's philosophy of nature may not simply be severed from the rest of his rationally ordered system, and that Hegel's thoughts about nature and the conceptual organization of the natural sciences should not be ignored.
5. The dissertation is one of the few attempts made by a German idealist to investigate a concrete scientific question.
6. Setting aside for a moment the issues of the truth of Hegel's final philosophy of nature and the validity of its arguments, we may say that, in a sense, the dissertation is one of the last attempts made by a philosopher to articulate the unity of physics and philosophy, and that the dissertation represents the first step taken by Hegel in that endeavor.

The relation of the theses to the dissertation is addressed below, in the section entitled "The Defense."

## The Latin Text and Its Translation

The *Philosophical Dissertation on the Orbits of the Planets*, published in 1801 by Prager Press at Jena, was, as I said, written in Latin. Hegel's Latin is hybrid and, as such, does not facilitate the work of the translator, the difficulty of the text only compounding the arduousness of the task. My rendition has tried to keep as close to the text as possible, save that I did not hesitate to break up Hegel's long and involuted periods into shorter sentences. But even as the translation stands, some readers may still find many of its sentences somewhat long.

I have benefited from the work of three previous translators: Georg Lasson, François De Gandt, and Wolfgang Neuser,<sup>2</sup> deriving much valuable help in understanding the text from De Gandt's and Neuser's respective

exegetical and historical work on it. Both their books should be read by anyone interested in Hegel's dissertation.<sup>3</sup> More specific debts to their work are acknowledged in my notes to the translation.

The Latin text of the *Dissertatio* is available in the following three editions of Hegel's works:

1. *Sämtliche Werke*, edited by Georg Lasson (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1928), volume 1: *Erste Druckschriften*, pp. 347–401. Lasson's German rendition faces the original.
2. *Sämtliche Werke*, edited by Hermann Glockner (Stuttgart: Frommann, 1958), volume 1: *Aufsätze aus dem kritischen Journal der Philosophie und andere Schriften aus der Jenenser Zeit*, pp. 1–29.
3. *Gesammelte Werke*, volume 5: *Schriften und Entwürfe (1799–1808)*, edited by Manfred Baum and Kurt R. Meist (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1998), pp. 237–53.

The original text can also be found on the facing pages of Wolfgang Neuser's German translation.<sup>4</sup> Neuser had the Latin text typeset from a copy of the first edition of the dissertation in such a way that it faithfully reproduces both the number of words per line and the number of lines per page of that edition. The first edition of the *Dissertatio* and the theses counts thirty-two pages: the *Dissertatio* begins on page 3. The page numbers of the first edition appear in the margins of my translation.

As for the theses, they appear on page 404 of the first volume of Lasson's edition and on pages 227–28 of volume 5 of *Gesammelte Werke*, as well as in the book edited by Neuser, but are omitted in Glockner's edition. There also exists an English and Latin edition of the theses, which appeared in 1987.<sup>5</sup> In the Prager edition, the theses occupy pages 1 and 2.

The following translation is a greatly revised version of my first one, which appeared in the *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* 12 (1987), pp. 269–309.<sup>6</sup> This initial translation was recast on two occasions, in 1997 and 1999. The helpful suggestions of Peter Tanzer, as well as the philological work of Cinzia Ferrini, improved my work of revision.<sup>7</sup> I also reworked and expanded the introduction and the notes to the translation.

## The Defense

In order to obtain a license to teach at the University of Jena, where he arrived in January 1801, Hegel had, as we saw, to produce (and publish) a dissertation, and defend it. To this effect, he wrote *Dissertatio Philosophica de Orbitis Planetarum*. The defense took place on August 27, 1801, coincidentally falling on Hegel's birthday. Present at the examination were Friedrich Schelling and

his brother Karl, then a student at Jena. However, according to the records of the University of Jena, Hegel did not, on that day, defend the text about the orbits of the planets, but only the twelve theses which were to be published along with the dissertation, and which immediately follow my introduction. The theses deal with such topics as logic, the philosophy of nature, the theory of knowledge, and ethics. Although the dissertation was itself not ready on August 27, its title was known. The university only received a printed copy of it on October 18. It would seem that Hegel wrote the dissertation during the month of September. In so doing, he most certainly used preparatory notes and reflections gathered earlier in the year and over the course of the summer, if not prior to 1801.<sup>8</sup>

### Hegel's Hypothetical Statement Regarding the Distances of the Planets, and the Asteroid Ceres

The dissertation consists of two introductory paragraphs and three increasingly shorter parts. The second introductory paragraph gives an *aperçu* of the three parts. In the original, the parts are not numbered, as they are in my translation.

The first part offers a philosophical critique of elementary notions of Newtonian mechanics and of the conception of astronomy that rests on it. The second part sets forth a "philosophical construction" of the concept of solar system, in which Hegel relies on Kepler's and Schelling's thought, as well as on the contemporaneous theory of magnetism.<sup>9</sup> It contains some of the most difficult passages of the whole work.

The relation of the third part to the other two is barely articulated by Hegel, save for his saying that knowledge of the laws of nature rests on the belief that there is an isomorphism between reason and nature. In this last part, Hegel proposes a (modified) Pythagorean series of numbers, borrowed from Plato's *Timaeus*. The members of the series are supposed to measure the distances of the planets from the Sun. The sequence is offered as an alternative to the then-scientifically current Titius-Bode series, which, in view of its allegedly arithmetical character, Hegel deems unphilosophical.<sup>10</sup> The Titius-Bode series anticipates the presence of a celestial body between the orbits of Mars and Jupiter. Hegel, however, claims that on the assumption that the series set forth by him is more consonant with the rational structure of nature than that of J. D. Titius and J. E. Bode, i.e. on the assumption that the Demiurge conformed nature to the Pythagorean series, the large interval between Mars (fourth planet from the Sun) and Jupiter (fifth planet) need no longer puzzle anyone, for the Pythagorean series accounts for it. At this point, it is suitable to quote the crucial (and eventually infamous)

statement of Hegel's proposal: "If this series is an order of nature truer than the arithmetical progression, then it is manifest that there is a large gap between the fourth and fifth positions and that no planet is missing therein." For this assertion—and probably for a few more to be found in the *Dissertatio*—Hegel was accused of impeding the progress of science, of ruling out the existence of a celestial body on the basis of *a priori* considerations, of not even being worthy of untying Newton's shoelaces, and other such things.<sup>11</sup> Indeed, if accepted, Hegel's series leaves no room for a body between Mars and Jupiter.

To the detriment of Hegel's assumption, on January 1, 1801, the astronomer Giuseppe Piazzi (1746–1826) had discovered an object between the orbits of Mars and Jupiter, which he first construed to be a comet and subsequently identified as the planet anticipated by the Titius-Bode series.<sup>12</sup> Piazzi had conducted his observations at Palermo, Sicily. He named the object of his discovery Ceres Ferdinandea, after the tutelary divinity of the island, and his patron, Ferdinand IV of Naples (1751–1825). Ceres, it turned out, was an asteroid, or minor planet, located between Mars and Jupiter. The discovery was reported in a Jena journal on May 6, 1801, as well as in two other German publications. In June of the same year, the German-Hungarian astronomer Franz Xaver von Zach published a more extensive treatment of the discovery in *Monatliche Correspondenz zur Beförderung der Erd- und Himmelskunde*.<sup>13</sup> There is, however, no evidence in the dissertation that Hegel was aware of the discovery at that time.

In the first edition of the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1817), Hegel alludes to the third part of his dissertation in a dismissive but perfunctory manner: "What I attempted to do with this topic [that of the series of planetary distances] in an earlier dissertation, I can no longer regard as satisfactory."<sup>14</sup> One can reasonably assume that what prompted him to recant is that he eventually learned of the existence of Ceres.

Michael J. Petry thinks that "[i]t is not very likely that he [Hegel] missed out completely on the stir Bode created in the May of 1801 by publicizing the conclusions he had drawn from the information supplied by Piazzi, especially since the very earliest public announcement on May 6th appeared in the *Jenaische Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung* (no. 90)."<sup>15</sup> Since the dissertation shows no trace of the discovery of Ceres, Petry makes his case obliquely by interpreting the fact that Hegel proposed a series other than the Titius-Bode one as meaning that "he did not regard the evidence available as settling anything" (p. 447). If Petry is right, then why did Hegel not offer that as his reason for the substitution and why would he publish a disavowal in 1817? (See my note 14.) It seems to me that if he had indeed known about the discovery of Ceres while composing the dissertation, he could easily

have stated afterward that although at the time of writing, matters, in his estimation, were not so clear-cut, the subsequent evidence settled them in favor of the presence of an asteroid between the fourth and fifth positions and proved him wrong, and he could have done so without waiting for sixteen years. From the standpoint of the practice of science, such behavior would have been unimpeachable, for at the time of writing the evidence was still being strengthened, and such a statement would have implied that he was acquainted with Piazzi's discovery. But he did not say that. Instead, he chose a formulation, the vagueness of which seems rather to betray embarrassment: why else would he withhold the retraction from the 1827 and 1830 editions of the *Encyclopaedia*?<sup>16</sup> On the other hand, the kind of frankness that, for example, a scientist such as Alexis-Claude Clairaut (1713–1765) demonstrated in the face of an error he had made in his theory of the irregularities of the moon's motions, is fairly rare, even in the history of science. This is not to say that one wrong justifies another, but rather that scientists suffer from misplaced pride no less than philosophers, although the increasingly communal character of scientific research may contribute to curbing that sentiment in science to a greater degree than in philosophy.

Furthermore, given the polemical animus of the dissertation, one is tempted to say that Hegel would have been all too happy to adduce the discovery of the celestial object as more support for the thesis of isomorphism between reason and nature, and for reason's ability to project, to anticipate the form and structure of nature in advance of experience. To that temptation one might object that Hegel excludes the Titius-Bode series from the province of philosophy, although I think that he does so unjustifiably, given his own criterion of a philosophically acceptable series (see note 61, where I show this in detail). But that is not tantamount to saying that it has thereby also been banished from that of science.

### *"Dissertatio" ab omni naevo vindicata?*

In the face of the errors that have been discerned in Hegel's dissertation and the charges that have been brought against it over the course of its reception and translation, two lines of defense have been put forward during the last three decades. One deals with Hegel's critique of Newton; the misunderstandings regarding inertial force and centrifugal force belong to this topic. The other addresses sundry errors that have been imputed to Hegel's text, namely, those concerning the shape of the Earth, the distances of the planets from the Sun, the presence or absence of a body between Mars and Jupiter, and the shape of the planetary orbits, to which one may add the episode of tampering with Newton's text. As may be seen in the preceding section of my introduction, some of the allegations, especially those aimed at the third



part of the dissertation, date back to the very beginning of the reception of the text.

To remove the charge of incomprehension of inertial physics from the Hegelian critique of Newton, philosophers such as Michael Petry and Wolfgang Neuser have proposed that Hegel is not so much criticizing Newton as he is taking issue with an eighteenth-century version of Newtonianism.<sup>17</sup>

I remain unconvinced of this interpretation for two reasons. First, the dissertation bears no evidence that Hegel drew a distinction between Newton and various versions, some quite extravagant, of Newtonianism. Second, even if one could convincingly establish that Hegel was really demurring to some species of Newtonianism and not to Newton, and that he was right in doing so, that still would not tell us what he thought of Newton's mathematical treatment of the behavior of mobile things and of light. The fact of the matter is that Hegel speaks about Newton, not about Newtonians, and that he often misunderstands him.

The second line of defense has chiefly been propounded by Cinzia Ferrini (see note 4), although, to some degree at least, Petry and Neuser subscribe to it too.<sup>18</sup> Ferrini absolves Hegel by construing most of the incriminating passages of the text as instances of Hegelian irony.<sup>19</sup> Although it is in virtue of the application of hermeneutic generosity to Hegel's text that Ferrini's attempt deserves our attention, I have benefited from her painstaking work only in certain respects, without being able to subscribe to her irony thesis. It seems to me that in defending the thesis the author renounces intersubjectively accessible means of interpretation and adduces evidence that is marred by unsupported assumptions.

One also may wonder why Hegel himself did not defend his dissertation by invoking its ironical aspects. As I point out in the preceding section, instead of doing that, he took back, in the *Encyclopaedia* of 1817, some of the claims made in the dissertation, while in the two subsequent editions of the same text he deleted that recantation altogether.

It is undeniable, however, that there are one or two passages in the dissertation that will strike one as quite playful; this is especially true of the passage about the apples. But, precisely because of that, it is difficult to assess how seriously Hegel meant them to be taken.

Ferrini managed to change my mind with respect to one important issue, namely, that concerning the shape of the Earth (see note 39). What convinced me was a point of syntax; as such, it was intersubjectively accessible. As I indicate in my notes to the translation, I also found her remarks on the rendering of certain words quite judicious.

**Theses Presented in Advance**  
of the  
Philosophical Dissertation  
on the Orbits of the Planets  
Which,  
the Rector of the Academy Being  
the Very Magnificent and Most Noble Prince and Master,  
Charles Augustus,  
Duke of Saxony, of Jülich, of Cleves,  
of the Mountains of Hungary and Westphalia, etc.,  
With the Consent of the Great Order of Philosophers,  
with a View to Obtain,  
in Keeping with Custom,  
the License to Teach,  
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,  
Doctor of Philosophy,  
Will Defend Publicly  
On the Twenty-Seventh of August, 1801,  
Karl Schelling  
Being the Partner.  
Württemberg  
Jena  
Prager Press and Co.

## Theses

1

Contradiction is the rule of the true; non-contradiction is the rule of the false.

2

The syllogism is the principle of idealism.

3

The square is the law of nature; the triangle is the law of mind [*mens*].

4

In true Arithmetic, there is no room for addition other than unity's being added to the dyad, nor for subtraction other than the dyad's being removed from the triad, nor for the triad that is a sum, nor for unity that is a difference.

5

Just as the magnet is a natural lever, so too the gravitation of the planets toward the sun is a pendulum of nature.

6

The idea is synthesis of the infinite and the finite, and the whole of philosophy consists in ideas [*est in ideis*].

7

Critical philosophy lacks ideas; it is an imperfect form of Skepticism.

8

The matter of the postulate of reason, which critical philosophy exhibits, destroys that very philosophy and is the principle of Spinozism.

9

The state of nature is not unjust; for that reason one must leave it.

10

The principle of moral science is the reverence that is to be given to fate [*reverentia fato*].

11

Virtue excludes innocence of deed [*agendi*] and suffering [*patiendi*].<sup>20</sup>

12

Morality that is absolute in respect of every one of its parts is incompatible with virtue.

**Philosophical Dissertation**

**on**

**the Orbits of the Planets**

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Submitted,

the Rector of the Academy Being  
the Very Magnificent and Most Noble Prince and Master,

Charles Augustus,

Duke of Saxony, of Jülich, of Cleves,  
of the Mountains of Hungary and Westphalia, etc.,

With the Consent  
of the Great Order of Philosophers,

For a Public Examination,  
with a View to Obtain,  
in Keeping with Custom,

the License to Teach,

by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,

Doctor of Philosophy.

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Jena  
Prager Press and Co.  
1801

p. 3 Although all bodies generated by nature are perfect in their genus in that they express the splendor<sup>21</sup> of the universe, they are not self-sufficient with respect to the first force of nature, namely, gravitation, and they perish, suppressed by the force of the whole. The celestial bodies are an exception, however; as they are not bodies of glebe and bear their center of gravity more perfectly within them, they proceed through the light air like the Gods: no other expression of reason [*ratio*]<sup>22</sup> is more sublime and purer than this living thing<sup>23</sup> which we call the solar system. Nor is any expression of reason worthier of philosophical contemplation. The praise bestowed upon Socrates by Cicero for having brought philosophy down from heaven and into the life and families of men, either is to be considered a trifle or will have to be so interpreted that we say that unless philosophy descends from heaven, it cannot be of any merit to the life of men and their families, and that efforts must be geared toward [re-]elevating it to heaven.

p. 4 The restricted space of a dissertation is not sufficient for the treatment of such a vast subject. It allows only for the transmittal of its elements. In view of this situation, I shall concern myself with an elucidation of the first concepts<sup>24</sup> on which the physical part of the science of astronomy customarily depends. Thereafter, I shall expose what true philosophy establishes concerning the composition of the solar system, especially as regards the orbits of the planets. Lastly, using an illustrious example from ancient philosophy, I shall show what value philosophy may have in determining the mathematical relations among quantities.

|

Anyone who accedes to this part of physics readily sees that it is a mechanics of the heavens rather than a physics, and that the laws exhibited by this science of astronomy draw their origin from another science, the mathematical one, rather than being drawn truly from nature itself or constructed by reason. After the felicitous talent of our great Kepler had discovered the laws by which the planets turn in their orbits, Newton was reported to have demonstrated the same laws by geometrical and not physical reasons, and to have nonetheless given astronomy over to physics. It was in no way he who introduced the force of gravitation—which he held to be the same as the centripetal or attractive force—into this part of physics, for all physicists before him established that the relation of the planets to the Sun is a true relation, i.e. a real and physical force; rather, he compared the *quantity* of the force of gravity, as experience reveals it in the bodies of which our Earth is composed, with the *quantity* of the celestial

movements. He did this by means of mathematical reasons [*rationes*], by geometry and calculation.<sup>25</sup> With respect to such a coupling of physics and mathematics, one must above all take heed not to confuse the purely mathematical relations with the physical ones, rashly taking the lines used by geometry to construct demonstrations of its theorems for forces or directions of forces. To be sure, the whole of mathematics must not be regarded as purely ideal or formal, but also as real and physical. The relations among quantities exhibited by mathematics, precisely because they are reasons, are inherent in nature, and, understood properly, are laws of nature. But the analysis and the explication of the whole, which stand at a remove from the perfection of nature, must be distinguished from the very reason of the whole, for, as geometry disregards time, while arithmetic disregards space (the former constituting the geometrical whole by the principle of space only, and the latter constituting the arithmetical whole by that of time alone), the relations characteristic of the knowledge of formal wholes are separated from the true relations of nature, in which time and space are conjoined. As for higher geometry,<sup>26</sup> which brings together analytical calculation and geometry, and which arose from the very necessity of measuring the relations of space and time taken together, it sublates<sup>27</sup> this separation only negatively by its concept of the infinite. It does not offer a true synthesis of the two, and, in its negotiation, it does not steer clear of the formal method of geometry and arithmetic. For that reason, let us not confuse what concerns the proper and formal relations of mathematical knowledge with physical relations, by attributing a physical reality to those relations which are only mathematical.

p. 5

It is true not only that Newton gave the title *Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy*<sup>28</sup> to a most illustrious work which describes the laws of motion and exemplifies them in the system of the world, but also that he warned repeatedly that I . . . use the words attraction, impulse or propension of any sort toward a center promiscuously, and indifferently, one for another; considering those forces not physically, but mathematically: wherefore the reader is not to imagine that by those words I anywhere take upon me to define the kind, or the manner of any action, the causes or the physical reason thereof, or that I attribute forces, in a true and physical sense, to certain centers (which are only mathematical points); when at any time I happen to speak of centers as attracting, or as endowed with attractive powers.<sup>29</sup> Now, what conception Newton had of physics is obvious from this alone, that “perhaps these attractions, physically speaking, may more truly be called impulses.”<sup>30</sup> As for us, we estimate that impulses concern mechanics and not true physics.

p. 6

Regarding the difference between these two sciences, more will be said later. For now, we caution that if he wished to develop mathematical relations, it is astonishing that he brought in the word "force" at all; for whereas the quantities of the phenomenon pertain to mathematics, the knowledge of force is the concern of physics. In fact, believing that he everywhere was defining proportions of forces, he built a composite edifice of mathematics and physics, in which it is difficult to isolate what belongs and has truly accrued to physical science.

p. 7 As for Kepler, he knew that gravitation was a quality universal to bodies, that the Moon's attraction was the cause of the ebb and flow of the ocean, and that irregularities in lunar motion originated in the conjoined forces of the Sun and Earth. If Kepler, who was endowed with a quite pure love and sensibility for philosophy and the sciences, had been able to sustain himself throughout the confusion arising, as we shall see, from the postulation of gravitational, centripetal and centrifugal forces, it would have been very easy for him to give physical form to the pure and mathematical expression of the immortal laws he discovered.<sup>31</sup> Indeed, to the law he issued (i.e. that the area swept by the vector radius of a body in circular motion is proportional to the time) he would have been able to give the form of a physical law (i.e. that gravity is in proportion to the arcs of equal sectors). And since the surfaces of the circles  $A$  and  $a$  are as the squares of the radii,  $1/A : 1/a$  will be as  $r^2 : R^2$ . Since  $1/A$  and  $1/a$  express the quantity of motion, and, if you will, the quantity of the centripetal force, he could have said that the force of gravitation or centripetal force is inversely proportional to the radii, or distances. However, he who wants to have, instead of a true demonstration, the demonstration Newton gave of the proposition that "the areas, which revolving bodies describe by radii drawn to an immovable center of force . . . are proportional to the times . . .,"<sup>32</sup> is not to be envied his complacency. The demonstration results in the arcs', as much as the areas', being proportional to the times, whereas what was to be shown was that the areas alone, and not the arcs, were proportional to the times.

p. 8 I think that since in most cases the celebrated decomposition of forces lacks a physical meaning, it must be counted among the things that are important in mathematical proofs. Since the mechanical direction of motion really can arise from the opposed directions of several forces, not only does it not follow from it that the direction of the living force [*vis viva*] arises from opposed forces, but a mechanical relation such that in accordance with it a body would be driven by forces alien to it, must be considered as entirely alien to the living force. When Newton, who takes apart the light which nature meant to be simple, similarly decomposes



other uncomposed forces, and calls forces the lines used in the construction of the theorems that deal with the quantities of these uncomposed forces, the physicists justifiably wonder how the mathematical manipulation of the phenomenon gives rise to such a multiplicity of forces, of which nature knows nothing. When nearly the entire science of mechanics, and astronomy rest on this decomposition and on the parallelogram of forces built up out of it, the very breadth of the science, albeit perfected in itself and accorded to the phenomena of nature, so seems to support that hypothesis that its principle gains the greatest credit, for its uses appear to be manifold. However, when considered in itself, it lacks in plausible ground [*ratio*]. Later, we shall see the true reason why what a certain force brings about must be displayed by a square, and why all quantities referring to that force must be displayed by relations that follow from the construction of the square. At this point, suffice it to note: (1) that the decomposition into other lines of a simple phenomenon exhibited by a straight or curved line is a mathematical postulate, which its manifold advantages amply commend to mathematics, but the principle of which depends on another science; (2) that one must not evaluate that principle on the basis of its use and consequences; and (3) that on account of mathematical advantages alone no physical meaning accrues to the lines resulting (by application of the postulate) from the decomposition of a force's direction that is represented by a line.

But both centripetal force—insofar as it is distinguished from gravity—and centrifugal force appear to have no other origin than the one drawn from the decomposition of the direction of motion into mathematical lines. Indeed, an infinitely small part of a circle is so inscribed in a parallelogram (1) that it forms the diagonal of the parallelogram; (2) that two sides of the parallelogram are the tangent and the chord or sine, the chord being equal to the tangent in the last ratio [*ultima ratio*]; and (3) that the remaining two sides are the versed sine<sup>33</sup> and the secant, the latter being equal to the versed sine in the last ratio. To these lines one attributes physical reality, so that the efficacy of the centrifugal force takes the place of the tangent, and the efficacy of the centripetal force the place of the versed sine. Let us first examine the reality of the centrifugal force.

It is undoubtedly clear that the geometrical necessity of a tangential line in no way produces the necessity of a physical tangential force. Pure geometry does not modify the true form of a circle; it does not compare the circumference with the radius; nor does it know the circumference via the radius; it rather compares and knows the lines determined by the relation of the circumference to the radius. On the other hand,

the geometry that endeavors to subject the circle to calculation, and to express numerically the relation of the circumference to the radius, seeks refuge in the hypothesis of an infinitely-sided, regular polygon. It does this, however, in such a way that in the same move it suppresses this very polygon and the straight lines by means of the concepts of the infinite and of last ratio. What is there to say to the geometry that decomposes the circle into many straight lines and simply treats this concept as a hypothesis, since the straight lines vanish as the parallelogram is reduced to infinite smallness? How could the physical reality of such lines proceed from that geometry?

p. 10 As no reason of geometry was educed, we now inquire into the physical reality of centrifugal force. Let us not strive after a philosophical construction of it in the manner of that experimental philosophy which Newton, or rather all of England, always considered to be the best, or, better yet, the one and only philosophy. It can and wants to confirm the hypothesis of such a force by experience alone. However, nothing is more distressing than the examples by which it undertakes to carry this out. Newton and his followers give, in particular, the example of the stone that “whirled about in a sling, endeavors to recede from the hand that turns it; and by that endeavor, distends the sling . . . and as soon as it is let go, flies away.”<sup>34</sup> They also illustrate centrifugal force with the example of a leaden ball which, when

projected from the top of a mountain by the force of gunpowder, with a given velocity, and in a direction parallel to the horizon, is carried in a curved line to the distance of two miles before it falls to the ground . . . ; and by increasing the velocity, we may at pleasure increase the distance to which it might be projected, and diminish the curvature of the line which it might describe, till at last it should fall at the distance of 10, 30 or 90 degrees . . . or lastly, so that it might never fall to the earth, but go forwards into the celestial spaces, and proceed in its motion *in infinitum*.<sup>35</sup>

The last example presents the concept of rectilinear motion, which can be imagined by anyone without need of an example. Both examples draw the concept from the action of projecting: from it, the shortest path to the concept of rectilinear motion characterizes centrifugal force as a force that projects a body in a straight line; but neither example shows even a trace of such a force in nature.

p. 11 It may be, however, that philosophy *a priori* deduces what the experimental method, which calls itself philosophy, undertakes to know falsely and with barren success from experiments, since it seeks the simulacrum

of the true concepts of philosophy with blind zeal and the senses. It must be assumed that the opposition between forces of attraction and repulsion offered itself to the gaze of this ignorant philosophy and was applied to its theory of motion. But in reality philosophy so attributes this difference of forces to matter that it makes gravity, or identity itself, the condition of those forces. How remote the construction of the movement of the planets is from that reason is obvious from the fact that centrifugal force, which has a rectilineal direction of motion, is attributed to the other body without taking the central body into account. Consequently, there cannot be any principle determining the union of these two forces, nor, since they are contradictory opposites, can it be explained why they are not opposed along a straight line, but rather along an angle that splits into two the straight line of their opposition. Since these forces lack a common principle, it is undeniable that they are purely ideal and in no way physical. Therefore, when experimental philosophy attempts to construct the phenomenon out of forces that have exactly nothing in common and are alien to each other, it may not appeal to the opposed forces of true philosophy. The relation of the latter forces is completely different. True philosophy repudiates the principle of experimental philosophy, which is sought by a mechanics that imitates nature insofar as it is dead matter, and that effects a synthesis of absolutely different forces in a body. Now, what concerns the imitation of nature must be entirely set aside in the cognition of nature itself, and physics must brook neither chance nor whim. If the motion of the Sun, the planets, and the comets is explained by the relation between centripetal and centrifugal forces, one will have to say that they came together by no necessity, but rather by pure chance.

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Although physics has drawn the concepts of force tending toward a center and of tangential force from a geometrical relation, this method of constructing the phenomenon out of absolute opposites is in no way to be considered as the geometrical method. Geometry does not construct the circle or any other curve by lines joining at right angle or any other angle. Rather, it takes the circle or curve under consideration as given, and on the basis of those data it makes visible the determinate relations of the remaining lines. Physical science ought to imitate perfectly this proper method of positing the whole and of deducing from it the relations among the parts, and not that of composing the whole out of opposed forces, that is, out of parts. Moreover, how could it happen that this physical astronomy which arrives at its laws by way of mathematics does not truly follow mathematics? When it takes itself to be speaking about centrifugal force, centripetal force or gravitation, it in fact always speaks about the

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whole phenomenon. When geometry states that a certain line is equal to the [square] root of the sum of two squares, it speaks not of any singular line but of a hypotenuse, i.e. of a part determined by a whole, a right triangle; and it thereby distinguishes this part from the whole, as well as from the other parts. Similarly, one and the same phenomenon of whole motion is so determined by the quantity of centripetal, centrifugal and gravitational force (1) that it makes no difference whether one solves a problem on the basis of the quantity of gravitation, centripetal force, or centrifugal force; and (2) that these distinct forces are names with which it would be more appropriate to dispense. From the emptiness of such a distinction arises all the confusion and perplexity encountered in the explanation of phenomena.

One will discern a manifest contradiction in the fact that the effect of centripetal force is displayed by the versed sine, and that of centrifugal force by the tangent, while the two forces are said to be equal. To sublimate this contradiction, one cannot appeal to the first ratio [*prima ratio*] of nascent quantities and the last ratio [*ultima ratio*] of evanescent quantities, where the relation among arc, versed sine, and tangent would be one of equality, i.e. would be such that each of the lines could be used in place of the other. For the first and last ratio is only a relation of equality if it is null, if there is a place for neither arc, nor versed sine, nor tangent, nor the difference between the forces under discussion: centrifugal force is precisely equal to centripetal force only when the quantity of one or the other in fact expresses the quantity of total motion, and when the relation between those forces, and their difference, and their names have become empty.

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Therefore, as regards the vacuity of this difference, it is first of all recognized that centripetal force is the same as gravitation, and Newton alone put such effort in obtaining their identity. Hence, the physical construction of the celestial bodies' motion, which attributes the entire phenomenon to gravitation and posits two factors in gravitation (i.e. centripetal and centrifugal forces) amounts to nothing, for one of the two factors is posited as being equal to the total force. Secondly, since the law of centripetal force, which states that the force is inversely proportional to the distances, requires that the total quantity of motion stand in the same relation, it includes and at the same time contains the tangential direction attributed to centrifugal force. This is so, for it is established that circular motion does not result from the sole propension toward a center, but is composed of central and tangential directions. Now, since the total quantity of motion is attributed to centripetal force and determined by its quantity, it becomes obvious that this force is not opposed to centrifugal force, but that the entire phenomenon is expressed by it. It is owing to

this that in the geometrical construction the effect of centripetal force is exhibited by the surface of the whole triangle (one of whose factors is the tangential line), i.e. by the sector. However, the extent to which it is necessary that in a mathematical relation one force be posited as equal to the other, or posited truly as the whole, is obvious from the fact that the total quantity of opposing forces is to be measured not only by what one of the forces actually accomplishes, but also by the effect it would have produced had it not been impeded by the opposing force; and in reckoning one must add to each force the effect brought about by the other. As such, the true quantity of centripetal force must be exhibited not only by the versed sine, but also by the tangent, or by the product of the two, the diagonal line. Similarly, the true quantity of the centrifugal force must be exhibited not by the tangent line alone, but also by the versed sine, or by the product of the two. This also establishes that centrifugal force is inversely proportional to the distances. Whether one attributes the phenomenon to centripetal or centrifugal force, the solution to any problem will always be the same.

The law according to which each of the two forces is inversely proportional to the distances reveals that the forces are not opposed to each other as mechanical physics required in its construction of the phenomenon of motion. For, of two opposed forces, one decreases when the other increases. However, since the versed sine and the tangent increase or decrease at the same time, we understand (1) that the total phenomenon is described and determined by one force alone; and (2) that the two forces depend on a third one, which is their true principle and their identity; or rather that neither centripetal nor centrifugal force is defined, and that the phenomenon is not constructed out of those factors, but that the quantity of the entire phenomenon of motion has been postulated.

The extent to which the opposition between centripetal and centrifugal force and its exhibition by the versed sine and tangent lack a true sense is particularly visible in the explanation of the change of velocity of a body revolving in an ellipse. Since in an ellipse the relation between the arrow displaying centripetal force and the tangent displaying centrifugal force is not the same everywhere, the change of velocity is usually explained by a disturbance in the equilibrium of the forces. At both middle points, the same relation between arrow and tangent obtains, as well as the same velocity. At the aphelion and the perihelion, on the contrary, the relation between arrow and tangent is the same, whereas the velocities differ most.<sup>36</sup> In this respect, one might especially wonder at the fact that, although all rests upon mathematical proofs, some contend, as was said above, that centrifugal force is inversely proportional to the square of

the distances, while others yet claim that it is inversely proportional to the cube.

p. 16 In this method of explaining the different velocities of both a single planet and all orbiting bodies, the reason of empirical phenomena, always locked in accord with itself, shows itself to be turning in a circle: indeed, the different velocities of the planets are known through the different intensities of the forces, while the intensities of the forces are known through the velocities.

Let us also note another quite renowned application of centrifugal force. The force usually explains the phenomenon of the pendulum's greater slowness at lower geographical latitudes; and the lesser gravity in those places is usually known to this [experimental] philosophy. The explanation of this phenomenon by a gravity lesser at the equator and increasing as the square of the latitude's sine, is given in such a way that the centripetal force at the equator is said not to be equal to gravity, but smaller by  $\frac{1}{289}$ , a difference that is imputed to centrifugal force. That small part is found as follows: a body revolving uniformly in a circle, in a day of 23 hours, 56 minutes, and 4 seconds, and at a distance of 16,695,539 feet from the center, describes in one second an arc which measures 1,436.2 feet, its versed sine measuring 0.0523 feet or 7.54 lines. But as on our Earth, at the latitude of Paris, a falling body covers about 15.5 feet or 2,174 lines<sup>37</sup> per second, and as the centripetal force is known through the distance a falling body covers in a given time, and as that force is expressed by the versed sine, the difference between the former versed sine and the latter one will be such that the former is the  $\frac{1}{289}$ th part of the latter: the former is attributed to centrifugal force, which we saw expressed elsewhere by a tangent.<sup>38</sup> But as we realized earlier that one force may be substituted for the other at our convenience, and that the forces may be used interchangeably without modifying the laws, nothing prevents us from taking the smaller versed sine as the efficacy of the centripetal force, from adding to it gravity, and thereby from saying that gravity augmented, and not diminished, by that amount is the cause of the pendulum's slowing at the equator and that the weights of bodies increase and do not decrease at lower latitudes. Measuring and explaining the phenomenon are carried out just as well in this manner. Since experience teaches that the oscillation of the pendulum clock is slower at lower latitudes, and since the oscillations derive from gravity's causing the fall of bodies, they [the experimental or natural philosophers] hold that gravity is lesser because the motion of a pendulum of same length and weight is slowed down. The motion of a pendular body is not a simple fall, however: lest the fall immediately produce a straight line, the weight is impeded; the weight is suspended and thrown not from the point of suspension

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but from the side. Thus, the vertical direction of the line changes into a curved line, which comes about, if you will, through the centripetal force and the centrifugal force, the latter producing, we say, the horizontal or tangential direction. Why, then, do we not explain the slower oscillations at the equator by the fact that there is a larger obstacle that impedes the difference produced by the vertical line of fall, or that impedes the horizontal motion and, if you will, the centrifugal force? This obstacle would then have to be located in the stronger propensity for the vertical line, namely, in a greater centripetal force at lower latitudes, which binds itself to the vertical line by a stronger effort, restores the suppressed vertical line, and overcomes more swiftly the direction contrary to it. Finally, let us say that the foregoing agrees remarkably well with the figure of an Earth that is higher about the equator, and the diameter of which is shorter in respect of the axis.<sup>39</sup> Consequently, as a pendulum at a lower latitude is closer to a larger mass, it undergoes a stronger attraction, and tends toward the Earth and the vertical line with greater weight; it cannot diverge from the vertical line as easily as a body that is attracted by a smaller mass at higher parallels takes on a lateral motion.

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It would take too long to discuss Newton's distinction between motive and accelerative force, with which he seems to conceal, among other things, the fact that in the most celebrated application of the law of centripetal force to the motion of the Moon, the planets, and their satellites, he takes no account of their masses. As such, it is manifest that his law of gravitation is a mere law of phenomenal motion, and not a law of force, for it is necessary that the effect of a force depend not only on the law of force, but also on mass, and the phenomena cannot agree with the law of force alone. To be sure, when others are put to explain the comparison of the law with lunar motion, they use the relation of lunar mass to terrestrial mass. They then conjecture that the different masses of the planets do not affect the law, which they hold to pertain to force only, because, when compared with the mass of the Sun, the masses of the planets are quite small. They think that the same relation obtains among the satellites when they are compared with their respective planets. However, they measure the density of a planet on the basis of the velocity of the satellites, and of its relation to the distance, just as they measure the density of the Sun on the basis of the same relation to the planets.

Just as we have shown that the centripetal and centrifugal forces can be substituted for each other in the explanation of phenomena, and that a decrease in gravity can be replaced by its increase, and that the phenomena explained by a decreasing force of gravity can be explained by its augmentation, so too the law stating that the force of gravity is

p. 19 inversely proportional to the square of the distances can be so transposed that the force of gravity is directly proportional to the square of the distances. Indeed, if gravity is said to diminish at a greater distance, only one factor is being considered in the evaluation of gravity, namely, velocity. As the velocity is lower at a greater distance, gravity is said to be lesser. But we must at the same time evaluate the magnitude of the force on the basis of the magnitude of the distance at which it acts; and of a force acting at a double distance, we must say that it is four times larger. Consequently, given the usual expression of the law of the force of gravity, if it is said that this force diminishes or augments on the basis of velocity alone, and distance is not brought in to determine the relation of augmentation and diminution, nor to ascertain the concept itself of augmentation and diminution, then we could with equal right leave out of account velocity when ascertaining magnitude, saying that a force acting at a greater distance is greater and directly proportional to the distances. As is the case with the lever, whose two factors, distance and weight, are inversely proportional, gravity may be said at leisure to augment or to diminish when the distance increases. For at a greater distance, in order that there be equilibrium, the weight is less—Newton calls it the motive force—and gravity is, therefore, less; or at a greater distance, gravity is greater, for the same weight at a greater distance can be attributed to a greater force.

p. 20 From all of these considerations, we obtain first the result that the distinction between centrifugal and centripetal forces is empty, but that the laws put forth as laws of centripetal and centrifugal forces are in reality mathematical laws of motion, marred by [being given] the physical appearance of forces and by being called forces. It then follows that it is wrong to attribute an increase or decrease to the force of gravity, and that neither quantity nor any quantitative relation to any other thing—not even space and time—is suited to gravity itself. One must say that gravity is one and the same thing which exists in the form of two factors, space and time, or even, so to speak, in the form of space at rest and space engendered by motion in time. All quantitative differences and relations concern those factors, one of which augments while the other diminishes; and no relation or proportion can obtain between the factors, unless it obtains between factors posited within one and the same thing. And their absolute identity cannot vary, either in augmentation or in diminution.

This shows how much purer were the talent and native inclination of Kepler: he posited nothing but the relation of those factors that can truly increase and decrease, and did not spoil the pure and truly celestial expression of these relations by determining the quantities of gravity, which has no quantity. Nonetheless, the large accumulation of mathe-



matics and the extensive and fruitful use of mathematics (particularly, in astronomy) have made the confusion initiated by Newton between mathematics and physics appealing to the learned. People are pleased with the force of gravity's being known. The rather distressing story of the apple that fell before Newton has instructed them well in the fact that heavenly bodies revolve in their orbits less because of the force common to the world, which Kepler and other philosophers established as one and the same, than by virtue of the everyday force which attracts stones toward the Earth; and [from that] they derive indifference<sup>40</sup> toward the heavens, forgetting of course that an apple was present at the beginning of the universal misfortune of humankind and of the misfortune of Troy, in turn a bad omen for the philosophical sciences.

Consequently, although one must deem that the science of astronomy, insofar as it concerns mathematics, owes much to Newton, the physical appearance he gave the mathematical relations must be separated from those relations, and whatever truth resides therein must be examined by philosophy. Of experimental philosophy, which the English temperament as well as Newton, Locke, and others who expressed that temperament in their writings, alone understand, I shall adduce an example which concerns our topic. In order to refute a theorem of Descartes, Aristotle, and others which asserts that the weights of bodies depend on the forms of matter, and to prove that weights are not a function of the form but rather of the quantity of matter, Newton performed the following experiment. Putting pairs of equal weights of gold, silver, sand, wheat, etc., into two identical containers in order to overcome the inequality of the air's resistance, he constructed pendula entirely alike in length, weight, shape, and resistance to air. What is revealed by pendula of like shape, length, and resistance to air? It is the equality of, or the difference between, the weights. Therefore, as he had made the weights of the pendular bodies equal, he happily discovered that the weights of the bodies were equal, thinking that such experimenting and philosophizing refuted the philosophers who ascertained that only different forms belong to one and the same matter. On the basis of this example, we understand that experimental philosophy altogether ignores the requirements of true philosophy. The same principle also helps to explain the true source of centripetal and centrifugal forces. Since in the case of mechanical science, science is alien to the life of nature, there can be no other primitive concept of matter in it than death, which they [the experimental philosophers] call inertial force, namely, indifference to rest and motion. This matter is nothing but the most abstract concept of the object or of that-which-is-absolutely-placed-before.<sup>41</sup> Hence, taking it from elsewhere, they add to matter all the

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diversity which they apprehend in it, even that known through motion. Moreover, by experiments and induction they know that gravity is a quality of universal matter: according to the second rule of philosophizing stated by Newton, “the same causes characterize natural effects of the same genus,” e.g. “the descent of stones in Europe and America”; and according to the third rule, “the qualities . . . proper to . . . bodies, upon which one may perform experiments, are to be esteemed the qualities of bodies in general.”<sup>42</sup> Therefore, as experience teaches that matter has weight, and since it is patent that the relation of gravity in the case of a stone falling to Earth differs from the gravity of the heavenly bodies (primarily, those making up the solar system, yet not falling to Earth), they ascertain that there is another cause of this phenomenon, and that is centrifugal force. One must indeed permit this philosophy which ignores both the nature and the origin of gravity and of the impulse toward an infinite horizontal line, which it takes to be centrifugal force, to attribute all things to God, but one must require that it philosophize correctly about God and the rationality of his actions, and that, although ignoring nature, it know God truly. Now God’s action is neither external nor mechanical, nor arbitrary nor fortuitous. One must therefore firmly hold that the forces with which God is said to have endowed matter are truly inherent in matter, and that they constitute the nature of matter, this nature being an immanent and internal principle of opposed forces. But in reality mechanics avoids that concept, understanding neither God nor true force nor things internal and necessary, but repeating instead that inert matter is always moved by an external impulse, or what amounts to the same thing, by forces alien to matter itself. As mechanics deals with external causes, and does not conceive of nature through reason, it cannot attain the principle of identity that posits difference within itself. Having finally been returned to philosophy, the principle of identity restored philosophy itself, separated mechanics from physics, and gave back to philosophy a physics that is not distinguished from mechanics by merely being called “dynamics.” In the following brief exposition, we propose to understand the elements of the planetary system by way of that principle.

## II

Gravity so constitutes matter that matter is objective gravity. One and the same matter sunders itself into two poles, forms a line of cohesion, and, in a series of unfoldings, takes on diverse shapes through the varying relation of these factors. From that real difference in gravity, we distinguish the ideal difference, namely, that of the potencies of time and space;

for when a twofoldness has been posited, a double twofoldness—one of the poles, the other of the potencies—or four regions, must be posited.

We first consider the line of cohesion. In constituting this line, gravity posits itself in all points. At the same time, the points are diversified among themselves<sup>43</sup> in accordance with the reciprocal relation of the factors. Gravity thereby brings forth of itself a series of nodes<sup>44</sup> and centers. Although the nodes and centers retain the remaining multiplicity of relations, each contains them subjected to the power of its own principle, under its law and individual organization. The solar system expresses such a line, and it is larger than the other lines: as its line of cohesion is broken up, each body carries its center of gravity within itself, not with absolute power, to be sure, but with a power greater than that of other bodies. Indeed, although each body is a whole in itself, it does depend on others, being a part and an organ of a larger system. That is why, imperfect, yet maximal freedom and independence from gravity is suited to the celestial bodies. Therefore, it is not by chance that the planets, wandering through infinite space along a straight line and fortuitously passing in the vicinity of the Sun, were forced under its law and thence into circular orbits. Nor does a hypothetical centrifugal force keep them remote from the Sun, but forming a basic system with the Sun, they are both contained and kept separate by a true force of cohesion.

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The center of forces is distinct from the point of indifference. When the point of indifference is expressed, as in the magnet and thus in the lever, which imitates the natural line of magnetism within dead matter, it turns out to be the median point. As indifference is neutral, it exerts no force, whereas force is the condition of difference. That is why the centers of forces, which are the bodies, are posited within the line, yet not in its middle. For a body is nothing else but the phenomenon of a physical force, or of a true idea. No doubt Newton thought that the center of gravity, i.e. of indifference, should not be posited<sup>45</sup> in the Sun, since it is displaced slightly from its location by the attractions of the planets. Indeed, since in the explanation of the motion of the celestial bodies he supposes nothing other than the mutual attraction of the bodies, and since such a hypothesis does not immediately posit a center, he cannot succeed in demonstrating the propositions concerning curvilinear motion without positing a center of orbits. In Section XI of Book I [of *Principia*], where he broaches “the motions of bodies tending to each other with centripetal forces,”<sup>46</sup> he supposes that the actions of the attracted and attracting bodies are reciprocal, so that none may stay at rest, but he also supposes that “both bodies, being mutually attracted, revolve *as it were* about a common center of gravity”;<sup>47</sup> and he appeals to the fourth corollary to the laws [of motion], where one discovers only

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that "the common center of gravity of two or more bodies does not alter its state of motion or rest by the reciprocal actions of the bodies upon one another,"<sup>48</sup> and where the necessity of a true and real center, or of a central body, is in no way to be found. This common center of gravity is thus a purely mathematical point, and that the Sun is the center of forces or is very close to that center must be attributed not to necessity, but to the chance occurrence that endowed it with the largest mass. The immensity of the solar mass, a concept to which that of density belongs, in turn rests upon the hypothesis that force depends upon mass. However, physical philosophy teaches that the true center of forces is necessarily the source of light, and that the true force and virtue of the Sun must be located in that source.

p. 26 We have seen that the center of forces is not posited<sup>49</sup> in the middle. For as a line of cohesion constitutes two external poles, so too does it constitute two internal centers of force. We recognize this internal duality in the culminating points of magnets and in the foci of an ellipse, the main axis of which is a true line of magnetism.<sup>50</sup> Those culminating points are so disposed that each lies closer to the opposite pole than to that upon which it exerts its force, i.e. that therefore just as the internal pole  $+M$  lies between the point of indifference and the external pole  $-M$ , so too the internal pole  $-M$  lies between the middle point and the external pole  $+M$ . However, since the system of the planets is an interrupted line of cohesion and does not form one continuous body, and since, as we shall see, one and the same body effects both poles, there is only one real culminating point of forces, namely, the Sun at one of the foci of the ellipse, the other focus being blind and purely mathematical. Thus the line of natural magnetism turns into<sup>51</sup> the form of a natural pendulum, for, since the mechanical pendulum lost its other pole, it effects an incomplete lever, and a suspended body succumbing to gravity cannot engender that other pole. We notice that owing to this rectilinear and effective, yet not rigid, series of bodies that has been placed at the basis of the entire system, the bodies are mutually related to each other, and that although they form a system rather than one body, they do not satisfy nature, for nature means the force existing here in the form of a line to take the form of a body.

The real difference between the poles and the line of cohesion once understood, we now turn to the other difference, the ideal one, or the difference between potencies, between subject and object. If matter is so conceived that space is full, it lacks form, and space and matter are nothing but the abstract concept of that which is objective. In order that the physical and real concept of matter be intelligible, it must also be posited in the form of subjectivity, and the point must be posited

in space, although the point is indeed abstracted from space, yet so as to be at the same time related to space. In the concept of matter as filled and, so to speak, dense space, and thereby of quiescent space, there is admittedly contained the concept of a resistance to other matter that would be intruding into the same place, but that concept is purely negative and empty. Once space is filled, any principle of change and of resistance is sublated and must therefore be sought elsewhere. In order that real matter may be intelligible to us, there must be added to the abstract concept of space, the contrary form, that of subjectivity, which we shall designate by the more Latin word “*mens*” [mind], and, if subjectivity is related to space, by the word “point.” In this way, the point—or, under the form proper to self-differentiation, time—and space constitute the elements of matter, and matter does not result from the combination of those elements, but rather is their principle. Through the internal and primitive identity and difference of the opposed potencies of coming-into-being and passing-away<sup>52</sup>—for the poles are at rest—the necessity of change and motion becomes intelligible. Change is indeed nothing but the eternal restitution of identity out of difference, and the renewed production of difference, namely, contraction and expansion. Now, the other potency, mind, which produces itself in abstraction from space, is time, and insofar as it relates this production of itself to space, it constitutes the line. The line is the mind producing itself, but in a subjective form and shut up within itself. Mind assumes a form perfect and natural to it, when it turns into<sup>53</sup> its contrary, space, and constitutes the plane. Since we posited no difference other than that between mind and extension, the plane lacks any other difference and is square.

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Reflection seems to be alien to this transition of time into space, as it abstracts from the things themselves in mathematics, and as it deems to compare the numbers and measures of things but not the incommensurable things themselves; time and space appear to be such incommensurables to reflection. However, although geometry and calculation [*calculus*] are forgetful of the things themselves and manipulate only lines and numbers, discovered by operations of calculation [*calculus*] or by geometrical demonstrations, lines and numbers are given a meaning that concerns the things themselves, so that it is patent that not only quantities but the things themselves have been compared. Moreover, mathematics makes use of this reciprocal transition of incommensurables into each other under another form: it extends the line into the plane, and the plane into the body. Generally, it conceals this identity of incommensurables with the word “infinite,” saying that the plane consists of innumerable lines, etc. Furthermore, expressing the relations of many

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numbers by infinite series, it acknowledges that it has exceeded the absolute difference of reflection and compared incommensurables. Notably, however, the geometry called higher geometry reduces the plane to the line, and both to the infinitely small, that is, to the point; while analysis constructs the line—even the infinite line—out of points. But how the line arises from the point, and the plane from the line, and so forth, is not conceived otherwise than by calling upon the concept of motion, i.e. after space and time have first been equally posited. We have seen that the line is the mind producing itself in the subjective form appropriate to it, and that its transition into its truly objective form is the square. The product, on the other hand, which concerns the *natura naturata*<sup>54</sup> is the cube. If we abstract completely from mind, there are indeed three dimensions to a space producing itself. The body coming to be is the square, the body which is, the cube. As the relation of bodies separated from each other is the line, i.e. the subjective relation lacking an objective form, the bodies change the line into a square when they sublimate this difference and so constitute themselves into a single body by falling upon each other. That is why the law of falling bodies is the relation of the square of the distance, or of the line changed into a square.

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But in all of this there is room for another difference: either the difference of the two bodies is really sublated or it subsists; in other words, out of the two bodies there arises one body that is either real or ideal. The real body is effected by free fall, the ideal one by circular motion. In the case of falling, the element of the square is simply exhibited by the sum of the units of time, or by a line divided in accordance with an arbitrary measure and expressed by numbers. In the case of circular motion, however, which produces an ideal body, the difference between the bodies, and thus in one respect between time and space, remains. Time brings about periodic time, while space brings about the distance between bodies. Now, periodic time must be brought together with the space that the body covers and that forms an angle with the space of the distance. This synthesis [of periodic time and space], which brings about the quantity of motion, is the square itself. There are therefore two elements in what is called the matter of motion, which expresses the whole relation between two bodies moving about each other: the line of the distance and the square of the motion. Hence the quantity of the whole that is formed by the union of these two elements will be the cube or the body. Since gravity is always one and the same, the cube of all the planets of which we speak is the same. From that, one easily produces Kepler's famous law.

From what we have taught the philosophical lemmata of mathematics must be drawn; and, from it, we must also derive the demonstrations of the

theorems that found nearly all of applied mathematics and have not yet really been demonstrated (in fact, such a demonstration cannot be carried out mathematically). We wanted to make an attempt in this direction by way of the concepts we have exhibited. The common decomposition of forces, the mathematical truth and necessity of which are postulated and lack in physical truth, rests on this exposition of the synthesis of space and time and on the transition of the mind or the line into the square. From there an easy path is open to the laws of mechanics, which transfers the physical laws to dead matter. But the laws must be sought in nature, and not in mechanics, which imitates nature. We now return to our topic.

The relation among the distances of the celestial bodies,<sup>55</sup> which we shall soon treat, is therefore determined by the line of cohesion. Separated from each other, the heavenly bodies' masses form centers of density opposed to the rarity of the ether, points of extreme contraction opposed to extreme expansion. Hence physicists ascribe absolute elasticity and repulsive force to the ether, while attributing attractive force to bodies; they refer the force of gravity to bodies alone, and not to the ether. The primitive identity of nature strives to suppress [*tollere*] this opposition between extreme density and extreme rarity, and the phenomenon of this opposition, that is to say, the separation of bodies. Now, the effective line strives to turn into<sup>56</sup> the square, and to take on a form and a body. This striving is the phenomenon of motion. Since nature meant the system of celestial bodies not to coagulate into a single mass, nor to fall into the sad state of a *natura naturata* and share in the lot of its bodies, but rather meant it to be a living expression and an image of reason, curvilinear motion does not produce a real body, but an ideal one, namely, a square. As such, the bodily shape taken on by the line of the celestial bodies is nothing but the space embraced by the bodies gyrating in their orbits. Consequently, if we wish to define circular motion by its opposite, we shall say that it is a sublated body, or that it is the reduction of the body or the cube by the square, and that this concept expresses Kepler's sublime law.

In the formal circle, the concept of equal distance from a point brings about the circumference. The primitive character of the circle consists in the fact that no diameter, and no point of the circumference runs over the infinitely many other diameters and points. Hence, if only the difference of the bodies and not the effort of nature to bind them into a single body is posited, then it is impossible to arrive at motion by proceeding from the primitive line of cohesion. But if the circle can be constructed mechanically from the attractive force of the central body and the centrifugal force of the body revolving in its orbit, how can one arrive at the preeminence of any diameter, at the line of cohesion and its culminating points, and at the ellipse?

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Although in the solar system the bodies are separated, and the sublated rigid line of cohesion turns into motion,<sup>57</sup> the force of the line is in no way lost in the indifference of the formal circle's diameters. The line manifests its force in that it coheres as the axis of the orbits, and it manifests its polarity in the change of motion, the motion being slowed down by one of the poles and accelerated by the other. It slows down at the aphelion, where the force of the culminating point, the Sun, is greatest; it accelerates at the perihelion, where the force is least, but where the indwelling force [*insita vis*] of the body is greatest. The perturbations of planetary motion must be attributed to this: they are formations the cohesion of which is weaker, transitory,<sup>58</sup> and easily constrained by a first cohesion.

Lastly, as we opposed the ideal difference of the potencies to the real difference in magnetism, we must observe briefly that the real difference also exists in the form of a double difference: a real line is formed of the occident and the orient, and so too is formed the line of those bodies called comets, which revolve in orbits with immense apsides because the orient and the occident stand under the law of the difference of potencies.

### III

There remains for me to make a few remarks regarding the relation that the planets' distances to the Sun bear to each other.<sup>59</sup> The distances indeed seem to be a matter of experience alone. But in truth the measures and numbers of nature cannot be foreign to reason: the study and knowledge of the laws of nature rest on nothing other than our belief that nature has been formed by reason, and our conviction of the community of all laws of nature. When those who seek laws on the basis of experience and induction come upon the form of a law, they acknowledge the community of reason and nature<sup>60</sup> by the joy they experience in the face of the discovered law. If other phenomena do not sufficiently agree with the law, they acknowledge the community of reason and nature by the way in which they doubt the experiments and apply themselves to bring the two into harmony by all means.

Our topic, the relation of the distances of the planets, illustrates this point: since the distances of the planets present a relation characteristic of an arithmetical progression,<sup>61</sup> and since no planet in nature corresponds to the fifth term of the progression, a planet is thought to exist between Mars and Jupiter and, unknown to us, to wander through the celestial spaces, while it is being sought with zeal.

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Since this progression is arithmetical and does not result from the generation of numbers out of themselves—which is to say that it does



not result from the powers—it in no way concerns philosophy. It is well known that the Pythagoreans extensively treated the philosophical relations between numbers. This gives us license to adduce a series of numbers handed down to us and preserved in each of the two books called *Timaeus*. To be sure, *Timaeus* does not link them with the planets, but he deems that the demiurge conformed the universe to their relation. The series of numbers is as follows:

1   2   3   4   9   16   27.

It is permissible to put 16 in place of the 8 that we read in the text. If this series is an order of nature truer than the arithmetical progression, then it is manifest that there is a large gap between the fourth and the fifth positions, and that no planet is missing therein.<sup>62</sup>

Now, to convey briefly the remainder of the matter, one will see that the cube roots of the fourth powers of these numbers (not to omit the unit, let it be  $\sqrt[3]{3}$ ) are the reasons of the distances of the planets:<sup>63</sup>

1.4   2.56   4.37   6.34   18.75   40.34   81.

One also sees that the distances between the satellites of Jupiter are in the same relation to Jupiter as the first four planets are to the Sun, except that the fourth satellite somewhat exceeds its [anticipated] distance.

Furthermore, a different relation, quite worthy of notice, obtains among the satellites of Saturn: the periods of the first four stand in the same relation as the square roots of

1   2   4   8

and their distances stand in the relation of the cubic roots of the same numbers. And if one wants the numbers of the periodic times, one obtains:

$\sqrt{2^9}$     $\sqrt{2^{10}}$     $\sqrt{2^{11}}$     $\sqrt{2^{12}}$     $\sqrt{2^2}$     $\sqrt{3^2}$     $\sqrt{4^5}$     $\sqrt{6^4}$ .

The fifth satellite modifies the formal progression, as does the fifth planet.

Whereas the distances of the first four [satellites of Saturn] were as the cubic roots of

1   2   4   8

i.e. whereas they were

1   1.26   1.63   2,

$\sqrt[3]{8}$  concerning the fourth satellite,  $\sqrt{8}$  or  $\sqrt[3]{(16:32)}$  pertain to the fifth satellite, and the series of cubes the roots of which express the relation among the distances, is:

1   2   2<sup>2</sup>   2<sup>3</sup>   (2<sup>4</sup>:2<sup>5</sup>)   2<sup>8</sup>   (2<sup>12</sup>:2<sup>13</sup>)  
or ..... 2<sup>9/2</sup> ..... 2<sup>25/2</sup>.

## Notes

Abbreviations used in the notes are as follows:

- OPDG* G. W. F. Hegel, *Les Orbites des Planètes*, translated, with an introduction, notes, and appendices, by François De Gandt (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1979).
- OPL* G. W. F. Hegel, *Über die Planetenbahnen*, translated by Georg Lasson, in Hegel, *Sämtliche Werke*, volume I: *Erste Druckschriften*, edited by Georg Lasson (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1928), pp. 347–401.
- OPN* G. W. F. Hegel, *Dissertatio Philosophica de Orbitis Planetarum: Philosophische Erörterung über die Planetenbahnen*, translated, with introduction and commentary, by Wolfgang Neuser (Weinheim: Acta humaniora d. VHC, 1986).
- Principles* Isaac Newton, *Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy*, the Andrew Motte translation (1729) revised by Florian Cajori (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962).
- Principia* Isaac Newton, *Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica*, the 3rd edition, with variant readings, assembled and edited by A. Koyré and I. B. Cohen, 2 volumes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972).

When referring to the dissertation in my notes, I give both the Lasson pagination and, immediately following it, that of the first edition in brackets.

1. G. W. F. Hegel, *Theorie Werkausgabe*, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971).

2. The two German translations (Lasson and Neuser) and the French translation (De Gandt) are listed immediately above the notes. There also exists an Italian translation: G. W. F. Hegel, *Le Orbite dei pianeti*, translated, with an introduction and commentary by A. Negri (Bari: Universale Laterza, 1984).

3. For further bibliographical information, see the bibliographies in De Gandt and Neuser. I also note that chapter 2 of Antonio Moretto's *Hegel e la matematica dell'infinito* (Trento: Verifiche, 1984) deals with the dissertation. However, my limited competency in Italian is such that I was unable to benefit properly from Moretto's very thorough work.

4. See note 2. For a description of the first edition, and for a list of five libraries and one archive that own copies of it, see Cinzia Ferrini, "Features of Irony and Alleged Errors in Hegel's *De Orbitis Planetarum*," in *Hegel-Jahrbuch* 1991 (pp. 459–77), p. 470 note 3 (hereafter referred to as Ferrini).

5. See Norbert Waszek, "Hegel's *Habilitationsthesen*: A Translation with Introduction and Annotated Bibliography," in D. Lamb, ed., *Hegel and Modern Philosophy* (Beckenham: Croom Helm, 1987), pp. 249–60. Waszek's annotated bibliography will be useful to anyone puzzling over the meaning of the terse and provocative theses.

6. I thank the editors of the journal for allowing the reprinting of the text.

7. See note 4. In the notes to my translation, I identified specific debts to her work.

8. The reader will find extensive documentation of the circumstances of the *Habilitation* in Heinz Kimmerle, "Dokumente zu Hegels Jenaer Dozententätigkeit (1801–1807)," in *Hegel-Studien* 4 (1967), pp. 21–99. See also T. G. Bucher, "Wissenschaftstheoretische Überlegungen über Hegels Planetenschrift," in *Hegel-Studien* 18 (1983), pp. 65–137 (hereafter referred to as Bucher), p. 72 (particularly note 35); and *OPN*, pp. 2–3. Like Bucher, Neuser relates that in composing his thesis Hegel drew on a sizable manuscript of his devoted to Newton and Kepler, as well as on a study of the calculus. These writings were in German. In a letter to his brother Karl, Hegel's son Immanuel informs him that he destroyed a large manuscript of computations in 1855. Neuser takes Immanuel to mean that he got rid of both the sheets of calculations and the manuscript on Newton and Kepler (see *OPN*, p. 63 note 7). But as Wolfgang Bonsiepen points out in "Die Aktualität der Hegelschen Naturphilosophie," in *Philosophische Rundschau* 35 (1988), pp. 214–39, "This conclusion, however, is justified by nothing at all. Thus there still remains ground for hoping that some day Hegel's German treatise on the relationship between Kepler and Newton will be found again" (p. 224, my translation).

9. See Michael J. Petry's very interesting account of Hegel's application of magnetic theory to the behavior of heavenly bodies in his "Hegel on Newton, Coulomb and Bode: The Background to *The Orbits of the Planets*," in W. C. Zimmerli et al., eds., *Fessellos durch die Systeme* (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann Holzboog, 1997), pp. 391–457 (hereafter referred to as Petry 1997), pp. 408–20.

10. For the Titius-Bode series and the history leading up to it, see Michael Martin Nieto, *The Titius-Bode Law of Planetary Distances: Its History and Theory* (New York: Pergamon, 1972). Among the protagonists of that history, one finds Johannes Kepler (1571–1630), Christian Wolff (1679–1754), Johann Heinrich Lambert (1728–1777), and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804).

11. The first indictment of Hegel's dissertation is due to Franz Xaver von Zach; it was published in the April 2, 1802, issue of the journal *Monatliche Correspondenz zur Beförderung der Erd- und Himmelskunde*. Part of von Zach's communication is quoted in *OPN*, p. 1. See also note 62.

12. *OPN*, p. 53; and Petry 1997, pp. 444–47.

13. For the May and June 1801 communications, see Bucher, pp. 68–69, and p. 91. For the facts pertinent to, and the theoretical context of, the discovery of Ceres, one should read the informative presentation in Petry 1997, pp. 434–51.

14. G. W. F. Hegel, *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. Lasson (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1923), vol. 5, *Encyclopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*, § 280, p. 250: "Was die Reihe der Planeten betrifft, so hat die Astronomie über die nächste Bestimmtheit derselben, ihre Entfernungen, noch kein wirkliches Gesetz entdeckt." At the end of the last sentence, an asterisk refers to the following footnote: "Zusatz der 1. Ausgabe (1817): Was ich in einer früheren Dissertation hierüber versucht habe, kann ich nicht mehr für befriedigend ansehen." The citation in my text translates this quotation from the 1817 edition of the *Encyclopaedia*.

15. Petry 1997, p. 447.

16. Neither the 1827 nor the 1830 edition of the *Encyclopaedia* includes the retraction: see the following volumes of G. W. F. Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1968ff.); vol. 19, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse* (1827; new ed. 1989), ed. W. Bonsiepen and H.-C. Lucas, § 280, p. 220; and vol. 20, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse* (1830; new ed. 1992), ed. Bonsiepen and Lucas, § 280, p. 284.

17. Neuser thinks that the real target of Hegel's criticisms of Newton is the eighteenth-century version of Newtonian physics, i.e., the conceptual presentation of Newtonian physics at the hands of Benjamin Martin (1704–1782), Colin Maclaurin (1698–1746), Nicolas De Lacaille (1713–1762), and Jean Le Rond D'Alembert (1717–1783) (see *OPN*, pp. 5 and 7–23). The following provides an aperçu of Neuser's interpretation, *ibid.*, p. 17: "*Der Sinn der Hegelschen Kritik läge dann darin, daß er eine Inkonsistenz zwischen den Nachfolgern Newtons und Newton aufzeigt, die Unvereinbarkeit von dynamischen und statischen Konzepten anspricht und eine willkürliche Aufsplitterung von Kräften kritisiert, deren physikalische Bedeutung im Hypothetischen bleibt, deren mathematische Nützlichkeit aber unbestritten ist.*"

To my knowledge, this reading of Hegel's critique of Newton was first formulated by André Doz, in his commentary on Hegel's discussion of the category of measure in the *Science of Logic*: see G. W. F. Hegel, *La théorie de la mesure* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1970), p. 179: "*et s'il [Hegel] vise Newton, il est difficile de savoir jusqu'à quel point il a su discerner ce qui revenait à Newton lui-même et ce qui revenait à certains de ses vulgarisateurs: toujours est-il qu'il ne s'est pas soucié de les dissocier.*"

A similar interpretation of Hegel's critique of Newton is to be found in Michael J. Petry's paper "Hegel's Teleological Reconstruction of Newtonian Mechanics," in Dieter Henrich and Rolf-Peter Horstmann, eds., *Stuttgarter Hegelkongress 1987: Metaphysik nach Kant?* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1988), pp. 579, 580, 584, and 595. See also Petry 1997, pp. 392 ("... in spite of Hegel's assertions ... the critical assessment of Newtonian astronomy put forward in the first main section of the dissertation is more concerned with the problems presented by Cartesianism than it is with the work of Newton himself"), 395, 397, 401, and 416.

In 1989 Michael Petry organized a conference devoted entirely to the theme of Hegel and Newtonianism. The proceedings, forty-two papers on Hegel and Newton, and two on Hegel's library, are collected in Michael Petry, ed., *Hegel and Newtonianism* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993). Petry's foreword to the book begins by reiterating the thesis concerning Hegel's criticism of Newton (p. xi), and ends with the claim that the papers contain "much evidence of common ground between Newton and Hegel" (p. xiv). However, in order to find the contributions to the volume quite stimulating and informative, one need not agree with those two theses; one need only be interested in Newton's natural philosophy, Hegel's philosophy of nature, and the history and conceptual structure of modern science. In fact, there is much in the papers that diverges from the theses.

18. Petry 1997, pp. 434 and 456. Neuser notes the presence of irony in the text on two occasions (*OPN*, pp. 50 and 161). The first case, however, is one of objective irony, so to speak. To my knowledge, the first intimation that there is an element

of irony in the dissertation occurs in Michael Petry's notes to his exemplary and richly annotated translation of the second part of Hegel's *Encyclopaedia*, entitled *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature*, 3 vols. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970), vol. 1, pp. 372–73: "On the last page of this work [the dissertation], Hegel . . . suggests, evidently not without some irony, that the sequence attributed to the demiurge in the *Timaeus* . . . might provide a better guide, as it not only accounts for the *known* planetary sequence, but also simplifies consideration of the satellites of Jupiter and Saturn."

19. For instance, Ferrini, p. 469: "To sum up, the problem of the inexplicably casual substitutions loses [sic] importance if framed in an ironical context . . ."

20. "Deed" and "suffering" stand in the same relation as "agent" and "patient," "doing" and "undergoing," or "activity" and "passivity."

21. "Splendor" renders "*species*"; instead of "splendor," one could have used "majesty." The Latin word "*species*" has many meanings. I initially thought that I would translate this word as "shape" throughout, for I thought that Hegel was using it as the Latin equivalent of "*Gestalt*." In other words, it seemed that Hegel might be using "*species*" as a technical term meant to convey his interpretation of nature as a hierarchical structure of interrelated shapes or figures that constitute the order of nature (the *kosmos*), the pendant, in the philosophy of nature, to the shapes or forms of consciousness or of *Geist*. This assumption, however, cannot be borne out: e.g., at *OPL*, pp. 376 [19] and 378 [21], there are two occurrences of the word, and in both cases it is used in its pejorative sense, namely, to mean "mere appearance," or "semblance." Although I reserved the English "form" for the Latin "*forma*," I had to use "form" to translate some occurrences of "*species*," i.e., at *OPL*, pp. 354 [7], 392 [28], and 398 [31]. On the understanding of nature as a hierarchically arranged whole of shapes, see *OPDG*, pp. 61–70; and pp. 21–40 of Petry's introduction to vol. 1 of *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature*, op. cit.

22. The term "*ratio*" occurs with great frequency in the text. It is, however, said in several ways. Depending on the context, it may mean either "reason," or "relation," or "ratio," or even "proportion." The interested reader can easily verify these translations.

23. "Living thing" translates "*animal*." Another plausible translation is "animated being," in the sense of "being having an internal principle of motion." In this respect, see Ferrini, p. 473 note 46.

24. Throughout the translation, "concept" is used to render "*notio*."

25. Here "calculation" is the translation of "*calculus*." It also renders the two occurrences of the word at *OPL*, p. 390 [27–28]. In those three cases, could Hegel have intended what is nowadays meant by the word "calculus" in English, namely, the differential or integral calculus? Neuser thinks so, for he translates by "*Differentialrechnung*" in all three cases. See also *OPL*, p. 352 [5]: "*analyticus calculus*," which I rendered by "analytical calculation"; and p. 358 [9]: "*circulo calculo subijcere*," which I translated as "to subject the circle to calculation."

There are two reasons why I have not translated as Neuser did: first of all, Newton uses neither the differential nor the integral calculus in *Principia*, and secondly, what Hegel means by the Latin word "*calculus*" is unclear to me. It may

be that Neuser's translation of "*calculus*" is of a piece with his interpretation of the dissertation's critique of Newton as being in reality a critique of the eighteenth-century version of Newtonian physics. For this interpretation, see the last section of my introduction.

26. "Higher geometry" renders "*sublimiore geometria*." Later in the text, Hegel uses "*altior geometria*" (at *OPL*, p. 390 [28]).

27. The infinitive form of the verb rendered by "suppresses" is "*tollere*," its principal parts being *tollo, sustuli, sublatum*. The English "to sublate" stems from this verb. Both Lasson and Neuser use "*aufheben*" to render it. Depending on the context, I have used either "suppress" or "sublate" to translate "*tollere*." However, "suppressed" in the very first sentence of the dissertation does not render "*tollere*," but "*opprimere*."

28. Hegel uses no quotation marks at all in his dissertation. All which appear are mine. Nor does he make use of any typographical device to mark the title of Isaac Newton's epoch-making work.

29. *Principles*, vol. 1, pp. 5–6 (definition VIII); *Principia*, vol. 1, p. 46. (Hegel does not identify the work from which he quotes; nor does he supply any page numbers.)

30. *Principles*, vol. 1, p. 164 (translation modified); *Principia*, vol. 1, p. 266.

31. Syntactically, it might have been more correct to render the last words of this sentence as follows: "to disguise the physical shape [*species*] of the immortal laws discovered by him with a pure and mathematical expression." That is Neuser's option: see *OPN*, pp. 87–88, 1.32–1.2. It seems to me, however, that that translation conflicts with the clause which follows: "he would have been able to give the form of a physical law . . ."

32. *Principles*, vol. 1, p. 40 (section II, proposition I); *Principia*, vol. 1, p. 88.

33. Nowadays, the versed sine is formulated as follows:  $1 - \cos a$ . The following short proof shows how one arrives at this expression:


If the diameter is 1, then  $AC = AB = 1$ , and

$\sin a = CE/AC = CE$ , and

$\cos a = AE/AC = AE$ .


But  $AB - AE = EB$  (or versed sine).

Therefore,  $AB - AE = 1 - \cos a = \text{versed sine}$ .



Newton's decomposition of the uniform circular trajectory of a body under the action of a central force is as follows.  $PQ$  is covered in a very small interval of time. The versed sine measures the deflection undergone by the inertial trajectory of

the body. Had the body not had any inertial motion, the line measured by the versed sine would represent the trajectory of the body under the sole action of the central or centripetal force *S*. The tangent line *PR* is the geometrical representation of the path that would have been covered by the body in the absence of centripetal force, i.e. under the sole action of inertial velocity.



This is not to say that the tangent represents a path covered in the absence of force: the uniform rectilinear path is covered under the action of an internal (or indwelling or inherent) force (the *vis insita*). In other words, one must observe that Newton uses the Latin equivalent of “force,” namely, “*vis*,” in two senses: (1) in the sense that it has in the phrase “*vis impressa*” (“impressed force”), for example, in Laws I and II of *Principia*; and (2) in the sense which the word has in the phrases “*vis insita*” and “*vis inertiae*,” these two expressions being used synonymously, as is made plain in definition III of *Principia*. The impressed force of Laws I and II—whether it be pressure, percussive force, or centripetal force—causes a change in a body’s state (of motion or rest), i.e. it produces a change in momentum if it is impulsive, or in acceleration if it is continuous, whereas the *vis insita* “is the power by which it [the body] endeavors to persevere in its state of being at rest or moving uniformly in a straight line, and is proportional to the quantity of the body” (my translation of a passage from Newton’s *De motu corporum*, a preparatory manuscript for *Principia*, quoted on page 67 of I. B. Cohen, *Introduction to Newton’s ‘Principia’* [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978], in the section entitled “Newton’s Use of ‘*Vis Insita*,’” where the author discusses the translation of “*vis insita*” and gives the meanings of its participle). In other words, the internal force or force of inertia does not operate any change in the state of a body, whereas the impressed force does cause such a change. On this twofold notion of force in Newton, see I. B. Cohen, *The Newtonian Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980; hereafter referred to as Cohen 1980), pp. 190–93.

Hegel, however, shows himself incapable of understanding (Newtonian) inertia, since he consistently imputes to Newton the claim that the tangent represents centrifugal force. In this he is thoroughly mistaken, for Newton never says anything of the sort. To the extent that Hegel fails to appreciate the role, the nature, and the theoretical import of the principle of inertia in Newtonian physics, he simply fails to understand the conception of natural motion introduced by seventeenth-century natural philosophy, which displaced the Aristotelian understanding of motion and defines the modern conception. Hegel’s urge to make motion intelligible seems to be greater than his ability to let Newton’s texts speak;

these texts replaced the Aristotelian quest for making motion intelligible with a mathematical treatment of change of state or inertial velocity, rest being a limiting case of inertial velocity.

It follows that those portions of the *Dissertatio Philosophica de Orbitis Planetarum* which are based on the confusion between centrifugal force and inertia are vitiated. The critique directed against Newton is thus simply invalid.

The situation is worsened when one takes note of the fact that the analysis of non-circular trajectories—e.g. the elliptical paths described by the planets—exhibits greater complexity, and that Hegel does not grasp the differences between the analysis of a circular trajectory and that of any other type of orbit. For example, in an ellipse, the line PS is not perpendicular to the tangent, except at the perihelion and the aphelion. In those cases, Newton does not use the expression “*sinus versus*” but the term “*sagitta*,” “arrow.” On this issue, see *OPDG*, pp. 71–86, p. 136 note 19, 145 note 39, and 185–88; as well as the relevant section of André Doz’s commentary on Hegel’s treatment of the category of measure at the end of the “Doctrine of Being” section of the *Science of Logic*: Hegel, *La théorie de la mesure*, op. cit. pp. 178–90. For a very clear and stimulating presentation of Newton’s three-tiered analysis of central forces in *Principia*, see François De Gandt’s article “The Geometrical Treatment of Central Forces in Newton’s *Principia*,” in *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* 12 (1987), pp. 111–51.

Concerning the above issues and Hegel’s basic Aristotelianism in matters of physics, see the papers by William R. Shea, “Hegel’s Celestial Mechanics,” and Frans H. van Lunteren, “Hegel and Gravitation,” in Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Michael J. Petry, eds., *Hegels Philosophie der Natur* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1986), pp. 30–44 and 45–53, respectively.

In fairness to Hegel, one must say that his bungles concerning centrifugal force are not restricted to him, that they are tied to the confusing history of the notion of force from Huygens to Kant: see, for example, Cohen 1980, p. 82: “Apart from the fact that Huygens had not really got the message of the *Principia*, and still thought of an interplay or counterbalancing of centripetal and centrifugal forces rather than the action of a centripetal force on a body with inertial motion. . . .” One gets a first sense of this history in *OPDG*, pp. 185–88 (see also pp. 71–72, 136 note 19, 145 note 39, and 146 note 40). To my knowledge, the discussion of this aspect of Hegel’s dissertation that is most generous to Hegel and most sensitive to his historical situation is Wolfgang Neuser’s. In his approach to all three parts of the dissertation, Neuser is most willing to understand it, is always very knowledgeable, and is forthright about Hegel’s mistakes (down to Hegel’s—interpolation?—mistakes in the computation of the series of numbers that are to measure the distances of the planets to the Sun, *OPN*, p. 51).

34. *Principles*, vol. 1, pp. 2–3 (definition V); *Principia*, vol. 1, p. 42.

35. *Principles*, vol. 1, p. 3 (definition V); *Principia*, vol. 1, pp. 42–43.

36. In Latin, this sentence reads as follows: “. . . in Aphelio contra et in Perihelio eadem quidem est sagittae et tangentis, sed diversissima velocitas ratio.” Wolfgang Neuser renders it in this way: “aber das Verhältnis von Brennstrahl und Tangente ist im Aphel entgegengesetzt und im Perihel gleich, aber das Verhältnis der Geschwindigkeiten ist völlig



anders.” He thus seems to be construing “*contra*” as an adjective. I am aware of only two uses of this word: an adverbial one and a prepositional one. I took it to be an adverb. As for “*velocitas ratio*,” it is odd, because the text speaks of two velocities and of their one relation.

37. In this passage, Hegel employs French units of measurement no longer in use today, but prevalent in the physical treatises of his time (see *OPN*, pp. 52 and 154): 1 toise = 6 French feet = 2.13 English yards = 1, 95 meters. 1 foot = 144 lines. 1 foot = 0, 3248394 meter.

38. The Latin reads as follows: “. . . *et vis centripeta per spatium, quod corpus in dato tempore cadendo percurrit, cognoscatur, et per sinum versum exponatur, inter priorem igitur et hunc sinum versum tanta sit differentia ut ille sit hujus pars  $\frac{1}{289}$ : ille vi centrifugae tribuitur, quam alias per lineam tangentem exponi videmus.*”

39. In the original, the sentence is as follows: “*Denique haec praeclare cum figura terrae consentire dicamus, ad aequatorem, cujus diameter axi brevior est, altioris. . .*” In the previously published version of my translation, it was rendered as follows: “Lastly, let us say that those things agree remarkably well with the figure of an Earth wider elsewhere than at the equator, the diameter of which is shorter than the axis.” Compare that to the new translation: “Finally, let us say that the foregoing agrees remarkably well with the figure of an Earth higher about the equator and the diameter of which is shorter in respect of the axis.” My new translation of this sentence is indebted to Ferrini, p. 461, in two respects. Ferrini makes two important points about this sentence, namely: (1) that “*axi*” is an ablative of respect, and not one of comparison; and (2) that the antecedent of the relative pronoun “*cujus*” is “*terrae*,” and not “*aequatorem*.” I accept both of these points. I added “and” to my rendition in order to make clear that the antecedent of the relative pronoun is “Earth,” and not “equator.” Although “*cujus*” immediately follows “*aequatorem*,” and although that may suggest that its antecedent is “*aequatorem*,” once one construes the ablative of “*axi*” as an ablative of respect, it would be contradictory not to modify the antecedent of “*cujus*”: for how can one maintain both that the Earth is higher about the equator and that the diameter at the equator is shorter than the axis? If one were to do that, one would be saying that the Earth’s diameter at the equator is both longer and shorter than the diameter at the axis.

This novel reading of the sentence frees Hegel’s dissertation of one flaw, namely, of the belief that the Earth is flatter at the equator (see, for instance, *OPDG*, p. 146 note 41). It also seems to remove Neuser’s worry that “[t]his sentence of Hegel’s stands in a relation of contradiction to the remaining portion of the argument” (*OPN*, p. 155, my translation). The removal of the contradiction needs further elucidation, however, for in the next sentence Hegel says both that “a pendulum at a lower latitude is closer to a larger mass” and that “it undergoes a stronger attraction.”

The thesis of the flattening of the Earth at the poles was derived by Newton from other results and principles in *Principia*, at Book III, Proposition XIX. It was confirmed empirically in the eighteenth century by measurements taken by Pierre Louis Moreau de Maupertuis (1698–1759), Alexis-Claude Clairaut (1713–

1765), Charles-Etienne-Louis Camus (1699–1768), and Pierre-Charles Lemonnier (1715–1799) in their surveying expedition to Lapland, and by Charles-Marie de La Condamine (1701–1774) and Pierre Bouguer (1698–1758) in theirs to Peru. Clairaut published his results in his 1743 book *Théorie de la figure de la Terre*, while La Condamine's book of 1749, *La figure de la Terre, déterminée par les observations de MM. de La Condamine et Bouguer*, made public the findings of the South American trip. The Earth is an oblate spheroid: it bulges at the equator and is flatter at the poles. The centripetal force exerted on an object at the poles is thus somewhat greater than at the equator.

The reader will find an account of the verification of Newton's prediction in the eighteenth century in T. B. Jones's *The Figure of the Earth* (Lawrence, Kansas: Coronado Press, 1967).

40. Ferrini, pp. 463–64.

41. "That-which-is-absolutely-placed-before" renders "*absolute oppositi*." The phrase could also have been translated as "that which stands absolutely opposite." One will rightly ask: placed before what? or opposite what? The answer is "placed before, or opposite a subject." But what do we make of "absolutely"? Matter is that which is placed before a subject absolutely, that is, without further qualification. In other words, its only determination is that of being placed before a subject.

42. *Principles*, vol. 2, p. 398, translation modified; *Principia*, vol. 2, p. 550; "*Regula II. Ideoque effectuum naturalium ejusdem generis eadem assignandae sunt causae, quatenus fieri potest . . . descensus lapidum in Europa et in America . . .*"; and p. 552: "*Regula III. Qualitates corporum quae intendi et remitti nequeunt, quaeque corporibus omnibus competunt in quibus experimenta instituere licet, pro qualitatibus corporum universorum habendae sunt.*"

43. "Among themselves" renders "*in se invicem*."

44. "Node" is a technical term of astronomy: it describes the point at which the orbit of a planet or a comet intersects the plane of the ecliptic, that is, the Sun's apparent annual path through the heavens. The expression "nodal line" describes the line connecting the ascending and descending nodes. However, Neuser, *OPN*, p. 157, points out that the concept of nodal line has a more general sense in Hegel: it characterizes any determinate series (of objects) arising from a qualified breaking up of a continuum.

45. The infinitive form of the verb rendered by "posited" is "*ponere*." I keep to this translation throughout the text. In this particular sentence, one may feel that "located" would have been a more fitting translation. It seems to me that the specific use of "*ponere*" in the next seven sentences justifies my decision.

46. The words in quotation marks form the title of Section XI of Book I of *Principles*, vol. 1, p. 164; *Principia*, vol. 1, p. 266.

47. *Principles*, vol. 1, p. 164, translation modified; *Principia*, vol. 1, p. 266. The translation by Motte and Cajori had to be modified so as to accommodate Hegel's modification of Newton's text. Here are the two passages: Newton: "*ambo . . . quasi attractione mutua, circum gravitatis centrum commune revolvantur*." Hegel's "quotation" of Newton: "*ambo autem attractione ista mutua quasi circum gravitatis commune centrum revolvi*." If one disregards the negligible additions of "*autem*"

and “*ista*” and the change of the verb’s mood, the important alteration consists in Hegel’s having displaced “*quasi*.” Whereas Newton speaks of two bodies “being as it were mutually attracted,” Hegel makes him speak of two bodies “revolving as it were about a common center.”

48. *Principles*, vol. 1, p. 19, translation modified; *Principia*, vol. 1, p. 61.

49. See note 45.

50. See *OPN*, pp. 158–59, for a very helpful illustration of and commentary on these remarks on magnetism. See also my note 9.

51. “Turns into” translates “*transit*.” “*Transire*” means “to go beyond,” “to go over.” The German rendition of “*transit*” would be “*geht über*,” “*übergehen*” being a verb often used by Hegel.

52. The initial words of this sentence are as follows: “*Ex hac interna et primitiva oppositarum potentiarum orientis et occidentis . . . identitate et differentia*.” Neuser, *OPN*, p. 129, translates them in this way: “*Aus der inneren und ursprünglichen Identität und Differenz der entgegengesetzten Potenzen des Entstehens und Vergehens . . .*” In English: “Through the internal and primitive identity and difference of the opposed potencies of coming into being and passing away . . .” Neuser thus construes the two participles as having their ordinary verbal senses, and not as nominalized participles designating the cardinal points, as do Lasson (*OPL*, p. 389) and De Gandt (*OPDG*, p. 157). I have adopted his decision. Later in the text Hegel does use these two words to designate cardinal points: see *OPL*, p. 396 [31].

53. See note 51.

54. I have abstained from translating this expression, for I know of no elegant and brief translation that would do it justice. If there existed a verb such as “to nature,” one might render this phrase by “nature natured.” Spinoza uses it in *Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata*: for example, in the Scholium to Prop. XXIX of Part I.

55. The relation meant is the relation among the planets’ distances to the Sun. This phrasing occurs again in the third part.

56. “To turn into” renders “*abire*,” “to go away,” “to leave,” and figuratively “to disappear,” “to leave one state or condition for another,” “to turn into.” When the verb is used in these last two senses, it takes the preposition “*in*,” as is the case here. Neuser translates it by “*übergehen*.”

57. The verb occurring here is the same as the one identified in the previous note. “Turns into motion” translates “*in motum abeat*.” In German, this would be rendered by “*in die Bewegung übergeht*,” the literal translation of which is “passes over into motion” or “goes over into motion.”

58. “Transitory” renders “*cito praetereuntis*,” the literal sense of which is “swiftly going beyond.” Neuser translates it by “*schnell vorübergehenden*.”

59. “The relation the planets’ distances to the Sun bear to each other” translates “*ratione distantiarum planetarum*.” Literally, the three Latin words translate as “the relation of the distances of the planets.” I took the liberty to render them by means of a relative clause, in order to make explicit what I take this phrase to mean on the basis of the context. In Hegel’s time, it was a scientific assumption that the numbers that measure the distances of the planets to the Sun form an

ordered series, i.e. a series the terms of which are arranged in an order that is expressible by a general formula. Arithmetical or geometrical progressions are examples of such ordered series, which are also called “sequences,” as will be seen in note 61.

60. “Community of reason and nature” translates “*identitatem rationis et naturae*.” By it, Hegel means, I think, that which is common to, shared by, nature and reason. The English “community” renders “*identitas*” (the word being in the accusative in the text). The same word occurs in the previous sentence, in the phrase “*identitate omnium legum naturae*.” I rendered that phrase by “community of all laws of nature.” This sense of “*identitas*” is in keeping with medieval usage.

61. “Relation characteristic of an arithmetical progression” renders “*rationem . . . progressionis arithmeticae*.” It would seem that what Hegel means by that phrase is what we nowadays call “the common difference,” i.e. the difference between each term of an arithmetical progression and the term that precedes it. In this respect, see Leonhard Euler, *Elements of Algebra* (1770; New York: Springer, n.d.; reprint of 1840 translation), pp. 126–27, where the expression “arithmetical ratio” is introduced as meaning the same as “difference between two numbers.” I am citing that as a possible source, not being sure whether Hegel read this work of Euler’s, and being aware that I am referring to an English translation of the original.

Be that as it may, I should like to make a few remarks about the passage in which the above phrase occurs, and the two paragraphs that immediately follow it.

1. Hegel does not identify the “progression” in question by its name, but the partial description he gives of it, namely, that no planet corresponds to its fifth term, indicates that it is the Titius-Bode series, which is as follows:

4   7   10   16   28   52   100   196   etc.

2. The form of the series can be made explicit as follows, where  $a = 4$  and  $d = 3$ :

$$\begin{aligned} 4 &= (a + 0) & 7 &= (a + d) & 10 &= (a + 2d) & 16 &= (a + 4d) \\ 28 &= (a + 8d) & 52 &= (a + 16d) & 100 &= (a + 32d) \\ 196 &= (a + 64d) & \text{etc.} \end{aligned}$$

In Euler’s treatise on algebra (op. cit., p. 132), the general form of arithmetical progressions is given as follows:

$$\begin{array}{cccccc} 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & 6 \\ a & a \pm d & a \pm 2d & a \pm 3d & a \pm 4d & a \pm 5d \quad \text{etc.} \end{array}$$

Note that whether Hegel read Euler’s 1770 treatise on algebra is irrelevant in this case, for not only was this form to be found in other algebra handbooks of that time, but it also is an objective mathematical structure.

3. Comparing the forms of the two sequences, one sees that whereas in the Titius-Bode series the coefficients of “ $d$ ” are powers of two, in Euler’s general form of an arithmetical progression the coefficients of “ $d$ ” are the positive integers.

4. According to the mathematical theory of sequences, both the Titius-Bode series and arithmetical progressions are sequences, or ordered sets of numbers; however, they are different types of sequences. My third remark shows in what respect they differ. Other sorts of well-known sequences are the geometrical progression, the harmonical sequence, and the Fibonacci sequence.
5. The Titius-Bode sequence is thus not an arithmetical progression. It may be that Hegel called it "arithmetical" because he overlooked the important role the coefficients play in determining the form of a sequence and thereby its type.
6. In view of the nature of the coefficients involved in the Titius-Bode sequence, it is curious that in the next paragraph Hegel goes on to say that the Titius-Bode sequence "does not result from the powers." This seems to lend support to my hypothesis, in the previous remark, that he did not pay sufficient attention to the coefficients.
7. The reason Hegel gives for excluding the Titius-Bode sequence from the concern of philosophy is thus at odds with the very form of the sequence.
8. The Pythagorean series of numbers offered by Hegel as an alternative to the Titius-Bode sequence can only be said "to result from the powers," if one understands it, as Neuser does (*OPN*, p. 51), as a hybrid of the two sequences 1, 2, 4, 8 and 1, 3, 9, 27, the first sequence being constituted by powers of two, the second by powers of three. Hegel, however, modifies the first sequence since he replaces 8 by 16, which is still a power of two. The cost of these manipulations is (i) that the series is not one sequence; (ii) that the sequence constituted by the powers of two has a gap in it; (iii) that the number one now occurs twice in the series; (iv) that the number one is useless for Hegel's purposes; (v) that he is thus compelled to replace the number one by  $\sqrt[3]{3}$  when he indicates how one is to obtain the distances of the planets to the Sun from the modified Pythagorean series; and (vi) that the distances of the planets are not arrived at by application of the same procedure throughout, unless  $\sqrt[4]{3}$  is substituted for 1 in the modified Pythagorean series. And so on . . .
9. One wonders how such ad hoc maneuvers can still qualify as philosophical, for the last sentence of the second introductory paragraph to the dissertation does promise to "show what value philosophy may have in determining the mathematical relations among quantities."

On the Titius-Bode regularity, I also recommend Gerald Holton's presentation and discussion in *Introduction to Concepts and Theories in Physical Science* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 156–60.

62. It is very likely that this is the one sentence of Hegel's dissertation that brought upon him most of the wrath, ridicule, and charges of incompetence, sophistry, intellectual bankruptcy, and of deriving empirical facts from concepts,

prompted by this work (for some examples, see *OPN*, p. 1). Neuser reminds us of a grammatical fact that should have been obvious to all. The sentence in question is a hypothetical one: its consequent holds only on the assumption that its antecedent obtains (*OPN*, p. 51; the same point was made by van Lunteren, op. cit., p. 47). Neuser's thorough and provocative discussion of the third part of the dissertation deserves to be read.

In appealing to such numerical considerations in his effort to display reason in natural things, Hegel had respectable predecessors. These include Rheticus, Kepler, Francesco Sizi, and Christiaan Huygens himself, in other words, some weighty actors in the history of science. Rheticus, Copernicus's disciple, accounted for his master's system by pointing out that its having six planets is due to six's being the first perfect number, i.e. to six's being the sum of its divisors ( $6 = 1 + 2 + 3$ ). Kepler proposed another justification for the number of planets: in his view, God created the solar system in accordance with the order of the five nested perfect solids. Sizi was convinced that there were exactly seven planets. This conviction was founded on the presence of the number seven in certain natural wholes: for example, the seven openings in the head (ears, eyes, nostrils, and mouth), the seven primary components of the alchemical genus of metals, etc. After Huygens discovered that Saturn had a satellite, he deemed that the solar system was complete and symmetrical, for the respective number of the primary and secondary planets was now six. In his creation, God had abided by the principle of perfect numbers. For this, I am indebted to Cohen 1980, pp. 20–21. In the last note to this catalogue of theologico-numerico-physical thoughts, Cohen mentions the Titius-Bode law. That the Titius-Bode regularity was also explicitly embedded in a theological context for both Titius and Bode is shown by Neuser in *OPN*, pp. 56–57.

63. Regarding the numbers making up this series, one should mention Neuser's suggestion, *OPN*, p. 52: "*Nun hat Hegel zwar einerseits eine mathematische Umrechnung zugrunde gelegt, andererseits aber gesagt, daß die Planetenabstände nur aus der Erfahrung zu nehmen sind. Dann wäre eine vernünftige Interpretation, daß die Umrechnung der Timaiossschen Zahlen nur ein Angleichen an ein anderes Maßsystem bedeute und Hegels Zahlen eine Reihe absoluter Zahlen seien, deren Maßeinheit Hegel verschwiegen habe und bei der jeder einzelne Wert einen empirischen Fehler enthalte. Diese Interpretation ist stimmig, wenn man als Maßeinheit ( $10^8$ ) 'Pariser Fuss' (1 Pariser Fuss = 0,32485 meter) unterstellt, eine Maßeinheit, die Hegel in der Habilitationsschrift im übrigen in Anlehnung an Newton schon benutzt hat. Diese Maßeinheit ist auch in den damaligen physikalischen Schriften durchhaus üblich. Vergleicht man darüber hinaus Hegels Werte mit den damals bekannten Abständen, so sind die Hegelschen Werte mit einer maximalen Abweichung von rund 8,3 % recht gut.*"

# Introduction for the *Critical Journal of Philosophy*: On the Essence of Philosophical Criticism Generally, and Its Relationship to the Present State of Philosophy in Particular

Translated by H. S. Harris

**T**his essay formed the introductory manifesto of the short-lived *Critical Journal of Philosophy*, which was edited by Schelling and Hegel and published between the last months of 1801 and the first months of 1803. The *Critical Journal* was Schelling's brainchild, and he was the principal editor. Hegel was at this time a virtually unknown newcomer to the academic scene, known only as a stout defender of Schelling's philosophy and regarded quite generally as no more than Schelling's mouthpiece. (The only signed statement in the whole body of the *Critical Journal* was a footnote in which Hegel denounced as a lie a report that his own essay on the *Difference between the Systems of Fichte and Schelling* was merely Schelling's way of giving notice to the world that he, Schelling, had decisively surpassed Fichte.)<sup>1</sup>

This view was certainly mistaken, but when we consider the conflict of evidence about the authorship of the present essay, we must ask ourselves very seriously whether Schelling himself did not actually regard his relation with Hegel in this light. I find it hard to interpret what he himself claimed many years later on the basis of any other hypothesis. There cannot be any real doubt that most of the essay was written by Hegel himself, for he included it in a list of his contributions to the *Critical Journal* which he drew up in connection with his candidacy for a professorship at the University of Jena in 1804.<sup>2</sup> Yet Schelling declared in a letter of 1838, "As far as the Introduction

to the *Critical Journal* is concerned, it was partly written by Hegel, but many passages which I could not precisely identify at the moment, as well as the main ideas (*Hauptgedanken*) are by me; there can surely be no passage which I have not at least revised.”<sup>3</sup>

Now what I would call the *Hauptgedanken* of the essay are for the most part distinctively Hegelian. But there could well be dispute about what the *Hauptgedanken* are. The “main idea” of the identity philosophy itself was certainly Schelling’s, but I think Hegel has here set his own theory of criticism into that frame. Anyone who will read the whole of the *Critical Journal* carefully, as I have done, will be obliged to agree that Hegel’s contributions embody and express the program of the “Introduction” much better than Schelling’s do. If Schelling remained convinced, when the two of them were discussing what should be said in this opening salvo of their critical onslaught upon the old ways of thought, that he was directing the attack, this only makes the essay into the first documentary record of an insidious influence of Hegel upon him, which others more thoroughly conversant with Schelling’s writings than I am have fairly conclusively exhibited in works that he definitely wrote for himself.<sup>4</sup>

Having said this much, I shall leave the reader to ponder upon my notes (remembering always that it is Hegel’s thought that I am interested in, and that I have read Schelling only for the light his work throws upon that). Setting aside all arguments about whose ideas these are, and who influenced whom, what I take to have happened in the writing of this Introduction for what everyone agreed was “Schelling’s journal” is this. The two editors discussed what should be said (and discussed it at some length) before Hegel sat down and wrote a draft for Schelling’s review and approval. Schelling, as senior editor, certainly went over that draft carefully and made revisions and additions, because he felt directly responsible for what was said. The ideas had to be his, by definition, because they were appearing in this initial proclamation. Hence Schelling should certainly be regarded as a coauthor of the piece.

\* \* \*

## On the Essence of Philosophical Criticism Generally, and Its Relationship to the Present State of Philosophy in Particular

- p. iii In whatever domain of art or science it is employed, criticism requires a standard which is just as independent of the person who makes the judgment as it is of the thing that is judged—a standard derived neither from the singular appearance<sup>5</sup> nor from the specific character of the subject, but from the eternal and unchangeable model of what really is.<sup>6</sup> Just as



the Idea of fine art is not first created or discovered by art criticism, but is purely and simply presupposed by it, so too in philosophical criticism the Idea of philosophy is itself the precondition and presupposition without which it would only be able to set one subjective view against another for ever and ever, and never set the Absolute against the conditioned.

What distinguishes philosophical criticism from art criticism is not the judgment of the capacity for objectivity that is expressed in a work, but rather just the object; the Idea itself that is basic to the criticism, and which cannot be anything other than the Idea of philosophy itself. As far as the capacity for objectivity is concerned, philosophical criticism involves the same claims to universal validity that art criticism does. So anyone who wants to deny objectivity of judgment in philosophy in spite of that, must claim not merely the possibility of distinct forms of one and the same Idea, but the possibility of essentially distinct yet equally true philosophies—a view of the matter which properly deserves no consideration, for all its immense comfortableness. The fact that philosophy is but one, and can only be one, rests on the fact that reason is but one; and just as there cannot be distinct reasons, so too a wall cannot be set up between reason and its self-cognition, through which its self-cognition could become essentially distinguishable from its appearance. For reason absolutely considered, and reason when it becomes object for itself in its self-cognition (and hence philosophy) is again just one and the same thing, and therefore completely equal.

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The ground of a distinction within philosophy itself cannot be in its essence, which is strictly one, any more than it can be based on the inequality of the capacity to formulate the Idea of philosophy objectively. For the fact is that in the philosophical perspective the Idea itself is all that counts, while the capacity to set it forth that comes additionally with its possession, makes only another side of philosophy, and one that is not peculiar to it. Therefore, once philosophy is defined as a cognition of the Absolute, the possibility of infinitely many distinct reflections, such that each has an equal right to maintain itself against the others, each of them being essentially distinct from the others, could only result from thinking of the Absolute (whether as God or in some other aspect as nature) as fixed in immovable and absolute opposition to cognition as subjective.

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But even upon this view the distinction would have to suspend and ameliorate itself. For since cognition is here represented as something formal, it is thought of as completely passive in its relationship to the object; and it is required of the subject that is to be capable of this reception of the divinity, or of the purely objective intuition of nature, that it should close itself quite generally against every other relationship to any limiting factor at all, and restrain itself from any activity of its own, since that would upset the purity of the reception. Through this passivity of

intake, and the equality of the object,<sup>7</sup> what is represented as result, would have to be just the cognition of the Absolute, and a philosophy that sprang from this root must again be simply unique and in every respect the same.

p. vi It is because the truth of reason is but one, like beauty, that criticism as objective judgment is possible in principle, and it follows evidently that it only makes sense for those who have the Idea of the one identical philosophy present to their minds; and by the same token it can only be concerned with those works in which this Idea is expressed more or less clearly for cognition. The effort of criticism is entirely wasted on the people and the works that are deprived of the Idea. In the absence of the Idea, criticism gets into the gravest difficulty, for if all criticism is subsumption under the Idea, then all criticism must necessarily cease where the Idea is lacking, and it can have no other direct relationship than that of repudiation. But in this repudiation it ruptures altogether every connection between that wherein the Idea of philosophy is lacking, and that in whose service criticism exists. Since reciprocal recognition<sup>8</sup> is in this way suspended, what appears is only two subjectivities in opposition; things that have nothing in common with one another come on stage with equal right for that very reason; and in declaring that what is before it to be judged is anything else one likes—which is tantamount to declaring it to be nothing at all, since philosophy is all that it aims to be—criticism transposes itself into a subjective situation and its verdict appears as a one-sided decision by violence. Since its activity ought to be objective, this situation directly contradicts its essence; its judgment is an appeal to the Idea of philosophy but since this Idea is not recognized by the adverse party, it is only a foreign court of judgment for him. There is no immediate escape from this relationship of criticism, which cuts unphilosophy<sup>9</sup> off from philosophy—criticism must stand on the one side and have unphilosophy on the opposite side. Since unphilosophy takes up a negative attitude to philosophy, and hence there can be no question of discussing it as philosophy, there is nothing to be done but recount how this negative side expresses itself and confesses its non-being (which inasmuch as it has a phenomenal aspect is called platitude); and since what is nothing to begin with, must unfailingly appear ever more clearly as nothing in its development, until it can be recognized as such by virtually everyone, through this completely executed construction from the primal nullity.<sup>10</sup> Criticism is reconciled once more with the incapacity<sup>11</sup> which could see nothing in the original verdict<sup>12</sup> but self-satisfied personal bias and caprice.

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On the other hand, where the Idea of philosophy is actually present, there it is the concern of criticism to interpret the way and the degree in which it emerges free and clear, and the range within which it has been elaborated into a scientific system of philosophy.

As for this last point, if the pure Idea of philosophy is expressed with spirit, but naively and without scientific range—if it does not arrive at the objectivity of a systematic consciousness—we must still greet it with joy and delight; it is the mark of a beautiful soul, whose inertia guards it against falling into the original sin of thinking, but which also lacks the courage to hurl itself into that sin and to follow the path of its guilt, until the guilt is dissolved—and so it has not arrived at the intuition of itself in an objective whole science. The empty form of such spirits, however—those who aim to give the heart and essence of philosophy in short formulas without spirit—this form has no scientific significance, and has no other interest either.<sup>13</sup>

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But when the Idea of philosophy becomes more scientific, it must be carefully distinguished from the individuality which will express its character without harm to the identity of the Idea of philosophy or to the purely objective exposition of it—the subjectivity or limitedness, that gets mingled in the exposition of the Idea of philosophy. Criticism has to apply itself especially to the way that philosophy looks when masked by this subjectivity—it must tear the mask off.

When it is shown to be the case that the Idea of philosophy is actually before the mind, the criticism can cleave to the requirement and to the need that is expressed, to the objective factor in which the need seeks its satisfaction, and can lay aside the limitedness of the shape through its genuine tendency toward perfect objectivity.

But in this connection two cases are possible. In the first case consciousness has not properly developed beyond subjectivity. The Idea of philosophy has not risen to the clarity of free intuition, but stays hidden in a dark background, partly, perhaps, because some forms in which it finds itself largely expressed, forms which possess great authority, still hinder the breakthrough to pure formlessness, or to the highest form (which is the same thing). Even when criticism cannot allow the work and the deed to be valid as a shape of the Idea, it will not ignore the striving; the genuinely scientific concern here is to peel off the shell that keeps the inner aspiration from seeing daylight; it is important to be aware of the manifoldness of the reflections of the spirit, each of which must have its place in philosophy, as well as being aware of their subordinate status and their defects.<sup>14</sup>

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In the second case it is evident that the Idea of philosophy has been more clearly cognized, but that subjectivity has striven to ward off philosophy insofar as this is necessary for its own preservation.<sup>15</sup>

Here what matters is not to set the Idea of philosophy off in relief, but to uncover the nooks and crannies that subjectivity makes use of in order to escape from philosophy, and to make the weakness, for which any limitation offers a secure foothold, visible both on its own account and

with respect to the Idea of philosophy, *qua* associated with a subjectivity; for the true energy of the Idea is incompatible with subjectivity.

p. x But there is still another way of proceeding upon which criticism must especially fasten: the one that gives itself out to be in possession of philosophy which uses the forms and vocabulary in which great philosophical systems are expressed, goes in for lengthy debates, but is at bottom only an empty fog of words without inner content.<sup>16</sup> This sort of chatter, though lacking the Idea of philosophy, gains for itself a kind of authority through its very prolixity and arrogance. Partly this is because it seems almost incredible that such a big shell should be without a kernel, and partly because the emptiness is in its way universally understandable. Since there is nothing more sickening than this transformation of the seriousness of philosophy into platitude, criticism must summon up all its forces to ward off this disaster.

p. xi These distinct forms<sup>17</sup> are in general more or less dominant in the German philosophy of the present time to which this *Critical Journal* is addressed. But they have the further peculiarity that every philosophical enterprise takes on the aspect of a science and the dimensions of a system, or at the very least takes its stand as the absolute principle of philosophy as a whole. Through the work of Kant, and still more through that of Fichte, the Idea of a science, and particularly of philosophy as a science, has been established. Philosophizing piecemeal has lost all credit, and the possibility of counting for something as a philosopher through a variety of philosophical thoughts upon this or that topic, published perhaps in scholastic treatises, no longer exists. As a result a multitude of systems and principles is arising which gives that part of the public which does philosophy a certain outward similarity to the state of philosophy in Greece, where every prominent philosophical mind elaborated the Idea of philosophy in his own individual way. At the same time philosophical freedom—emancipation from authority and independence of thought—seems to have reached such a pitch with us, that it would be considered disgraceful to call oneself a philosopher after the fashion of a school that already exists; opinion has it that thinking for oneself can only proclaim its presence through originality—the invention of a system that is entirely novel and one's own.

When the inner life of philosophy comes to birth in an outward shape, it necessarily endows that shape with something of the form of its own peculiar organization; by so much is the original aspect of genius distinct from *the particularity* which takes itself for, and gives itself out to be, *originality*. For this particularity, upon closer examination, really keeps firmly to the common highway of culture, and can never boast of having arrived at the pure Idea of philosophy by leaving it; for if it

had grasped this Idea, it would know it again in other philosophical systems, and *ipso facto* it would then be unable to label itself with the name of a *personal philosophy*, even though it must, of course, preserve its own living form.<sup>18</sup> What the particular originality has created of its own upon that highway, is a particular form of reflection, seized upon from some singular, and hence subordinate, standpoint. This is easy enough to do in an era that has cultivated the understanding in so many aspects, and has, in particular, fashioned it into philosophy in so many ways. An assemblage of such original tendencies, and of the manifold efforts after a form and system of one's own, offers us the spectacle of the tortures of the damned, rather than that of the free upsurge of the most various living shapes in the philosophical gardens of Greece. Either they are forever bound to their own limited position; or they must seize on one position after another, marveling unstintedly at them all, and casting one after the other away.<sup>19</sup>

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As for the labor of enlarging a *particularity of this kind into a system*, and setting it forth as the whole, this is a hard labor in good sooth, and the particular originality must surely come to grief over it, for how could what is limited be capable of extending itself into a whole, without *ipso facto* flying to pieces itself? The very quest for a particular principle is already committed to the goal of possessing something of one's own, something that satisfies one's self alone, and renounces any pretension to the objectivity of knowledge or to its totality. And yet the whole is, more or less, present in objective form, at least as raw material, as a mass of knowledge; it is hard to do it violence and to follow the thread right through it consistently with one's own peculiar concept; but at the same time, given that it is indeed there, one is never permitted to stage it approvingly without coherence; the cleverest way, it seems, is not to bother oneself on that account, and to set up one's own peculiar principle as the only thing that matters, leaving the rest of knowledge to bother itself about its coherence with the principle. It seems, of course, that this is a lower task altogether: to give to the basic principle its objective scientific range. But if, on the one hand, this range is not to be lacking, and, on the other hand, one wants to spare oneself the effort of bringing the manifold array of knowledge into coherence with itself and with the limitedness of the principle, the way of proceeding that unites both of these requirements is that of "provisional" philosophizing, i.e. that which sums up what is present not in terms of the needs of a system of knowledge, but on the following ground: that it seems that what is present can have its use then too—to exercise our heads, for why else should it be there?<sup>20</sup>

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In this respect the critical philosophy has performed an exceptionally important service. To wit, it has been proved therein—to express the

matter in its own words—that the concepts of the understanding only have their application in experience, that reason as cognitive through its theoretical Ideas only involves itself in contradictions, and that its objects must be given to knowledge generally by sensibility. All this is useful for us to renounce reason in science and give ourselves over to the most crass empiricism. The crudest concepts dragged into experience, and an intuition polluted by the rudest offspring of a spiritless reflection, have been given out as “inner and outer experience” and “actual facts of consciousness.” Everything has been tumbled together under this heading upon an assurance received from anywhere, that it does occur in consciousness; and all this comes to pass by appeal to the critical philosophy, which has proved that experience and perception are necessary for cognition, and which allows reason no constitutive relationship to knowledge, but only a regulative one. Apart from the fact that unphilosophy and anti-science, which philosophy used to regard with easy contempt, have taken on a philosophical form for their justification, the critical philosophy has in this way brought about even greater benefits; to wit, it has reconciled common sense, and every limited consciousness, with philosophy<sup>21</sup>—along with their finest blooms, which are at times called the highest moral interests of humanity.

But if subjectivity, without regard for the further difficulty which it faces in setting itself forth as a system, because the critical philosophy has now made at least one great range of finite forms suspect or unusable—if it is afflicted with insight into its limitedness, and by a kind of bad conscience, and is ashamed to set itself up as absolute, how can it be present and made valid in spite of its own better knowledge and the Idea of philosophy that floats before its mind?<sup>22</sup> —In the first place, we must start with a form that is recognized as finite. It must represent nothing but what is, to all appearances, an arbitrary starting point, worth nothing indeed upon its own account, but it has to be granted for the moment because its utility will become evident soon enough. It is granted for the time being, on request, in a provisory, problematic, hypothetical way, without any special pretensions; it will soon legitimate itself later on. —If we once arrive at what is true having started from it, our gratitude for the signpost will recognize that arbitrary starting point as a necessary one, and see that it has been verified. However, the true needs no leading-reins to guide us to it,<sup>23</sup> but must bear within itself the power to step forth on its own account; and the limited starting point is itself recognized here for just what it is, that is to say it does not have the stuff of its own subsistence in it, but is understood to be only something hypothetical and problematic, even though in the end it is due to be verified as something veritably true. It is evident therefore that the salvation of finitude was the principal

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concern. But what is not supposed to be hypothetical later on, cannot be hypothetical in the beginning either; or else what is hypothetical at the beginning cannot become categorical later on. It might, of course, come forward as absolute straightaway, but since it is, quite rightly, too timid for that, we need a roundabout way to sneak the Absolute in.

Making out that a finite starting point of this kind is a hypothesis for the time being only introduces one more deception. For the starter comes on stage pretending to have no pretensions; whether he comes forward modestly as hypothetical or right away as self-certain, both starts lead to the same result:<sup>24</sup> that the finite is preserved as what it is in its separateness, and the Absolute remains an Idea, a beyond—in other words, it is afflicted with a finitude.

The certain starting point, which is taken up in its immediate consciousness in order that it may be certain, seems through its immediate certainty to make up for what it lacks by reason of its finitude; and pure self-consciousness is just such a certainty since, *qua* starting point, it is posited as a pure consciousness in immediate opposition to the empirical.<sup>25</sup> In and for itself the concern of philosophy cannot be with finite certainties of this kind. A philosophy which, in order to anchor itself to a certainty, begins from the most universally valid statements or activities ready at hand for every human understanding, is either doing something superfluous, since it must still transcend this limitation and suspend it, in order to be philosophy at all (and ordinary common sense, which must thereby be led astray will take good note when its sphere is abandoned, and one wants to lead it into self-transcendence); or else, if this finite certainty is not to be suspended as such, but is to abide and subsist as something fixed, then it must, of course, recognize its finitude, and *require* infinity. However, the infinite then comes on the scene precisely and only as a requirement, as something thought of, *only as an Idea*. For although it is the necessary and comprehensive, all-inclusive, Idea of reason, it is still, *ipso facto*, one-sided, since the Idea itself and that which thinks it<sup>26</sup> (or whatever else the determinate was from which the start was made)<sup>27</sup> are posited separately. In this type of salvation for the limited the Absolute is exalted into the supreme Idea, but not at the same time into the unique being, so that the antithesis remains dominant and absolute throughout the whole system of philosophy, since this is the point from which the science of philosophy first begins.<sup>28</sup> To a certain extent these salvation programs are what typifies our own recent philosophical culture; and almost everything that has been accepted as philosophy in our day falls within the scope of this concept. Even the highest manifestation of philosophy of the last generation has not overcome the fixed polarity of inner and outer, of here and yonder. It allows two opposed philosophies to stand:

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one in which we can only approach toward the knowledge of the Absolute, and another which is within the Absolute itself—though this latter is, to be sure, only established under the title of faith. In this way the antithesis of dualism is given its most abstract expression, and so philosophy is not led forth from the sphere of our reflective culture.<sup>29</sup> As a result the most abstract form of the antithesis is of the greatest importance; and from this most acute extreme, the transition to genuine philosophy is all the easier. For the very idea of the Absolute that is set up itself rejects the antithesis, because the antithesis carries with it the form of an Idea, of an ought, of an infinite requirement. We must not overlook how much the study of philosophy has profited from the manifold elaboration that antithesis in general has undergone—the antithesis which every philosophy aims to overcome—because a later philosophy was directed against the form of the antithesis that was dominant in an earlier one, and overcame it, even though the later philosophy fell back again, all unwittingly, into another form of antithesis; but at the same time we must also not overlook the variety of forms that the antithesis can assume.

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On the other hand, there is a prevalent manner of proceeding that has only unprofitable aspects: to wit, that which is at pains to make philosophical ideas *popular*, or more precisely, common, as soon as they appear on stage. Philosophy is, by its very nature, something esoteric, neither made for the vulgar as it stands, nor capable of being got up to suit the vulgar taste: it only is philosophy in virtue of being directly opposed to the understanding and hence even more opposed to common sense, under which label we understand the limitedness in space and time of a race of men; in its relationship to common sense the world of philosophy is in and for itself an inverted world.<sup>30</sup> When Alexander, having heard that his teacher was publishing written essays on his philosophy, wrote to him from the heart of Asia that he ought not to have vulgarized the philosophizing they had done together, Aristotle defended himself by saying that his philosophy was published and yet also not published. In the same way philosophy must certainly admit the possibility that the people can rise to it, but it must not lower itself to the people.<sup>31</sup> But in these times of freedom and equality, in which such a large educated public has been formed that will not allow anything to be shut away from it, but considers itself good for anything—or everything good enough for it—in these times even the highest beauty and the greatest good have not been able to escape the fate of being mishandled by the common mob which cannot rise to what it sees floating above it, until it has been made common enough to be fit for their possessing; so that vulgarization has forced its way into being recognized as a meritorious kind of labor. There is no aspect of the higher striving of the human spirit that has not

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experienced this fate. An idea, in art or in philosophy, needs only to be glimpsed in order for the processing to start by which it is properly stirred up into material for the pulpit, for textbooks, and for the household use of the newspaper public. Leibniz partly undertook these labors for his philosophy himself, in his *Theodicy*; his philosophy did not thereby gain a general *entrée*, but he made a great name for himself.<sup>32</sup> Nowadays, there is a ready supply of people trained for the job. With isolated concepts, it happens automatically; all that is necessary is to attach the concept-name to what has long been familiar in everyday life. In its origin and its realized essence the Enlightenment already expresses the vulgarity of the understanding, and the vanity of its exaltation above reason, and there was no need to change the meaning of the concepts in order to make them attractive and easy to grasp; but one can readily grant that the word “Ideal” carries nowadays the general meaning of that which has no truth in it, or the word “humanity” of that which is utterly dull.<sup>33</sup>—The seemingly opposite case—which is, however, just the same as this one at bottom—occurs where the matter is “popular” already, and where popular clichés (everyday ideas), which do not go even one step beyond the sphere of common concepts, have to be given the outward look of philosophy by philosophical and methodical processing. Just as in the first case the assumption is made, that what is philosophical can still be “popular” at the same time, so in the second that what is “popular” by nature, can in some way or other become philosophic.<sup>34</sup> Thus the compatibility of platitude and philosophy in both cases.

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In a general way we can relate this variety of efforts to the spirit of unrest and instability that is everywhere astir. This spirit is the mark of our time. After long centuries of the toughest obstinacy, for which the casting off of an old form involved the most fearful convulsions, it has finally brought the German spirit to the point of tying even philosophical systems into the concept of the ever changing and the ever new, although we must not mistake this passion for change and novelty for the indifference of play which, in its extreme insouciance, is at the same time the most exalted and only true seriousness.<sup>35</sup> For the restless impulse of our time goes to work with the extreme earnestness of limitedness. Yet fate has of necessity given it a dim feeling of mistrust and a secret despair which very soon reveals itself because the earnest limitedness is without living seriousness, so that on the whole it cannot stake much upon its concerns. Hence also it cannot achieve any great works—or highly ephemeral ones.

Moreover, if we wish, we can also regard this present unrest as a process of fermentation through which the spirit strains upward toward a new life out of the putrefaction of the deceased culture, and springs forth again in a rejuvenated shape from under the ashes of the old.<sup>36</sup> To be exact

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it was against the Cartesian philosophy and the universal culture that it expresses that philosophy like every other side of living nature had to seek a means of salvation. The Cartesian philosophy expounded the universally comprehensive dualism in the culture of the recent history of our northwesterly world—a *dualism* of which both the quiet transformation of the public life of men after the decline of all ancient life, and the noisy political and religious revolutions are equally just differently colored outward manifestations. What philosophy has done for its salvation has been greeted with fury where it was pure and openly expressed;<sup>37</sup> where it was more covert and more mixed up, the understanding has mastered it more easily and turned it round again into the earlier dualistic pattern.<sup>38</sup> All the sciences have been founded upon this death, and the time itself has completely killed whatever was still scientific in them, and hence at least subjectively alive.<sup>39</sup> So that if it were not immediately the spirit of philosophy itself which feels the strength of its growing wings all the more when it is submerged and crushed together in this broad sea, the very tedium of the sciences would make the whole flat plain unbearable—this edifice built by an understanding abandoned by reason which at its worst (under the borrowed title either of rational enlightenment, or of moral reason) has even ruined theology in the end.<sup>40</sup> This tedium was bound to at least arouse a yearning of the riches for a spark of fire, for a concentration of living intuition, and, once the cognition of the dead had gone on long enough, for that cognition of the living which is only possible through reason.

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Belief in the possibility of such an actual cognition, and not just in the negative wandering along or the perennial springing up of new forms, is absolutely necessary if the effect to be expected from a critique of them is to be a true one, i.e. not a merely negative destruction of these limited forms, but one that results in a preparation of the way for the arrival of true philosophy. But in any case, even if it can only produce the former effect, it is quite proper that the pretensions of limited forms and the enjoyment of their ephemeral existence should be soured and cut short; and he who can, may well regard criticism as nothing but the ever-turning wheel, dragging down again every instant the shape that the sure had thrown up.<sup>41</sup> It may be that resting self-assured on the broad base of healthy common sense, he simply delights in this objective spectacle of appearance and disappearance, and takes comfort and confirmation from it all the more for his own banishment from philosophy, because by induction *a priori* he regards the philosophy upon which the limited comes to grief as just another limited form. Or again, it may be that he marvels over the coming and going of the forms in their fountain with profound sympathy and interest, grasping it with much effort, and

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then watches their disappearance with a wise eye, and lets himself drift giddily.<sup>42</sup>

When criticism itself wants to maintain a one-sided point of view as valid against others that are likewise one-sided, it becomes partisan polemic. But even the true philosophy cannot protect itself from the outward look of polemic against unphilosophy. For, since it has nothing positive in common with the latter, and cannot engage with it in a critique of the common ground, only the negative activity of criticism is left—together with the construction of the inevitably singular manifestation of unphilosophy. Moreover, since this appearance follows no rule and takes on a different shape again in every individual, the construction of unphilosophy is the construction of the individual in which its manifestation has occurred.<sup>43</sup>—Now if one group has another group facing it in opposition, each of them is called a “party”; but when one of them no longer even seems to amount to anything, then the other ceases to be a party likewise. Hence, on the one hand, each side must find it unbearable to appear merely as a party, and must not spare itself the spontaneously appearing and disappearing semblance which it acquires in the struggle, but must enter into the battle, which is at the same time, the emerging manifestation of the nullity of the opposed group. On the other hand, if a group wants to save itself from the danger of the battle and from the manifestation of its own inward nullity, then in virtue of its declaration that the other side is *only* a party, it has recognized the opposition as something, and has renounced for its own part the universal validity in respect to which, what is actually a party, must not be a party but rather nothing at all. In so doing it has confessed itself to be a party, i.e. to be null and void for the true philosophy.<sup>44</sup>

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## Notes

The marginal page numbers refer to the *Critical Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1802, pp. iii–xxiv.

1. See G. W. F. Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. Rheinisch-Westfälischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1968ff.), vol. 4, p. 190, note 1. More details about this incident will be found in my introduction to the *Difference* essay in G. W. F. Hegel, *Difference between the Systems of Fichte and Schelling*, trans. H. S. Harris and W. Cerf (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977), p. 67, note 10.

2. The relevant passage is cited in Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 4, p. 541. The curriculum vitae is known to us only through Hermann Nohl’s citation of it. Since his time it has been lost. Nohl supplies the date September 1804. (See G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften*, ed. Hermann Nohl [Tübingen:

J. C. B. Mohr, Paul Siebeck, 1907], pp. viii—ix; or G. W. F. Hegel, *Briefe von und an Hegel*, 2nd ed., 4 vols., ed. Johannes Hoffmeister [Hamburg: Felix Meiner 1952], vol. 4, pp. 91–92, and 172.)

3. Cited in Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 4, p. 542. The full text of Schelling's letter to Weisse is in *Aus Schellings Leben*, ed. G. L. Plitt (Leipzig, 1869), vol. 3.

4. See especially Klaus Düsing, "Spekulation und Reflexion," in *Hegel-Studien* 5 (1969), pp. 95–128.

5. I.e. the immediate occasion for critical judgment.

6. "*Urbild der Sache selbst*." In this appearance of *die Sache selbst*, the conceptual context appears to involve a combination of Spinozist and Neoplatonic concepts (the one substance and the Ideas as archetypes).

7. I.e. in all such pure intuitions.

8. "*Das gegenseitige Anerkennen*"—the "struggle for recognition" is a distinctively Hegelian theme that makes its first appearance here. The reader will see as he proceeds that the whole conception of criticism in the present essay depends upon the kind of recognition that is possible between author and critic. In this connection the relation of "philosophy" to "unphilosophy" is the first case of a master-slave dialectic. The awkward implications of this—which are still by no means apparent to Hegel himself as yet—will not escape any careful student of the Hegel's the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

9. "*Unphilosophie*"—the sense of active opposition, rather than merely neutral difference—is best captured by preserving the Latin prefix unchanged. The noun forms are unnatural in both languages; but the echo of the perfectly natural adjective (*unphilosophisch*, unphilosophical) is appropriate.

10. "Construction" is Schelling's preferred technical term for the general method of the identity philosophy. At each level (*Potenz*) of life and knowledge, the Absolute Identity has to be "constructed" as a "totality" that is the complete unfolding of an original unity. Critical "construction" is apparently the complete unfolding of an original nullity (i.e. it is what we would ordinarily call *destruction*). But at the end of the essay Hegel speaks of the "construction" of *individuality*—even in the case of the specific manifestations of "unphilosophy"—as if it were something positive, and not just a negative or destructive demonstration of philosophic nullity.

11. I.e. of the cultured public.

12. I.e. of the philosophical critic.

13. The target of this polemical remark is very probably Jacobi (who summed up Spinoza's theory in a set of short formulas). The whole paragraph deserves to be considered in the light of Hegel's discussion of Jacobi in *Faith and Knowledge* (G. W. F. Hegel, *Faith and Knowledge*, trans. H. S. Harris and W. Cerf [Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977]).

14. This "first case" is the situation of pre-Kantian or "dogmatic" metaphysics. The forms that "possess great authority" are typically those of theology which still has philosophy as its handmaid, or of "faith" dominant over "reason." But the Enlightenment reaction against this dominance involved the same imperfection. Thus, an example of a work which is "not valid as a shape of the Idea," but which

nevertheless deserves philosophical appreciation, is provided by the *Système de la nature* of Baron d'Holbach. (Compare Hegel, *Difference*, p. 177).

15. This is the post-Kantian case, and the paradigm for it is probably Fichte—though Kant himself would fit the bill.

16. F. H. Jacobi, K. L. Reinhold, and G. E. Schulze (against whom Hegel's "Skepticism" essay was directed) are all attacked in Hegel's later contributions to the *Critical Journal of Philosophy* for proceeding in this way.

17. I.e. of philosophy and unphilosophy.

18. Fichte is in the particular hybrid position of being by Hegel's standards a true original genius with a personal philosophy which cannot recognize itself in other systems (compare Hegel, *Difference*, pp. 87–88).

19. Dante is often in Hegel's mind in this period—and it is quite likely that Schelling was responsible for this, since there are no obvious references to Dante in Hegel's papers before the Jena period. The paradigm of Dantesque damnation here (being "forever bound to his own limited position") is probably Jacobi. The philosopher who "seized one position after another, marvelling unstintedly at them all" is unquestionably Reinhold—compare Hegel, *Difference*, pp. 178–79, 191. (For other Dante references, see Hegel, *Faith and Knowledge*, pp. 146–47; and G. W. F. Hegel, *Natural Law*, trans. T. M. Knox [Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1975], pp. 104–5.)

20. It was Fichte who insisted on the absoluteness of his philosophical principle, and left experience to take care of itself. Reinhold laid great stress on the *provisional* character of all philosophizing; he also (apparently) thought of the study of earlier philosophies as being mainly useful as an exercise for our minds. Hegel seems here to be characterizing both of these attitudes (compare Hegel, *Difference*, pp. 86–89, 108–9, 130–31; and Hegel, *Faith and Knowledge*, pp. 156–62).

21. "Common sense" (*gesunde Menschenverstand*) had many spokesmen in this period. But one who spoke for it against a Kantian background, and whose work was criticized by Hegel in this same first issue of the *Critical Journal* under the heading "How the Ordinary Human Understanding Takes Philosophy," was W. T. Krug. In his book *Letters on the Newest Idealism* (1801), Krug took issue with the "systematic" pretensions of the identity philosophy by challenging its proponents to provide "deductions" for a variety of specific objects, including, most notably, his own quill pen. This may very well be what is here referred to as *Unwissenschaftlichkeit*.

22. This question, and the fairly careful exposition of the ambiguity involved in the answer, can be interpreted with considerable plausibility as the reflection of a better understanding of Fichte's views than Hegel had when he wrote the *Difference* essay, a few months before the present introduction was drafted. Hegel's exposition of Fichte in the *Difference* essay is based on his direct study of Fichte's *Science of Knowledge* (*Wissenschaftslehre*) of 1794. Hegel there takes Fichte as a "speculative" thinker (i.e. one who expounds philosophy from an "infinite" or "absolute"—not from a "finite" or human—standpoint). In *Faith and Knowledge* (1802) Hegel abandons this view entirely and criticizes Fichte as a "reflective

philosopher of subjectivity" (where "subjectivity" refers to the same finite, human standpoint that is referred to here). The change is most easily accounted for by assuming that after the publication of the *Difference* essay, Hegel gained access (in some form) to the second version of the *Wissenschaftslehre*. This was the substance of Fichte's last lecture courses at Jena (1798), but it remained in manuscript until after 1930. Students who had attended the course could well have taken Hegel to task for misunderstanding the formal exposition of 1794, and for assuming that the whole position was meant to be seen from the standpoint of the self-positing ego which is placed first on grounds of logical priority only. If they backed up their claim by producing their lecture notes, the sudden switch in Hegel's attitude toward Fichte would be fully accounted for. (One would think that Schelling would know what Fichte was saying in 1798, but if he did, he probably attached little importance to what he would have regarded simply as an experiment in Fichte's mode of exposition. He was always making such experiments himself without any important change in the views expounded. For that matter, Fichte did not change *his* views, either. He was impelled to seek a new mode of exposition in order to demonstrate his loyalty to his Kantian beginnings, and to make clear the difference between his view and the "speculative" theory of his supposed "disciple" Schelling. Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre* of 1798 is the exposition which shows clearly that there was *always* a radical difference between him and Schelling about the question of how philosophy is possible—about "The Possibility of a Form of Philosophy in General," as Schelling put it in the title of one of his earliest essays.)

23. The French translator, B. Fauquet (Hegel, *La relation du scepticisme avec la philosophie; suivi de L'essence de la critique philosophique*, trans. Bernard Fauquet, preface by Jean-Paul Dumont [Paris: J. Vrin, 1972]), believes that this metaphor originates in Rousseau's attack on the pedagogic use of leading reins for children (*Emile*, Book II, trans. Foxley [Everyman], p. 42). Kant took up Rousseau's point in his own *Reflections on Education* (trans. Churton [Ann Arbor, 1960], section 41, pp. 40–41); but then went on to use the image metaphorically with respect to the human faculty of judgment generally in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, B174. Hegel, like Kant, admired Rousseau and read him carefully. But it is Kant—if anyone—who has suggested this metaphor to him.

24. The great proponent of the "hypothetical" and "problematic" starting point was Reinhold. But if the hypothesis in note 20 is correct, Hegel may have been uncertain whether Fichte's actual starting point was to be regarded as problematic (in the Kantian sense) or as certain (in the Cartesian sense). There is this sort of ambiguity, I think, about the "I" of Fichte's *The Vocation of Man*. So Hegel may here be considering Reinhold and Fichte together, or Reinhold alone—or, of course, there may be still other theorists in his mind either specifically or additionally. The important points to notice are (i) he claims here that it makes no difference in the end whether the starting point is certain or problematic; (ii) that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* begins with a "self" whose status is ontologically ambiguous in just this way—but Hegel also insists that "we" who observe the "phenomenology of the Spirit" must be at home with the Absolute from the start.

25. This opposition is unmistakably Fichtean. It is basic to Hegel's exposition of Fichte in the *Difference* essay.

26. "*Dasjenige, das sie denkt.*" The word "*sie*," which refers to "*die Idee*," can be either the subject or the object of *denken* here; and I believe that the ambiguity is deliberate. That the Infinite Idea "thinks" all finite reality, and in particular it is the "pure ego" which thinks the finite ego, expresses the standpoint of "speculative" philosophy. That the finite reasoner "thinks" the infinite Idea of reason—and finds himself involved in dialectical contradiction when he seeks to pass from "thinking" to "cognition"—expresses the "reflective" standpoint of Kant and Fichte. The French translator chooses the speculative interpretation here. But I think that the context requires rather the reflective one. We are, however, meant to be conscious of the "true" (speculative) interpretation.

27. This clause indicates that Hegel means his discussion to embrace the theories of Reinhold, Jacobi, and other "reflective" philosophers of finite experience generally. But the Idea which is "only an Idea" is the Kantian "Idea of Reason." So there can be no question that his principal targets are Kant and Fichte.

28. The antithesis of thought and being is the ultimate dualism which the philosophy of identity seeks to overcome. This is the opposition that is basic to the "reflective philosophy of subjectivity" (in which thinking is regarded as a mere "reflection" of "being"). (See further the next note.)

29. "*Reflexionskultur.*" There is a deliberate echo here from the Book of Exodus. Kant was often thought of as a philosophical Moses. But for the Identity theorists, the conception of thought as a mere "reflection" of being was the philosophical "land of Egypt" or "house of bondage." Hegel's longest and most important critical essay, *Faith and Knowledge*, aimed to show that Kant, Jacobi, and even Fichte were all "reflective philosophers of [finite] subjectivity." The whole of that essay forms an extended commentary on the present passage.

30. This is the first occurrence of the concept of a "*verkehrte Welt*" in Hegel's work. In view of the way in which the "inverted world" appears in the *Phenomenology* as part of the dialectic of the understanding, it is important to note that it appeared first as the crucial contrast between "healthy human understanding" and "reason." There is no contradiction here, since the dialectic of understanding in the *Phenomenology* is the process by which ordinary perceptual consciousness becomes philosophical in the first instance. Thus, the present passage illustrates how important the seemingly absurd byplay of the *Phenomenology* really is. Also it shows both the limited justification and the ultimate injustice (from Hegel's point of view) of Engels' complaint that Absolute Idealism turns the world upon its head. According to Hegel, this is a necessary result of Kant's critical philosophy, but the further transition from critical understanding to reason turns things the right way up again. The Marxist critique of Hegel's Idealism ascribes to it the "reflective" opposition to "reality" which is the hallmark of the "subjective" standpoint which it set out from the first to overcome (but which was, by the same token, essential to its own genesis).

31. The insistence that philosophy is essentially esoteric belongs to Schelling more than to Hegel at this period. At the time of his arrival in Jena, Hegel was preoccupied by the problem of how his philosophical ideals could be made

"influential in the life of men." Aristotle's response to Alexander (that a philosophy may be at once published and yet still unpublished) represents the way in which he reconciled this concern of his own with his acceptance of Schelling's position. Hegel agreed that philosophy could not be expressed in a "popular" form because of its opposition to the standpoint of the understanding, and its dialectical treatment of the principles of common sense. But he insists that the *Volk* can "rise to philosophy" nevertheless. This contradicts Schelling's more rigorously aristocratic view that philosophy is *für sich* antipathetic to the vulgar. The *Phenomenology* was the eventual outcome of Hegel's effort to raise general cultural consciousness to the level of philosophy. It would, perhaps, be generally agreed that this book is a paradigm case of a philosophy that remained unpublished in its publication.

The spurious correspondence of Aristotle and Alexander is cited and appealed to by Plutarch in his "Life of Alexander," chapter 7; compare Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae*, XX, 5.

32. The term "popular philosophy" was apparently coined (in Germany) by Moses Mendelssohn (and he was the most notable member of the group of Enlightened thinkers in Berlin, who set out to write philosophy in the plain and simple manner of the French *philosophes*). But Hegel (rightly, I think) sees that the kinship of these German "Enlighteners" is with Leibniz's *Theodicy* rather than with Voltaire's *Candide*. Among those "trained for the job nowadays" Hegel certainly included Bardili (called by Fichte a "formula philosopher") and Krug—and probably Reinhold himself.

33. "*Ideal*" is Kant's name for the perfect exemplification of an *Idee*. "*Humanität*" is an ideal with which Herder made great play. Hölderlin and Hegel both took it over from Herder, and remained much attached to it even in the last years of the eighteenth century, at a time when Schelling was openly contemptuous about it as being mere empty rhetoric. Hegel himself shows contempt for Herder's rhetoric in *Faith and Knowledge* (1802). Nevertheless, I think that this example stems from Schelling.

34. Hegel regarded Fichte's *The Vocation of Man* as belonging to this genre—and indeed the affinity with Leibniz's *Theodicy* is here obvious enough. *The Vocation of Man* is perhaps the clearest instance of "the seemingly opposite case"—see especially *Faith and Knowledge*, pp. 177–87. The same tendency is present in Kant, according to Hegel, *Faith and Knowledge*, pp. 94–95.

35. The true seriousness of "play" is insisted upon for the first time in Schiller's *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man* (1795). The present passage testifies to the lasting importance of this work in Hegel's mind. The "playfulness" of the *Phenomenology* has certainly not been ignored, but it has not generally received the "serious" interpretation that it deserves.

36. The sense that 1789 was the dawn of a new age to which Germany must give its philosophical expression dominated Hegel's mind from 1793 onward. The concluding pages of his preface to the *Phenomenology* (the last pages of the book to be written) express this consciousness very explicitly. (The remarks here about the relation of the new idealism to Cartesian rationalism should be compared with Hegel, *Difference*, pp. 91–93.)



37. The reference here is probably to the general reputation of Spinoza as a "notorious atheist."

38. This may well be a reference to the way that Wolff's scholastic system was derived from Leibniz.

39. The evil genius responsible for the "death" of living nature into universal mechanism was Newton.

40. The currents of French Deism, Wolff's eudaemonism, and the "religion of Reason" in Kant and Fichte appear to be lumped together in this passage. Compare Hegel, *Difference*, pp. 89–90, 193–95; and Hegel, *Faith and Knowledge*, pp. 177–78.

41. Hegel is now considering the skeptical followers of the critical philosophy, especially G. E. Schulze ("Aenesidemus").

42. Reinhold is the most notable example, but not the only one, of a philosopher who was bowled over by each new philosophical fashion in turn.

43. The relation of this historical "construction" to the method of "construction" in the system of identity itself is by no means clear (see note 13 above). But the project of a critical "construction" of each form of *unphilosophy* is certainly an important moment in the genesis of the *Phenomenology*, in which a series of quite unphilosophical individualities are "constructed" in a way which shows that "appearance" does not follow a rule after all. By this means, too, the opposition between philosophy and the unphilosophical is overcome so that although the movement toward the "true philosophy" is a "highway of despair," it is not a reduction of the unphilosophical forms to a mere nullity.

44. This is perhaps the first appearance of the "life and death struggle" in Hegel's thought. We should note that it is a struggle for *recognition*, but that the essentially equal and reciprocal character of effective recognition is not yet recognized. The struggle between philosophy and unphilosophy aims at the establishment of the "lordship" of the former and the "bondage" of the latter. Thus the analysis of "lordship and bondage" in the *Phenomenology* should be seen as a criticism of the inadequacy of the *aristocratic* position adopted here (see note 8 above).

# How the Ordinary Human Understanding Takes Philosophy (as Displayed in the Works of Mr. Krug)

Translated by H. S. Harris

Wilhelm Traugott Krug was born, like Hegel himself, in 1770. He was not an important thinker, and there are only two reasons—as far as I can see—why he deserves a place in the scholarly footnotes of the history of German Idealism. First, the challenge he issued that the new idealism should “deduce his pen”—which Hegel waxes so ironical about in this review—stuck in Hegel’s mind. It is clear that he always regarded the demand as illegitimate; but in the context of the identity philosophy he could not clearly show what was wrong with it. The immediate response that he gives is important because it shows us how significant the “ontological argument” was for the new idealism from the very beginning. For this reason alone, Hegel’s critical review of Krug deserves our careful attention. But the definitive answer to Krug’s challenge comes only in the first chapter of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.<sup>1</sup> As Aristotle had already laid down, philosophical science is not concerned with the knowledge of singulars. But Hegel could only show the relation of “science” to “experience” properly by writing his “science of the experience of consciousness.” Even in the Berlin years, he recurred to Krug’s challenge as the irritant that forced him to deal with this problem.<sup>2</sup> So it is right to see this review of Krug as an important moment in the evolution of Hegel’s mature system.

Second, when Kant died in 1804, the philosophical faculty at the University of Königsberg elected Krug to Kant’s chair of logic and metaphysics. This is interesting because it reflects and symbolizes the aged Kant’s own

attitude toward his “idealistic” followers. Krug was outwardly a “Kantian,” rather than an adherent of the Scottish philosophy of common sense. But, as the title of Hegel’s essay suggests, Krug’s work showed how the “common human understanding” can “take philosophy” upon itself as a disguise. The early followers of Thomas Reid, James Oswald, and James Beattie in Germany were mainly hostile to Kant (and he to them). This was only natural, since, as Manfred Kuehn remarks, “If Scottish common sense had already succeeded in showing what Kant wanted to show, then Kant’s difficult critical philosophy was really superfluous.”<sup>3</sup> But when he was faced with the work of declared “followers” like Jakob Sigismund Beck and Fichte—not to speak of Schelling, who never acknowledged that he followed anyone—Kant preferred to align himself with the “popular philosophy” which he had effectively vanquished and driven from the field. In his “open letter” of August 7, 1799, he declared:

Since some reviewers maintain that the *Critique* is not to be taken literally in what it says about sensibility and that anyone who wants to understand the *Critique* must first master the requisite “standpoint” (or Beck or Fichte) because Kant’s precise words, like Aristotle’s, will kill the mind, I therefore declare again that the *Critique* is to be understood in accordance with the letter, and is to be understood exclusively from the point of view of common sense, which only needs to be sufficiently cultivated for such abstract investigations.<sup>4</sup>

It was ironically appropriate therefore that his successor was someone who had already been exposed (by the successors whom he rejected) as a thinker who was merely dressing up common sense in the stage costume of his “transcendental synthetism.”

In 1809 Krug became professor of philosophy at the University of Leipzig. Hegel did not live to see the *Allgemeines Handwörterbuch der philosophischen Wissenschaften nebst ihrer Literatur und Geschichte* (*Universal Dictionary of the Philosophical Sciences along with Their Literature and History*) that Krug published there in six volumes between 1832 and 1838, but the reader of Hegel’s review will be amused to note that in the end the philosophical literature and its “*Sachregister*” (“topical index”) filled almost all of the promised volumes! Krug himself died in 1842.

## How the Ordinary Human Understanding Takes Philosophy (as Displayed in the Works of Mr. Krug)

- i. *Letters on the Science of Knowledge. Together with a Treatise on the Philosophical Definition of Religious Faith Essayed by the Science of Knowledge.* Leipzig, Roch and Co., 1800.
- ii. *Letters on the Newest Idealism. A Continuation of the "Letters on the Science of Knowledge."* Leipzig, H. Muller's Bookshop, 1801.
- iii. *Outline of a New Organon of Philosophy, or Essay on the Principles of Philosophical Cognition,* by Wilh. Traugott Krug, Member of the Philosophical Faculty at Wittenberg. τι πσωτον ἐτπν του φιλοτοφουντοζ;—ἀποβαλειν οἴησιν.<sup>5</sup> Arrian. Meissen and Lübben, K. F. W. Erbstein, 1801.

Mr. Krug's philosophical efforts distribute themselves naturally into two categories; one group is polemically directed against transcendental idealism, the other is concerned with his own philosophical convictions (as Krug himself calls them).

p. 92 So far as his polemical campaign is concerned, the standpoint that Mr. Krug adopts in his opposition to the *Science of Knowledge*<sup>6</sup> is to be the standpoint of skepticism (I, p. 5, Preface) so that, as befits the skeptical stance, Mr. Krug argues from within the science of knowledge and not from his own convictions. (The *Letters on Transcendental Idealism*<sup>7</sup> and especially the *Organon* where the author expounds his own convictions, offer him an occasion to tell us why he does not argue from his own standpoint.) Mr. Krug intends his "letters" to be the introduction for a scientific inquiry. With respect to his subjective manner of expression, it is a true delight to hear the author's sobriety, equity and fair dealing speak out: "The *Science of Knowledge*," he says "has so far been priggish enough, to be sure, and in very large measure has set its opponents right in a somewhat ungentle tone of voice. It is not to be denied, however, that in many instances it has only availed itself of the right to take fair revenge, and if in doing this, it has overstepped the bounds of that right now and again, this may perhaps arise more from the total commitment with which it marches into battle, than from a naturally hostile disposition. The author has taken no part in this conflict until now, because he took it as his duty to test any system rather carefully on its own account, before he issues the result of the test to the public."<sup>8</sup> With the nobly benevolent consciousness of this duty well done, he now treats the *Science of Knowledge* "with the respect due to it; he has set solid grounds against it, not spiteful inferences and unless he is wholly mistaken in his opponents, he need fear no contrasting treatment himself; for he has too good an opinion of them not to expect to be treated in quite

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a different way than, etc. *But if* he should find that he was deceived in this hope of his, then he *would give up his investigations.*"<sup>9</sup> The right-minded and respectable reason for this is "because it is *but seldom* that *anything sensible* emerges from a literary feud that is pursued with passionate heat, and in the end only a *scandal* is created for the audience which *brings both science itself* and its promoters (among whom Mr. Krug reckons himself as well) *into public disrepute.*"

In the first letter Mr. Krug tells us what he finds worthy of approval in transcendental idealism. He declares on p. 14 that he does not find the ego by any means *so ridiculous* or *so unthinkable* as many people seem to find it. "For what is irrational," he asks, "what is there that could make *an intelligent man laugh, or even just smile*, if I call what I think of through *Abstraktion* (Mr. Krug's own spelling) from everything that does not pertain to myself simply ego?" *Also he "finds the demand very reasonable:* 'Attend to yourself. Turn your gaze away from everything that surrounds you, and into your inwardness.'<sup>10</sup> *Furthermore he has nothing against, etc., and "finally he cannot regard idealism as a philosophical theory to be so dangerous* as it seems to be considered by many people"<sup>11</sup> In these respects he does not see anything objectionable in transcendental *Idealisme* (Mr. Krug declines "ism" words thus: *dem Organisme, dem Dogmatisme*; and in the genitive, *des Idealismes, des Organismes, des Realismes*, etc.).<sup>12</sup> *"But whether it does not have weaknesses in other respects* the sequel will show."<sup>13</sup>

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What Mr. Krug gives his seal of approval to in transcendental idealism constitutes the content of the first letter; but this self-conceited and self-satisfied tone of righteousness and platitude, and this tediousness of manner prevails throughout.

But what Mr. Krug brings up against the science of knowledge, and what he calls on p. 79 a *thorough testing* extends from p. 24 to p. 52. For in the second letter he only deals with idealism, dogmatism, and realism nominally: "The main question does not depend upon names . . . but through the opposition set up with dogmatism each and every opponent of the science of knowledge is *to some extent* condemned in advance, and for that reason alone all access to the spirit of impartial testing—which is *so often* and so expressly asked for on its behalf *nevertheless*—is, *if not* quite prevented, *at the least* impeded."<sup>14</sup> To stave off any such peril Mr. Krug divides dogmatism in its material aspect into idealism (which denies the reality of the external world) and realism (if it *concedes* and *asserts* this reality). But it is precisely transcendental idealism that is left out in this division; for transcendental idealism does not just concede—it is not concessions that are at issue between philosophical systems—but asserts the reality of the external world, just as much as its ideality; and the

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theoretical part of the *Science of Knowledge* is concerned with nothing else but a deduction of the reality of the external world.

The detailed examination (I, pp. 24–52) of the *Science of Knowledge* is directed against one single point. Specifically, Mr. Krug cannot tolerate the being bounded of the ego: The ego is to *bound* itself then, “and that not *freely and arbitrarily* (what a fine pairing!) but *in accordance with an immanent law of its own essence*”;<sup>15</sup> and yet the basis for believing in transcendental idealism is the interest in independence; and I, too, says Mr. Krug, along *with* the friend to whom I am addressing these letters *and with* the author of the *Science of Knowledge*, have a great interest in *my own* independence. That Fichte has associated himself with Mr. Krug and his friend as one who shares the interest in Mr. Krug’s independence (as Mr. Krug tells us here) has not been publicly acknowledged before. But it makes no difference at all to the interest in Mr. Krug’s independence, whether the ego necessarily acts as it does through its outward or through its inward nature. Mr. Krug compares the ego that acts from inward natural necessity with the ego that gets determined through a nature outside us thus: the latter is like a simple flute that a musician plays, the former like a mechanical flute that produces harmonious sounds *all by itself*.<sup>16</sup>

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“As a result it is *also* clear enough, *of course*, that the moral dutifulness of the idealistic way of thinking is not such a serious matter as all that”;<sup>17</sup> a good will and a moral disposition can be bound up with any philosophical theory. (On the other hand, the anthropomorphism of the imagination in polytheism, is for him such awful abomination that, as he declares on p. 112, it is quite incompatible with morality.) Never mind that “the interest of independence is not adequately satisfied by transcendental idealism; for it involves an uncommonly important advance for the *speculative* interest of reason in any case. Here everything is radiant and clear, the ego lets everything arise before its eyes, and sees it all”;<sup>18</sup> but the main problem is still not solved. For Mr. Krug sees “two men, one a European, the other a Moor, and he feels compelled to represent the one to himself with white skin, and the other with black; or he might save one man from a perilous situation, but the torrents still rage, and the flames still blaze, etc.”<sup>19</sup> The *Science of Knowledge* stays stuck in the incomprehensibility of the boundaries, just as “in *all likelihood all philosophy*.”<sup>20</sup>

Mr. Krug closes the last letter (in which he equitably and sensibly opines about the consistency or inconsistency of the Kantian system with the *Science of Knowledge* that it is best to refrain from judgement on this head altogether), with the Latin tag: *ignavum, fucos, pecus a praesepibus arce*.<sup>21</sup> This is certainly apposite to a great deal that Mr. Krug was not thinking about when he wrote it out.

The polemical part of the *Letters on the Newest Idealism*—which is directed against Schelling's system of transcendental philosophy—is just the same in content. But the author does say in his Preface that “with respect to the *public* exposition of his own convictions he has here gone one step further.”<sup>22</sup>

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It must also be reckoned as part of this public exposition that Mr. Krug voices his objections more boldly in this case and demonstrates unforgivable inconsistencies, palpable contradictions, *nonsense* and so forth in Schelling's system—though how Mr. Krug can call him “our transcendental idealist” is past all finding out.

Some light seems to have dawned for Mr. Krug about the original *limitedness*, from the construction of the ego's modes of action out of opposite activities, or from the original difference; and he is no longer forthcoming about the absolute necessity of positing reason as subject and object, and hence the necessity of positing boundedness. But he now clings all the more tightly to the *determinacy*, which will be admitted as the inexplicable and incomprehensible thing in philosophy.

*In the first place* he finds a contradiction in the fact that nothing is to be presupposed in philosophy at all, and yet the Absolute  $A = A$  is presupposed as absolute identity, and as difference, from which all boundedness is constructed.<sup>23</sup>

This contradiction is just the one which the common understanding always finds in philosophy. The common understanding posits the Absolute on exactly the same level with the finite, and extends the range of the requirements that are made in respect of the finite to the Absolute. Thus it is required in philosophy, that nothing shall be established without proof; the common understanding at once discovers the inconsistency that has been committed, it sees that the Absolute has not been proved; the being of the Absolute is posited immediately with its idea, but the common understanding is quite up to objecting that we can very easily think of something, form an idea of something, without there being any necessity on that account that the thing we have thought of should straightaway have any existence, and so on. Presumably Mr. Krug will object to geometry that it is not an internally complete science (as it claims to be) since it certainly does not prove the existence of an infinite space, though it draws its lines in that space. —Or does Mr. Krug take God or the Absolute to be the kind of hypothesis for which philosophy makes itself responsible, just as one theory of physics permits itself the hypothesis of an empty space, a magnetic or electrical matter and so on, in place of which another physical theory can posit still other hypotheses?

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The *second* inconsistency that strikes Mr. Krug is that a promise is given that the whole system of our presentations will be deduced; and although he has himself already found a passage in the *Transcendental*

p. 99 *Idealism* in which the sense of this promise is explicitly clarified,<sup>24</sup> still he cannot help altogether forgetting again that it is philosophy we are talking about here. He cannot help understanding the question like the most vulgar man in the street and demanding that every dog and cat shall be deduced—yes and why not his own pen too.<sup>25</sup> And since this does not come to pass he thinks he must remind his friend about the mountain laboring and the tiny wee mouse coming forth: *one ought not to have* given the impression that one was going to deduce the whole system of presentations.<sup>26</sup>

It is comical to see how Mr. Krug is nonetheless gracious enough not to want to take the philosopher who puts on the air of being a master in philosophy, quite strictly at his word. Instead he asks just for *some small example*, just a deduction of one definite presentation, e.g., of the Moon with all its characteristics or of a rose, a horse, a dog, or of wood, iron, clay, an oak tree, or even just of his pen.<sup>27</sup> It looks as if Mr. Krug wants to make the problems easy for the idealists, when he makes these demands; for he only sets them the task of deducing one subordinate point in the solar system (the Moon)—or as something even easier still by a lot, his own pen. So Mr. Krug does not comprehend then, that the determinacies which cannot be comprehended within transcendental idealism, belong—so far as they are a proper topic of philosophical discussion at all—as Mr. Krug's pen is *not*—to the philosophy of nature. He seems not to know anything about the distinction between natural philosophy and transcendental idealism; but in natural philosophy he can find a *Dedukzion* (the meaning of the word matters no more here than its spelling!) of one of the things that he proposes, to wit, of *iron*. But has Mr. Krug so little conception of what philosophical construction is, as to suppose that the Moon could be comprehended apart from the solar system as a whole, and has he such a trivial impression of the solar system that he does not see that cognition of this system is the highest and most sublime task of reason? If Mr. Krug had even the vaguest notion of the importance of this determinate task, how could it occur to him to demand from philosophy the deduction of his pen? Not to mention the task that touches the interest of philosophy most nearly at the present moment: to put God back again at the peak of philosophy, absolutely prior to all else as the one and only ground of everything, the unique *principium essendi* and *cognoscendi*, after all this time in which he has been put *beside* other finite things, or put off right to the end as a postulate that springs from an absolute finitude. A dog, an oak, a horse, a reed are higher things to be sure (like a Moses, an Alexander, Cyrus, Jesus and so on);<sup>28</sup> and both of the series of organic forms [*Organisationen*] are more germane to philosophy than Mr. Krug's pen and the philosophical works that it writes. The philosophy of nature

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gives him the clue regarding how he has to comprehend such organic forms as an oak, a rose, a dog or cat; and if he has the desire and the urge to contract his own human individuality to the vital level of a rose or a dog in order to comprehend their living being and grasp it completely, then he may make the attempt, but he cannot expect others to do it. It would be better for him to try to expand his own essence to the great individualities of a Cyrus, a Moses, an Alexander, or a Jesus etc., or even just to that of the great orator Cicero; for then he cannot fail to comprehend their necessity, and to regard these singular men, along with the sequence of the manifestations of the world-spirit that we call history as capable of a construction. But to this end he must completely renounce the demand for a deduction of his pen, and not trouble his head any more about idealism's ignorance in such matters.

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Mr. Krug believes he has made an extremely good find with this demand of his for the deduction of something determined in this way. He considers that with this he is fully equipped against idealism, and he opines that through the solution of this problem "the newest idealism could be securely established against all further objections." He, at least, would have no hesitation in underwriting the whole system straightaway once he has a deduced pen to write with. But he is "also convinced in advance that no idealist in the world will even make an attempt" at the deduction.<sup>29</sup>

To the end that we may really understand his objection in the proper way he displays *samples* of his common sense (in II, pp. 34 ff.) in a series of naive problems which transcendental idealism will hardly be capable of resolving. These problems are such things as the fact that we are forced to represent to ourselves that we were born at a specific time, that we die at a specific time, that we even get news daily through the newspapers about what happens in the world in places where we are not, and so on. That if the organism is a product of intelligence, one cannot see how investigators can come upon regions where they discover new plants, or why they are forced to journey all over the earth, and so on; or again one cannot see how intelligence could produce someone born blind, or sickness and death.<sup>30</sup> In short it is quite stupid not to count oneself among the drones, and yet to talk purely in this tone of the most vulgar common sense. —Mr. Krug declares that "no false shame shall keep him from advancing his objections, for he is sincerely seeking the truth. Because he quite simply cannot conceive an activity or a doing, without a being, it may be (says he) that I am *ipso facto* absolutely incapable of philosophizing, but I cannot help the fact that that is the case, and I would rather confess my incapacity than pretend to a conviction that I do not have."<sup>31</sup> But the alternative does not really exist of either pretending or else spilling

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p. 103 one's common sense all over philosophy. — Apart from this wide-ranging contradiction that Mr. Krug discovers (that everything is supposed to be deduced in transcendental idealism yet the dog and the horse do not get deduced) he finds some other contradictions too, by putting together specific passages from the system where the discussion is conducted from quite distinct points of view. Then he cries out against the contradiction in the words of the Jews (as in II, p. 90): "What need have we of further witness that *our* system is a dogmatic transcendent idealism? For indeed we have heard it from the system's own mouth."<sup>32</sup> In one of the passages that Mr. Krug has picked out the discussion concerns specifically the original limitedness (i.e. the fact that the ego posits itself in opposition as subject and as object). In this connection, it is remarked that any system which sublated this ground would be a dogmatic transcendent idealism.<sup>33</sup> The other passage concerns the epoch in the development of self-consciousness in which the subjective and the objective are divided for the ego itself. For this point of division, the limit lies neither in the ego (which is now defined as subjective) nor yet in the thing. It lies nowhere (this is expressly said); it simply is because it is. It will appear as strictly contingent, both in connection with the ego, and in connection with the thing.<sup>34</sup> Mr. Krug explains this thus: there is no ground of limitation at all.

From such pitiable things as this it is obvious that Mr. Krug is not even superficially acquainted with the system which he declared it was his duty to try out thoroughly before he ventured to give a public judgment upon it. Otherwise, once he was aware that consciousness was to be constructed, he would know in advance without hunting around for a particular passage, that an act of the intelligence must occur, in which the limit appears to be contingent (or without a ground) for the ego and the thing.

p. 104 After this demonstration of Mr. Krug's way of testing things, it remains to mention that at the end of the *Letters on the Science of Knowledge* (from p. 61 to the end) there is a treatise on religious faith; and this has both an appendix and a further addition.<sup>35</sup> All of it together is concerned with Fichte's essays on religion. Since Mr. Krug explicitly declares here that in this inquiry he means to leave aside the transcendental standpoint (which is the only one proper for the philosopher as such) completely,<sup>36</sup> we have nothing whatsoever to say about these effusions of the heart and the common understanding. Without saying so, Mr. Krug leaves the transcendental standpoint out everywhere, and we find that in his detailed testing of it he has not talked about it at all. His outbursts of fiery zeal against the pagans are particularly emphatic. Their utterly crude superstition is directly contrary to the religion of conversion to the good life.<sup>37</sup> These outbreaks are directed against the assertion in one of the essays in the *Philosophical Journal* that religion is just as consistent with

polytheism or anthropomorphism as with other views.<sup>38</sup> In Mr. Krug's opinion there is a certain hardihood in this that does not befit the seriousness of the problem. "Look what risky adventures, even a really good head can be misled into through the ambition to produce brilliant paradoxes," he exclaims.<sup>39</sup>

As for Mr. Krug's *own convictions*, he asks us to "test them with special care since he is concerned precisely with a new *philosophy of foundations*, so that a really careful trial *might perhaps be quite appropriate*."<sup>40</sup> Mr. Krug first begins to pour forth these convictions in the *Letters on Transcendental Idealism* and the *Organon* (in Latin: *urceus exit*,<sup>41</sup> "the jug pours it out"). But the great pot that holds them properly is to be a work in eight volumes on philosophy as a whole, seven of them for the contents and one for the topical index.<sup>42</sup> Mr. Krug is hanging out the sketch of the *Organon* as a garland for it. In order to get hold of these convictions right at their center, let us take up what Mr. Krug calls his system, or the main plank in those convictions of his. He holds that in our consciousness there is an original transcendental synthesis between the real and the ideal (*Organon*, p. 75); and he "calls the system that recognizes without wanting to explain it (because in order to do that one must begin either from one side or from the other and must thereby sublate the synthesis) 'transcendental synthetism.' His system is thus an indivisible union of transcendental realism and transcendental idealism." These are expressions that do not sound bad. But we still have to investigate just how Mr. Krug really understands that synthesis of the real and the ideal; for the word "synthesis" does not constitute the thing itself. Now according to the *Organon* (p. 25) the original synthesis is consciousness; but consciousness is not the ego, rather it is *in* the ego.

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Let us listen further to Mr. Krug about the ego: he is generally a warm patron of the ego against the opponents of the science of knowledge, "he has nothing against the ego as the starting point of philosophy; all the jesting about it is petty and tasteless," etc.<sup>43</sup> Like Fichte he makes the ego into the real first principle of cognition;<sup>44</sup> he tells us how transcendental idealism is grounded on the independence of the ego, *or of reason*, and that he has a real concern for this independence.<sup>45</sup> In Mr. Krug's work, however, the ego is separated from reason; only in this story does the one term occur as an explanation for the other. Elsewhere in the three works before us, even the word "reason" is not employed by Mr. Krug—except that in the *Letters on the Science of Knowledge* it occurs a few times in the genitive (or on p. 45 in a similar sense).<sup>46</sup> (We are pointing this out to Mr. Krug, lest it should come to pass in the seven volumes of the philosophical sciences that reason either does not occur at all, or only in the genitive, so that in the fact-index in the eighth volume this "fact" is not to be found.) Mr. Krug has sublated this collocation of "the ego or reason," because

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reason cannot be made into a thing; that the ego is a thing, on the other hand, is one of the basic principles of this synthetism, and one which he proves often and earnestly. Thus (*Letters on Transcendental Idealism*, p. 80) "where we *perceive* as action," we *must* "also assume an agent, that is we must posit a subject with a certain reality, from whom the action proceeds *as it were*; or in the *Organon*: there is an ego, the subject of the activity exists, "*because* actual activity without a subject who acts is not thinkable—as *his own* consciousness *will teach anyone*" (Mr. Krug asserts) "*as soon as he will but try to think of something in that way.*"<sup>47</sup> That the *principium essendi* of cognition, or its real principle, is a cognizing subject, for this Mr. Krug gives a kind of proof; "*for,*" says he, "were there no such subject *there*, then there would be no cognition there either."<sup>48</sup>

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Well now, it is in this *thing* that consciousness is, and this consciousness is an infinite collection of facts. Among them Mr. Krug lists a principle of contradiction, a certain practical principle (namely the ethical law), and a man named Alexander too, who was a great hero, a man named Cicero who was a great orator, and an infinite array of things of that sort. In the *Organon* (p. 14) they are said to be plain facts that are none of them contained in the proposition "Ego = Ego" or "A = A," and the manifold actual facts of consciousness. Those infinitely manifold actual facts of consciousness do indeed all lie within the ego, into which they enter in an incomprehensible way, but chaotically of course, and without any unity or order: "everything gets mixed with everything else, / like mouse-dirt and coriander."<sup>49</sup>

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Then a reason in the genitive makes its entrance as well, introducing a formal unity (III, pp. 76–77), putting the muddle in order, and binding it down by "subordinating it under a certain principle as its point of union. This is not to be taken to mean that all the singular cognitions could or should be inferred from the point of union as far as their *content* is concerned. Rather the singular cognitions in their multiplicity should be connected with it as a certain unity: *just as* every element in a vaulted roof is connected with the keystone as the last and highest point of union, even though this point cannot at the same time contain the foundation of the vaulting within itself." And "*perhaps,*" opines Mr. Krug "this is just what the *Science of Knowledge* had in mind, when it set up the proposition 'Ego = Ego' at the apex of its inquiries," and this "A = A" should be taken as "a symbolic displaying of that harmony, the supreme formal principle of philosophy, but one which does, of course, presuppose other material principles, actual facts of consciousness grasped in concepts, and set forth in propositions."<sup>50</sup> That "perhaps" does honor to the prudence of Mr. Krug, for it is certain that he would not want to assert this positively.

We see now too that when Mr. Krug attacked transcendental idealism on account of the original boundedness, it was not his concern to liberate from being bounded, but rather to find herein a license for the infinite multitude of boundaries in empirical consciousness, and to prove that the system of transcendental idealism is not one whit better than his “synthetism” which posits an infinite multitude of boundaries for empirical consciousness. Mr. Krug, “for his part, holds in this connection, that it does not in any way dishonor the philosophers, to admit right from the start, that there are things which are too high for any human wisdom” (*Letters on the Newest Idealism*); “to want to go outside of his consciousness, or beyond and above it, seems “to Krug,” to amount exactly to sublating his consciousness, while yet wanting to retain it in that very same act by which it is sublated.”<sup>51</sup> But what else does Mr. Krug mean by philosophical reflection, if not the sublation of consciousness and its retention, both together in one and the same act?

Mr. Krug believes he has every right to make the empirical consciousness into the first principle of his speculation; and every right to assume too, that whatever he finds in his own empirical consciousness, and whatever he must think within it, is perfectly true; he must think of the ego as a thing, and therefore it is a thing. We “posit as actual whatever we must think as a necessary addition; that is how physicists and mathematicians have proceeded in their own field ever since men began to think” (II, p. 82), “and no one has taxed thereabout this procedure to this day”; indeed transcendental idealism proceeds thus itself “in a hundred places!” “Why then are its opponents not allowed to do the same?” *ego homuncio non fecerim?*<sup>52</sup> But Mr. Krug is forgetting that when mathematics, physics and idealism ask what has to be thought, they do not turn to the empirical consciousness in which the dogs and cats, Mr. Krug’s pens, the great orator Cicero, and so on, carry on their affairs. When one uses this model, the “synthetism” of Mr. Krug has to be thought of as follows: One forms the image of a Krug jug in which Reinhold’s pure-sweet water, beer that went flat in Kant’s corner, enlightening syrup (“Berlin” brand) and other similar ingredients that just happen to be around, are contained as “actual facts”; the jug is the synthetic bond of all these—(= ego). Now someone comes in and introduces a unity throughout all that muddle, separating the things, by smelling and tasting them one after the other (or doing whatever is appropriate); but more especially he hears from others what has come into fashion among them, and finally he makes a report of it all. This, then, is the formal unity or philosophical consciousness.

This is the essence of the Krug-jug “synthetism”; and though it lies before us quite plain and undisguised, it is still none too easy to find

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it out because this system contains all the others at once within it (just as a true philosophical system must do). Since being and thinking are united within the empirical consciousness in an incomprehensible way, so that a just, sober and modest philosophy ought not to go beyond this experience, Mr. Krug regards his system as being at one with that of Jacobi;<sup>53</sup> the Kantian *a priori* concepts he does not lack; and as we have seen, he is also a warm patron of the ego of idealism.

p. 111 Furthermore, with respect to the historical aspect of what is most distinctive in this system, we are inescapably reminded of the earlier quite similar system of Mr. Schmid (*Philosophical Journal*, 1795, Part 10): The reviewer of Krug's *Organon* in the *Jena Literary Times* has already remarked on this. One would never have thought that after the inventor of this system himself had abandoned any attempt to work it out in detail, it would again be taken up by someone else after he had rejected it. What Fichte foretold at the time (*Philosophical Journal*, 1795, Part 12) has come true completely: "this discovery will undoubtedly be made use of; but it is to be hoped that those who use it will accord the honor of the invention to its true inventor (or as he prefers to say, the honor of the finding); and that they will behave better toward him than toward another famous philosophical author whose writings are the original fountain of their Kantianism, yet to whom but few of them show the gratitude that they ought to."<sup>54</sup> —Toward Reinhold Mr. Krug is not entirely guilty of this fault of ingratitude, but still he is a long way from doing full justice to him. On p. 33 of the *Organon* Krug says that "when the *Theory* set up consciousness as the foundation of philosophical cognition it was by no means so far removed from the truth, as many of its critics have claimed." But it was only mistaken on one point (Mr. Krug has hit on the very spot): it presupposed that "the whole of philosophical cognition must be erected upon or derived from one unique actual fact of consciousness."<sup>55</sup> The truth is, however, that Mr. Krug does Reinhold's *Theory* an injustice, for in virtue of the material character of presentations which is also involved in that one basic principle of consciousness, the whole mass of the actual facts of consciousness (just as endlessly manifold as Mr. Krug could ever desire them to be)—come in too.<sup>56</sup>

Fichte also said about this system of synthetism itself, that it answered exceptionally well to the most pressing needs of the time. The Kantian philosophy made a great stir, and there are many people looking for something special beyond it; through the system of synthetism all the difficulties are removed with one blow; the world is all there waiting without any help from reason; critical idealism receives an interpretation that is *so easy* to grasp; nothing more is asserted by it than the *capacity to bring all our awareness into one system*.<sup>57</sup> All that remains remarkable,

once we have achieved this outcome, is how so many alarms could have arisen about nothing, and why Kant had to make such tremendous preparations just in order to establish the simple proposition that we can draw inferences about the things in the world. Mr. Krug has now done the same service for the Fichtean system that was then rendered in respect to Kant, in that he shows that "Ego = Ego" signifies the "principle of the original identity of the ego," about which only the consciousness of our own self can teach us, "which accompanies *all of my* activities, and through which I recognize them as *my* activity."<sup>58</sup> Or in short the identity has to be posited in this: that all of the actual facts of consciousness are in me and in no one else. But still Mr. Krug is cautious enough to preface this explanation of the "Ego = Ego" with a *perhaps*; for perhaps "Ego = Ego" could also express something else.

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Mr. Krug lays the foundation stone soundly for this philosophy of his fundamental convictions in his third section, where he *proves* that there must be only *one* "real principle" (the ego) but several ideal principles; he appeals later on (III, pp. 19 and 77) to the way that the plurality of the principles is established here. And yet the concluding footnote to this section (III, p. 15) begins thus: "I doubt very much whether anyone will ever get out of the magic circle into which the investigation of the principles of philosophical cognition transposes us, through the assumption of one supreme absolute principle that would express the complete content and the complete form of philosophy," etc. (from Schelling's essay "On the Possibility of a Form of Philosophy in General").<sup>59</sup> If Mr. Krug is ready to base an eight-volume system of the philosophical sciences upon his principle, how can his modesty and sobriety lead him so far astray that after he has proved this principle of his convictions, he is *only doubtful* about the opposed principle?

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About one of the main actual facts of consciousness (the external world) Mr. Krug gets no further than this: on page 40 he draws the conclusion that although indeed "the assumption of the reality of the external world cannot be directly proved, nevertheless *a great deal* can be *said* to justify our belief in it indirectly," i.e. through reflection upon the contrary supposition. Specifically this belief and presupposition "is so natural and necessary to every man that the most resolute idealist cannot possibly free himself from it; *for he believes in it, as soon as he is not speculating.*" And on page 47 it follows just from this that the belief in the objective world is "*far more rational*, than the asserting of the contrary."<sup>60</sup>

Mr. Krug has crammed all these facts and popular ideas about philosophy as a "synthetism" which we have set forth, into the Spanish boots of his real principles and his ideal principles (both the formal and the material ones); he cites the writings of Fichte and Schelling, the

p. 114 *Philosophical Journal*, and his own works diligently; he divides the whole argument into sections with their special notes 1, 2, 3, etc.; by all of these devices, in short, he has deprived the substance of his ordinary common sense of part of the popularity and easiness that belongs to it on its own account. But popular easiness constitutes such a notable virtue of it, that if this plain common sense organized into numbered sections were really philosophy, one would have to lament the fact that our times and customs do not permit him to do as Socrates did, and try it on everyone, gentry and commoners alike; in no time at all Mr. Krug would succeed in arraying the whole of the uncultured public in philosophic robes; even for the skeptic this philosophy is good medicine, as Mr. Krug himself is aware; “if I have merely grasped the actual facts of my consciousness rightly,” he says, “and expressed them intelligibly, then no philosopher in the world will be able to reject the philosophical principles I have established; even the skeptic will have to grant them.”<sup>61</sup>

p. 115 Mr. Krug announces at the end of his *Organon* (where we are also informed that this organon is still not properly speaking *the* organon) that, “if his basic propositions are fortunate enough to meet with the approval of connoisseurs, he would not be averse to the working out of a system of philosophy” in eight volumes (“as he has already given his friends to understand in a private communication”).<sup>62</sup> On that account we bid him first merely to consider that although in seven volumes a fine big catalog of the actual facts of consciousness can be set out, still it is hard to see how he can fit the *infinitely* manifold facts of philosophical consciousness all in (among which he even counts the fact that “there was a great orator by the name of Cicero, and a great warrior by the name of Alexander,” etc.); and second that if seven volumes will not suffice for them, where will there still be room to philosophize about these facts laid to rest on their foundation, since the eighth volume (according to III, p. 112) is already bespoken for the philosophical literature, and for a factual index of the philosophical facts in the other seven?

## Notes

The marginal page numbers refer to the original printing of this essay in the *Critical Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1802, pp. 91–115.

The three volumes by W. T. Krug under review by Hegel, *Letters on the Science of Knowledge* (1800), *Letters on the Newest Idealism* (1801), and *Outline of a New Organon of Philosophy* (1801), are hereafter referred to as Krug I, II, and III, respectively.



1. G. W. F. Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. Rheinisch-Westfälischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1968ff.), vol. 9, p. 66; G. W. F. Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977), § 102.

2. G. W. F. Hegel, *Enzyklopadie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, ed. F. Nicolini and Otto Pöggeler (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1959), § 250 (footnote); G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977), p. 23. Hegel returns there to the problem of the quill as part of the natural order.

3. M. Kuehn, "The Early Reception of Reid, Oswald, and Beattie in Germany: 1768–1800," in *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 21 (1983), p. 485.

4. Immanuel Kant, *Philosophical Correspondence*, trans. Arnulf Zweig (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 254. (I follow Kuehn's revised version of the last sentence.)

5. "What is the first task of the philosopher? To cast out conceit." *Discourses* (of Epictetus), trans. W. H. Oldfather (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1925–28), II, p. 17.

6. "*Wissenschaftslehre*" (*Science of Knowledge*) was the title of the textbook that Fichte published in connection with his lectures in 1794. Thus Fichte is the target of Krug's first volume of polemical letters, while Schelling's *System of Transcendental Idealism* is the target of the attack on the "newest idealism." (Hegel himself does not underline the references to Fichte's "science" and Schelling's "idealism" as book titles. But I have done this wherever I felt that it would be helpful.)

7. I.e. W. T. Krug, *Letters on the Newest Idealism* (Leipzig, 1801). Hegel repeatedly refers to this work by an inaccurate title.

8. Krug I, pp. 5–6. The emphases are Hegel's. (Hegel also peppers all of his quotations with many superfluous commas, which can hardly be added in the translation. I think that an ironic, eyebrow-raising impression is, perhaps, intended.)

9. Krug I, pp. 6–7 (the emphasis is Hegel's). Hegel put this passage in quotation marks; it is partly a condensed paraphrase. (Where Hegel wrote "etc.," Krug says he "expects to be treated differently from mindless buffoons and sycophants." The implication of Hegel's breaking off at this point is clear enough. In the following sentence the quotation marks have been added by the translator. The marked passage—emphasis Hegel's—is closer to a verbatim continuation of the quotation than the last sentence enclosed in Hegel's own marks.)

10. These quotations were not marked as such by Hegel. The first is rather free. The second contains a citation by Krug from Fichte's "First Introduction to the *Science of Knowledge*" (J. G. Fichte, *Sämtliche Werke*, 8 vols., ed. I. H. Fichte [Berlin, 1845–46], vol. 1, p. 422; J. G. Fichte, *Science of Knowledge with First and Second Introduction*, trans. Peter Heath and John Lachs [New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983], p. 6).

11. Hegel omits what Krug (I, pp. 17–18) "has nothing against" (probably because he is himself very much against exactly what Krug finds acceptable—the characterization of "necessity" as a "feeling"). Krug cites two of Fichte's formulations of the problem of philosophy here: "What is the ground of the system of presentations that are accompanied by the feeling of necessity and of

this feeling of necessity itself?" ("First Introduction," in *Werke*, vol. 1, p. 423; *Science of Knowledge*, p. 6) and "How do we come to attribute objective validity to what is nevertheless only subjective?" ("Second Introduction," in *Werke*, vol. I, pp. 455–56; *Science of Knowledge*, p. 31). Hegel also does not mark his own quotation. What Krug actually wrote (I, pp. 18–19) was: "Finally I cannot regard the idealism of the *Science of Knowledge* to be so dangerous merely as a philosophical theory as it seems to be considered by many people, though it would be most harmful as soon as it passed over into practice; it is not dangerous for the very simple reason that it is not possible for it ever to pass over into practice."

12. The form "*Idealism*" (in the title of Krug II, etc.) is not normal German. In Hegel's time and now, the Germans speak of "*Idealismus*"; and they treat these Latin forms as indeclinable. Krug's attempt to naturalize these words more completely may perhaps be a reflection of the Scottish influence upon his thought.

13. Krug I, p. 20. Hegel does not mark this quotation. The emphasis is his.

14. Krug I, pp. 20–21. Hegel (or the printer) failed to mark the beginning of the quotation, but it is fairly close from the point here marked. The emphasis is Hegel's.

15. Krug I, p. 27. Hegel did not mark the quotation; and apparently he did not notice that Krug was quoting Fichte's *System der Sittenlehre* (see Fichte, *Werke*, vol. 2, pp. 100–I; the emphasis is Fichte's). So here Hegel's irony falls on the wrong target—or does it?

16. All of this is based on Krug I, pp. 29–31.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 32 (not quite verbatim; quotation marks mine).

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 36–37 (not quite verbatim; quotation marks mine).

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 45–46 (turned to oblique form; quotation marks mine).

20. *Ibid.*, p. 48 (not verbatim; italics Hegel's, quotation marks mine).

21. Virgil, *Georgics* IV, 168: "Keep the drones, the base herd, away from the mangers." (See Krug I, p. 59.)

22. Krug II, p. 6 (italics Hegel's, quotation marks mine).

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 13–15.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 29. Krug here refers to the passage in Friedrich Schelling, *Sämmtliche Werke*, 24 vols., ed. K. F. A. Schelling (Stuttgart and Augsburg: Cotta, 1856–61), vol. 3, p. 398; Friedrich Schelling, *System of Transcendental Idealism*, trans. Peter Heath (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1978), p. 50. For the "second inconsistency," see Krug II, pp. 16, 19, etc.

25. As the justification for his challenge, Krug (II, p. 73) quotes Schelling, *Werke*, vol. 3, p. 429: "No dogmatist has yet undertaken to describe or depict the nature and manner of this external influence, etc." (Schelling, *System*, p. 74). Examination of this passage in context will soon convince the reader that Krug did indeed miss the point of Schelling's argument.

26. These complaints of the mountain and the mouse and of false impressions are found earlier in Krug's discussion (II, pp. 24, 28).

27. The challenge about his own pen is at Krug II, p. 73. The other cases are offered earlier (II, pp. 31–34).

28. A “deduction” of these historic figures (and others) is asked for in Krug II, pp. 38–39.

29. Hegel did not mark these quotations from Krug II, pp. 32–33.

30. See Krug II, pp. 43–44, 47ff.

31. Hegel put this in quotation marks, but what he gives us in indirect speech is not a quotation. Krug does say (II, pp. 66–67) that he “quite simply cannot conceive (*denken*) an activity or a doing without a being.” The rest of Hegel’s quotation then follows as given in the text.

32. The echo is from Caiaphas (Matthew 26:65).

33. See Schelling, *Werke*, vol. 3, p. 408 (*System*, p. 58).

34. Schelling, *Werke*, vol. 3, p. 425 (*System*, pp. 71–72).

35. Krug’s supplementary essay, with its appendages, deals with the essay of Fichte that occasioned the *Atheismsstreit*, and with Fichte’s subsequent essay in his own defense.

36. Krug I, pp. 77–79.

37. *Ibid.*, pp. 112–13.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 109. Here Krug is criticizing an essay by Forberg on the “Development of the Concept of Religion,” in *Philosophisches Journal* 8, pt. I, pp. 21–46.

39. Krug I, p. 116 (quotation marks added).

40. See Krug II, p. 6. (Hegel marked the end of the citation.)

41. Hegel is punning on Krug’s name, which means “jug” or “pitcher” in German.

42. See Krug III, pp. 112–14.

43. See Krug II, p. 63. (Quotation marks added, as also for the quotation from II, p. 75.)

44. See Krug III, pp. 16–18.

45. See Krug I, pp. 24 and 31.

46. In fact, this claim is false. Krug uses the word “*Vernunft*” fairly often and not only in the genitive. Hegel is playing upon Krug’s claim that reason is not a “thing,” but pertains to various “things,” to suggest that it does not pertain to Krug’s ego or his books.

47. See Krug III, p. 64 (italics Hegel’s, quotation marks mine).

48. See Krug III, p. 17 (italics Hegel’s, quotation marks mine).

49. J. W. von Goethe, Act I of *Ein Fastnachtsspiel vom Pater Brey*, in Goethe, *Werke* (Berlin: Aufbau, 1960–78), vol. 5, p. 160.

50. Krug III, pp. 77–79. (Hegel has eliminated most of Krug’s italics and added his own. Quotation marks are mine.)

51. Krug II, p. 91 (quotation marks added).

52. “Why should a mere man like me not have done it?” The second sentence is from Krug II, p. 83 (quotation marks added). Hegel’s classical tag is from Terence, *Eunuchus*, line 591 (tense changed from future to future perfect). (In the play the question asked is “If Jove may seduce Danae, then why may not a little guy like me do it too?”)

53. For the language, see Krug III, p. 27. But Krug does not mention Jacobi. (His argument for the external existence of things, at III, pp. 37–38, is very

reminiscent of Jacobi, however. Jacobi's view was modeled upon Hume.)

54. See Fichte, *Werke*, vol. 2, p. 439. (Hegel did not mark this as a quotation, but it is almost verbatim.)

55. The reference is to Reinhold's famous early work: *Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens* (1789; reprinted, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1963). What Krug actually says at the end of this unmarked quotation is: "erected upon one supreme principle, or derived from it, and this principle must express one *single determinate actual fact of consciousness*."

56. Compare Hegel's criticism of Reinhold's theory in *Difference between the Systems of Fichte and Schelling*, trans. H. S. Harris and W. Cerf (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977), pp. 178–95.

57. Fichte, *Werke*, vol. 2, p. 438.

58. See Krug III, pp. 78–79 (quotation marks added).

59. See Schelling, *Werke*, vol. 1, p. 94; F. W. J. Schelling, "On the Possibility of a Form of Philosophy in General," trans. Fritz Marti, in Schelling, *The Unconditional in Human Knowledge* [Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press, 1980], p. 43).

60. Krug III, pp. 40–41, 47 (italics Hegel's, quotation marks mine).

61. Ibid., p. 30 (quotation marks added).

62. Ibid., p. 113 (not quite verbatim; quotation marks added).

# Aphorisms from the Wastebook

Translated by Susanne Klein, David L. Roochnik,  
and George Elliot Tucker

Hegel wrote these aphorisms between 1803 and 1806. They were edited and published posthumously by Karl Rosenkranz in five installments of the *Königsberger Literaturblatt* of 1842, and were reprinted (in incomplete form) in Rosenkranz's biography of Hegel, *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Leben* (Berlin: Duncker und Humboldt, 1844). The text used is the Suhrkamp (Frankfurt am Main, 1970) edition of Hegel's *Werke*, edited by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (vol. 2, *Jenaer Schriften 1801–1807*, pp. 540–67). For the present translation, a number of the aphorisms have been omitted. For further discussion of the text, see Friedhelm Nicolin, "Unbekannte Aphorismen Hegels aus der Jenaer Periode," in *Hegel-Studien* 4 (1967), pp. 9–19; and Manfred Baum and Kurt Meist, "Hegels 'Promethische Confession,' Quellen für vier Jenaer Aphorismen Hegels," in *Hegel-Studien* 8 (1973), pp. 79–90.

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## Aphorisms from the Wastebook

A party may be said to exist when it falls apart internally. Thus the case of Protestantism, whose differences are now supposed to coincide in the attempts at unification—a proof that it no longer exists. For in falling apart, the inner difference establishes itself as what is real. All the schisms

of Catholicism ceased with the rise of Protestantism. Today the truth of the Christian religion is always being proved, one does not know for whom; for after all we have nothing to do with the Turks.

*Experience.* The shadow which candlelight projects, when illuminated by the early morning light, becomes blue; the shadow which daylight casts (which is weaker, and in order for it to become visible one must move away from the light), when lit up by candlelight, becomes red. The shadow cast by candlelight, when held quite near to the light, shimmers almost green.

The ancient Germans were certainly a hearty and mirthful people. Out of the worthy Ulysses, whose life is earnestness itself, they made a foolish Eulenspiegel;<sup>1</sup> out of the divine Circe, appearing to her as a nemesis, they made a pig. The moderns do more or less the same thing only with greater earnestness. In former days the people were ironical about these divine beings; today however these divine beings are ironical about the earnest scholars and interpreters.

The peasant woman lives within the circle of her Lisa, who is her best cow; then the black one, then the spotted one, and so on; also of Martin, her boy, and Ursula, her girl, etc. To the philosopher, infinity, knowledge, movement, empirical laws, etc. are things just as familiar. And as her dead brother and uncle are present to the peasantwoman, thus Plato, Spinoza, etc. are present to the philosopher. The one has as much reality as the other, but the latter are immortal.

In Germany common sense is always protected against the so-called presumptions of philosophy. This is an effort in vain, for even if philosophy should concede everything to the common people, it would do them no good, for the common people have no common sense. Genuine common sense is not boorish crudeness, but in the sphere of culture it consists in being, within the formal determination of education, free and forcefully conversant with the truth.<sup>2</sup> But then we are immediately faced with Rousseau's paradox of expressing his opposition in principle to formal restraints as well as to education itself,<sup>3</sup> or to experience, reasoning and wit, such as that of Voltaire or Helvetius. The nobility of Germany does indeed have common sense, but precisely for this reason, they use it, without trying to prove that it is permissible to use it—and they let the matter rest at that.

Wieland, whom one otherwise would not suspect of paradox, has formulated the paradoxical proposition that it would be useful to understand

something of the matter about which one writes; and he was applauded for that.

Fools become wise with misfortune; but clever people remain with all misfortune unwise.

One may say to a scrupulous man, that conscience is a moral lantern which illuminates only the good path. If one takes the bad path, one blows it out.

In Swabia one says of something which happened long ago, it is already so long ago that it is almost no longer true. Thus Christ has already died so long for our sins that it is almost no longer true.

Balls, public places, and plays are no longer well attended. *On s'assemble en famille, on revient aux mœurs.*<sup>4</sup> These *mœurs* constitute the universal boredom of the public, morality.

The truth of science is a calm and quiet light, illuminating and joyous to all, like a warmth in which everything sprouts up in abundance and at the same time inner riches unfold in the broad spectrum of life. A flash of inspiration is like Capaneus<sup>5</sup> who imitates this heavenly fire, but in a manner which is formal, inferior and ephemeral, being destructive and incapable of achieving any lasting life.

One man, acquainted with the Pythagorean theorem, says, "One can't get a meal out of that." Another says, "What is that to me. I am only interested in the application for practical life. I must find my whole being expressed in it." A third, "There is no useful application to be gotten out of this, no wise maxim for moral life." These expressions are all the same, but we interpret the first as boorish doltishness, the second as common sense and the third as a zeal for the moral interest of mankind.

Reading the morning newspaper is the realist's morning prayer. One orients one's attitude toward the world either by God or by what the world is. The former gives as much security as the latter, in that one knows how one stands.

*Ora et labora!*<sup>6</sup> Pray and curse. It is usually a swearword when one says "Jesus," but in religion these things, otherwise separate, coincide. The earth is accursed, and in the sweat of thy brow thou shalt eat thy bread. To work is to destroy or to curse the world.

It is necessary to study a system of philosophy as a whole. The principle of a philosophy contains everything in undeveloped form, but only as undeveloped, latent, as the empty formal concept, not the thing itself. Just like a miser keeps all his enjoyments in his purse as possibility, and spares himself the actuality, the toil of enjoyment itself.

The questions which philosophy does not answer are answered in that they should not be so posed.

Common thinking does not construct: here is a linden tree next to the willows, the saplings, etc., and below a cow walks by. It does not prove, but rather takes its effort as a proof of something, boredom for depth and its fatigue for the result.

Whatever has a deep meaning is for this reason good for nothing.

*Science.* The individual can assure himself and others whether he possesses it. Whether it is true is decided by the immediate surroundings, the present and then the future, if the present has already given its applause. However, consciousness has risen to such a degree in culture and the barbaric sluggishness of comprehension has become so much quicker and fluid, that a few years will already bring about the future. The Kantian philosophy was condemned long ago, while the Wolfian philosophy held its own for fifty years or more. The standpoint of Fichte's philosophy was determined more quickly. What the essence of the Schellingian philosophy is will be revealed shortly. Judgment is standing at the door, for many understand it already. Yet these philosophies were defeated less by proofs than by the empirical experience of how far is to be gotten with them. They train disciples blindly, but the web becomes ever thinner, and finally they find themselves surprised by the flimsy fabric of the spider's web. For them it is like ice melted and quicksilver run through their fingers, without their knowing what has happened to them. They no longer have anything, and whoever looks at the hand with which they offer out their wisdom sees nothing but the empty hand and passes by mockingly. While they, feeling the cold, still declare it to be something, the passersby erroneously believe that they have explained things, since they see only the nothingness of this wisdom and not what it once was. The one is as deceived as the other. The truth is that this vanished wisdom itself is what has brought both of them here. The word of Scripture is fulfilled: when we remain silent, the stones cry out.

The first imperative in the study of the sciences is honesty with oneself. Universal doubt is easily conceived and asserted, but the question is



whether it is true. The empty word, unless the whole nature of things be denied, is a lie; and it is terrible what men want to deceive and persuade themselves and others of.

In the study of a science one must not let oneself be put off by the principles. They are general and mean very little. As it seems, the only one who understands them is he who has a grasp of the particular. Often the principles are bad. They are the consciousness of a thing, and the thing is often better than the consciousness. One must keep studying. At first consciousness is opaque. One does not want to have to comprehend and prove step by step. One throws the book away, keeps reading as between waking and sleeping, gives up on one's consciousness, that is, on one's individuality, which is embarrassing. This is the way I studied differential calculus and other things. And this is the way others are said to have studied Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*.

Original and astonishing works of culture are like a bomb which falls on a lazy, stupefied town, where everybody sits with their mug of beer and is very wise, and is oblivious of the fact that their insipid well-being is precisely the cause of the thunder's crash.

The most damaging thing is to want to save oneself from errors. The fear of intentionally making a mistake is the comfort and accompaniment of a wholly unintentional error. Thus a stone makes no intentional mistake, except, for example, limestone when nitric acid is poured upon it. Then it completely comes apart. It goes totally astray, boils over, comes into another world. This world is utterly foreign to it and it perishes. But not so with man. He is of a durable substance and preserves himself. This stoneness, stoniness or stonity (in the German language it is difficult to make a substantive, a thing, a solid man, an upright citizen who has a wife and children, into a predicate), this stiffness, is what must be renounced. Malleability, not the instinctual *non aridet*,<sup>7</sup> is the truth. Only when one understands things, which comes after study, does one have a mastery of them.

The fundamental principle of a system of philosophy is its result. Just as we read the last scene of a play or the last page of a novel, or as Sancho considered it better to reveal beforehand the solution to a riddle, so the beginning of a philosophy is also its point of return, which is not the case with these other things. However, no one is satisfied with the end of a play or a novel or with the answer to a riddle; rather, the process by means of which this result is attained is considered the essential element. The opponents of philosophy deny that the particular is contained within

the general, and they themselves testify to this in that they dispute over the principle as if the whole were contained in it. They possess the whole just as they would possess mathematics if they had bought a copy of Euclid or a slave who is a mathematician. But the thing itself cannot be given as a bonus included along with a purchase in which the principle or result is bought. On the other hand, not to go beyond intuition,<sup>8</sup> the intuition of, for example, Jacob Böhme, is barbarism, just as it is superficiality not to go beyond fundamental principles. The development of knowledge is as little the abolition of these intuitions as it is of fundamental principles; rather it is an extending and widening out of these from the inside outward or from the outside inward. Böhme's intuition is deeper than is revealed by Jacobi's faith. Those who take views such as these as only a particular ephemeral opinion and place the barbarism in the thing itself, err just as much as those who do not consider the fundamental principle to be essential. The former make the form of the barbarous, while the latter on the contrary make the purity of faith into the nature of things. (Jacobi: we are born in faith; handshakes; dear Mendelssohn, and so on; like empty Pietists they shake hands with bent heads and rolling eyes, without knowing what to say.)

The barbarian is amazed when he hears that the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides. He thinks it could also be otherwise, is in a perfect fright before the understanding<sup>9</sup> and cannot go beyond perception.<sup>10</sup> Reason<sup>11</sup> without understanding is nothing, but the understanding is still something without reason. Understanding is not free for the having.

The words "eternal," "holy," "absolute" and "infinite" elevate the man who is affected by them; they enthuse and inflame him. They are powers which rule him, and draw him this way and that. The sign of their dominion over him, is that with them he feels himself. They are the visible<sup>12</sup> gods of the Greeks, which to the northerners are only abstractions, words, that is to say, an ideal form. Only the comprehension of them kills them as powers. Comprehension separates itself from them. Instead of remaining in their element, it draws back from them and, looking through them, achieves a numb clarity. These words elevate man—but how much more the knowledge of them! This knowledge gives man, the I, his freedom; and in this elevation the fire or the feeling of the individual is extinguished.

Faulty reflection is the fear of a deep immersion in a subject; it always wants to go beyond the subject and return to itself. The analyst, as Laplace says, gives himself over to the calculation, and the problem disappears, that is, the overview and the dependence of the particular moments of

the calculation on the whole. The essential thing is not only an insight into the dependence of the particular on the whole, but just as much that every moment itself, independent of the whole, is the whole—and this is the deep immersion in a subject.

Everyone wishes and believes himself to be better than his world. He who is, however, in fact better, only expresses his world better than others.

The usual royal road in philosophy is to read prefaces and book reviews, in order to get an approximate idea of things.

The last royal road in studying is thinking for oneself.

Those who say so much against philosophical systems overlook the fact that a specific system is a philosophy. This is the most important fact, just as an oak is a tree.

To the public, philosophy deals with religion, which has been lost, and not with science. Concern for this only comes later. Men want to know how they stand, want to be satisfied—which is the interest of the men of our day.

We no longer have so much to do with thoughts. We have enough of them, good and bad, beautiful and bold. Rather, we have to do with concepts. But in that thoughts are through themselves immediately made valid, whereas concepts, on the contrary, must be made comprehensible, the form of writing thereby undergoes a change and acquires a form of appearance demanding a perhaps painful effort, as with Plato and Aristotle.

A mended sock is better than a torn one; not so with self-consciousness.

To study means to take at face value as the truth what others have thought. But if from the start one acts as though one is to be immediately done with what is to be taken as false, one does not understand things.

It is demanded of philosophy, since religion is lost, that it devote itself to edification and replace the priests.

The partition between the terminology of philosophy and that of ordinary consciousness is still to be broken down; there is a reluctance to think the familiar. Ordinary consciousness is supposed to rest content

with this; it is not supposed to consort seriously with philosophy. However, philosophy does this when it applies itself to day-to-day things.

It is not good for philosophy to have a principle and to be able to say: this *is* or is *nothing*.

Kant is quoted with admiration as having said that he taught philosophizing and not philosophy—as if someone could teach carpentry but not how to build a table, a chair, a door, a cabinet, etc.

The perfect is everywhere the simple, but particularly so with what is great in art: not to want to color statues; nor to combine the lyrics of the chorus with the drama of the characters; also not to want to combine philosophizing with poeticizing; generally, to resolve on a necessary separation, and to observe it strictly.

*Fichte's contribution.* Only after the history of consciousness does one know through the concept what is contained in these abstractions.

Critics are gravediggers. But if sometimes they bury something alive, it still survives. They themselves have to learn. To judge, to characterize, means to kill, to represent the individual not the thing, as if the individual were the living, and not the truth. The judge of a secret court or the freemason are no more advanced than the rest of the general public. When mystery is made public, it only amounts to common hearsay.

The times seem unfavorable for philosophy, because with so much expended effort only a thought of the supersensible has been achieved, the first raw beginning. But this thought ought to be exhibited in the best-known things, e.g., fruit, and not in the religious sense in general.

Philosophy rules the representation of things and these rule the world. Through consciousness spirit intervenes in the order of the world. This is spirit's infinite tool, also bayonets, cannons and bodies. But spirit is their standard and the soul of their commander. Bayonets, money and stratagems are not what rules. These must also exist, just as a clock must have cogs and wheels, but its soul is time and the spirit which subordinates matter under its law. Just as an *Iliad* is not to be thrown together out of chance elements, so also a great work is not the product of bayonets and cannons. Spirit is rather the author.

*The backwoods.* Pastoral life. No spiritual advance. Nourishment of the inclination toward sloth. Religious teachers are dependent upon the

people who elect them and who have their livelihood in their power. This dependence makes them resort to intrigue. They flatter the ignorant masses, force their way into family secrets, maintain parties and acquire a wide dominion over the minds of country parishes. They are not allowed to use this power to recommend anything to these ignorant and limited men that might deviate from the customary; no useful schooling, only vulgarity, barbarization. It is in the political interest of the wealthier families to let this barbarization be, in order to retain their influence and public offices. The freedom of the ignorant masses becomes poverty and melancholy. The churches are never empty of worshipers, the streets of pilgrims and the graveyards of mourners. But with all this there is a decay of morals, a malicious delight at the losses of the envied rich, and slander, faithlessness and ingratitude. Bad management and gluttony exist alongside poverty; petty, beggarly self-interest. Amidst the neglect of agriculture and the forests and the lack of industry, luxury nevertheless increases.

In philosophizing there is nothing to be represented.<sup>13</sup> Now and then there is an image. Men cling to this. The *tabula rasa* of Aristotle is accidental and used as a makeshift. Everyone is familiar with this. However, it does not express the essence of Aristotle's concept of the soul.

In former times the lower classes expelled family members as scapegoats, upon whom the blame of their hardships, their penance and their estrangement was laid to the point of madness. They themselves, however, went free and bought atonement for themselves with this sacrifice. But now they have taken the penance upon themselves.

It is necessary to have laws against usury. Because the individual does not know the opportunities and the persons from whom money is to be obtained, usury appears to occur less often than it actually does. The state, however, is aware of the scarcity or plenitude of money. Its tax on interest is the cause of the effect out of which such a need would have arisen, viz. the opinion of greater scarcity, which is thus the cause of higher interest. Moreover, just as every rumor of war or peace, hailstorms and the like have an influence on the corn price, so the same kind of fluctuations occur regarding money. This inconstancy is what raises the price, for the hope of selling at a higher or at least not lower price is stronger than the fear of the opposite, and the former is a stronger motive to hold than the latter is an inducement to sell. Hence, taxes on bread, meat, etc. are necessary.

Κουριδίη ἄλοχος<sup>14</sup> —Would that this woman not be exhausted from frequent childbirth. —Slave girls. The incommensurability of the duration of desire and the capacity of the man, as opposed to the charm, fertility and health of the woman, is a disproportion within the sanctity of European marriage which always perpetrates a mute struggle, internal discord and the evil of promiscuity among a people.

I remember very well how long I wandered about in the sciences, believing in good faith that what was openly revealed was not everything. From the manner in which what was being done was discussed, I decided that the essence of things lay still hidden in the background, and everyone knew much more than they let on, viz. the spirit of the matter and the reasons for advancing such things. However, after I had sought long in vain where all this was to be found—which was always being discussed or acted upon as if it were general knowledge, business as usual and correct, and whose justification I could not discover—I found that as a matter of fact there was nothing more to these things than I already knew, except the tone of assurance, the capriciousness and the presumption.

One enlightens the age, others exalt it into sonnets, educate it up, reflect on it and look up to it, pray up to it. The age is for each the *truncus fculnus*,<sup>15</sup> from whose totality each attempts to shape a Mercury. But the devil snatches the *truncus* from their hands, or, to shift the metaphor, he takes away the Mont Blanc granite and leaves them only a splinter or a grain. Thus, when one finally sees his completed work in the light of day, he has brought forth a pitiful little Mercury and cannot rail enough against the badness of the times and of the devil, who only left him such bread crumbs. Hence, a multitude of little *Zeitgeists* now run around, which each represents differently: as a little salt man, as a little wooden man, as a smallpoxed little *Zeitgeist*.<sup>16</sup> They distill the essence out of and clarify the age, so that it may become a pure, clear ether from which the patterns of the stars are miraculously born amidst the eternal splendor and radiance of the sun.

## Notes

1. “Eulenspiegel”: Till Eulenspiegel is a half-historical, half-legendary figure from late medieval times, associated with the area around Braunschweig. He is represented, with many variants throughout German literature, as a wanderer and occasional apprentice to tradesmen, famous for never settling down and for playing tricks on people, after which he disappears and starts again somewhere else.

2. "... But in the sphere . . . conversant with the truth" translates "... sondern in der gebildeten Sphäre mit den Bestimmtheiten der Bildung frei und gewaltsam umgehend nach der Wahrheit . . ."

3. "Formal restraints" translates "*die Bestimmtheiten*"; "education itself" renders "*die Bildung selbst*."

4. "*On s'assemble en famille, on revient aux mœurs*" can be translated as "One gathers within the family circle, one returns to morals."

5. "Capaneus": one of the Seven against Thebes who is destroyed by Zeus' thunderbolt. Cf. Aeschylus, *Seven Against Thebes*, lines 427ff.

6. "*Ora et labora!*" can be translated as "Pray and work!"

7. "*Non aridet*" literally means "it does not please me"; i.e. to be resistant on this account.

8. "Intuition" translates "*Anschauung*."

9. "Understanding" translates "*Verstand*."

10. "Perception" translates "*Anschauung*."

11. "Reason" translates "*Vernunft*."

12. "Visible" translates "*angeschauten*."

13. "To be represented" translates "*zum Vorstellen*."

14. Κουριδίη ἄλοχος can be rendered as "young concubine."

15. "*Truncus ficulnus*": the "trunk of a fig tree," a wood of inferior quality, which in Horace (*Satires*, I, 8, 1) is suitable material for only a rough stool or a statue of Priapus.

16. "A little salt man" translates "*Salzmännisches*": C. G. Salzmann (1744–1811), theologian, pedagogue, reformer, and philanthropist. "A little wooden man" translates "*Campesches*": J. H. Campe (1746–1818), theologian, pedagogue, linguist and lexicographer, reformer, and philanthropist, and the tutor of Alexander and Wilhelm von Humboldt. Campe was a publisher and a prolific and popular writer on many subjects. (*Campescheholz* is a wood traditionally exported to Europe from the Mexican state of Campeche, valued as building timber and for the natural dye extractable from it.) "A smallpoxed little *Zeitgeist*" translates "*Kuhpockenzeitälterchen*": more literally, the era of the cowpox. The English physician Edward Jenner (1749–1833) discovered the serum against smallpox in 1796. His treatises quickly spread the discovery throughout Europe: *An Inquiry into the Causes and Effects of the Cow-pox, or Variolae Vaccinae* (1798) and *Further Observations on the Variolae Vaccinae or Cow-pox* (1799). All these persons may be associated with the Enlightenment or its aims.

# Fragment on the "Life-Course" of God

Translated by Michael H. Hoffheimer

The passage by Hegel which is translated here was one of the "Aphorisms of the Jena Period" published by Karl Rosenkranz in 1844.<sup>1</sup> Rosenkranz excerpted these "aphorisms" from a notebook (the original of which has been lost) which Hegel compiled in Jena between 1803 and 1806. In this notebook Hegel recorded experiments and observations, transcribed passages from his current readings, and jotted down ideas about various subjects. These fragmentary entries were not really intended by Hegel to be aphorisms. Rather they were notes or *pensées* written for his own edification, surely never intended for publication, and were in many cases related to his broader systematic, philosophical concerns.

Hegel's systematic philosophy was in a state of development in Jena. The earliest system that he elaborated in Jena from 1801 until 1803 was composed of four parts: "Logic and Metaphysics," "*Naturphilosophie*," "System of Ethical Nature," and "Religion." But around the middle of 1803 (about the time he may have begun his notebook), he abandoned the earlier tetradic schema, which had been built largely on the systematic principles of Schelling's identity philosophy. In his lectures on the "System of Speculative Philosophy" of 1803–4, Hegel articulated the triadic architectonic which was to characterize all his subsequent formulations of a system of philosophy. In the familiar three-part organization of the system, comprising "Logic and Metaphysics," "*Naturphilosophie*," and "Philosophy of Spirit," there is no separate component identified with religion. This represents an important transition in Hegel's philosophical development.



In the various critical essays Hegel published during his first two years in Jena (1801–2), he had defended the possibility of a nonscientific, personal comprehension of the Absolute through a religious consciousness. This was, in part, a continuation of his position in Frankfurt that philosophy was an inherently limited form of cognition. But Hegel's maintenance in Jena of the possibility of an unmediated union with the Absolute outside of speculative philosophy was also a response to certain problems posed by the procedure of philosophical criticism and the dichotomizing method of the identity philosophy. Both tended to require an external introduction of unity into the system.

The characteristically Romantic dependence on a nonscientific and unmediated source of union with the Absolute was evident in Hegel's positive appraisal of the psychology of the "beautiful soul" in his first writings in Jena. It was systematically instantiated through the elaboration of the fourth component, "Religion," the return to absolute simplicity and the polar opposite of "Logic" according to the tetradic system. This early attitude toward religion was clearly articulated in one of Hegel's lectures in Jena where he contended that as regards its subject matter scientific knowledge was not superior to religion.<sup>2</sup>

Hegel's evolution away from this early treatment of religion was already evident in his later contributions to the *Critical Journal of Philosophy*, especially his critique of Schleiermacher and Jacobi in "Faith and Knowledge." This critique, together with his ultimate repudiation of "Religion" as an autonomous component of the system during the ensuing year, may be taken as signaling Hegel's decisive break with the unmediated world-view of the German Romantics, and it reflects his maturation to the standpoint of German Classicism.

Hegel's attitudes toward the ideas of the seventeenth-century mystic Jacob Böhme are an index of his intellectual evolution during his first years in Jena. Böhme's mystic union represented an emphatic counterpoint to the abstract tendencies of medieval Arab-Jewish and Thomistic philosophy. Where the main current of Scholastic and Renaissance philosophers followed the rabbinical tradition, proscribing the attribution of concrete sense-qualities to the Absolute, Böhme gave brilliant expression to the mystical countercurrent, seeking to apprehend and depict God as a process, invoking natural images and depending heavily on ideas derived from the contemporary natural philosophy of Paracelsus.

Böhme's thought was revived in the late eighteenth century by the French writer Saint-Martin, who influenced a host of important German thinkers, including Goethe, J. K. Lavater, and F. X. von Baader.<sup>3</sup> Böhme's philosophy assumed contemporary relevance in the intellectual context of the reaction inaugurated by the *Sturm und Drang* against the extreme ratioci-

native character of the Enlightenment and the philosophical efforts to reevaluate imagination (which for early Enlightenment thinkers like Christian Wolff had been completely inferior to intellection, an abstract, non-sensuous mode of thought). Böhme's ideas had been enthusiastically taken up by the German Romantics. Tieck had been actively popularizing Böhme's views in Jena in 1799 and 1800, just before Hegel's arrival. Hegel attended Friedrich Schlegel's lectures in early 1801, which may be where he first encountered Böhme's thought.<sup>4</sup>

It is possible that Hegel, in elaborating a treatment of religion as a distinct part of his tetradic system of 1801–3, was drawn to the insights of Böhme.<sup>5</sup> But the extent to which he was actually familiar with specific works of Böhme is problematic.<sup>6</sup> It is clear, in any event, that during the following period in which Hegel decisively rejected an autonomous religious consciousness and proceeded to elaborate his triadic system, he was repeatedly concerned with a critical confrontation with the views of Böhme.

Hegel's most extended and illuminating treatment of Böhme is comprised by the passage translated below. The first two paragraphs of this fragment use a number of metaphors and expressions which derive from Böhme, although Hegel is probably mimicking Böhme rather than quoting any particular work.<sup>7</sup> The second part of the fragment (the third paragraph) criticizes the myth sketched in the first part. That myth is rejected as inadequate, and instead of such a religious mythology Hegel propounds "science" (i.e. philosophy) as the only adequate way of comprehending the Absolute.

At the same time, Böhme and the religious attempt to grasp the Absolute in imaginative terms are not just rejected out of hand. Rather, they are retained as part of the evolution of religious consciousness to science in a way that anticipates the approach of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Hegel had great respect for Böhme, and even during the period of his critical engagement with the views of the mystic, he noted the superiority of Böhme's insight to that of F. H. Jacobi.<sup>8</sup>

The discussion of the life-course or career (*Lebenslauf*) of God in this fragment is related to Hegel's system of philosophy. In a lost manuscript for a "real philosophy" (*Naturphilosophie* and "Philosophy of Spirit"), Hegel introduced the notion of a "life-course" of God, identifying it with the immanent dialectic of the Absolute.<sup>9</sup> The notion of the life-course of God represents an advance from the more static and abstract tendencies inherent in the idea of the Absolute posited in the identity philosophy.

The life-course of God in this fragment is also the formation of the awareness of God, which, as self-recognition, represents the ascent to scientific intuition. The interplay of subject and object, ultimately unified as a process of recognition, anticipates the dialectical function of the *Phenomenology*. It evinces a more developed conception of mediation, where mediation is not just established objectively (God's life-course) or subjectively (the awareness

of God). Rather, full mediation arises through the interaction of both processes. The fragment thus embodies a genuine religious phenomenology, but it rests on a subordination of particular religion to a more all-encompassing scientific perspective: true intuition of religion "is universal religion and is so only as science."

The abstract character of Hegel's discussion in this fragment stems in part from the fact that it is probably intended to subsume several different levels of meaning. Most immediately it is an elaboration and critique of Böhme's mysticism. As such it may also represent a semi-autobiographical account of Hegel's intellectual evolution from 1801 to 1804. In a larger theological context, the passage may also denote the overcoming of certain dogmatic Christian views of sin and redemption of which Hegel had been critical since his student days. Still more generally, the myth may be identified with the progress and historical evolution of the world-view of Christianity and religion as a whole.

\* \* \*

### Fragment on the "Life-Course" of God

God become nature has diffused himself in the splendor and mute orbits of the configurations, becomes the expansion, is conscious of the lost punctuality and is enraged by it. The rage is this formation, this gathering together in the empty point.<sup>10</sup> It is found as such, and its essence pours out in the untranquil and restless infinity where there is no present but rather a sterile escaping from the limits which is always becoming and canceled [*aufgehoben*]. This rage, while it is this mere breaking out, is the destruction of nature. The transcending of the configurations is as much an absolute going into itself—an evolution to the focal point. In this focal point the rage consumes its own configurations. Its whole extended realm must pass through this focal point; its bones are thus pulverized and its flesh ground to pieces in this fluidity.<sup>11</sup>

The wrath of God toward Himself in His otherness is now fixed as the fallen Lucifer; he rebels against God, and his beauty makes him insolent.<sup>12</sup> Nature, conscious of its shape, publicly exhibits its shape and is pleased with it. But nature's being for itself or its being as consciousness is not a representation of itself which becomes increasingly peaceful and in which thought would only be the secondary, the empty inactive space which passively receives its content. Rather its consciousness is immediately absolute activity—it is wrath itself, inflammation, the burning up of rage in consciousness which is rubbed open and consumes its insolent splendor.<sup>13</sup> The nature thus consumed rises up in a new ideal shape as a realm of shadows which has lost that first life, the appearance of the

spirit of nature after the death of its former life.<sup>14</sup> This new shape is, however, the overcoming of evil, the credit for having held out, endured in the blazing of the agony in the focal point where it has been purified and left all specks in the crucible, leaving behind a residue which is the pure nothing. This new shape raises itself as free spirit which sees this transfiguration of itself only within nature.

Such myths, such intuitions are the intuitions of the *barbarians*.<sup>15</sup> The shape of these intuitions annihilates the individual,<sup>16</sup> or it has rather now become the rage against this developed and newly self-subsisting Absolute. For the individual is nothing in it. The individual does not go under but rather is already gone. And that intuition must undergo a second process<sup>17</sup> in order to become Absolute. This Absolute intuition is the science of cognition that the former<sup>18</sup> self-penetrating imagination and that the life-course of God arises from cognition itself; that nature in its essence is not that otherness about which the spirit, because it is this lost to itself, becomes enraged, but rather that the intuition of nature, *nature as nature, is the spirit*. The individual as such is itself nature and the intuition of the divine essence is a natural one if the content of nature be the same as the spirit. The individual follows the same path in consuming itself or in science, for in science the natural essence of the subject perishes. And the path is not merely the raising of the individual to science or a cultural forming of it; it is not merely a looking on from its side or a relating to it: rather it is the second course of the Absolute itself, which having come to be for itself as spirit, enters as such into that pain as consciousness, as generated totality, as spirit, so that spirit as consciousness begets that becoming with respect to itself as something which has already come to be. — The first intuition of religion is universal religion, and it is this only as science.<sup>19</sup> That first intuition is not a passing through or generation of the first path within itself as an intuitive course; rather science raises itself above faith and its contemplation, abandons itself as spirit and comes to itself as spirit. The forming or scientific development of that former intuition consists in the fact that it always remains spirit. It does not lose the spirit and, as this spirit, which has not lost itself, becomes *itself* another and finds itself once again. Science turns every stage of intuition (which is for itself an impenetrable, determinate shape which does not disclose its own internal content but only arises, acts and disappears through the action of another) into a process in itself or into a spiritual nature.

## Notes

I am grateful for the help of H. S. Harris, who carefully read this translation and suggested several improvements. The perspective of the introduction is heavily

indebted to Professor Harris' responses to my earlier analysis of Hegel's relation to Böhme.

1. Karl Rosenkranz, *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Leben* (1844; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1963), pp. 547–48; the fragment is reprinted in G. W. F. Hegel, *Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung*, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Stuttgart: Frommann, 1936), pp. 364–66. Some of the fragments from the notebook have been translated in the *Journal of Independent Philosophy* 3 (1979), pp. 1–6. Reprinted in this volume on pp. 245–55.

2. The relevant lecture notes, dating perhaps from mid-1803, were reported by Rosenkranz and are now lost. See G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel's System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy of Spirit*, ed. and trans. H. S. Harris and T. M. Knox (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1979), p. 179.

3. See Jacques Roos, *Aspects littéraires du mysticisme philosophique au début du romantisme: William Blake, Novalis, Ballanche* (Strasbourg: P. H. Heitz, 1951), p. 23.

4. See Helmut Schneider, "Anfänger der Systementwicklung Hegels in Jena," in *Hegel-Studien* 10 (1975), p. 161f.

5. H. S. Harris contends that Hegel's experimentation with triangle symbolism in Jena, which is clearly influenced by Böhme, stems from his first years there and was part of his elaboration of "Religion" in the context of the tetradic system of 1801–3.

6. In 1810 one of Hegel's students offered him the 1715 edition of Böhme's works. Hegel responded: "I have long wanted to own the whole collection of his works." And upon receiving the gift in 1811, he wrote, "I can now study Jakob Böhme more exactly than before, because I did not own his writings myself." In Ernst Benz, *Les Sources mystiques de la philosophie romantique allemande* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1968), p. 122, footnote 40.

7. See Schneider, "Anfänger," pp. 161, 164. However, some of Hegel's excerpts of readings were so elliptical they long defied identification. Cf., for example, Manfred Baum and Kurt Meist, "Hegels 'Promethische Confession': Quellen für vier Jenaer Aphorismen Hegels," in *Hegel-Studien* 8 (1973), pp. 79–90. The phraseology of this fragment could derive from any number of Böhme's writings, in which he repeated the central tenets of his vision. I have been unable to trace it to any particular work.

8. In another entry in the notebook Hegel wrote, "Böhme's intuition is deeper than Jacobi's revealed faith." Rosenkranz, *Hegels Leben*, p. 546.

9. See Rosenkranz's citation, translated in Hegel, *System of Ethical Life*, p. 185.

10. This whole passage makes more sense if we recall Hegel's views on geometry and astronomy in the early Jena period. In his *Philosophical Dissertation on the Orbits of the Planets* (1801), Hegel criticized the procedure of reflection in geometry and developed the outline for a more speculative approach. While mathematics is a constructive form of reflection (building planes from lines, etc.), geometry is seen as the application of similar principles in the reduction or analysis of planes to lines to points. The goal of each is a sort of reflective bad infinity (infinitely large, infinitely small); the procedure of reflection simply takes certain ideas as given (ultimately from experience) without penetrating to the most important relationships: "Yet how lines could arise from points and

planes from lines, etc., cannot be comprehended without the help of the concept of motion, i.e. that within which space and time are first posited as identical." G. W. F. Hegel, *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. Georg Lasson (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1929), vol. 1, pp. 390–401.

Hegel's discussion of God and nature in this fragment rests on his criticism of absolute, pure extension (empty, infinite space). This abstraction loses the form of the point and is without time: the pun on punctuality is bilingual. Yet collapsed into the form of a point, into the empty, the infinitely small, there is no extension, but pure time—a time which, since there is no extension, no change, is without real duration. In the philosophy of nature briefly sketched in his first published essay in Jena, Hegel had identified inorganic nature as theoretical and organic nature as practical; the progression from theoretical to practical in nature is described as a process of the internalization of light (the self-concentration of light into a point)—which is the natural analogue of reason. See G. W. F. Hegel, *Difference Between the Systems of Fichte and Schelling*, trans. H. S. Harris and W. Cerf (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977), pp. 168ff.

The internalization of light in this fragment is to be applied in a broad metaphorical sense to theology and is associated with the tradition of Lucifer—an analogy which is further supported by the etymology of *Lucifer* (light-bearing, the morning star). However, the resulting myth is ultimately to be rejected as "barbarian."

11. Fluidity (*Flußigkeit*) is a key concept in Hegel's philosophy in Jena, especially in the fragments on *Naturphilosophie* dating from 1803–4. It is probably taken from Baader and Schelling, who had extended the notions of fluidity and rigidity (as states of matter and chemical theories) into a basic dichotomy which served as a pervasive ordering principle in the philosophy of nature. Pure fluidity, without the correlate notion of rigidity, lacks an internal principle of differentiation and is identified with abstract expansion. It is a sort of chaos; thus "... the rage consumes its own configurations."

12. Lucifer, as noted, is identified with light. This passage should be compared with the *Phenomenology of Mind* (or *Spirit*): "It may thus be said that it was the very first-born Son of Light [Lucifer] who, by becoming self-concentrated, fell . . ." (G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, trans. J.B. Baillie [1910; New York/Evanston: Harper, 1967], p. 771). Similarly, in one of his later lectures on the philosophy of nature Hegel was to remark: "Jakob Böhme says that God's first-born is Lucifer; and this son of Light centred his imagination on himself and became evil . . ." (G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature*, trans. A. V. Miller [Oxford: Clarendon, 1970], p. 19).

It is not insignificant that in both of these later passages Hegel immediately counterposes Lucifer to the Son (*Sohn*), Christ, which also invokes wordplay on the collapsed light in opposition to the Sun (*Sonne*).

13. Hegel may have in mind here the amalgamated Greek-Roman myth in which Saturn (or Cronos, i.e. time) devoured his offspring until outwitted by his son, Zeus-Jupiter, who freed his siblings—assisted, according to one version of the myth, by Metis or Prudence. The cosmos was then divided into heaven (Jupiter), seas (Neptune), and Hades (Pluto), while most of the Titans were banished to

Tartarus—which Hegel may here be conflating with Hades. The metaphors drawn from different parts of Christian theology are self-evident.

14. This is certainly an allusion to the Ceres myth, in which Hegel was much interested. Indeed, in Frankfurt Hegel composed two poems that were dependent on the myth, and much of his Bern poem ("Eleusis") also invokes this myth.

15. "*Barbarei*." In another fragment from the notebook, Hegel explicitly criticizes Bohme's intuition as "barbarian." In yet another he describes the barbarian attitude toward rational thought: "The barbarian (*Barbar*) is amazed when he hears that the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides. He thinks it could also be otherwise, is in a perfect fright before the understanding and cannot go beyond perception. Reason without understanding is nothing, but the understanding is still something without reason. Understanding is not free for the having." (Rosenkranz, *Hegels Leben*, p. 546. Reprinted in this volume on p. 250.)

There may be a certain irony in Hegel's use of this term, since it was originally used by the Greeks to refer to non-Greek-speaking peoples (and thus would be directed against the extended Christian metaphor at play here), but was later used derogatorily by Europeans against non-Christians (and thus might be directed against the classical mythological allusions); in conflating the two, of course, Hegel is setting them both up to be rejected as inferior (barbarian) ways of viewing the Absolute.

16. "*Individuum*" (individual) may be a further elaboration of Jacobi's and Schelling's use of this term. Hegel differentiates between "*der Einzelne*" and "*das Individuum*," but both are used in a more extended sense than simply that of persons. "*Einzelne*" denotes the individual as single and different, has quantitative connotations, and emphasizes the contingent nature of the individual. "*Individuum*" denotes the integral and indivisible character of the individual, that which unites it, ultimately, with others, and emphasizes its necessary or essential property. This latter conception probably stems from Leibniz's notion of "individual substances." Thus the terms have different referents. Hegel occasionally invokes the positive and negative implications of the distinction without any apparent metaphysical distinction; for instance, in another notebook passage he says laws against usury are necessary because the individual (*Einzelne*) who is in the position to lend does not know the individuals (*Individuum*) from whom money is to be made (Rosenkranz, *Hegels Leben*, p. 553). In Hegel's *Naturphilosophie*, the individual is only attained at the level of the earth-element, which is also the starting point for organic (and practical) nature. See G. W. F. Hegel, *Natural Law*, trans. T. M. Knox (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1975), p. 110.

17. "*Prozess*" (process) also means lawsuit or trial and thus connotes a process of resolving opposed claims or tendencies.

18. I.e. barbarian.

19. This sentence might make more sense if we posit a *geworden* at its end. Then it would translate: "The former (or first) intuition of religion *has* become universal religion and *has* done so only as science" (i.e. only attains this level in the second course of consciousness).

# The Full Report of Rosenkranz Concerning the Triangle of Triangles

Translated by H. S. Harris

The following translation is not a text by Hegel himself but rather an excerpt from Karl Rosenkranz's article "Hegels ursprüngliches System 1798–1806" (*Literarhistorisches Taschenbuch*, ed. R. E. Prutz, vol. 2, 1844). The text has been reprinted by Helmut Schneider in *Hegel-Studien* 10 (1975), pp. 133–35. The pagination of the original publication is shown in the margins. Everything in the direct report given in Rosenkranz's biography<sup>1</sup> of Hegel (pp. 101–2) is condensed from the introductory discussion in the excerpt translated here. Only one subsequent back reference adds anything new. At the end of a quotation from the lecture course on "Real Philosophy" from the summer of 1806, Rosenkranz comments as follows: "Hegel still loved, even now, as it was put already above in his first exposition of metaphysics [i.e. in the "Triangle Fragment"], to set forth the creation of the universe as the *uttering* of the absolute *word*, and the return of the universe into itself as the understanding of the same, so that nature and history became the *medium—itself* a vanishing medium, *qua* other-being—between the uttering and the understanding [of the word]." <sup>2</sup>

\* \* \*

## The Triangle of Triangles

p. 157      Once Hegel had emerged from his limited concern with theology and had resolutely recognized his vocation to speculation, he always worked



out his philosophy as *system* or as a self-articulating whole. But this whole lived through distinct epochs even in the period that ends with the *Phenomenology*.

The first of these epochs occurs already in the earlier half of the *Frankfurt* period, and has essentially a *theosophical* character. It is consumed with the effort to lay out the image of the *Trinity* by means of Plato's thoughts about the *bond of analogy* in the *Timaeus* (thoughts which are themselves still half in the mode of imagery). . . .

So far as the first shape of the system is concerned, we can only form an inadequate picture of it for ourselves from certain sibylline ruins that it has left behind it. The likeliest thing is that Hegel never followed out any of these attempts quite to the end, because in the course of working on them the lack of correspondence between the image-form and the form of pure thinking became too great. But still there survives a fragment of some importance, which deals with the *divine triangle*. This geometrizing mode of imagery had been suggestively revived at that time by Franz von Baader in his essay *On the Pythagorean Square or the Four Regions of the World* (Tübingen, 1798).<sup>3</sup> The philosopher of the Romantic School, Jacob Böhme, too, had returned to honor with his *Ternary*.<sup>4</sup> Hegel passed through this phase, too, in his philosophical formation. But because he wanted to penetrate it through and through with philosophical seriousness, and not merely to amuse himself in it with mystical game-playing, he was bound to orient it basically according to its geometric determinacy (as being precisely what should be accounted the most characteristic aspect of it).<sup>5</sup> There remained, accordingly, nothing else in it but the concept of the unity that distinguishes itself from itself in three ways. For Hegel's dialectical spirit a *simple* triangle was not sufficient. To express the life of the Idea, he constructed a *triangle of triangles*, which he suffered to move through one another in such a way that each one was not only at one time *extreme* and at another time *middle* generally, but also it had to go through this process internally with each of its *sides*. And then, in order to maintain the ideal plasticity of unity amid this rigidity and crudity of intuition, to maintain the fluidity of the distinctions represented as triangle and sides, he went on consistently to the further barbarity of expressing the totality as a *square resting* over the triangles and their process. But he seems to have gotten tired in the following out of his labor; at any rate he broke off at the construction of the *animal*. The interest of this fragment consists especially in the active conflict between the woodenness of the form and the living vitality of the dialectic of the content. It was bound to prove to Hegel the impossibility of displaying what genuinely is for cognition in any form other than its logical determinacy, without violence and wild half-fancies.

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Up to this point, this work was for Hegel perhaps the most fearful, and at the same time the most fruitful effort. Through his works in Bern he had wrestled his way from the most bitter indignation against the manifold distortions of Christianity back to trust in it and in its fundamental images. He wanted now to *comprehend the Trinity* in the triangle of triangles. He wanted at this date, not to banish this image from himself as irrational, in which the faith had for centuries revered its highest possession. His acquaintance with the German mystics of the Middle Ages, and their speech with its profound sense, strengthened this tendency. Already at the outset of the Swiss period we find among Hegel's papers excerpts of passages from Meister Eckhart and from Tauler, which he copied out for himself from literary journals.<sup>6</sup> But as he got involved with *Gnosis*, the concept of spirit forced itself upon him as opposed to them,<sup>7</sup> the Concept which, because it is the *total Concept*, escapes all *imagery*, in the end. In the *succession* of ecclesiastical images it looks at first as if the Spirit were subordinate as against the Father and the Son who *breathe* it, according to the metaphor of the image. But the Church itself has expressly accorded to the Spirit the same independence and eternity, as are accorded to the two other so-called "persons" of the Godhead. Spirit for the first time is the unity, without which the distinction of Father and Son would be without sense, or if it made sense, must lead to dualism. For this reason Hegel hurled himself about in the most peculiar expressions to display the *reciprocity of mediation* between the Persons. To this end he also availed himself of the ecclesiastical formula of the *realm* (of Father, Son and Spirit) which he later retained in his philosophy of religion. Love would according to him be a more fitting, more understandable expression for the concept of God, but *Spirit* is deeper.<sup>8</sup>

In the Son God is cognizant of Himself as God. He says to Himself: I am God. The within-itself ceases to be a negative. The distinction and the wealth of God's self-consciousness is reconciled therein with His simplicity, and the realm of the Son of God is also wholly the realm of the Father. The self-consciousness of God is not a withdrawal back within himself and an otherness of the Son, just as it is not an otherness of his withdrawal back within Himself as simple God, but His intuition in the Son is the intuiting of the simple God as *His own self*,<sup>9</sup> but in such a way that the Son remains Son, or as not distinguished and at the same time distinguished; or the far-spread realm of the universe, which has no longer any being-for-self over against itself, but rather its being-for-self is a returning back within God, or is God's returning back within Himself, a joy over the majesty of the Son whom He intuites as Himself. And the *Earth* thereby ceases to be something mixed<sup>10</sup> (for that its being-within-self is no longer pure being-for-self, or evil). What stands over against the Son in his

majesty as he intuits the Earth, is the majesty of God Himself, the looking back and returning home to Him. And for the consecrated Earth this *self-consciousness of God is the Spirit*, which proceeds from God, and in which the Earth is one with Him and with the Son.<sup>11</sup> This Spirit is here the eternal mediator between the Son returned unto the Father, who is now wholly and only one, and between the being of the Son within himself, or of the majesty of the universe. The simplicity of the all-embracing Spirit has now stepped into the middle, and there is now no distinction anymore. For the Earth as the self-consciousness of God is now the Spirit, yet it is also the eternal Son whom God intuits as Himself, and the pair is one unity and the cognition of God within Himself. Thus has the holy triangle of triangles closed itself. The first is the idea of God which is carried out in the other triangles, and returns into itself by passing through them.

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In this *first*, which is at the same time only one side of the absolutely unique triangle, there is only the Godhead in reciprocal intuition and cognition with Himself. It is His idea, in which the pure light of unity is the middle, and whose sides are likewise the pure raying outward, and the pure refraction of the ray back into itself.

In the *second* God's intuiting has stepped over to one side. He has come into connection with evil and the middle is the *badness* of the mixing of both. But this triangle becomes a *square*, in that the pure Godhead floats above it. Its unhappiness, however, does not let it remain thus as this triangle either, but instead it must turn over into its opposite, the Son must go right through the Earth, must overcome evil, and in that he steps over to one side as the victor, must awaken the other, the self-cognition of God, as a new cognition that is one with God, or as the Spirit of God: whereby the middle becomes a beautiful, free, divine middle, the *universe of God*. — This second triangle is (*qua* being in the separation) herewith itself a twofold triangle, or its two sides are each a triangle, the one the converse of the other, and the middle is in this movement of history the all-effecting force of the absolute unity that floats above the first, and takes this up into itself and changes it into another within itself. But what is visible, are the two triangles, but the middle is only the invisible might at work in the inwardness.

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But through the second triangle of the second, the *third* has immediately formed itself, the *return of all into God himself*, or the having-been-poured-out of the idea overall. What was only a mixture, is through this Spirit absolutely one with God, and as He is cognizant of Himself in it, so it is cognizant of itself in God.

This triangular construction is now followed out in detail by Hegel through nature, though with frequent desertion of the premised picture-image, and with a peculiar mingling of purely logical and pictorial

characteristics. The *Sun* is called the *negative unity* of his system. The *Earth* is supposed to beget the antithesis of air and water, and what is more, to do it in such a way that they do not divide from one another *in polluted* form, but each expresses the opposite in itself and destroys itself, the air *fattens* itself with water, the water with air, and thereby both become at the same time so *tensed*, that they come to the leap, where each passes over into its opposite; and so on. —Even in later years Hegel still availed himself sometimes of the triangular schema.

## Notes

1. Karl Rosenkranz, *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Leben* (1844; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1963).

2. Rosenkranz, *Hegels Leben*, p. 193. The preceding context of this passage is translated in G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel's System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy of Spirit*, ed. and trans. H. S. Harris and T. M. Knox (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1979), pp. 264–65.

3. The full title is *On the Pythagorean Square in Nature or the Four Regions of the World*. In Baader's essay, the three domains of natural history (animal, vegetable, mineral) and the three types of matter (combustible, salty, earthy) are subordinated under three "basic forces" or "principles" (fire, water, earth). These elements would remain inert, however, were it not for the fourth principle (air) which enlivens them. The relation of the four elements is symbolically portrayed as a triangle with a point in the middle (representing air). This symbol (triangle with point) Baader calls the "*Quaternarius*," or "Pythagorean Square." No theological connection is made by Baader. (This summary is based on the report of Helmut Schneider in *Hegel-Studien* 10 [1975], pp. 158–59.)

4. Baader's triangle with central point is employed by Böhme and probably derives from him. Moreover, Böhme used it as a Trinitarian symbol. Hegel's attitude to Böhme in 1804–6 is critically appreciative, but he consistently attacks the direct acceptance of Böhme's metaphors and symbols as the simple truth. See especially the "Aphorisms from the Wastebook," items 45 and 48 (Rosenkranz, *Hegels Leben*, pp. 546, 547, and 199). So if we project this attitude back to an earlier period when Hegel was less discontented with pictorial modes of expression generally, we might fairly take the "Triangle Fragment" as an attempt to develop what Hegel took to be Böhme's meaning in Böhme's own mode. (The extent of Böhme's influence is much disputed. For a more skeptical view than the one adopted here, see the summary account of Schneider in *Hegel-Studien* 10 [1975], pp. 159–64.)

5. To my eye, this sentence (and the one following) appear to be a direct summary by Rosenkranz from Hegel's own manuscript. I infer from this that Hegel himself connected his triangle with Böhme's "Ternary," and that he contrasted his

own use of the symbol with the “mystical game-playing” of Franz von Baader. (This hypothesis explains both why Rosenkranz is so ready with the Baader reference, and why Schneider is nevertheless right about its relative insignificance.)

6. This is an important piece of information about Hegel’s studies at Bern (see H. S. Harris, *Hegel’s Development: Toward the Sunlight, 1770–1801* [Oxford: Clarendon, 1972], pp. 230–31). But we can set it aside without hesitation as irrelevant to the “Triangle Fragment” (which cannot be less than five years later than Hegel’s departure from Bern).

7. Hegel makes a critical reference to the Gnostics in the same breath with a critique of Schelling (Rosenkranz, *Hegels Leben*, p. 188; Hegel, *Ethical Life*, p. 262). The existence of this critique (after Schelling’s departure from Jena) argues strongly in favor of some earlier studies in a more positive spirit. That a critical reaction to Gnosticism was the source of Hegel’s conception of the primacy of Spirit is not very plausible, however, since Rosenkranz is right in thinking that the Bern period was crucial for that development, and there were few signs of an interest in Gnosticism on Hegel’s part at *that* time. But see further, Harris, *Hegel’s Development*, p. 212; and we should never forget that Rosenkranz had other manuscripts dating (at least, according to him) from the Bern and Frankfurt years, in the context of which he chose to interpret the “Triangle Fragment.”

8. Haym cites the sentence in the following variant form as a direct quotation (*Hegel und seine Zeit* [Berlin, 1857], p. 101): “More understandable for the concept of God (as the life of all) would be the expression ‘love’; but spirit is deeper.” The addition of “*als des Allebens*” may be nothing more than Haym’s own way of connecting this sentence from the “Triangle Fragment” with the discussion of the “Fragment of a System” of 1800 which he is there conducting. But it is plausible to suppose that Haym made his own direct transcription from the manuscript, since he did this in other instances where Rosenkranz had already transcribed passages in his biography.

9. Cf. Hegel’s definition of “the Absolute” at the end of the first installment of the *Natural Law* essay (G. W. F. Hegel, *Sämtliche Werke: Neue Kritische Ausgabe*, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister [Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1952ff.], vol. 4, pp. 464, 21–31; G. W. F. Hegel, *Natural Law*, trans. T. M. Knox [Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1975], pp. 111–12).

10. The metaphor of “mixing” comes from the second account of the creation of man in Genesis 2:7: “And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath [Latin: *spiritus*] of life; and man became a living soul.” But Hegel generalizes the story into a “breathing” of God’s spirit into the whole natural universe.

11. Cf. Hegel’s account of the consecration (*Heiligung*) of nature by the Catholic church in his “natural law” lectures of 1802 or 1803 (Rosenkranz, *Hegels Leben*, pp. 138–39; Hegel, *Ethical Life*, pp. 183–84).



# BAMBERG, 1807–1808







# Guidelines for the *Journal of German Literature*

Translated by Christiane Seiler and Clark Butler

Once the systematic standpoint of Hegelianism is attained, only the criticism of contemporary works can prevent it from losing its contact with the objective, historically developing world, from closing in upon itself and possibly exhausting itself in internal systematic development; hence the immense importance of the idea of criticism for Hegel, and for Hegelians after Hegel with respect to the full range of contemporary movements of thought.

In early 1807, with his first systematic work, the *Phenomenology*, behind him, Hegel wrote the following prospectus for a review periodical.<sup>1</sup> The periodical he describes did not then come to fruition. But the prospectus served as an occasion to articulate his mature concept of criticism, which in an important respect goes beyond the idea of criticism expressed in the 1802 “Introduction” for the *Critical Journal of Philosophy*,<sup>2</sup> but which he had already encapsulated for Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer in a letter from September 17, 1806.<sup>3</sup>

The premise of Hegel’s concept of criticism is that cultural history—at least the expressive unfolding if not the dialectical development of absolute spirit—is not demonstrably over. New works may still further the self-education of the public. The purpose of criticism is to mediate such works and the educated public, contributing to the advance of general culture. The method of critiquing new works requires the same initial hermeneutic self-alienation used in the dialectical understanding of historical acts and works. The critic must first abandon himself to the internal life of the literary or

scientific work itself. He must first be a faithful interpreter. But where the dialectical interpreter of historical standpoints eventually has the satisfaction of seeing his own contemporary standpoint triumphantly reconstructed out of the contradictions of transcended standpoints, the honest critic of contemporary literature may see no self-contradiction in the work of colleagues. In that case, the public exposition and exposure of divergent views and arguments helps bring any dialectical problems they may contain into the open. In no case should the critic yield to the temptation of external criticism of a personal or purely polemical nature as a substitute for—or even a supplement to—the exhibition of a standpoint’s dialectical self-refutation. The criticism of contemporary works reverts to the typical pattern of dialectical or philosophical criticism only when the works being criticized, despite their currency, express historically and dialectically transcended perspectives. The philosophical critic, when he encounters what is genuinely novel and is not merely recording a self-critique of what is essentially past, for the time being must be content to promote sympathetic understanding of a pre-philosophical nature.

The novelty of this statement is apparent if one keeps in mind Hegel’s 1802 statement that the critic must presuppose a concept of reason, that no communication with a work’s author is possible unless they share this concept, and that without such a shared concept true criticism yields to an external criticism of “repudiation” of “unphilosophy.” The new formulation requires no explicitly shared concept of reason for the critic to understand the content of a work. The possibility of an unconsciously or implicitly shared concept of reason means that the critic should temporarily suspend his own rational self-certainty and project himself sympathetically into the standpoint of the author. If there is no explicit agreement between critic and author, the critic may be dialectically in advance of the author, or the author in advance of the critic. In the latter case, the critic limits himself to exposition. In the former case, refutation derived from the work’s own content is called for. But the philosophical reason of the critic is itself at risk if there can be what Hegel in 1802 called “unphilosophical rubbish”<sup>4</sup> in which philosophical reason is not dialectically implicit, and which can only be “cauterized” by “cudgels, whips and bats.”<sup>5</sup> Unless such rubbish displays a total absence of thought, its very dismissal as rubbish would point to a limitation of philosophical reason in the critic.

It may be doubted whether Hegel, in his own later treatment of J. F. Fries or Friedrich Schleiermacher, lived up to his own 1807 prohibition of personal invective as opposed to refutation embellished merely by “flashes of wit.” Yet in 1821 he addressed to the Prussian government the same concept of criticism as he formulated in 1807,<sup>6</sup> in the hope that state financing for a critical journal would be forthcoming. Two differences between the 1807 and 1821 formulations nonetheless seem to stand out. First, the 1821 version

stressed the desirability of an official state journal in enhancing the authority of its reviews. But this stress is absent from the 1807 statement only because the journal whose founding was then being contemplated was to be owned privately by a corporation of scholars. Already in a contemporary letter from 1808,<sup>7</sup> Hegel voiced his preference for an official organ, drawing on state authority to put immature or impudent critics to shame.

The second apparent difference is that the earlier formulation is critical of tradition, while the later one views tradition favorably. But it would be a mistake to interpret this as a reflection of the political difference between the revolutionary times of Napoleonic Germany and the reactionary environment of 1821. The tradition which Hegel opposes in 1807 is that of ossified concepts manipulated mechanically without thinking, impeding original work in science and philosophy. The tradition which he upholds in 1821, against the Romantic pretense of complete originality, is the massive presence of historical continuity even in the most original works. The difference is between congealed tradition and living tradition.

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### Guidelines for the *Journal of German Literature*

The general intent of the journal is to further the scientific and aesthetic education in which all those not belonging to the trades participate through criticism of new publications related to the arts and sciences appearing in Germany.

**a.** All essays not containing a critique of some publication are excluded, for their content becomes too heterogeneous because of the indeterminateness of their scope. Their content is, if singular, too restricted in its interest, while if it is general, it easily becomes superficial because of scant development and the interest it holds is too slight.

**b.** The purpose of criticism is not a knowledge of literature, and thus not to be a *complete* depository of all new publications—something, by the way, which other journals cannot so much actually achieve as merely promise. Thus what is intentionally excluded is, in part, unimportant publications, while in part it is whatever does not belong to scientific literature and the *belles lettres*—e.g., economics, technological subjects are other such fields.

**c.** Also excluded from this plan is the *detail* of the particular sciences of theology, jurisprudence, etc., inasmuch as it can hold interest only for those exclusively and immediately occupied with it. But in the case of *general works* concerned with these sciences as also with medicine, physics, natural history, chemistry, mathematics, history, and philology,

the decision as to whether criticism of them conforms with the purpose of the institute cannot depend so much on their *content*; rather, *the nature of the criticism itself* must determine whether general spiritual education *in toto*, science and taste have anything to gain from it.

d. Science, general spiritual education and taste are not usually advanced by so-called reviews and critical judgments by which one characterizes a publication without entering into its content. One may discover from such reviews and judgments whether the book is good or bad, as well as the title of the subject treated by the author; but the matter itself is not inquired into and talked through with the author. Thus our critiques shall be more of the sort that *treat* the subject, the author's own presentation serving as the basis to be followed, and not of the sort that critique the publication.

e. When a publication, be it empirical or theoretical in content, proves interesting through the novelty of its content and does not yet permit any real judgment, any false pride is to be put aside and a *historical presentation of its content*—analysis—is to be given. When in such a case the critic does not feel up to being the sort of master in the subject who has already finished with all the *scibili* and knows everything better, false modesty prevents the publication from ever being discussed. This is the case with Winterl's works and many another publication.<sup>8</sup> Though the critics are conscious they cannot puff themselves up in connection with these publications, they do not wish to renounce the venture and be content with an analysis which for the time being informs the public. The public desires such information and in fact prefers it to judgment. Faced with a choice between analysis and pure review, surely the public prefers the former.

f. There is likewise no room for reviews which aim to prove to the author the attention with which his publication has been read, and which—aside from a general judgment—consist in a *dialogue* with the author, presenting him with objections and corrections of interest only to the author and critic but not to any third party. Everything that is merely the critic's personal opinion is in principle eliminated, even if he at once claims to represent the public in the matter.

g. To enter into the essential content of publications from the particular specializations, however, is of just as great general interest as utility to science. To cite a definite example, consider a review of a book such as Paulus' *Commentary on the New Testament* which includes in the review investigation of the principles of the New Testament.<sup>9</sup> To speak of other special sciences, for example jurisprudence, natural law, constitutional law,

even systems of pandects, inquiries into criminal justice, the *Code Napoléon* and so forth fall into this category. And so, in medicine, its systematic side, along with ingenious opinions and treatment of individual diseases, yellow fever with its current interest, and so on, are likewise included here. In physics and chemistry publications containing an essential enrichment of the sciences find a place here. Ancient literature, moreover, should command the interest of any educated man; it is important that the way be paved and eased for such a man in this field, mainly through the depreciation of purely pedantic endeavors and of the *scientiae arcanae* of which a number of professionals make a show, but which upon closer examination point up the caprice and arbitrariness of such experts.

h. At present all sciences are facing regeneration with respect to their concepts, and with respect to the absence of spirit which transforms scientific content into mere material and handles uncritically and unconsciously concepts which it usually does not even know it has. The theoretical side like the empirical side form a tradition which is transmitted unexamined from one hand to the next as something long proven and laid away. Criticism must above all direct inquiry against this tradition, which encounters the boredom if not the contempt of the public. It is precisely what is customary, what has tradition on its side, what is considered long known—a kind of old rubbish whose acceptance is brought about by mere use along with a so-to-speak conventional life mode, even though it is not taken more seriously by those who continue to talk about it without interruption than the phrase about the rotation of the Sun around the Earth is habitually taken by astronomers who condescend to it—it is precisely this that most needs to be set on its head and challenged, in order first at least to stir up amazement and perplexity and then to give matter for reflection.

i. We do not mean to enter into the mannerism of the current fermentation in the sciences which, coming from philosophy, submerges and confuses them. Victorious attack on the empty and spiritless method of scientificity in part calls merely for common sense, assuming it possesses the educated confidence not to let itself be misled or imposed upon by any air of earnestness in such scientificity. In part such philosophical scientificity, which was supposed to be an application and transition of abstract ideas to the definite content of genuine sciences—for it was this which was taken to be currently at issue—is for the most part rather empty formalism, an immature brew of half-apprehended concepts, shallow and for the most part even foolish brainstorm, and ignorance not only of the sciences but of philosophy itself. To spell out my meaning more definitely, I cite as examples Windischmann, Görres, Steffens' pursuits for

the greater part, along with attempts published especially in the opening numbers of *Jena's General Literary Review*.<sup>10</sup> Above all, scientific criticism must resist this raw torrential stream now threatening to confound reason and science—the posturing and principles of which Schelling, after having in part indicated and employed them himself, now solemnly begins to renounce. We shall thus support the instinct of the public which, after its first wonder, passed over to indifference toward such mannerism. We shall lend support to the respect for philosophy which, due to the general need for it, still basically continues. We shall find a sympathetic response among all the friends of insight who were reduced to silence and neglect of the whole subject through such insolence and immaturity. We will likewise extricate that wonder which shies away from a test and which had respect for all this pretense because of the universal ideas woven into it. And by separating out what is impure, we shall make it possible for such wonder to profit from what is authentic.\*

k. Thorough investigation and treatment of the *subject* automatically implies that what is mediocre and inferior—even if it must be discussed because of what prestige it enjoys or pretensions it makes—must not expect any mercy or tolerance, but is rather exposed to all the grounds against it as well as to wit and flashes of insight. But everything personal, spiteful, everything stemming from a desire to vex or to vaunt oneself shall be eliminated. The fact that it is a question of subject matter also means that the critic must find it preferable to be able to recognize, with understanding, something as excellent rather than to be obliged to speak against it. For it is harder to develop properly why something is excellent than to find its imperfections. Undeveloped admiration and approval are of just as little interest as mere criticism and fault-finding. Honest zeal for science and thorough treatment remain equally free of the kind of concern a critic thinks he has to have, so to speak, by profession, to say something always more clever than what already is very clever; in the case of what is excellent, to know how to indicate that it could have been done even better—whereby in most cases it would have become worse; and generally to know everything better and assume the air of a master and judge for whom it is no longer a question of his learning something from a publication and speaking in this sense.

In a word, if, putting aside personal considerations as well as superficial loyalty to tradition and mere opinion which only asserts and gives

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\* [The letter “j” is missing from Hegel’s text, although there does not seem to be a lacuna. He seems simply to have forgotten it.]

assurance but neither examines nor elaborates, the subject matter of science and taste is boldly seized and given currency against all false pretensions and is asserted with earnestness and penetration of the grounds, an institute which accomplishes this and in this way largely distinguishes itself from present ones cannot fail to hold both intrinsic interest and interest for the general public, whose instinct always gives what is right preference over what is bad, with which it temporarily makes due.

With respect to external arrangements, I make the following observations:

The journal appears in monthly issues of preferably twelve rather than ten sheets or less.

The agreement with the publisher is made according to the number of copies, so that 500 or 750 copies are determined as the fixed starting point and are considered the minimum.

A board of directors drawn from those first embarking on the institute exercises a supervisory function with respect to what publications are to receive notices and to which collaborators are to be invited. This board is to be regarded as proprietor of the whole.

The editor, who is a permanent member of the board, is in charge of correspondence, accounts, and the current business of printing and so on. The expenses are first deducted from the revenue of the whole operation. The size of *honorariums* is determined according to what remains. Instead of a fixed salary, the editor is granted for his trouble a certain *percentage*, fifteen to twenty percent of this remainder.

The publishing house supplies the books at a discount of twenty- to twenty-five percent of the retail price. The reviewer has the right of retaining them at a forty-percent discount; otherwise they are sold by the board account. They are to be classed with expenses. Books that have not through use become unsaleable by the publisher, and of which a copy has not been expressly assigned by the publisher to the institute, will be taken back by the publisher without any further commission if it can otherwise use them.

To begin in July 1807

## Notes

1. G. W. F. Hegel, *Sämtliche Werke: Jubiläumsausgabe*, 20 vols., ed. Hermann Glockner (Stuttgart: Frommann, 1927–40), vol. 1, pp. 541–47. See G. W. F. Hegel, *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Werke in zwanzig Bänden*, 20 vols., ed. Eva

Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1970–71), vol. 2, p. 592, on the dating of the prospectus.

2. Hegel, *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. 1, pp. 173–89.

3. G. W. F. Hegel, *Briefe von und an Hegel*, 3rd ed., 4 vols., ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1969), no. 70.

4. Hegel, *Briefe von und an Hegel*, no. 32.

5. Ibid.

6. Hegel, *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. 20, pp. 31–53.

7. Hegel, *Briefe von und an Hegel*, no. 112.

8. Jakob Joseph Winterl (1773–1838), professor of medicine, chemistry, and botany.

9. Heinrich Eberhard Gottlob Paulus (1761–1851), *Philological-Critical and Historical Commentary on the New Testament* (1800).

10. Karl Josef Hieronymus Windischmann (1775–1839), Johann Josef von Görres (1776–1848), and Heinrich Steffens (1773–1845). *Jena's General Literary Review* (*Jenaische Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung*).



# Hegel's Advertisement for the Publication of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*

Translated by Walter Kaufmann

The following is a translation of Hegel's own description of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* which appeared in the Jena cultural supplement, i.e. *Intelligenzblatt der Jenaer Allgemeinen Literatur-Zeitung* (*The Intelligence Papers of the Jena Journal of General Literature*), on October 28, 1807. The *Phenomenology* itself had already appeared in April of the same year.

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Announcements of new books:

Jos[esph] Ant[on] Goebhardt's Bookstore, Bamberg and Würzburg, has published and sent to all good bookstores: G. W. F. Hegel's *System of Science*, volume one, containing the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Large Octavo. 1807. Price: 6 fl.

This volume deals with the *becoming of knowledge*. The phenomenology of spirit is to replace psychological explanations as well as the more abstract discussions of the foundation of knowledge. It considers the *preparation* for science from a point of view, which makes it a new, an interesting, and the first science of philosophy. It includes the various *forms of spirit* as stations on the way on which it becomes pure knowledge or absolute spirit. In the main parts of this science, which in turn are subdivided further, consideration is given to consciousness, self-consciousness, observing and acting reason, the spirit itself as ethical, educated, and

moral spirit, and finally as religious in its different forms. The wealth of the appearances of spirit, which at first glance seems chaotic, is brought into a scientific order which presents them according to their necessity in which the imperfect ones dissolve and pass over into higher ones which constitute their next truth. Their final truth they find at first in religion, then in science as the result of the whole.

In the Preface the author explains what seems to him the need of philosophy in its present state and also the presumption and mischief of the philosophic formulas that are currently degrading philosophy, and what is altogether crucial in it and its study.

A *second volume* will contain the system of *logic* as speculative philosophy, and of the other two parts of philosophy, the *sciences of nature* and *spirit*.

# Who Thinks Abstractly?

Translated by Walter Kaufmann

In the early-nineteenth-century edition of Hegel's *Werke*, this article appears in volume 17, pp. 400–5.<sup>1</sup> Rosenkranz discusses it briefly and says that it shows “how much Hegel . . . entered into the Berlin manner.”<sup>2</sup>

Hermann Glockner reprints it in his edition of Hegel's *Sämtliche Werke* in vol. 20 (1930), which is entitled: *Vermischte Schriften aus der Berliner Zeit*.<sup>3</sup> He includes it among “four *feuilletons* that Hegel wrote for local papers during the later years of his Berlin period.” But Glockner admits: “The exact place of publication is unfortunately unknown to me.”<sup>4</sup>

Johannes Hoffmeister, whose critical edition of Hegel's *Berliner Schriften: 1818–1831* (1956) is much more comprehensive than Glockner's, does not include this article.<sup>5</sup> In a footnote he says that it belongs to Hegel's “Jena period (1807/08).”<sup>6</sup> This is an uncharacteristic slip: at the beginning of 1807 Hegel went to Bamberg, in 1808 to Nürnberg; and in the first weeks of 1807, before he left Jena, he certainly lacked the time and peace of mind to write this article.

Of Glockner's “four *feuilletons*” Hoffmeister retains only one, and that is really a letter to a newspaper, protesting their review of a new play. Hoffmeister gives no reasons for dating this article so much earlier than Rosenkranz and Glockner did. Possibly, Hegel's disparaging remark in it about the German playwright August von Kotzebue suggests a date before Kotzebue was stabbed to death (1819) by a German theology student. That the piece was written in Jena seems most unlikely: it is so very different from the articles—and the *Phenomenology*—that Hegel wrote during his harassed and unhappy

years in that city. But Hoffmeister could be right that it was written in 1807 or 1808.

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## Who Thinks Abstractly?

Think? Abstractly? —*Sauve qui peut!* Let those who can save themselves! Even now I can hear a traitor, bought by the enemy, exclaim these words, denouncing this essay because it will plainly deal with metaphysics. For *metaphysics* is a word, no less than *abstract*, and almost *thinking* as well, from which everybody more or less runs away as from a man who has caught the plague.

But the intention here really is not so wicked, as if the meaning of “thinking” and of “abstract” were to be explained here. There is nothing the beautiful world finds as intolerable as explanations. I, too, find it terrible when somebody begins to explain, for when worst comes to worst I understand everything myself. Here the explanation of thinking and abstract would in any case be entirely superfluous; for it is only because the beautiful world knows what it means to be abstract that it runs away. Just as one does not desire what one does not know, one also cannot hate it. Nor is it my intent to try craftily to reconcile the beautiful world with thinking or with the abstract as if, under the semblance of small talk, thinking and the abstract were to be put over until in the end they had found their way into society incognito, without having aroused any disgust; even as if they were to be adopted imperceptibly by society, or, as the Swabians say, *hereingezäunselt*,<sup>7</sup> before the author of this complication suddenly exposed this strange guest, namely the abstract, whom the whole party had long treated and recognized under a different title as if he were a good old acquaintance. Such scenes of recognition which are meant to instruct the world against its will have the inexcusable fault that they simultaneously humiliate, and the wire-puller tries with his artifice to gain a little fame; but this humiliation and this vanity destroy the effect, for they push away again an instruction gained at such a price.

In any case, such a plan would be ruined from the start, for it would require that the crucial word of the riddle is not spoken at the outset. But this has already happened in the title. If this essay toyed with such craftiness, these words should not have been allowed to enter right in the beginning; but like the cabinet member in a comedy, they should have been required to walk around during the entire play in their overcoat, unbuttoning it only in the last scene, disclosing the flashing star of wisdom. The unbuttoning of the metaphysical overcoat would be less

effective, to be sure, than the unbuttoning of the minister's: it would bring to light no more than a couple of words, and the best part of the joke ought to be that it is shown that society has long been in possession of the matter itself; so what they would gain in the end would be the mere name, while the minister's star signifies something real—a bag of money.

That everybody present should know what thinking is and what is abstract is presupposed in good society, and we certainly are in good society. The question is merely *who* thinks abstractly. The intent, as already mentioned, is not to reconcile society with these things, to expect it to deal with something difficult, to appeal to its conscience not frivolously to neglect such a matter that befits the rank and status of beings gifted with reason. Rather it is my intent to reconcile the beautiful world with itself, although it does not seem to have a bad conscience about this neglect; still, at least deep down, it has a certain respect for abstract thinking as something exalted, and it looks the other way not because it seems too lowly but because it appears too exalted, not because it seems too mean but rather too noble, or conversely because it seems an *espèce*, something special; it seems something that does not lend one distinction in general society, like new clothes, but rather something that—like wretched clothes, or rich ones if they are decorated with precious stones in ancient mounts or embroidery that, be it ever so rich, has long become quasi-Chinese—excludes one from society or makes one ridiculous in it.

Who thinks abstractly? The uneducated, not the educated. Good society does not think abstractly because it is too easy, because it is too lowly (not referring to the external status)—not from an empty affectation of nobility that would place itself above that of which it is not capable, but on account of the inward inferiority of the matter.

The prejudice and respect for abstract thinking are so great that sensitive nostrils will begin to smell some satire or irony at this point; but since they read the morning paper, they know that there is a prize to be had for satires and that I should therefore sooner earn it by competing for it than give up here without further ado.

I have only to adduce examples for my proposition: everybody will grant that they confirm it. A murderer is led to the place of execution. For the common populace he is nothing but a murderer. Ladies perhaps remark that he is a strong, handsome, interesting man. The populace finds this remark terrible: What? A murderer handsome? How can one think so wickedly and call a murderer handsome; no doubt, you yourselves are something not much better! This is the corruption of morals that is prevalent in the upper classes, a priest may add, knowing the bottom of things and human hearts.

One who knows men traces the development of the criminal's mind: he finds in his history, in his education, a bad family relationship between

his father and mother, some tremendous harshness after this human being had done some minor wrong, so he became embittered against the social order—a first reaction to this that in effect expelled him and henceforth did not make it possible for him to preserve himself except through crime. —There may be people who will say when they hear such things: he wants to excuse this murderer! After all I remember how in my youth I heard a mayor lament that writers of books were going too far and sought to extirpate Christianity and righteousness altogether; somebody had written a defense of suicide; terrible, really too terrible! —Further questions revealed that *The Sufferings of Werther*<sup>8</sup> were meant.

This is abstract thinking: to see nothing in the murderer except the abstract fact that he is a murderer, and to annul all other human essence in him with this simple quality.

It is quite different in refined, sentimental circles—in Leipzig. There they strewed and bound flowers on the wheel and on the criminal who was tied to it. —But this again is the opposite abstraction. The Christians may indeed trifle with Rosicrucianism, or rather cross-rosism, and wreath roses around the cross. The cross is the gallows and wheel that have long been hallowed. It has lost its one-sided significance of being the instrument of dishonorable punishment and, on the contrary, suggests the notion of the highest pain and the deepest rejection together with the most joyous rapture and divine honor. The wheel in Leipzig, on the other hand, wreathed with violets and poppies, is a reconciliation *à la* Kotzebue, a kind of slovenly sociability between sentimentality and badness.

In quite a different manner I once heard a common old woman who worked in a hospital kill the abstraction of the murderer and bring him to life for honor. The severed head had been placed on the scaffold, and the sun was shining. How beautifully, she said, the sun of God's grace shines on Binder's head! —You are not worthy of having the sun shine on you, one says to a rascal with whom one is angry. This woman saw that the murderer's head was struck by the sunshine and thus was still worthy of it. She raised it from the punishment of the scaffold into the sunny grace of God and, instead of accomplishing the reconciliation with violets and sentimental vanity, saw him accepted in grace in the higher sun.

Old woman, your eggs are rotten! the maid says to the market woman. What? she replies, my eggs rotten? You may be rotten! You say that about my eggs? You? Did not lice eat your father on the highways? Didn't your mother run away with the French, and didn't your grandmother die in a public hospital? Let her get a whole shirt instead of that flimsy scarf; we know well where she got that scarf and her hats: if it were not for those officers, many wouldn't be decked out like that these days, and if

their ladyships paid more attention to their households, many would be in jail right now. Let her mend the holes in her stockings! —In brief, she does not leave one whole thread on her. She thinks abstractly and subsumes the other woman—scarf, hat, shirt, etc., as well as her fingers and other parts of her, and her father and whole family, too—solely under the crime that she has found the eggs rotten. Everything about her is colored through and through by these rotten eggs, while those officers of which the market woman spoke—if, as one may seriously doubt, there is anything to that—may have got to see very different things.

To move from the maid to a servant, no servant is worse off than one who works for a man of low class and low income; and he is better off the nobler his master is. The common man again thinks more abstractly, he gives himself noble airs *vis-à-vis* the servant and relates himself to the other man merely as to a servant; he clings to this one predicate. The servant is best off among the French. The nobleman is familiar with his servant, the Frenchman is his friend. When they are alone, the servant does the talking; see Diderot's *Jacques et son maître*; the master does nothing but take snuff and see what time it is and lets the servant take care of everything else. The nobleman knows that the servant is not merely a servant, but also knows the latest city news, the girls, and harbors good suggestions; he asks him about these matters, and the servant may say what he knows about these questions. With a French master, the servant may not only do this; he may also broach a subject, have his own opinions and insist on them; and when the master wants something, it is not done with an order but he has to argue and convince the servant of his opinion and add a good word to make sure that this opinion retains the upper hand.

In the army we encounter the same difference. Among the Austrians a soldier may be beaten, he is *canaille*; for whatever has the passive right to be beaten is *canaille*. Thus the common soldier is for the officer this *abstractum* of a beatable subject with whom a gentleman who has a uniform and *port d'épée* must trouble himself—and that could drive one to make a pact with the devil.

## Notes

1. G. W. F. Hegel, *Werke: Vollständige Ausgabe*, 18 vols. (Berlin, 1832–45).
2. Karl Rosenkranz, *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Leben* (1844; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1963), pp. 355f.

3. G. W. F. Hegel, *Sämtliche Werke: Jubiläumsausgabe*, 20 vols., ed. Hermann Glockner (Stuttgart: Frommann, 1927–40).

4. Hegel, *Sämtliche Werke: Jubiläumsausgabe*, vol. 20, p. xix.

5. G. W. F. Hegel, *Sämtliche Werke*, 32 vols., ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg, 1952ff.).

6. G. W. F. Hegel, *Berliner Schriften: 1818–1831*, vol. 11 of Hegel, *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. Hoffmeister, p. xiii.

7. *hereingezäunselt*, the past participle of *hereinzäunseln*, which in Swabish as Hegel indicates means “to entice” or “to inveigle.”


8. I.e. by Goethe (1771).



PART

7

NÜRNBERG, 1808–1816





# On Classical Studies

Translated by Richard Kroner

The text translated here was a speech delivered by Hegel as rector of the *Gymnasium* (i.e. high school) at Nürnberg on September 29, 1809, at the end of the school year. The opening and closing paragraphs, which deal with matters of school organization and progress, have here been omitted. The translation has been made from the text in the collected edition of Hegel's works published after his death, *Werke: Vollständige Ausgabe*, 18 vols. (Berlin, 1832–45), vol. 16, pp. 133ff. Reference has also been made to the text published by Johannes Hoffmeister in *Hegels Nürnberger Schriften* (Leipzig, 1938), pp. 303 ff.<sup>1</sup> The partial translation by Millicent Mackenzie in her *Hegel's Educational Theory and Practice* (London, 1909) has been helpful in certain passages.

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## On Classical Studies

The spirit and purpose of our foundation is preparation for learned study, a preparation grounded on Greece and Rome. For more than a thousand years this has been the soil on which all civilization has stood, from which it has sprung, and with which it has been in continuous connection. Just as the natural organisms, plants and animals, struggle to free themselves from gravitation without being able to renounce this element of their

own nature, so the fine arts and the sciences have grown up on that soil, and, while they have attained a self-subsistence of their own, they have not yet emancipated themselves from the recollection of that older culture. As Antaeus renewed his energies by touching his mother-earth, so every new impetus and invigoration of science and learning has emerged into the daylight from a return to antiquity.

But, however important the preservation of this soil is, the modification of the relation between antiquity and modern times is no less essential. When once the insufficiency and the disadvantage of old principles and institutions is recognized together with the insufficiency of all former erudition and instruction based upon those principles, our mind first superficially reacts by demanding their complete rejection and abolition. But the wisdom of our government<sup>2</sup> has risen superior to such an easygoing method, and it has fulfilled the requirements of the time in the truest way by modifying the relation of the old principles to the new world; thus it preserves their essential features no less than it alters and rejuvenates them.

I need only remind you in a few words of the well-known position which the learning of the Latin language formerly had. It was not regarded simply as one element in education but was rather its most essential part and the only means of higher education offered to a pupil who refused to be satisfied with the general rudimentary instruction. There were hardly any educational arrangements expressly for acquiring knowledge useful to practical life or worthy in itself. The pupil was given the opportunity of learning Latin, and on the whole it depended on his use of that opportunity whether he picked up any knowledge of a practical kind, and, if so, how much. This other knowledge was thought of as acquired by a special art, not as a general means of education, and for the most part it was hidden in the shell of Latin instruction.

A unanimous objection was raised against that learning of Latin which had become obsolete. In particular, the feeling was produced that a nation cannot be deemed civilized if it cannot express all the treasures of science in its own language, if it cannot move freely in that language whatever the topic discussed. The intimacy which characterizes the possession of our own language is lacking in the knowledge which we possess in a foreign language only. Such a knowledge is separated from us by a barrier which prevents it from genuinely coming home to our minds.

This new outlook, together with deficient methods which often degenerated into a merely mechanical procedure, and the failure to acquire much important knowledge and many important intellectual accomplishments, has step by step destroyed the claim of Latin learning to be the citadel of all sciences. This learning has lost the dignity so long claimed

for it, the dignity of being the universal and almost the sole foundation of education. It has ceased to be considered as an end in itself; and this mental discipline has been compelled to see triumphing over it things not fitted for the purposes of education, among them mere matters of fact and everyday experience. Without entering into a discussion of this contrast and its consequences, its exaggerations or obvious incoherences, I may confine myself to expressing our joy at the wisdom of our government in handling this problem.

First of all it has enlarged the general system of civil education by improving the German elementary schools. In this way it has been made possible for everyone to learn what is essential for every human being and what is useful for every social position. To those who up to now missed a better education, this is now granted, while those who were compelled to learn Latin, in order to obtain something better than the inadequate elementary instruction, are now enabled to acquire abilities and knowledge better adapted to their special purposes, and Latin is not so indispensable for them. This city looks forward to the completion here of the beneficial organization which has already been achieved in the greater part of the kingdom.<sup>3</sup> The important consequences of this benefit for the whole country are almost incalculable.

Second, the study of the sciences and the acquisition of higher intellectual and practical abilities independently of the ancient literatures is now made fully possible in a sister-institute dedicated to this purpose alone.

Third, the study of the ancient languages is preserved. For one thing, it is open as before to everyone as a means of higher education; for another it is now consolidated as the fundamental basis of scholarly learning. Thus it has lost its exclusive character, because it now takes its place alongside those other modes of education and methods of attaining science, and in this way it may have extinguished the hatred aroused by its former arrogance. Thus as one separate discipline alongside others, it has all the more right to demand that it shall be given free scope and that henceforward it shall remain less troubled by alien and disturbing intrusions.

By this segregation and restriction it has obtained its true position and the opportunity of a freer and fuller development. The genuine mark of the freedom and strength of an organization consists in the opportunity granted to its various branches to develop their own peculiar existence and thus make themselves self-dependent systems. In such a way they can work side by side and look at each other's work without envy or fear, while at the same time they are integrated as no more than parts of one great system. It is only when a thing is segregated and when it carries out its own principle to completeness in segregation that it is

able to become a consistent whole, i.e. "something"; it gains depth and the vigorous potentiality of many-sidedness. Solicitude and anxiety about one-sidedness too frequently betray a weakness which generates nothing but a many-sided and inconsistent superficiality. Now, if the study of the ancient languages remains as before the basis of learned knowledge, it fulfils many claims even when it is restricted in the way just described. It seems to be a just demand that the civilization, art, and science of a nation should manage to stand on its own feet. Are we not entitled to assume that the achievements of modern times, our illumination and the progress of all arts and sciences, have worn out the Greek and Roman garments of their childhood and outgrown their leading-strings, so that they can now advance on their own territory without hindrance? The works of the ancients might on this view always possess an educational value of their own, highly rated by some, less highly by others, but they would have to be ranked with memories and superfluous learned antiquities, with things of merely historical import. Such things might be accepted or rejected within our higher education, but they should not, on this view, function any longer as its foundation and basis.

However, if we agree that excellence should be our starting point, then the foundation of higher study must be and remain Greek literature in the first place, Roman in the second. The perfection and glory of those masterpieces must be the spiritual bath, the secular baptism that first and indelibly attunes and tinctures the soul in respect of taste and knowledge. For this initiation a general, perfunctory acquaintance with the ancients is not sufficient; we must take up our lodging with them so that we can breathe their air, absorb their ideas, their manners, one might even say their errors and prejudices, and become at home in this world—the fairest that ever has been. While the first paradise was that of human *nature*, this is the second, the higher paradise of the human *spirit*, the paradise where the human spirit emerges like a bride from her chamber, endowed with a fairer naturalness, with freedom, depth, and serenity. The first wild glory of its dawn in the east is restrained by the grandeur of form and tamed into beauty. The human spirit manifests its profundity here no longer in confusion, gloom, or arrogance, but in perfect clarity. Its serenity is not like the play of children; it is rather a veil spread over the melancholy which is familiar with the cruelty of fate but is not thereby driven to lose its freedom and moderation. I do not believe I claim too much when I say that he who has never known the works of the ancients has lived without knowing what beauty is.

If we make ourselves at home in such an element, all the powers of the soul are stimulated, developed, and exercised; and, further, this element

is a unique material through which we enrich ourselves and improve the very substance of our being.

It has been said that activity of mind can be trained on any material, but best of all by external, useful, and visible objects which are supposed to be most appropriate to the age of youth or childhood, since they pertain to the compass and manner of mental development peculiar to this age.

One may doubt whether or not form and matter—training in itself and the objective circle of things on which we are trained—can be separated as if they had nothing to do with each other; but, even so, training as such is not the only thing that matters. As the plant not only trains its reproductive energies by enjoying light and air, but also absorbs its nourishment by this process, so likewise that subject matter which the intellect and our other physical faculties use in developing and training themselves must at the same time be their nourishment. This subject matter is not the sort of material which is called “useful,” i.e. the sensuous material which is the object of immediate sense perception to the child; on the contrary, it is only the content of mind, a content of intrinsic value and interest, which strengthens the soul. This content alone provides the independence and firmness, the essential inwardness which is the mother of self-control and self-possession, of presence and vigilance of mind; it generates in the soul thus prepared and educated a kernel of self-dependent value, of absolute ends, which alone is the precondition of all usefulness in life and which it is important to plant in all citizens of all walks of life. Have we not seen in our own times that even states become unsteady, expose themselves to dangers and collapse, despite plenty of valuable resources, just because they had neglected and disdained to preserve such an inner citadel in the soul of their citizens, and because they were interested in profit alone and directed their citizens to treat things spiritual as mere means?

The works of the ancients contain the most noble food in the most noble form: golden apples in silver bowls. They are incomparably richer than all the works of any other nation and of any other time. The greatness of their sentiments, their statuesque virtue free from moral ambiguity, their patriotism, the grand manner of their deeds and characters, the multiplicity of their destinies, of their morals and constitutions—to recall these is enough to vindicate the assertion that in the compass of no other civilization was there ever united so much that was splendid, admirable, original, many-sided, and instructive.

These riches, however, are intimately connected with the language, and only through and in it do we obtain them in all their special significance. Their content can be approximately given us by translations, but not their form, not their ethereal soul. Translations are like artificial

roses which may resemble natural ones in shape, color, and perhaps even scent, but which cannot attain their loveliness, delicacy, and softness of life. Whatever daintiness and refinement the copy has belongs to the copy alone, and in the copy the contrast between the content and the form that has not grown up with the content makes itself felt unmistakably. The language is the musical element, the element of intimacy that fades away in the translation; it is the fine fragrance which makes possible the reader's sympathetic enjoyment of the ancient work and without which that work tastes like Rhine wine that has lost its flavor.

This fact lays on us what may seem the hard necessity of studying the ancient languages thoroughly and making them familiar to us as a prelude to enjoying their works to the greatest possible extent in all their aspects and excellences. To complain about the trouble we have to undergo in learning the languages, and to regret or to fear that we have thus to neglect the learning of other things and the training of other abilities means to find fault with fate because it has not given us this collection of classical works in our own language. Only if we possessed them in our own tongue would we possess a substitute for antiquity and be spared the laborious journey thither.

After having spoken about the content of education, I wish to add some words about the form which its nature entails.

The progress of culture must not be regarded as the quiet continuation of a chain in which the new links, though attached to the older ones without incongruity, are made of fresh material, and the work of forging them is not directed by what has been done before. On the contrary, culture must have earlier material on which it works and which it changes and modifies. It is necessary that we appropriate the world of antiquity not only to possess it, but even more to digest and transform it.

But the substance of nature and spirit must have confronted us, must have taken the shape of something alien to us, before it can become our *object*. Unhappy he whose immediate world of feelings has been alienated from him—for this means nothing less than the snapping of those bonds of faith, love, and trust which unite heart and head with life in a holy friendship. The alienation which is the condition of theoretical erudition does not require this moral pain, or the sufferings of the heart, but only the easier pain and strain of the imagination which is occupied with something not given in immediate experience, something foreign, something pertaining to recollection, to memory and the thinking mind.

The demand for this separation, however, is so necessary that everyone knows it as a familiar and common impulse. What is strange, and far away, attracts our interest and lures us to activity and effort: it seems to be the more desirable the more remote it is and the less we have in common with it. The youth enjoys the prospect of leaving his native country and



living like Robinson Crusoe on a distant island. It is a necessary illusion to begin by mistaking distance for profundity; in fact, the depth and strength to which we attain can be measured only by the distance between the point to which we were fleeing and the center in which we were engrossed at first and to which we shall finally return again.

This centrifugal force of the soul explains why the soul must always be provided with the means of estranging itself from its natural condition and essence, and why in particular the young mind must be led into a remote and foreign world. Now, the screen best suited to perform this task of estrangement for the sake of education is the world and language of the ancients. This world separates us from ourselves, but at the same time it grants us the cardinal means of returning to ourselves: we reconcile ourselves with it and thereby find ourselves again in it, but the self which we then find is the one which accords with the tone and universal essence of mind.

If we apply to school education the general principle of this necessary process, which entails learning the ideas of the ancients as well as their language, it becomes evident that the mechanical side of this learning is not just a necessary evil. For it is the mechanical that is foreign to the mind, and it is this which awakens the mind's desire to digest the indigestible food forced upon it, to make intelligible what is at first without life and meaning, and to assimilate it.

Besides, with the mechanical elements in linguistic study there is closely connected the grammatical study whose value cannot be too highly assessed, for it constitutes the beginning of logical training. I mention this aspect last because it seems to be almost sunk in oblivion. Grammar, I mean, has for its content the categories, the special products and concepts of the understanding: in learning grammar, therefore, the understanding itself first becomes learned. These intellectual essentials, with which grammar first makes us acquainted, are something very easy for youth to grasp; in fact, nothing in the world of mind can be grasped more easily. While youth does not yet possess the power of comprehending the manifold sides of intellectual riches, those abstractions are quite simple. They are, as it were, the single letters, or rather the vowels, of the intellectual realm; we have to begin with them in order first to spell and later to read the language of mind.

Furthermore, grammar expounds the categories of the understanding in a fashion adapted to youth, because it teaches them by distinguishing them with the help of external marks mostly granted by the language itself. Knowledge of the categories thus accomplished is somewhat better than the knowledge of colors like red or blue which everyone can distinguish without being able to define them according to Newton's hypothesis or some other theory. It is of the utmost importance to have paid attention

to these logical distinctions. Since the categories of the understanding are present in us because we are intellectual beings, and since we therefore understand them immediately, the first step in erudition consists in our really possessing them, i.e. in having made them the objects of our consciousness and having become capable of distinguishing them by means of characteristic marks.

Grammatical terminology teaches us how to move in the realm of abstractions. This study consequently can be looked on as a preliminary instruction in philosophy. This is the reason why it is essentially regarded not only as a means, but also as an end, in the Latin as much as in the German language classes. The general superficiality and frivolity which only the tremendous gravity and impact of the political revolutions in our days was able to overcome had perverted the relation between means and ends in the field of linguistic studies as much as in all other fields: the material knowledge of a language was higher esteemed than its rational aspect. Grammatical learning of an *ancient* language affords the advantage of necessarily implying a continuous and sustained activity of reason. In speaking our mother tongue, unreflective habit leads us to speak grammatically; but with an ancient language it is otherwise, and we have to keep in view the significance which the intellect has given to the parts of speech and call to our aid the rules of their combination. Therefore, a perpetual operation of subsuming the particular under the general and of specifying the general has to take place, and it is just in this that the activity of reason consists. Strict grammatical study is accordingly one of the most universal and noble forms of intellectual education.

Study of the ancients in their own language and grammatical instruction together constitute the fundamental principle characteristic of our institution. This important benefit, though rich enough in itself, does not comprise the whole range of knowledge to which our preparatory institute is an introduction. The classical authors to be read are so selected that the content of their writings is itself instructive, but, apart from this, the school offers lessons about other subjects which have a value in themselves or are particularly useful or beautiful. I only need to mention these subjects here; their compass, their treatment, their order and gradation, and their relation to other subjects can be learned from the schedule that will be published and distributed. These subjects are, in general: religion, German (including our classics), arithmetic, followed by algebra, geometry, geography, history, physiography (comprising cosmography, natural history, and physics), elements of philosophy, French, Hebrew for future theologians, drawing and calligraphy. How little these subjects are neglected can be seen from a simple calculation: if we omit the last four subjects, the time given to the lessons in those first mentioned

is exactly as long as that given to the ancient languages, but if we add those four subjects, then the classical studies comprise not even one-half, but only two-fifths of the whole curriculum.

## Notes


1. G. W. F. Hegel, *Sämtliche Werke*, 32 vols., ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg, 1952ff.).
2. I.e. in reorganizing education.
3. I.e. of Bavaria.



PART

8

BERLIN, 1818–1831





# Prefatory Lectures on the Philosophy of Law

Translated by Alan S. Brudner

The following translation of the prefaces to Hegel's Berlin lectures on the philosophy of law is based on the *Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie* (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1973–74), edited by Karl-Heinz Ilting. All three prefaces presented here have been edited by Ilting from lecture notes taken by students of Hegel at the University of Berlin. The first preface, edited from the notes of Carl Gustav Homeyer, introduced lectures delivered in 1818–19; the second, from the notes of Heinrich Gustav Hotho, introduced the lectures of 1822–23; while the third, from Karl Gustav Julius von Griesheim's notes, prefaced lectures given in 1824–25. (A fragment from Hegel's final series of lectures, interrupted by his death in November 1831, is omitted.)

Hegel's lectures on *Rechtsphilosophie* have hitherto been available in English only in the "Additions" which T. M. Knox appended to his translation of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1952). These were based on Eduard Gans' edition (1833), which used only the Hotho and Griesheim manuscripts, from which it culled excerpts. The prefaces to all three available lecture cycles are thus translated here in their entirety for the first time.

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## Prefatory Lecture on the Philosophy of Law (1818–19)

The purpose of all constitutional law is freedom.<sup>1</sup> Spirit, in other words, is not what it is by nature, but rather is only that which it makes itself; it is itself only as its own work. Nature is its starting point, but its genuine being consists in transcending this natural immediacy, in generating itself out of itself. We see this development, which strives to cancel [*aufheben*] the form of naturalness, elicited not only by the spirit of man in the education of the individual, but also by the universal world spirit in the case of peoples in general.

The state of nature, the state of childhood, is that of unfreedom, of the caprice of the accidental will. The will, still immersed in nature, can for that reason be dependent on an alien will. Accordingly, we find in this context fear, oppression, the power of the isolated will which is directed not upon the universal but upon the particular. The human being subjects himself out of faith or fealty to the will of another. But man's passion for freedom, his striving to emerge from the natural condition to a higher one, issues forth from the subjugation of the will.

This middle condition is a mixture of determinations of the will and of right with those based on power or trust. Upon it devolves also positive law, which contains, besides rational determinations, those which originate in an earlier and lower condition.

The historical development of a people shows how that people realizes its concept of freedom. Every people must endure the struggle which aims at harmonizing the concept of freedom with reality, and, in fact, which does so through a necessary succession of stages grounded in the nature of reason.

Inasmuch as the legal conditions prevailing at these stages belong to reality, they have on the one hand a rational necessity, on the other a historical one. The absolute necessity is the infinity of the Concept, which has remained in none of its limiting cases; the external necessity is that which still obtains at some one stage belonging to the middle condition, where the concept of freedom doubtless begins to develop, but where it is still grasped in opposition to the natural will.

The genuine cognition of the eternal cannot remain with the historicist view of legal conditions, for this view counts as just only that which prevails, that which is formally valid, even if it is also, from the standpoint of the eternal, the greatest wrong. (The historicist viewpoint has been especially recommended in recent times, partly because of the necessity to justify the existing juridical order, partly because of the feeble condition of philosophy, which has sunk into a surmising without knowing. The



concepts of right in their mere abstraction cause interminable disorder.) The philosophy of law remains neither with abstraction nor with the historicist viewpoint when the latter is not conformable to the Idea. It knows that the kingdom of right can arise only through a progressive development, and that no stage of this development can be sprung over. The juridical order, however, is based only on the universal spirit of the people, so that the constitution stands in a necessary connection with the existing concepts. Accordingly, if the spirit of the people has advanced to a higher stage, then the constitutional moments that were related to earlier stages no longer have stability; they must collapse and no might can hold them. Thus philosophy knows that only the rational can occur, however much the external, particular appearances seem to contradict it.

The contemporary *Zeitgeist* is directed against several moments from which the current condition of European peoples still suffers, and which obstruct the pure development of the concept of justice. In Germany there are especially two such moments, the first of which concerns mainly private law, the second public law.

Germanic law in general proceeded from the peculiarity of the Germanic character; thus the realization of the concept of freedom was effected for awhile in the mode of feeling. Law was based on sincerity and trust, expressing itself more in the form of habit and custom than in determinations of thought.

However, the moment in which the Concept tears itself loose from personality, in which the juridical order strives to vindicate itself against the arbitrariness of feeling, was necessary here too. It was the peculiar fate of the Germans that this transition failed. A foreign law became master over the splendor of the old life at a time when the demand awoke to grasp ancient customary law as molded in the form of thought. German youth suffered itself to be impressed by the logical precision of Roman law, and hurried to Italy to delve into the foreign culture in order upon return home arrogantly to overthrow the old institutions.

The content of Roman law, be what it will, was always alien to the German genius and had first to be made applicable through the diligence of scholars. The administration of justice was torn from a people without legal erudition, and the old constitution, accepted insofar as its laws were the same as the Roman, was otherwise supplanted or reduced to nullity; in general the administration of justice [became] the property of a scholarly estate. (In England, that old, Germanic academy, which is closely bound up with political freedom, still exists.)

The second moment, which is related more to public law, is the feudal system. The latter contradicts the idea of justice in that it does not allow the freedom of property and of the person to come to its full

development. The person is more or less enslaved, bound to the earth. Even if the extreme form of serfdom ceases, the freedom of property is nevertheless always burdened with external and, for the most part, indissoluble obligations. Through the heritability of office, political rights are turned into private property, and duty toward the state becomes more a matter of individual caprice.

Wherever the spirit has come to a higher consciousness, the struggle against such institutions is necessary.

The object of the philosophical science of law is the higher concept of the nature of freedom without regard to what holds good to the popular conceptions of the time.

The ground of freedom is pure thought.

## Prefatory Lecture on the Philosophy of Law (1822–23)

Let us first briefly acquaint ourselves with the standpoint of our science.<sup>2</sup>

### 1. Positive Law

The subject matter is supposed to be justice. Where do we turn in order to know what justice is? The first conclusion is that we have to rely on the laws of the state. One speaks of the right of the individual *vis-à-vis* the state, of the state *vis-à-vis* the individual. In the natural condition of man there is no right. In my duty toward another lies the right of the other, that which I have to respect in him. Duties and rights thus give rise to each other. The most immediate knowledge of justice would accordingly be already contained in the laws. The laws therefore tell us what justice is. They hold together the life of human beings.

### 2. Juridical and Natural Scientific Laws

Nevertheless, another kind of law immediately comes to mind: there is a world of laws that in general we call nature. If we attend to the difference between juridical laws and laws of nature, the sphere of [juridical] law will at once draw nearer to us.

The laws of nature simply are and are valid as such; they are not liable to infringement, though in some cases they are transgressed. Here, in order to know what the law is, we must rely on nature in the usual way. These laws are right; only our ideas about them can be false. The standard of these laws is outside us, and our knowledge adds nothing to them nor does it assist them; only our knowledge of them can advance.

Knowledge of juridical laws is on the one hand the same, on the other not. The laws [of the state] too we get to know just as they are. The citizen becomes acquainted with the laws more or less superficially, and the jurist likewise remains at the knowledge of what exists, of what is given, of what is valid now. To this extent the way of knowing juridical laws is the same as that of knowing laws of nature.

However, in the case of juridical laws spirit arises. The diversity of laws draws attention to the fact that they are not as absolute as the laws of nature. The laws of right are posited, originated by men. With these laws, which are thus considered as nothing absolute, an inner voice may collide or agree. Man does not stop at the existent, but claims to have within himself the standard of what is right. He can subject himself to the compulsion and power of external authority, but not as he does to the necessity of nature, because an inner voice tells him how things ought to be; he finds in himself the confirmation or disconfirmation of what passes as valid. In nature the highest confirmation of a law is that it really exists; with the laws of right, the thing is not valid simply because it exists; on the contrary, everyone demands that it correspond to his own criterion. Here, therefore, conflict is possible between what is and what ought to be.

If we consider this difference between the two kinds of law and inquire as to the ground to which juridical laws belong, we see that [juridical] law originates only in spirit, for nature has no rights. Thus there is a world of existent nature and, over against it, a spiritual world. Initially their needs bring human beings together in a superficial way; but man has these urges entirely in common with animals. This connection with others is only a natural one; the spiritual forces itself through the natural connection and supplants it. The substantial core of this spiritual connection is the world of [juridical] law, whose ground is freedom. This is the sphere of the will, of freedom.

### 3. Natural and Positive Law

In establishing spirit as the ground of law, we are immediately confronted with a counterposition. We hear it said that if law stems from spirit, then this is an unstable ground, since personal preference and arbitrary opinions repose there as well. Hence these accidental elements are also operative in the determination of law, which thus appears under the aspect of contingency. We are thus confronted by an opposition between law as it is in and for itself, which is unchangeable, and the arbitrary definitions of what should count as law, [which definitions] may be the result of passion.

A contradiction of this sort does not seem to occur in the world of natural laws. The conflict involved in this schism is found only on the ground of spirit—an astonishing fact, since spirit is higher than nature, which nevertheless has as its foundation conformity to law. It may seem, therefore, that the privileged status of spirit leads only to discontent and constitutes its misfortune.

Man is often referred back from the capriciousness of life to the contemplation of nature. It is often said that he should direct himself according to the law of nature, that the latter should be his model. In this opposition between law in and for itself and what caprice makes pass for law lies the need to acquire a thorough knowledge of law. In law man must meet with his reason; consequently, he must contemplate the rationality of law, and this is the task of our science. [The latter thus stands] in contrast to positive jurisprudence, which often has to do with contradictions, but only in particular cases where the decision over the controversy belongs to the understanding with its determinate presuppositions (positive laws).

#### 4. Natural Law as a Need of the Time

The need to apprehend the rationality of law leads to the philosophy of law. This is the need of all ages. The contemporary age, however, needs it still more urgently, because whereas thirty or forty years ago fear, respect, and reverence for the law were still valued, the civilization of the world has now taken a different turn. Thought has placed itself at the pinnacle of everything that is to have validity. The various rights of individuals used to be derived from tradition; one estate had to perform one thing for the state, another something else. Rights were thus based on particular favors or particular conquests. Law of this sort could be known and understood only historically, i.e. one could only acquaint oneself with the historical circumstances which gave rise to the laws. Viewed superficially, these circumstances were devoid of necessity, of a universal principle. There was in general a particularism with regard to rights.

Above this [realm of particularity] thought arose and set up sweeping theories that claimed to have universal validity. Accordingly, there existed now a higher criterion of law. Frederick II ruled from the standpoint of what was best for the state; this was the universal principle of his administration, to which [particularistic] rights had to yield. Through this principle a uniformity was established, a universal and self-consistent body of law. This is not the place to determine who should decide on the universal principle to be established.

It is to be esteemed a great thing that the human being, because he is human, is now viewed as possessing rights, so that his humanity is

thus higher than his station. Among the Israelites, Greeks and Romans, only Jews, free Greeks and Romans respectively possessed rights, and only as Jews, Greeks and Romans, not as men in general. But now universal principles have been established as the sources of law, and therewith a new epoch has begun in the world. Mere respect for tradition is rejected in favor of universal principles, just as princes can no longer be seen proceeding from passion or whim. Formerly the pleasure of the prince opposed tradition, but in modern times it is universal principles that rule.

Thus, while theories have in recent times caused great mischief, they have also effected much that is great. These theories are set over against existing law and appear to count as objectively right and necessary. Inasmuch as the culture of the time has elevated itself to this form, there is a special need to know and understand thoughts of law. Since thought has risen to be the essential form [of things], we must grasp law too in thoughts. If the Mohammedans must go to the Koran and the jurists to positive law, then the times have passed them by.

## 5. Foundation of Natural Law

This form of thought appears at first as a mere form, while law seems to be a content. If we consider this more closely, however, we see that thought belongs to the nature of law, for law originates in spirit, whose highest form is thought. Thinking establishes the independence which makes men into human beings. In thought, therefore, the times have found the inner principle of law. It would appear that, when thought is made preeminent over law, the door is opened to arbitrary opinions. But genuine thought is no mere opinion about the thing but rather the concept of the thing itself. The concept of the thing does not come to us naturally. Everyone has fingers, brush, and colors, but that does not make him a painter. The same is true of thinking. The thought of law is not something one gets immediately along with a brain. Right thinking is scientific thinking and our knowledge of law should therefore be scientific. One can easily have objections to thinking of this sort, but we need not pay attention to these; precisely those who knock thinking, who are embittered by and rebel against it, are most of all lacking in thought. Accordingly, we must grasp law thinkingly.

Concerning the sphere of our science we shall say the following: the ground of law is freedom; law without freedom is meaningless; law is only the [concrete] existence of freedom. In law there is thus the moment of freedom. The latter is initially the inner essence of the will. Man is free in essence, but not yet in his existence. That he be free existentially is the second moment, and the unity of both is the true concept of law.

Law is thus freedom which has an existence. This existence is nothing accidental, but is rather determined through the concept itself, and only in being so determined is it adequate thereto. The concept is itself this activity which gives itself objectivity. Freedom is this energy to acquire existence, the power to give itself actuality. In considering freedom, therefore, we do not stop at the concept, but rather pass over to its realization, to the world which spirit builds for itself.

It is this which, to begin with, constitutes the scope of our science. The concept gives itself existence; therewith we have two moments: concept and existence. This is the same as saying that the concept determines itself further. From one side this appears as the extension of the world of law; from the other as the concept sinking deeper into its inner essence. In the state the concept of law gives freedom objectivity, creates a world for itself, and this is the deeper grasp of the concept, its grasp of what it is.

We are concerned, then, with the concept which determines itself, which gives itself existence. To the extent, therefore, that we remain with the concept, we also proceed to its existence; for we have before us no mere abstraction. Discussions of law often proceed from the idea of possession, of the gratification of instinct, regarding these as the foundation. Law is held to be the safeguard of possession and enjoyment which can be purchased only through the sacrifice of a part of our freedom. [In this view,] law stands opposed to freedom, being at one time the servant of enjoyment and possession, at another the restriction of our freedom. This conception must be abandoned in favor of the idea that freedom, or the spiritual, acquires existence through law rather than being restricted thereby.

### Prefatory Lecture on the Philosophy of Law (1824–25)

I base this lecture on the philosophy of law on my manual that bears the double title, "Natural Law and Political Science, or Foundations of the Philosophy of Law."<sup>3</sup> Inasmuch as natural law formerly did not include political science, the latter was treated independently. If we nevertheless reflect upon the relationship between what natural law has meant and what has been understood by jurisprudence, [it will be seen that] our science enters immediately into a relationship with the positive science of law. The latter stands opposed to it, as does positive constitutional law. The first topic of our discussion will therefore be the relationship between what has been understood by natural law and jurisprudence. The second topic is then the elucidation of the relation of philosophy to positive

jurisprudence. The latter does not, as a matter of fact, remain with the positive alone, with what is *de facto* valid or legal, but rather develops reasons for the laws, and insofar as it offers them especially in terms of historical circumstances we have a historicist approach to jurisprudence. This relationship<sup>4</sup> will be the third topic.

## Natural Law and Jurisprudence

### a. The Question concerning a Natural Law

The term “natural law” was formerly the usual name for our science, which investigated what is right by nature, the law of the natural man as opposed to conventional law, to the artificial association of men, to the social order insofar as its decrees appeared not to be grounded in the universal nature of man but to owe their origin merely to arbitrary will. It is natural and easy to imagine how man conceives the idea of contemplating what is lawful by nature. In the state he finds himself amid a plethora of laws, duties, and relationships, in contrast with which there easily occurs to him the simple thought of the little which human nature requires. The needs of the latter are circumscribed, and it must be possible to satisfy them in a simple, unconstrained, untroublesome manner. With this idea one can easily regard the manifold as superfluous. Insofar as they contradict natural law, these restraints and manifold contrivances can appear unnecessary, even unjust, far removed from the destiny of man, and one may be struck by a cleft between what human nature demands and these duties, laws, and regulations. Or it may even appear that both frequently contradict each other on the most important matters. There is thus forced upon the educated man the simple question, how many of the rights which I have and which are asserted against me, how many of the aforementioned duties would remain if one considered what human nature requires, if one asked what is lawful, by nature.

### b. Ambiguity of the Word “Nature”

This question is thus very natural; but we must note that the expression “nature” bears an ambiguity, a serious one that can lead us to an absolutely erroneous idea. On the one hand, nature means natural being, the way we find ourselves directly endowed in various respects, the immediate aspect of our being. Over against this definition and differentiated from it, nature also means the concept. The nature of the thing is equivalent to the concept of the thing, what is rationally, and this can be something quite other than mere natural. Thus natural law means on the one hand the right of nature, on the other what is inherently and objectively right.

### c. The Naturalistic Starting Point of Natural Law Doctrine

In the treatment of natural law, the two meanings are not plainly separated. Human nature as found is taken as the basis for natural law on the understanding that one will therewith also discover what man is in and for himself. And conversely, it is believed that if one wishes to apprehend the concept, one must turn to our natural being, to our appetites, inclinations, and passions. Thus, in seeking what is lawful in and for itself, the principle is laid down that it is the natural being which constitutes this foundation. Nevertheless, we arrive immediately at the insight that the principle of law is not to be sought in our natural condition, that this principle occupies instead a higher ground. Formerly, if one intended to investigate what law is in and for itself, the usual method was to consider for this purpose our nature, that which seems necessary therein. One was thereby compelled to rely on the experience we have of our nature, on what is given to us therein. Now these proximate determinations are inclinations, needs, instincts. First comes physical need, eating and drinking. Instinct wants to be gratified; it includes within itself the demand for satisfaction. These determinations and their satisfaction are a necessity in us, in our nature; they are our nature itself. Satisfaction is a general word. What is more specifically implied thereby is that one takes possession of objects, one obtains and secures for oneself and against others the means of satisfaction. And so we say that this is necessary and this is right. It is in general the right of life, the necessity of life and of preserving it, a necessity that belongs also to animals. The human being lives and should live, and whatever follows from this is necessary and right. Others too should live, not I alone; they too should affirm their life, and in this reciprocal arrangement whereby everyone should live and be left alone in the possession of the means to this end there steps forth law as such. Life and the necessity to have it for oneself, as well as the granting by others to me of what I grant to them yields the content of law, whose form consists in the reciprocal agreement to respect and honor such things in each other, i.e. not to disturb one another in the satisfaction of instinct.

### d. The Sociable Instinct as Basis

But the needs of physical life are not the only needs; there are still others which, to be sure, pertain to life, but which must be immediately classed with the spiritual life. The instinct of sociability, the urge for society, seems to be of such a kind. This instinct is related on the one hand to the sexual relationship, on the other to universal civil society, which develops into the state. If we must say that civil society and the state issue from an instinct, then the inadequacy of [explaining] this relation [i.e. the state] in terms of an instinct for the state is immediately apparent.



The instinct of sociability, which philosophy formerly assumed as the fundamental principle of the state, is indefinite and abstract, something that can provide only a few determinations for the vast state, and which seems extremely paltry compared to that whose basis it is made. The more precise distinction between natural and ethical instinct immediately enters here. Thus the bare sexual instinct is connected with the instinct of sociability. Were we to stop at the sexual relationship, whose purpose is procreation and which pertains also to animals, then this relationship would turn out to be very impoverished. Such a conception would rouse our ethical sensibility to indignation, inasmuch as marriage would then consist in nothing but mere natural instinct and its gratification. Marriage is not to be exhibited as something natural; it is ethical. According to Hugo it is not grounded in nature, and to this extent he is right. But he is wrong if he means thereby that only what can be shown to flow from the fountain of nature has genuine validity. Were we to stop at natural instinct, we could arrive at the result that the state is unnatural, an artificial contrivance which has produced enormous corruption as well as all the misery of peoples, which is based solely on brute power, and wherein therefore violence is done to nature. It could thus appear true that the state should be given up and a state of nature restored, an imaginary paradise or a condition such as we represent in the idea of so-called innocent peoples.

#### e. The Urge for Freedom and the Dissolution of the Naturalistic Starting Point

If we now proceed further with this kind of examination, we discover an urge which seems to be of an entirely different sort: the urge or need for freedom. It manifests itself as in agreement with other natural instincts, but also as contradicting and repudiating them. It has the power to offer resistance to these instincts; indeed it is capable of withstanding, leaving unsatisfied, and even repressing the universal instinct of life itself. With the urge for freedom, therefore, there appears a contradiction which is not found initially in what we have called nature. The latter is supposed to be harmonious, but in the nature of man there exists the most enormous contradiction. With the urge for freedom is disclosed a ground completely different from that of natural being and its content. It is freedom which claims to be the nature of the thing, to be the proper object of our concern. If freedom asserts that it alone is what law and ethics are concerned with, then the term "natural law" would prove to be a flexible one. We could retain it by allowing that freedom is the nature of the thing. Nevertheless, the expression seems unsuitable, for nature is to begin with impartial, not opposed to something else. By contrast,

freedom immediately appears polemical; it has opposites, the first of which is nature itself. Used in connection with the principle of freedom, the expression “nature” becomes ambiguous and unsuitable, since nature is opposed to freedom.

#### f. Unification of Freedom and Nature

It should be noted that, when customary natural law posits nature or natural need as a foundation, it does not say or mean that freedom should be excluded, or that with this manner of treating natural law freedom is excluded. It too has wished to pay homage to freedom, but in fact freedom has come off badly, since both principles have been adopted without an appreciation of their particular character. Freedom does not want to count as mixed up with nature, but alone, and recognizes nature only as belonging to itself. Freedom is not a principle alongside the other, but rather claims to be supreme, and allows the other validity only to the extent that it permits the other to be. Moreover, freedom does not want to count as valid in the form of immediacy. Freedom is essentially this, to be itself by itself; not to have form through something else, but to make also its form adequate to itself—this is what freedom must be. Freedom first becomes rational when it has the form of freedom. The highest goal of freedom itself is the union with nature—not, however, as a mixture or in the form of nature; rather, the goal of the union of freedom and nature must be conceived in such a way that both are developed, transfigured through freedom into freedom. It is this principle of freedom, too, which we posit as a basis in our consideration [of law]. It is recognized as the principle of law in the Kantian philosophy as well, but in a manner which is not the true one, and which also does not allow the science of law to become a comprehensive and coherent discipline. What the principle of freedom refers to will be seen in our science itself.

## 2. Philosophy of Law and Positive Jurisprudence

### a. The Source Common to Natural Law and the Philosophy of Law

The second topic is the relationship of the philosophy of law to positive jurisprudence. Such a relationship is common to both the philosophy of law and natural law; for the latter too, although it proceeds empirically, absolutizing wholly or in part natural inclinations and needs, nevertheless has this in common with the philosophy of law, that the source whence the law is to be derived is indwelling in man and in every man as his own. Inclinations, needs, appetites are immanent in man, not given to him from without, not imposed. He can perceive them as his own, so that

if he sees law based on them, he considers it calculated on his nature, in which he sees nothing alien. Later on we shall observe that natural needs, feelings, and inclinations, though they belong to ourselves, are nonetheless merely natural. We find ourselves determined in ourselves thereby, but we find ourselves nonetheless directly determined. This is the aspect of necessity; although those determinations are our own, nevertheless we are not free in them, but are subject therein to necessity. Thus it is only formally that natural instincts are our own, in which we then see what is ours; only in a superficial sense may we consider ourselves free therein. Thought, the philosophical concept, takes for its principle freedom in the form of freedom. This opposition notwithstanding, both the philosophy of law and natural law have in common a source supposed to be an inner one.

#### b. The Formal Definition of Positive Law

Positive jurisprudence has a different source of law, and the latter is indicated in §3 [of the *Philosophy of Right*]. "Law is in general positive by virtue of the form of being valid in a state, and this legal authority is the principle for the knowledge of positive right, for positive jurisprudence." Positive jurisprudence has for its content authoritative law, all the laws that have validity in a state, and that have validity by virtue of being posited. It is because they are posited [*gesetzt*] as valid that they are called positive laws [*Gesetze*]. In positive jurisprudence, what is, is right; in philosophy only what is rational, what suits the concept is right. Positive jurisprudence has legal authority before it, and law must become positive. We are here concerned, first of all, with the form of law as the latter is an object for positive jurisprudence; the content will be given afterward. The form is this: the law is valid whether the content is rational and intrinsically just, or whether it is extremely irrational, unjust, completely arbitrary, and given by authority of external force. The bare fact of being, of having authority, says nothing about worth.

One might harbor the prejudice that a civil constitution is to be condemned because it requires authority, obedience, subjection to an authority; thus in recent times we have seen very good laws and institutions looked on as evil because their validity is supposed to rest on authority. Law, the laws, both civil and constitutional, must become positive, but the positive is in general opposed to the concept, to one's own thinking, insight, conviction, and will. The law will be obeyed, let the insight of the subjects be disposed as it will. That what the law considers right, its own right, may not be regarded so by them and may even be considered unjust makes no difference to positive authority. Laws, however, must be positive, because laws and constitutions are determinations within the

state, within the real world, and must therefore have the form of natural laws. The state is a second nature, the rational in the consideration of the will as having objective actuality. The content of this spiritual actuality is statutory, should be inherently rational, and as the restless urge for reality, must exist in the mode of being, of authoritative validity. Whether these laws are comprehended or not, they are executed. The laws regarding eating and drinking exist; whether I understand them or not, I have to obey them. The same is true of the laws concerning justice. The laws live, are; they cannot wait upon the conviction of every single individual, but must be valid now, must be recognized and obeyed now. But not only can they not wait until everyone has conformed his insight and will to them; they are the very objectivity, the very substantiality of justice itself, opposed to the subjective preferences, opinion, caprice, and conviction of the isolated individual. The holiness of law lies in its being simply fixed, something raised above subjective opinion; it is a wall against the latter, one to which subjective pleasure must submit. This is the necessity pertaining to the form of the positive.

Nevertheless, the educated man is not precluded thereby from proceeding further to the fathoming of laws, to the investigation and judgment of their essence, to the knowledge of whether they are of a genuine nature; indeed, the thoughtful man must proceed to that. The laws must have the form of being indifferent toward insight and caprice, but on the other hand, it is the task of individuals to understand them. Being just, the laws must be able to withstand the test of reason. However, the thought that gives laws [to itself] likes to proceed from the assumption that every man is capable of judging what is right and good, that the latter are engraved in the heart of man, that the standard for judging laws and constitutions lies in feeling. This is an unfortunate prejudice, one which has, especially in recent times, caused considerable disorder and mischief. Experience has revealed that it is not so easy to know the nature of law, of the constitution, of the good. The isolated individual all too easily believes himself to be qualified for this. Such self-conceit has more or less passed, and completely different concepts are asserting themselves. While one discovers in oneself the objective or demand to understand the laws and to compare them with the concept, this is not something easy or immediate. Far more must one know that positive laws carry enormous authority, the authority of millennia, of the entire human race. The whole of mankind has labored upon them, and it is not so easy to judge this work of spirit, or to be more clever than this world-spirit. It alone understands that work; to conform ourselves to it is the proper goal of our striving, not to undo the matter with glib reasoning.

The law is authoritative—this is the fundamental principle for positive jurisprudence. Whether what is lawful is in fact rational is of no concern to it; it has nothing to say or to conclude about the matter, nor can it have anything to do with it, or with the reasonings connected with it. The philosophy of law posits as a basis for the knowledge and unfolding of justice only the nature of the thing.

### c. The Material Difference between Natural and Positive Law

However, law is also positive in its content, and the philosophy of law is distinguished from positive jurisprudence in this respect as well; that is, what is positive by content in jurisprudence lies quite beyond the content of the philosophy of law.<sup>5</sup>

In the first place, law is positive in content *through the particular national character of a people, the stage of its historical development, and the interconnection of all the circumstances pertaining to natural necessity*.<sup>6</sup> Now, the positive by content is the not-rational, that which is not determined through the concept. This means not that it is irrational, but rather that it is non-rational, i.e. partly irrational, but partly also indifferent as regards reason, that which the concept does not specify. There is a prejudice that the concept would determine everything; this is not true. A vast sphere exists into which the concept does not permit itself and this field is freely surrendered to subordinate influences. Hence it can be said that what is positive by content merely is, has its justification in what is, not in the concept, and is excluded from the philosophical consideration of right. To this context are relevant national character and the historical development of a people. It is a true observation that nations have a distinctive character; however, what pertains concretely in this way to a particular natural endowment falls merely in time, is external, does not belong to the concept. Nevertheless, if a concrete people or constitution is under consideration, then all these conditions must be taken into account: the situation of the territory, history, national character, religion, industry, climate. Montesquieu's *Spirit of the Laws* is without philosophical form, is not a process of reasoning, but consists rather of observations and experiences expressed in a lively and simple manner. Montesquieu's main thesis is that the general articles of law as well as the body of specific laws are not to be considered as something isolated and abstract, but rather as a dependent moment of a totality, interconnected with all the other features which make up the character of a nation and an epoch. It is in this connection that they acquire their true meaning and justification. Montesquieu's [concept of] spirit has the whole in view; this does him credit, and he is in virtue thereof unique in

this field. This particular totality is positive in its content, not determined through the concept. In what is positive by content must also be counted whatever in a system of law or a constitution has arisen through absolute caprice, violence, or oppression. Everything that derives from these is also positive in content and belongs in that category.

Another positive element originates in the fact *that a system of positive law necessarily involves the application of the universal concept to particular, externally given characteristics of objects and cases, an application that is no longer a matter of speculative thought and of the development of the concept, but is the subsumption by the understanding.*<sup>7</sup> The concept proceeds to a certain development, to a certain articulation of determinations; but these determinations remain on that account universal. The outward existence, however, to which the universal determinations are first applied is extremely variegated and concrete; consequently, this application does not involve speculative thinking but rather subsumption by the understanding. This intellectual operation is the principal activity, constitutes the chief efficacy of jurisprudence. For example, contract is still a universal determination. The objects, however, over which it can be made are extremely manifold. States can conclude contracts just like every private individual. The universal nature of the contract must be preserved in all, but the particularity of the objects makes for further applications thereof. Collisions may result from the nature of these objects, and these the understanding must resolve as best it can. But it can never be finished with this task. It is vain to demand that the positive legislator draw up a finished law code, or that statesmen create a finished constitution. Such completion is, to be sure, an imperative; however, it cannot be demanded of such material. Reason or the Concept becomes complete, but this, the application to empirical matter, does not fall within the sphere of reason. The content here is finite, [whereas] reason has only the eternal for its content. It is because the content is finite that no rational content is to be found therein. It<sup>8</sup> has the character of the bad infinite never to be complete. If one speaks of a perfect constitution or body of legislation in the sense that everything is determined therein and nothing undetermined, then this is a bad ideal. Just as one can count *ad infinitum*, so is everything finite infinite, so too the regulation of the complexities of particular cases. The more developed a body of legislation, the more is determined with respect to particular cases; the more the multiplicity of determinations increases, the greater the necessity and possibility of conflicts. The concept has nothing to do with this, but leaves it to its fate. Fulfillment is not to be found within the finite, neither therefore is completion or end. Accordingly, this subsumption by the understanding is of no concern to philosophy, to the Concept.

The third positive element with regard to content is *the final determinations required for actual judgment*.<sup>9</sup> These determinations, which must in general be decided before the laws are executed, and which must be fixed by statute, belong to the sphere of irrational externality. They begin where reason and even understanding leave off, but where a decision must nevertheless be made. The first requirement is that a decision in general be made, and this in consideration of justice. This is not an optional matter, for law is above all authoritative. Constitutions are not merely postulated but are the life of a people. The constitution must have presence. Only subsequently does the question arise as to whether a decision will be for better or worse. For this is also the difficulty with law codes. Every people must have one; the question as to which is better comes second. It is better to have a worse one than to wait for a perfect one. The French have a very true expression: *le meilleur tue le bien*. But it is an obsession of the Germans to want to have everything perfect.

As a consequence of their having authoritative validity, legal ordinances and constitutional laws pass over into a sphere of externality which is no longer determined through the concept. This sphere is concerned particularly with the quantitative, with the many, or with amount. The laws must also determine with respect to quantity, but in doing so the universal can only approximate the concept. In punishment, for example, the term of imprisonment must be determined in weeks, months, or years, the amount of a fine must be fixed, or, where corporal punishment is still the custom, the number of lashes determined. But as to the question of how much, there exists no principle which could give rise to a rational, indeed even a reasonable determination. If it is a question of one thaler or a thousand, of eight days or twenty years, then it is still possible to refer to a concept. But if a man is convicted of a serious crime and sentenced to twenty years, no legislator or judge will presume to claim that this is exactly the right punishment, or that perhaps seventeen or twenty-three years is not more correct. Here injustice is determined over a matter of three years. Two years, two months, or even one day too much or too little is unjust. This is the nature of quantity. There is no concept there, and yet a decision must be made. A hundred ducats, twenty years, six months are round numbers. Another people with a different number system, a different chronology will, under the same circumstances, decide differently. It is necessary that whatever is to occur in the sensuous world be fixed. A decision must be settled upon, one which admits of no rational ground, and which is therefore absolutely positive.

The same is true with respect to quality. There is the question as to whether a fine or imprisonment should be applied in a certain offense. In some countries the term of arrest is six weeks, in others a year and a

day; these are approximate numbers. I must have time for my defense; if this is not allowed, an injustice is done me. There must be a rule for this, but whether six weeks are enough or not, or are too much, cannot be decided. This is positive and not determined through the concept. The philosophy of law has as its criterion the concept of the thing, [whereas] positive law has only the existent.

### 3. The Historicist Treatment of Law

This is the place to touch upon yet a third relation of philosophy to jurisprudence, namely the historicist treatment and the philosophical, from which the former is distinguished.

Common to both is the search for reasons for what counts as law. The historicist approach does not simply remain with what happens to be authoritative, but instead offers grounds for these laws and regulations in terms of their evolution or genesis. To indicate the source or ground of the determinations of law is also in general the purport of the philosophical treatment. However, they carry this out in different ways. The historicist approach exhibits the historical genesis [of laws]. This evolution is essential to authoritative law; the [eternally] valid is differentiated in time, and in order to know it in its completeness, one must know the motives through which it was established.

This method of treatment is therefore not contrary to the philosophical science of law. They come into conflict only when the historicist approach claims to be the sole method of apprehending law, of acquiring insight into the grounds thereof. A distinction immediately appears here: if the historical approach offers the reason for a law, demonstrates its necessity, and intends this demonstration to signify that the law is thereby justified, then philosophy might well raise a protest against this justification of the law. The philosophical approach stakes all on this, that a just institution is a rational one, in which the right, the genuine right of the human being is respected.

A historically grounded right can be rejected by philosophy as irrational; so, for example, slavery in the Indies is justified historically by the fact that among the negroes too these slaves were slaves and were faced with an even harsher fate; by the fact that the indigenous population is thereby relieved; by the fact that the negroes are more capable of work, that the settlers have a property right over them, that the colonies would otherwise have to perish. Despite this justification, reason must maintain that the slavery of the negroes is a wholly unjust institution, one which contradicts true justice, both human and divine, and which is to be rejected.



Thus, historical justification does not suffice to demonstrate something as rational, and yet this is the main thing. For an institution or arrangement which still holds good, but which is now senseless, dead, and merely oppressive, historical justification often provides the excuse that at one time this institution was appropriate, a justification for former times being often confused with a justification for the present. So, for example, the service of monasteries in cultivating and populating wildernesses, in keeping alive learning through instruction and transcribing is urged in their support, and this service is deemed to be the ground and purpose of their continued existence. But this justification shows only that monasteries were a rational institute in those times, and directly implies as well that now, when these purposes are achieved in an entirely different way, and when these circumstances have altered so completely, monasteries have become unjust and harmful.

This used to be confused again and again. This is the case, for example, with the former German imperial constitution, whose institutions belonged to an era that was completely passed, and were dead at a time when they still had validity, or were supposed to. Thus, for example, the count palatine of the Rhine had the privilege of granting patents to the tinkers of the entire German Empire. One is astonished at this and asks the reason. It is this: in the German army the count palatine used to command the knights or cavalry, which possessed kettledrums and trumpets. The drums had to be made and repaired, and the tinkers thus stood as drum-makers under the general of the cavalry, of whom nothing in the end remained but the patron of tinkers. History justifies only, that there was a time when this connection was rational; it does not, however, justify the persistence of this arrangement to recent times. Historical explanation does not take the place of the viewpoint of the rational approach.

Frequently the capacity of philosophy to understand justice is disputed, though it is considered very easy to understand determinate laws. The law of the Roman Tables which gave the creditor the right, after the term of payment had expired, to kill the debtor or sell him as a slave, or indeed if there were several creditors, to cut pieces from him and divide him up amongst themselves (without, indeed, anyone being liable to legal action if he had cut off too much or too little), this law is easy to understand. But such comprehension means something different [from philosophical comprehension], for it means having knowledge about historical grounds. When the ordinary human understanding, not to mention philosophy, rejects such a law as abominable, it is said that it does not understand the law, that is, it does not know the good historical reasons for it. But these reasons notwithstanding, the law is abominable,

and understanding means knowing not only these historical grounds but also the reason of the thing.

Here the reason of the thing, the insight into the latter, is limited to the knowledge of the historical aspect of the thing, as if this were not mere understanding. The understanding has good reasons for everything; for bad constitutions and bad laws. Everything evil, wicked, and base has a good explanation, for the explanation has a content that must be respected. But though the understanding has good reasons for everything, this is not decisive for whether the thing is in fact rational. This is the relationship of the philosophical to the historicist treatment of law. The question of rationality is different from that of historical justification. The latter must deal with many quite external matters and subjects which are of no concern to reason. However, it so happens that the more arid and empty the subject matter, the more does educated self-conceit pride itself on its elaborate explanations.

## Notes

1. The first prefatory lecture is from G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie*, ed. Karl-Heinz Ilting (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1973–74), vol. 1, pp. 231–34.

2. The second lecture is from Hegel, *Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie*, vol. 3, pp. 91–102.

3. The third lecture is from Hegel, *Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie*, vol. 4, pp. 75–91.

4. I.e. of the philosophical to the historicist approach.

5. What follows is a disquisition on the sources of positive law, the substance of which the reader may also find in §§ 3, 213, 214, and 216 of G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon, 1952; Oxford University Press, 1967).

6. Hegel quotes again from the *Philosophy of Right*, § 3.

7. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, § 3.

8. I.e. the process of applying the universal to the particular.

9. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, § 3.

# On Teaching Philosophy at the *Gymnasium*

Translated by Sigrit Schütz

Hegel spent many years (1808–16) as a teacher of philosophy and as an administrator at the *Ägidiengymnasium*, a secondary school in Nürnberg. From 1810 to 1822 he was also a member of the Royal Prussian Examinations Commission, which judged members of the last class at the *Gymnasium* level as to their abilities as prospective university students.

The German text of this translation of Hegel's expert opinion can be found in *Berliner Schriften: 1818–1831*, vol. 11 (1956) of G. W. F. Hegel, *Sämtliche Werke: Neue Kritische Ausgabe*, 32 vols., edited by Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1952ff.) pp. 541–56. Hoffmeister uses the clean copy of the text as his textual basis (Preußische Staatsbibliothek acc. ms. 1904, 154). He prints it with a few additional remarks found in a preliminary draft. These have been included here as footnotes. In addition to these notes, a more continuous text from another draft has been included after the main text featured here.

This text was originally printed in the first collected edition of Hegel's works, i.e. *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe*, vols. 1–18, edited by Philipp Marheineke, Johannes Schulze, Eduard Gans, Leopold von Henning, Heinrich Gustav Hotho, Karl Ludwig Michelet, Friedrich Förster, Karl Hegel, Ludwig Baumann, Karl Rosenkranz (Berlin, 1832–45), *Amtliche Gutachten über den Philosophie-Unterricht*, vol. XVII, pp. 357–67. The text was reprinted in Hegel's *Sämtliche Werke*, Jubiläumsausgabe in 20 Bänden, edited by Hermann Glocker (Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann Verlag, 1927–40),

*Philosophische Propädeutik, Gymnasialreden und Gutachten über den Philosophie-Unterricht*, vol. 3, pp. 325–35.

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Berlin, April 16, 1822

To the Royal Department of Religious, Educational, and Medical Affairs

The Royal Department ordered in a gracious official ordinance of November 1st of the past year that I report on Dr. von Henning's tutorials. At the same time the Department has seen fit to take into consideration my respectfully submitted observations regarding the complaints which have been lodged from several sides, namely, that students tend to come to the university without the necessary preparations for the study of philosophy, and it charged me with giving an expert opinion on how a purposeful preparation could be arranged at the *Gymnasium*. . . .

I should be excused from explaining why the teaching of philosophy itself is still excluded from the *Gymnasium* and saved for the university because of the Royal Department's high ordinance, which presupposes this exclusion.

The *intermediate stage* alone remains to be taught at the *Gymnasium*, the stage which with regard to the substantial subject matter has to be considered as the transition from representation and faith to philosophical thinking. It would have to occupy itself *with general representations* and more directly with the *forms of thinking*, as they are *common* to mere reasoning and philosophical thought. Such an occupation would have a more direct relation to speculative thinking since, on the one hand, it presupposes an exercise in dealing with abstract thought in itself without any material substance, as is contained in subject matter of mathematics, but, on the other hand, also since the forms of thinking—the acquaintance with which would be obtained in the classes—will be used later on both by philosophy itself as well as being a main part of the material assimilated by philosophy. It is exactly *this familiarity with and practice in handling formal thoughts* which would have to be regarded as the direct preparation for the study of philosophy at the university.

As far as the more direct range of knowledge is concerned, to which the classes at the *Gymnasium* would have to be limited, I would like to exclude explicitly first of all the *history of philosophy*, although it often would seem to be suitable. But without prior training in speculative thought, it would be nothing but an account of coincidental, idle ideas, and the effect would be—and at times one would be tempted to view such an effect as its purpose and recommendation—the creation of

a detrimental, disdainful opinion of philosophy and especially of the notion that this scholarly exercise had been nothing but a futile endeavor and that it would be even more of a futile endeavor for future students to deal with.

Instead of this, I would mention among the subjects to be considered for the preparatory classes under discussion:

1. The so-called *empirical psychology*. It is true, a presentation which would limit itself to the widely familiar perceptions of the external senses, imagination, memory, and all further faculties of the soul would be trivial and pedantic. On the one hand, these topics could be removed from the university curriculum if they had already been dealt with at the *Gymnasium*. On the other hand, one could limit oneself to an introduction to logic, where one would have to mention in any case the various intellectual faculties other than thinking itself. Many interesting things could be said in regard to the external senses, for example, concerning images and representations, the connection between the two, the so-called associations, furthermore, concerning the nature of language, especially the difference between representation, thought, and concepts. Many useful remarks could be made about the last item, since it can lead to a direct introduction to logic if one stresses the part thinking has in the process of perception.

2. The *basic elements of logic*. I would consider this the main subject, excluding the speculative meaning and treatment of it. The lessons could extend to the theory of concepts, judgments, and syllogisms, and their types, and then to definition, classification, demonstration, and scientific method—just as it used to be. Definitions, which belong rather to the broader field of ontology, will normally be included in the theory of concepts, as they tend to be cited partly in the form of laws of thinking. It would be advantageous to follow this up with an introduction to the Kantian categories as the so-called common concepts of the mind. Any further Kantian metaphysics would have to be postponed, but by mentioning the antinomies one could open at least a negative and formal prospect of reason and ideas.

No subject is less suited than logic is for being judged by young people with regard to its importance or utility. This fact alone is a recommendation that this kind of instruction be included in the *Gymnasium* curriculum. The main reason for the gradual demise of such instruction, which used to be given in former times, lies in the fact that this insight has come to be generally neglected. Besides a subject such as logic is not attractive enough to induce young people to its study while they are matriculated at the university, where it is left to them which subjects they want to take

other than their practical studies directed toward making money. It also might be found that teachers of the positive sciences dissuade students from studying philosophy, by which they also might understand the study of logic. If, however, instruction in logic were to be introduced into the *Gymnasium* curriculum, the students would at least once have had the experience of getting formal thoughts into their heads and would have had them there. A highly important subjective result would be that young people would acquire the insight that there is a realm of thought in itself. They would recognize that formal thinking is itself a subject worthy of consideration, and a subject on which public authority places an emphasis as is seen just in the way it structures the curriculum.

Earlier experience suggests that this subject will not exceed the pupils' power of comprehension. Permit me to cite my own experience in this connection. As a longtime professor of philosophical education and headmaster of a *Gymnasium*, I was daily witness to the ability and receptivity of such students. I also remember my twelfth year, when I was chosen for the theological seminary of my home state and therefore had to learn the Wolffian definitions of the so-called *idea clara*. In my fourteenth year I knew all the figures and rules of syllogisms, and, moreover, I know them still. If it would not mean defying too much the present prejudice for independent thinking and productive activities, etc., I would feel inclined to suggest this kind of curriculum for classes at the *Gymnasium*, because one must have any kind of knowledge, whatever it might be, even the highest, in one's memory in order to possess it. One may start or end with that. By starting with it, one has more freedom and cause to think about it for oneself. Moreover, that which the Royal Department so justly wants to avoid could best be prevented, i.e. "that the philosophical classes at the *Gymnasium* would get lost in an empty formalism or exceed the limits of teaching on this level."<sup>\* 1</sup>

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\* [Additional remark from the preliminary draft:] The knowledge of logical forms would not only be relevant to the intentions discussed earlier since an occupation with them would already create an exercise in the handling of abstract thought, but these logical forms themselves would then also form the basis as the material which will be treated by speculative thinking in its own way. The double task of speculative philosophy—on the one hand, to make conscious its material, the general concepts of thought, and to elevate it to the level of familiarity with these forms, and, on the other hand, to tie this material to the higher Idea—is limited with regard to this second part by the presupposed knowledge of and familiarity with those forms. Whoever is prepared in this manner and turns to philosophy itself will find himself already on familiar territory.

3. The above-mentioned point of discussion can be added to the higher reasons for *excluding actual metaphysics proper* from the *Gymnasium*. One could, however, consider one part of the former Wolffian philosophy, namely that which has been exposted in *Theologia Naturalis* under the heading "Proofs of the Existence of God." Instruction at the *Gymnasium* will not be able to avoid the connection between the theory of God with the idea of finiteness and transitoriness of worldly things and their purposefulness, etc. This connection will be forever obvious to the unprejudiced intellect, whatever a critical philosophy might say about it. These so-called proofs, however, contain nothing but a formal analysis of the subject matter which comes up all by itself in instruction at the *Gymnasium*. They need, to be sure, further improvement by means of speculative philosophy in order to correspond to that which the unprejudiced human intellect maintains in its development. The preliminary acquaintance with that formal development would be of particular interest for later speculative contemplation.

4. Concerning *moral theory*, one could in a similar way introduce at the *Gymnasium* level correct and definite concepts about the nature of will, freedom, rights, and duty. This would be even more appropriate in the upper classes, since those topics would be connected with the religious instruction which is given continuously through all levels for eight to ten years. Also there would appear to be a greater need in our times to work against shallow thinking. The fruits of such thinking, born of instruction at the *Gymnasium*, together with correct concepts about the nature of the duty of an individual and a citizen have become publicly known.

This then is my humble opinion on *an expansion of the contents* of preparatory philosophical education at the *Gymnasium*, which I respectfully submit to the Royal Department. As far as this expansion is concerned with regard to both *time* and *gradation*, nothing more need be suggested than what has been said already with regard to religion and morals.\* With regard to the introduction of material in *psychology* and *logic*, one could specify that if *two hours* per week of a one-year course were spent on it, psychology would have to be treated primarily as an

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\* [Variant from the preliminary draft:] As far as the former natural theology is concerned, it could be covered completely in religious instruction, where the subject will come up by itself and only the formal side needs to be added. This aspect, however, should preferably be given entirely from a historical point of view so that no modern contempt would be cast on the time-honored older formulas which originated with Anselm [crossed out] from Catholic theology.

introduction and would have to precede logic. If about three or four semiannual courses with the same number of weekly hours were to be instituted (which could be considered sufficient), one could give instruction in more detail concerning the nature of the mind, its activities, and its conditions, in which case it might be more advantageous to start with the simple, abstract, and therefore easily comprehensible instruction in logic. This instruction would fall in a fairly early period when young people are more obedient and docile toward authority and are less contaminated by the presumption that any subject must be adapted to their expectations and feelings in order to win their attention.

The possible difficulty of increasing the curriculum by two more hours could be eliminated in a most unobjectionable manner by cutting down the so-called studies in German or German literature by one or two hours, or maybe even more fittingly by canceling the lectures on the juristic encyclopedia wherever they take place at the *Gymnasium*, and by replacing them with courses in logic—the more so since the *Gymnasium* should be dedicated to the general cultivation of the mind and should not be the beginning of training in practical studies directed toward making money.

Finally, as far as *textbooks* are concerned which could be recommended to teachers for the preparatory classes, I could not give preference to any of those I know.\* The subject matter is presumably contained in all those books and, to be sure, more comprehensively, definitively, and free from heterogeneous ingredients in the older ones. A high ordinance from the Royal Department could give instructions as to which topics ought to be stressed most.

I remain with due respect to the Royal Department your most obedient servant,

Hegel

Prof. p.[rofessor] o.[orinarius] at the Royal University.

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\* [Additional remark from the preliminary draft:] It is not as if I did not consider any of the existing textbooks worthwhile, but it is due to the fact that every book fair offers compendiums, and I do not tend to follow this literature since experience has taught me that those which I have seen are nothing but a more or less meager or broader repetition of the old ideas augmented by some useless novelties. In my opinion, for the entire purpose and method of this kind of course the teachers should be directed to the old textbooks which belong mainly to the Wolffian school, and only the Kantian Table of Categories would have to be substituted for the Aristotelian at the proper places.



[Hoffmeister's Note: "In addition to the preliminary draft, from which several quotations were given in footnotes to the above clean copy of April 16, 1822 (not, as it says in the old edition, of February 2, 1823), there is another draft in Hegel's posthumous papers at the Preußische Staatsbibliothek, vol. 3, folio 27–28, which also contains several important variant passages which are added here."]

. . . can, so that those who find classes in philosophy at the university and attempt to participate in them will not feel like a fish taken out of the water which is now supposed to breathe in the air. Neither mathematics nor other subjects of instruction at the *Gymnasium* bring about that with which we are concerned as regards the formal preparation for speculative thinking, namely to create the basis for thinking in general and to instill the habit of staying with it. Even the above-mentioned subjects cannot realize that aim, partly because they have an entirely external basis and partly because perception, feelings, and representations are their elements if the subject matter is of a genuinely intellectual nature.

This kind of learning at the *Gymnasium* would have the purpose of focusing representation and memory on the matter of the aforementioned subjects. *Examples* could serve to connect them more closely to the representation. Understanding, however, should not come from those so-called illustrations by means of examples. Those definitions are in themselves very easy and clear and have to be taken mainly in the sense that they have meaning and validity in themselves. If the illustrations by means of example do not have a grand manner about them, i.e. in that the general validity of the determinations of thought comes at least to some degree to consciousness, then flimsy examples\* result in the categories themselves being presented as meaningless; their value is held in low esteem according to the insignificance of such applications, and one begins to believe that their value lies only in the application itself. The prejudice of so-called independent thinking would have to be banned above all from such classes, and here is the place to speak out against it. It arises, on the one hand, from the misunderstanding that believes thoughts are not being thought, and that all thinking is not an occupation with thoughts, and that what one thinks is not thought by oneself—but by whom instead? I would not be able to say. On the other hand, independent thinking seduces one into a superficial, meaningless way of talking, void of all responsibility. It needs to be stressed in those courses that the students should know the rules just as definitely, exactly, and without hesitation

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\* [Added in the margin:] All men are mortal.—Cajus

as they have to know grammatical rules or mathematical definitions and theorems if they want to understand philology or mathematics. Maybe we would defy prejudices on these matters too much if we demanded that students memorize the main definitions, classifications, types, and laws, but that would make even more sense since definitions in logic in particular are immediately familiar to consciousness, and the purpose of the classes being discussed here can be seen in the fact that those definitions in logic in themselves can be made into a subject in the mind, and therefore the so-called comprehension of them demands nothing more than to fix them and to remember them—which is exactly what the memory is for.<sup>†</sup> Only in this manner can the basis which was discussed previously be prepared—the basis inasmuch as it is filled with the material only on the basis of which speculative thinking can exist and be dealt with. The argument for memorization can be contrasted to a much stronger degree with all those shallow ideas promoting independent thinking, vivacity, and the instilling of convictions, especially since in modern times the memorization of biblical verses and religious songs has been reintroduced as being necessary and expedient.

One would have to see to it at least during public examinations that the teachers know the prescribed sequence of [definitions] in logic and psychology and that the students know those definitions readily. It should be impressed on them that this kind of knowledge is being stressed. As a member of the Scholarly Examinations Commission, I find very often—almost as a rule—that the candidates do not deem it worthwhile to show accomplishments in those subjects and that, for example, they do not know the difference between reason and the understanding, intelligence and will, the parts of a syllogism, a definition, etc., whereas it seems to them a sign of thorough learning and valuable knowledge if they can specify various shades of a Greek particle as opposed to another related one. The reason for this is doubtless that this kind of knowledge has been impressed on them as an important matter since such knowledge is not very interesting in itself.

Finally, I have to note in regard to the question of which *textbooks* ought to be used and recommended to the teachers that the contents of the compendiums on logic, of which one or several are regularly published at book fairs, will always be one and the same. I did not have the opportunity to take an extensive look at the products of the industry,

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<sup>†</sup> [Added in the margin:] Thoughts in one's head are mainly in the memory—the contempt of the memory—the strength of the prejudice which has its origin in laziness.

and it is presumably only the greater formalism, the greater so-called popularity, or the shallowness of the contents which make them different from one another. By giving preference to one above the others, one would do injustice both to the one chosen and to the ones rejected. Besides, *Gymnasium* teachers instructing in those subjects would insist on writing their own textbooks anyway, as is the case with all other subjects at the *Gymnasium*, so that each *Gymnasium* has its own Latin grammars, readers, arithmetic textbooks, etc. Often a *Gymnasium* will have different books again in the various classes. So it would be difficult if an exception were made here to this liberality in other subjects, where everyone is permitted to do as he pleases.

[Hoffmeister's Epilogue: "According to Paulsen, *History of Scholarly Teaching* (*Geschichte des gelehrten Unterrichts*), 1885, the recommendation was not entirely effective. A Departmental Ordinance of May 26, 1825, did not order but merely recommended the teaching of classes in philosophical propaedeutics at the *Gymnasium* level as Hegel had envisioned, after having in the previous year made it a requirement for the consistories, examination commissions, and universities to pay as much attention to the study of philosophy as to the study of philology (see Paulsen, *op. cit.*, p. 604 ff.). Paulsen's presentation shows, by the way, the typical anti-Hegelian liberalistic traits."]

## Note

1. While Hoffmeister writes "February 2, 1823," the date given the *Werke* edition is actually February 7, 1823. See *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe*, 18 vols., edited by Phillip Marheineke, Johannes Schulze, Eduard Gans, Leopold von Henning, Heinrich Gustav Hotho, Karl Ludwig Michelet, Friedrich Förster, Karl Hegel, Ludwig Boumann, Karl Rosenkranz (Berlin 1832–45), *Amtliche Gutachten über den Philosophie-Unterricht*, vol. XVII, p. 367. See also *Sämtliche Werke*, Jubiläumsausgabe in 20 Bänden, edited by Hermann Glockner (Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann Verlag, 1927–40), *Philosophische Propädeutik, Gymnasialreden und Gutachten über den Philosophie-Unterricht*, vol. 3, p. 325.

# Foreword to Hinrichs' *Religion in Its Inner Relation to Science*

Translated by A. V. Miller, with an introduction  
by Merold Westphal

**T**his foreword is the most lucid and succinct statement of Hegel's mature position on the question of faith and reason insofar as that position begins with a negative critique of prevailing approaches to the problem. Sometimes, as here and in *Faith and Knowledge* (1802), that critique is allowed to stand alone. But it is never omitted from its role as the dialectical point of departure whenever Hegel presents his own positive proposals. Thus this obscure foreword is a valuable introduction to the *Phenomenology*, the *Encyclopaedia*, the *Logic*, the *Philosophy of Religion*, and the 1829 *Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God*, since all of these are, in their most fundamental intention, attempts to reconcile faith and reason.

Like Hegel's foreword, Hermann Friedrich Wilhelm Hinrichs himself is of more interest than his book. He was a young scholar whom Hegel had known at the University of Heidelberg. Hegel's boost for his book, *Religion in Its Inner Relation to Science* (1822), had happy consequences for both of them. Hinrichs got a position as a lecturer at the University of Breslau that very year, 1822, and as the first to teach Hegelian philosophy apart from Hegel himself, he became the founder of the Hegelian school. He was later identified with the so-called right-wing Hegelians.

In referring above to Hegel's essay as obscure, it is our own perspective that is invoked. In its own time it was not at all unnoticed, though it attracted attention in an ironic way. Though designed to lead the way to an authentic peace between faith and reason, it was decisive in effecting an irreparable breach between Hegel, the leading philosopher of the day, and Friedrich

Schleiermacher, the leading theologian. The two had been colleagues since the beginning of Hegel's tenure as J. G. Fichte's successor at the University of Berlin in 1818. In fact, it was Schleiermacher, in his capacity as the university's president, who had presented Hegel's nomination by the University Senate to the government for appointment. But from the first there was an intense personal rivalry between the two men, aided by theoretical differences. Its expression from time to time was not free from either bitterness or pettiness.

It is true that after one public confrontation between them, Schleiermacher began his letter of apology by supplying Hegel with the address of a wine merchant which he had requested. It is also reported that they once took a toboggan ride together at the Tivoli. But this was about the extent of their ability to work together. Just before Hegel wrote his foreword for Hinrichs' book, Schleiermacher's systematic theology, *The Christian Faith*, appeared. Since Schleiermacher defined religion in that work as the feeling of absolute dependence on God, Hegel was unable to treat Schleiermacher's *Speeches on Religion* (1799) and its defense of feeling as the essence of religion as merely the expression of a youthful Romanticism. Schleiermacher's mature stance could only be conceived as the theology of feeling.

In this context, Hegel's sustained polemic against the theology of feeling, and especially his assault on the "third universal prejudice" of the day, "that feeling is the true and even the sole form in which the religious spirit preserves its genuineness," is an undisguised attack on Schleiermacher. There can be no question whom Hegel has in mind when he says that "a dog would be the best Christian for it possesses [the feeling of its dependence] in the highest degree and lives mainly in feeling. The dog also has feelings of deliverance when its hunger is satisfied by a bone."

The main thrust of Hegel's case against allowing feeling to be normative needs no comment. But two related matters should be noted. First, as Hegel sees it, the issue is not just a theological one. The soil in which this sort of theological subjectivism can grow will also nourish the kind of ethical and social subjectivism which might be called "romantic anarchism," a phenomenon no stranger to our time than to Hegel's. Thus it is not just a matter of religion but of morality, or right and duty, and of the "ethical form of social life, both in the family and in the State." In fact, the confrontation with Schleiermacher mentioned above was grounded precisely in Hegel's concern that the reign of feeling would become the reign of terror.

"From the beginning," Hegel writes, "philosophy has been in conflict with sophistry." By applying this label to the "evil of the present time," Hegel assigns to his own philosophy a Platonic-Aristotelian task. This leads to the second point, namely that the cult of feeling is not the sole component of the sophistry he had to deal with. "This evil, the fortuitousness and caprice of subjective feeling and its opinions associated with the culture of reflective

thought, which has proved to its own satisfaction that spirit is incapable of knowing the truth, has from ancient times been called sophistry." It is subjectivism in conjunction with skepticism which constitutes sophistry.

Between the two of them the components of sophistry can bring about a reconciliation between faith and reason. In fact, one of the things most attractive about grounding faith in feeling is that this form "seems to offer no aspect which could be dialectically attacked by thought." But Hegel finds this to be a "superficial, barren peace." He says any peace between faith and reason would be unsatisfactory "if, on the one hand, faith had lost all substantial meaning, only the empty husk of subjective conviction remaining, or, on the other hand, reason had renounced all claim to a knowledge of the truth, the human spirit being left with only appearances and feelings for its sustenance." But this is precisely the kind of peace which sophistry can negotiate. A genuine peace presupposes the overcoming of sophistry.

It is Hegel's thesis here as elsewhere that sophistry's two elements, subjectivism and skepticism, are not equally fundamental. Subjectivism is seen to be the natural outgrowth of skepticism, which thus assumes the more basic position. The skepticism Hegel has in mind is one which on its theological side is called "Enlightenment" and on its philosophical side, "Kantianism." He is concerned with both its character and its origin.

As to the former, this skepticism is to be described as the understanding. Hegel uses this name as a technical term for finite thinking, or more specifically, that thought which directs itself to finite objects and is properly equipped for just this task. In the following passage, Hegel uses the term "secular" as a synonym for the understanding. "The aim of secular science is a knowledge of finite objects; the goal to which it aspires in its efforts to penetrate to their interior is a knowledge of causes and grounds. But these causes and grounds are essentially analogous to what is to be explained and for that reason the forces which come within its purview are likewise only finite." If this passage has a Kantian ring, it is no accident.

Now it is clear that the understanding can only express itself as skepticism with reference to what is absolute or infinite. The form this takes in Kant is familiar. Hegel links to this the deism and materialism of the Enlightenment. In both cases the understanding, directed toward the question of what is absolute or infinite, was only able to be negative and critical. It "has emptied truth of all content whatever so that nothing remains for it except, on the one hand, the pure negative, the *caput mortuum* of a merely abstract being, and on the other hand, a finite material."

But if the understanding is taken for reason as such, it follows that man cannot know the divine, except perhaps as some lifeless abstraction. And if he should find that he cannot abandon the project of some sort of intercourse with God, what is left for him but Romantic yearning and a resort to feeling

as the vehicle of contact? In this way the second component of sophistry, subjectivism, arises from the first component, skepticism.

But this first component Hegel distinguishes as "the other mischief" from "the first mischief," leading us back to a still earlier stage in the story he is telling. As we regress to its point of departure, that story increasingly resembles Plato's account of the decline of the state. In this case the starting point or "the first mischief" turns out to be the theological orthodoxy which was the Enlightenment's opponent. This is presented as a theology of the understanding, reminding us that the understanding is not only not inherently opposed to faith, but first appears in its service. But since its proper subject matter is finite, the result is that it confuses the finite content to which it is suited with the eternal truth which is its goal. Hegel gives special attention to its concern for historical matters, since in the eighteenth century much of the conflict between orthodoxy and the Enlightenment was rooted in the question of biblical criticism. An example of the sort of confusion Hegel has in mind would be the way in which the conflict over biblical criticism often led orthodoxy to treat the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, for example, as an article of faith.

Hegel believes this kind of theology bears the seeds of its own destruction, that the understanding will see the error of its ways and turn on itself in a "switching round of reflection—unexpected by reflection itself—into an activity hostile to its own work, a switching round which equally is only the spontaneous determination of reflection itself." In view of Kant's discovery of the inherently antinomic character of the understanding, we should not be too surprised to find such apparent opposites rooted in one and the same finite mode of thought. This is how we must understand Hegel's claim that it is theological orthodoxy which gives rise to the theological negativity of the Enlightenment. He anticipates Rudolf Otto's suggestion that orthodoxy is the mother of rationalism, but he goes on to add that rationalism is the mother of skepticism, which in turn begets subjectivism and anarchy. And none of the children are bastards.

After telling this tragic story of the fall of the house of truth, Hegel indicates in a sketchy manner his alternative proposal for reconciling faith with reason. He tells us that his models are Plato and Aristotle, on the one hand, and the Scholastics on the other. This latter is surprising, since he usually dismisses their work as the theology and metaphysics of the understanding. But here he speaks of their "sublime aim" in contrast to "a very inferior type of theology that places its scientific difference from general religious doctrine in the historical element. . . ." Once again Hegel's position on the historical becomes central. He has already indicated that distinguishing the finite from the infinite, the inessential from the essential, involves separating "finite and external narratives," i.e. temporal history,

from eternal history and eternal truth. This requirement, as his praise of the Scholastics reminds us, is central to the reason which he will oppose to understanding in order to reconcile it to faith.

But faith, for Hegel in this essay, is not just the form of subjective certainty and personal appropriation. It includes the content, “the *credo*, the church’s confession.” Since Hegel is talking about the Christian faith in particular, this would have to refer primarily to the canonical confessions of faith which constitute the Bible, and secondarily to the creeds of Christendom. But in these documents, instead of the flight to eternal history and eternal truth, great prominence is given to historical events as part of the content of faith. To be sure, one does not find the church confessing its faith in the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch. But just as Israel confesses its faith by acknowledging the mighty acts of God in history—the call of Abraham, the deliverance from Egypt, the covenant with David, the exile as God’s judgment and the return of the remnant as God’s faithfulness—so in the New Testament the faithful confess the incarnation and atonement, not as eternal truths or events in an eternal history, but as the presence of God himself in a particular part of our history.

The problem then is this: Hegel knows that between faith and reason there can be a “superficial, barren peace. In such a peace it may seem that what offends has been eliminated whereas it has only been put on one side. . . .” Since the historical, except as the inessential, the frame which adorns the picture of eternal history, is what offends in this case, the question is whether anything but this superficial and barren peace can be negotiated between the Christian faith and Hegelian reason. Hegel knows that the church’s teaching can be opposed “by a creed of man’s own making” and that there is a difference between merely human thought and that thought which “though human, is also divine.” The question is whether from the perspective of faith (which is being asked to sign the peace treaty) Hegel’s standpoint of eternal history can be seen as anything but a creed of man’s own making, the product of merely human thought. Nor will it suffice to respond that Hegel’s standpoint is not that of the understanding but of reason, for Hegel himself, by referring to the former as “so-called reason,” reminds us that the claim to be reason is neither infallible nor self-authenticating—not everyone who says “Reason! Reason!” will enter the kingdom.

But are we to include among those who merely say “Reason” the author of the *Science of Logic* and the *Encyclopaedia*? Hegel, as it turns out, is not hostile to the historical *as such*; but he does insist that a clear distinction be made between absolute truth and the external phenomena associated with its manifestation. The “reason” which is simply offended by the historical element as such in religion is the “reason” of the Enlightenment. By contrast Hegel stresses the historicity of Jesus in his *Philosophy of Religion*.<sup>1</sup> After saying



that we accept Homer's stories of Jupiter and the other gods without treating them as historical, he goes on to say: "Yet there is also a history that is a divine history which, moreover, is meant to be history in the strict sense of the word: the *history of Jesus*. This counts not as a mere myth but as something perfectly historical."

As early as 1802, in the first paragraph of *Faith and Knowledge*, Hegel sought to get beyond the way reason and faith had struggled over the historical during the eighteenth century. "The glorious victory won by the reason of the Enlightenment [rationalism] over faith—or rather over that faith which the Enlightenment with its very limited religious comprehension regarded as opposed to it—is seen, on closer inspection, to be nothing else than this: that the positive element [in religion] against which reason set out to do battle no longer remained religion, nor did the victorious reason remain reason; and the offspring of reason and faith which hovers triumphantly over these corpses as the child of peace uniting them both, has within it as little of reason as it has of genuine faith."

What we may take to be Hegel's final word on this topic comes in the introduction to his Berlin lectures on the *History of Philosophy*: "Philosophy, as a thinking that *comprehends* this content [the dogma of the church] has the advantage over the picture-thinking of religion that it understands both; for it understands religion and can do justice to it; it also understands rationalism and supernaturalism; and also it understands itself. But the converse is not true; religion as such, since its standpoint is that of picture-thinking, recognizes itself only in such thinking, not in philosophy, i.e. in concepts, in universal determinations of thought. Often, a philosophy is rightly reproached for its opposition to religion; but often, too, the reproach is unmerited, viz. when it emanates from the religious standpoint; just because religion does not understand philosophy."<sup>2</sup>

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## Foreword

The opposition between faith and reason which for centuries has been not only of academic, but also of popular, interest may seem nowadays to have lost some of its importance, indeed almost to have vanished. If this were indeed so, our age might perhaps be congratulated on it. For the nature of that opposition is such that the human spirit cannot turn its back on either faith or reason; each shows itself to be so deeply rooted in man's innermost self-consciousness that when they come into conflict, he is shaken to the depths of his being and his inner disharmony makes

his condition one of utter wretchedness. But even if the conflict between faith and reason had vanished and given place to a reconciliation, it would depend essentially on the nature of the reconciliation whether it would be a matter for congratulation or not.

p. ii For there is also a peace that is indifferent to the depths of the spirit, a superficial, barren peace. In such a peace it may seem that what offends has been eliminated whereas it has only been put on one side; but what is only overlooked or despised is for that very reason not overcome. On the contrary, if the reconciliation has not brought satisfaction to the deepest, true needs of the spirit, if the sanctuary of the spirit has not received its due, the disharmony will in principle remain and the hostility will continue to fester all the more deeply beneath the surface; the harm, unsuspected and unperceived, will be all the more dangerous.

It would be an unsatisfactory peace if, on the one hand, faith had lost all substantial meaning, only the empty husk of subjective conviction remaining, or, on the other hand, reason had renounced all claim to a knowledge of the truth, the human spirit being left with only appearances and feelings for its sustenance. How could there still be any great cleavage between faith and reason when neither any longer possessed an objective content, anything, therefore, about which there could be any dispute?

p. iii For I understand by faith neither the merely subjective state of belief which is restricted to the form of certainty, leaving untouched the nature of the content, if any, of the belief, nor on the other hand only the *credo*, the church's confession of faith which can be recited and learned by rote without communicating itself to man's innermost self, without being identified with the certainty which a man has of himself, with his consciousness of himself. I hold that faith, in the true, ancient sense of the word, is a unity of both these meanings, including the one no less than the other. They are fortunate times for the church when the opposition between faith and reason is limited simply to the formal distinction referred to above and the church's teaching is not opposed by a creed of man's own making, nor has changed into something external, untouched by the Holy Spirit. The church's work in relation to its members will consist primarily in educating them to the stage where the truth, which at first could be communicated to them only in the form of something to be learned by rote, has developed into an interior possession which touches their hearts so deeply that in that truth alone do they find their own fulfillment and their essential, permanent being. It is implicit in this perpetual process of education that the unity of these two aspects of faith is not present to begin with, nor is the union continuous and fixed: that between the certainty of self and the genuine content of faith there is a separation. Self-certainty is at first feeling and will in their natural state and the subjective opinions and idle thoughts that go with them. The

true content of faith, however, comes to the spirit at first externally as words understood literally; and religious education produces the twofold result that the power of the natural feelings is subdued and the letter of the truth is quickened and appropriated by man's own spirit.

This process of transforming and appropriating the externally given material is from the beginning involved in a struggle, its antagonist being the "natural" man. This latter is a necessary presupposition, because what is to be produced is the free spirit, not a natural life, and the free spirit exists only as twice-born. This natural enemy has, however, been vanquished in its origin and the free spirit liberated by the divine Idea. The struggle with the "natural" man is, therefore, only the manifestation in the finite individual. But still another enemy proceeds from the individual, an enemy which does not originate in man's natural being but, on the contrary, in his supersensible nature, in his *thinking*, in the pure form of man's inwardness, in that which signalizes his divine origin and distinguishes him from the animal and which alone is the source of his greatness as also of his degradation, for the animal is incapable of either. With the threat to faith by such independent thinking there ensues a struggle more stubborn and on a higher level than that other struggle in which only the natural will and the naive consciousness that has not yet asserted its independence are involved. This thinking, then, is what is called human thought, one's own understanding, finite reason; and this is properly distinguished from that thinking which, though human, is also divine, which seeks not its own interest but the universal, from that reason which knows and contemplates the infinite and eternal as that which alone has affirmative being.

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However, this finite thinking need not be immediately opposed to religious doctrine. On the contrary, its efforts will at first be directed to the supposed advantage of religion by adorning, supporting and glorifying it with the products of its own invention, curiosity and acumen. As a result of these efforts, a host of inferences, presuppositions, grounds and ends, all of them with a finite content, become associated with religious doctrine. But because they appear in the immediate context of eternal truth they easily become endowed with the same worth, importance and validity as the truth itself; and since they have only a finite import and are therefore exposed to contradiction and counterarguments, they naturally require to be defended by external authority and so become a field for impassioned dispute. Having been produced in the interest of what is finite, they lack the testimony of the Holy Spirit and can be supported only by finite interests.

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But with its manifestation, the absolute truth itself assumes a temporal shape with the external conditions, relationships and circumstances associated with it. In so doing it surrounds itself with a complex of local,

historical and other positive material. Because the truth is, it must manifest itself, and its manifestation must be an accomplished fact. Truth's self-manifestation is an inseparable part of its own eternal nature, so much so that if it did not manifest itself it would cease to be, that is to say, its content would be reduced to an empty abstraction. But a clear distinction must be made between the eternal manifestation which is inherent in the nature of truth and the transient, local, external phenomena of its inessential side, or else the finite will be confused with the infinite, the inessential with the essential. This phenomenal side of truth opens up to the activities of the understanding a fresh field of finite material in the context of which it finds a direct inducement to elevate these inessential particulars to the dignity of the truly divine, to ascribe to the frame the same worth as to the picture it surrounds, in order to demand for finite narratives, events, circumstances and imagery the same reverence, the same faith, as for that which is absolute being and is eternal history.

p. vi These then are the aspects of truth where the *formal* meaning of faith begins to make its appearance, the meaning that it is simply a *subjective belief* that something is true regardless of its inner nature. It is the same subjective belief that is appropriate in the ordinary affairs of everyday life or in connection with the phenomena of nature. If the outer sense of sight or inner, immediate feeling, the testimony of others and confidence in them, and so forth, are the criteria for belief in such things, then of course a distinction can be made between a conviction, a belief based on *grounds* that something is true, and belief as such. But this is too trivial a distinction to support any alleged superiority of such a conviction over mere belief; for the so-called grounds are none other than the sources just indicated of what is here called belief.

p. vii With respect to this general subjective belief that a thing is true, there is a distinction of another kind, one which refers to the material and especially to the use made of the material. For since those finite and external narratives and circumstances which lie within the sphere of religious belief enter into the context of the eternal history, the pious mind draws on this material for much of its inspiration, edification and instruction about mundane affairs, individual destinies and situations, and finds its imagery and the whole range of its culture mostly or wholly linked up with that sphere of narrative and doctrine which surrounds the eternal truth. In any case, that sphere from which, as from a "people's book," mankind has developed its consciousness of all the wider bearings of its mental and spiritual life, which indeed is also the medium through which it raises its actual world to the religious standpoint, that sphere deserves at least the greatest respect and a reverent treatment.

Now it is one thing when such narratives and doctrines are taken and used, just as they stand, by simple piety for its own purposes; but it is a

different matter when they are grasped by the understanding in a way which gives them a fixed, settled meaning with the aim of establishing them as canons of belief for others: for this implies that the understanding of these others shall be subjected only to that understanding and this subjection is demanded in the name of divine truth.

In point of fact, this demand does the very opposite of what it pretends to do: the demand for the subjection of the ordinary understanding comes not from the divine spirit of faith but from the understanding itself which thus is directly authorized to speak with authority on divine matters. Over against this content of literalism and the barren learning of orthodoxy the better mind has a divine right. And so it happens that the more this finite wisdom encroaches on the sphere of divine things and the more it stresses the importance of the external historical element and the products of its own acumen, the more it is working against divine truth and against itself. It has produced and recognized the principle that is opposite to divine truth, has opened up and prepared an entirely different realm for cognition; in this realm, the boundless energy which is immanent in the principle of cognition and which contains the deeper possibility of its eventual reconciliation with genuine faith, will turn against its confinement within that finite sphere of the understanding and will destroy its claims to be the kingdom of heaven.

It is the better mind that, indignant at the contradiction of such presumption which lets finite and external things be acknowledged and revered as divine, and armed with the weapon of finite thinking has, as the Enlightenment, on the one hand, restored and asserted the *freedom of the spirit*, the principle of a spiritual religion, yet, on the other hand, as only an abstract thinking, *has not known how to distinguish* between the characteristics of a merely finite content and those of *truth* itself. Consequently, this abstract understanding has turned against all determinateness, has emptied truth of all content whatever so that nothing remains for it except, on the one hand, the pure negative, the *caput mortuum* of a merely abstract being, and, on the other hand, a finite material. Part of the latter is, by its nature, finite and external and the rest, which it has procured for itself from the divine content, has itself been reduced to the externality of merely ordinary historical events, to local opinions and particular contemporary views. But thought simply cannot be inactive. From such a God, in Him, there is nothing to be had for He has already been emptied of all content. He is the unknowable, for knowledge has to do with a determinate content, with movement; but the void lacks a content, is indeterminate and possesses no immanent life and action. The doctrine of truth is wholly and solely this, the revelation of what God is, of His nature and works. But the understanding, having dissipated all this content, has again veiled God from human knowledge

p. ix and reduced Him to the status of something merely yearned for, something unknown. Consequently, all that remains as material for thought is the finite material already mentioned, only with the *consciousness* that it is merely temporal and finite in character; it is to such material that thinking is restricted, and it must find its satisfaction in the vain elaboration in various ways of a subject matter lacking any substantial import and in procuring for itself in scholarly fashion a vast mass of such material.

But to the spirit that cannot endure this vanity only yearning is left; for that in which it would satisfy itself is a beyond, without shape, content or definite character. Yet it is only through shape, content and a determinate nature that anything can exist for spirit, can exist as reason, actuality, life, can possess an intrinsic being of its own. This finite material is, however, merely subjective and is incapable of yielding a substantial filling for the empty eternal. The need therefore of the spirit which again seeks religion, what that spirit really demands, is a substantial content that is independent and self-subsistent, a truth that is not a matter of opinion and intellectual conceit but which is *objective*. The only way now in which this need can still be satisfied is for spirit to fall back on feelings. Feeling is the sole mode in which religion can still exist for spirit; in the higher forms of its existence, in the representation of a content and in the belief that the content is true, reflection always plays a part and reflection has gone to the length of negating every objective determination.

p. x These, in short, are the main features of the course taken by formal reflection in religion. The system of hairsplitting, metaphysical, casuistic distinctions and determinations into which the understanding split up the substantial content of religion and to which it gave the same authority as to eternal truth, is the first mischief which begins within religion itself. But the other mischief, much as it may seem at first to be the opposite, is already established in this first standpoint and is only a further development of it; it is the mischief that thought appears as autonomous, and armed with the formal weapons to which that mass of arid insignificant determinations owes its origin and which thought itself owes to its first activity, turns against them and finds its ultimate principle in pure abstraction itself, the characterless supreme being. From a philosophical point of view it is interesting to observe this switching round of reflection—unexpected by reflection itself—into an activity hostile to its own work, a switching round which equally is only the spontaneous determination of reflection itself.

It follows from what we have said that the nature of the mischief done to religion and theology by the Enlightenment is that they no longer possess a truth that is *known*, an *objective content*, a *doctrinal* theology: although, strictly speaking, it is only religion of which this can be said, for

where there is no such content, there can be no theology. It is reduced to historical erudition augmented by the meager exposition of some subjective feelings. The stated result is, however, what religion on its part has done toward reconciling faith and reason. It now remains to be mentioned that philosophy on its part has also offered a hand to achieve a settlement and that, too, in the same manner.

For the defect from which philosophy now suffers proves to be likewise a lack of *objective content*. It is the science of thinking reason, just as religious faith is the consciousness and the absolute conviction of the truth of reason presented in the form of picture-thinking, and for this science the subject matter has become just as attenuated as it has for faith.

The philosophy from which the standpoint of general intellectual culture in recent times has primarily been derived and which rightly calls itself the "critical philosophy," has done nothing else but reduce the work of the Enlightenment, which was in the first instance directed to concrete conceptions and objects, to its simple formula; this philosophy has no other content and result than what has been produced by the ratiocinative intellect. It is true that the *critical* or *Kantian* philosophy, like the Enlightenment, is outmoded so far as the *name* is concerned, and nowadays one would meet with a cool reception from those writers who regard themselves as philosophers and, too, from professional writers on theological, religious and moral topics, as well as from those who write on politics, law, and constitutional matters, if one described such philosophy as there might seem to be in their writings as Kantian philosophy; just as one would meet with an equally cool reception from ratiocinative theologians and still more from those who base religion on subjective feelings, if one associated them with the Enlightenment.

Who has not refuted or improved upon the Kantian philosophy and who will not even now win his spurs, so to speak, on the Kantian field? But if one examines the works of all these writers, philosophical, moral and theological—the last-named often protesting most vehemently against any desire to be philosophical—one immediately recognizes only the same principles and results; but here they already appear as *presuppositions and acknowledged truths*. "By their fruits ye shall know them." The fact that this self-satisfied conceit floats only on the stream of current popular ideas and prejudices does not prevent it from fancying that the trivialities it has scooped up from the general stream are entirely original views and fresh discoveries in the intellectual and scientific fields.

What is in and for itself and what is finite and temporal—these are the two fundamental determinations which must be present in a theory of truth, and the particular import of such a theory depends on how these

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two sides are apprehended and fixed and what our attitude to them is supposed to be. Let us apply these criteria to the truths of contemporary philosophy, truths which are accorded such general recognition that there is no need to waste a word on them!

p. xiii One of the absolute presuppositions in the culture of our time is that man *has no knowledge of the truth*. The mentality of the Enlightenment has not so much become conscious of this its result and enunciated it as that it has led up to it. As already mentioned, that mentality started out to liberate thought from those fetters of the other mentality which wanted to plant its own finite determinations in the soil of the divine doctrine itself and which wanted to use the absolute, divine authority for its own rank weeds; it also wanted to restore the freedom which had been won by the religion of truth and in which it had made its home. Thus its intention at first was to attack error and superstition and, indeed, what it truly succeeded in destroying was not religion, but that pharisaical mentality which had applied the wisdom of this world to the things of another world and fancied that its sophistries could also be called religious doctrine. It wanted to remove error solely to make room for the truth; it sought eternal truths and acknowledged them and still placed the worth and dignity of man in the fact that *such truths are for him* and for him alone, not for the animal. In this view, these truths are meant to be firmly established and objective in character in contrast to subjective opinions and the impulses of mere feeling, and opinions, like feelings, are to have their justification in being in conformity with the insight of reason, subject to it and led by it.

However, the *consistent* and *independent* development of the principle of the understanding leads to the stage where all definite character and with it all content receive a finite significance, thus destroying the specific form and character of the divine. Through this development, the objective truth which was supposed to be the goal has been attenuated to such an abstraction that all that the Kantian philosophy needed to do was to bring it before consciousness and to declare that it constituted the goal of reason. Accordingly, this philosophy pronounced the *identity of the understanding* to be the supreme principle, the ultimate result both for cognition itself and also for its object—the *void* of the atomistic philosophy, God deprived of all definite character, predicates and properties, lifted into a *beyond* where we cannot know Him, or rather reduced to an abstraction void of all content. This philosophy has given the understanding a correct awareness of itself, namely, that it is incapable of apprehending the truth. But in holding spirit to be only the understanding, Kantianism has given currency to the general proposition that man can have no knowledge of God and—as if apart



from God there could be absolute objects and a truth at all—in general, that man can have no knowledge of what possesses intrinsic *being*. If religion declares that man's glory and salvation lie in his knowing God and that religion's service to man consists in having imparted to him this knowledge and in having revealed the unknown nature of God, then this philosophy forms the most monstrous antithesis to religion for in it spirit has fallen to the lowliness of the animal as its highest destiny, only that, unhappily, spirit has the advantage of still being conscious of its ignorance; whereas the animal in fact possesses the much purer, truer, namely, the completely natural, humility of ignorance. This result may well be regarded as having become, except in a few instances, the universal prejudice of our culture. To have refuted the Kantian philosophy or to despise it is of no avail; the advances, or imagined advances beyond it, may in their way have accomplished much in other directions, but they are only the same secular wisdom as the Kantian result, for they deny to spirit the capacity and the vocation to know the objective truth.

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The other principle directly bound up with this wisdom is that spirit, although conceded a cognitive faculty, is denied a knowledge of the truth and therefore can have commerce only with phenomena and finite objects. The church and pious minds have often held the secular sciences to be suspect and dangerous, indeed to be hostile to religion and have regarded them as leading to atheism. A famous astronomer is supposed to have said that he had scanned the whole sky and could find no God in it. In point of fact, the aim of secular science is a knowledge of finite objects; the goal to which it aspires in its efforts to penetrate to their interior is a knowledge of causes and grounds. But these causes and grounds are essentially analogous to what is to be explained and for that reason the forces which come within its purview are likewise only finite. Now although these sciences do not conduct their knowledge over into the region of the eternal—which is more than a merely supersensible being, for those causes and forces, that inner realm which is generated by the understanding and apprehended after its own fashion, this too is not sensible—since it is not their business to bring about this result, there is nothing to prevent the finite sciences from conceding a divine sphere. In face of such higher sphere it seems quite natural to recognize those objects of consciousness deriving from the senses and from intellectual reflection as an intrinsically null content, as only appearance. But once knowledge of truth as such is renounced, then knowledge has only one basis, that of appearance. From this standpoint, even a doctrine recognized as divine cannot itself as such be the object of inquiry, but only the facts and circumstances surrounding it. The doctrine itself remains outside the interest of intellectual activity and because its content is

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assumed to be unattainable, it is idle to seek an insight into the doctrine, a belief in it and a conviction of its truth. Accordingly, intelligence in occupying itself with religious doctrines must confine itself to their phenomenal aspects, must concern itself with the outer circumstances, and the interest becomes a matter of history where spirit has to do with things past, with something it has left behind it, in which spirit is *not itself present*. The products of the earnest efforts of scholarship, of industry, of acumen, etc., are likewise called truth, and an ocean of such truths is brought to light and propagated; but these are not the sort of truths which the earnest religious spirit demands for its satisfaction.

p. xvi      Now if what is *present* and *actual* for spirit is only this wide realm of empty appearances, while substantial, absolute being is removed to an empty beyond, where can the human spirit still find a place where it could meet with substantial, absolute being, where the eternal could approach it and it could attain to union with the eternal, to the certainty and enjoyment of it? In the region of feeling alone can the spirit take refuge in its quest for truth. Consciousness can endure substantial being, that which can withstand the onslaughts of reflective thought, only in the veiled form of feeling. This form lacks the objectivity and definiteness which knowledge and an awakened faith demand but which the understanding has learned to destroy; and it is just for this reason that the religious spirit which fears this danger withdraws into this veiled form which seems to offer no aspect which could be dialectically attacked by thought. In such religiosity, when it springs from a genuine need, the soul will find the peace it demands, for it will strive to make good by intensity and inwardness what its faith has lost in definite character and extension.

There still remains to be mentioned as the third universal prejudice, the opinion that feeling is the true and even the sole form in which the religious spirit preserves its genuineness.

p. xvii      In the first place, this religious spirit is no longer simple and unreflecting. Spirit, because it is spirit, demands in general that what is in feeling must also be in representation and imagination; that corresponding to feeling there must be something felt; that the spontaneity of feeling must not remain an inert concentration, but must at the same time be concerned with objective truths followed, as occurs in the cultus, by an expansion into acts which proclaim the community of spirits in religion and, like the concern with truths, nourish religious feeling, preserving it in the truth and procuring for it the enjoyment of truth. But such an expansion into a cultus and into a body of doctrinal beliefs is no longer compatible with the form of feeling; on the contrary, religiosity in the form considered here, has fled from any development and objectivity

to feeling, which it has challengingly declared to be the exclusive and predominant form.

Here then is where the danger of this standpoint originates, the danger that it will turn round into the opposite of what the religious spirit seeks in it. This is a point of the greatest importance which can be touched on only briefly here, and I must refer to it only in the most general terms without being able to go further into the nature of feeling. It cannot be doubted that feeling is a form which, itself indeterminate, embraces matter of the most diverse and opposite kinds. Feeling, by itself, is the natural subjectivity which is equally capable of being good as evil, pious as ungodly. When, now, the seat of authority in matters of belief and conduct is transferred from so-called reason (but it is really the finite understanding and its way of reasoning) to feeling, there has vanished even the semblance of objectivity which is at least implied in the principle of the understanding. For according to this, what is to be valid for me must rest on a universally valid ground, on something which is in its own self true. But more definitely still, what is truly divine, eternal and reasonable in every religion and in every ethical form of social life, both in the family and in the state, is recognized as an *objective law* and, as thus objective, is recognized as a *prius*. It is from this alone that feeling gets its support, its true direction. The natural feelings are meant to be shaped, corrected, purified by the teachings and practice of religion and by the established principles of morality and only then ought feeling to be made the form for a content which will constitute a proper, *religious*, and *moral feeling*.

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"*The natural man perceiveth not the things of the spirit of God and cannot know them for they must be spiritually discerned.*" But the natural man is man in his natural feelings, and according to the doctrine of subjectivity, though such a man is not supposed to know anything, it is he alone who, as natural man, is supposed to perceive the spirit of God. Of course, included among the feelings of the natural man is *also* a feeling of the divine; however, a natural feeling of the divine and the spirit of God are two quite different things. And what other feelings besides cannot be found in the human heart? That the natural feeling just mentioned is a feeling of the divine, even this is not implied in the feeling as natural; the divine is only in and for the spirit and, as we have already said, the life of the spirit is not from nature but is twice-born. When feeling is said to constitute the fundamental character of man's nature, then he is put on the same level as the animal, for the peculiarity of the animal is to have its determination in feeling and to live in accordance with feeling. If religion in man is based only on a feeling, then the nature of that feeling can be none other than the *feeling of his dependence*, and so a dog would be the best Christian for it possesses this in the highest degree and lives

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mainly in this feeling. The dog also has feelings of deliverance when its hunger is satisfied by a bone. The human spirit, on the contrary, has its liberation and the feeling of its divine freedom in religion; only the free spirit has religion and can have religion; what is brought into subjection in religion is the natural feeling of the heart, the particularity of subjectivity, and what becomes free in it and precisely in this freedom comes to be, is spirit. Even in the worst religions—those that is in which servitude, and with it superstition, is most powerful—it is when man lifts himself up to God that he feels, intuitively and enjoys his freedom, his infinitude and universality, that is, his higher nature, and this does not originate in feeling as such but in the spirit.

In speaking of religious, ethical and other feelings of this kind we must, of course, admit that these are genuine feelings; and if then we go further and regard thought with mistrust or rather with contempt and hatred—the misology of which Plato already speaks—it is an obvious step to place in the feelings the source of what is genuine and divine. Certainly it would not be necessary to see only a choice between intellect and feeling for the source of religion and truth, especially in connection with the Christian religion. In fact one must have already utterly discounted the higher, divine revelation, which Christianity declares to be its source, if one is faced with such a restricted choice and if, after rejecting not only the understanding but thought in general, one seeks to establish Christian doctrine on the basis of feelings.

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However, in making feeling the seat and the source of the true it is overlooked that the essential nature of feeling as such is to be a *mere* form, indeterminate on its own account and capable of holding any content whatever. There is nothing which cannot be felt, and is felt. God, truth, duty are felt and so too are evil, falsehood, wrong; every human condition and relationship is felt; every conception of man's relationship to spiritual and natural things becomes a feeling. Who would attempt to name and count all the feelings from those of religious feeling, duty, compassion, etc., to envy, hatred, pride, vanity, etc., joy, pain, sadness, and so on. The very fact of the diversity of feelings, not to mention the opposition and contradiction between them, makes it possible even for ordinary thinking to draw the correct conclusion that feeling is something merely formal and cannot be a principle for truly determining a content. Further, it is equally correct to infer that if feeling is made into a principle that determines a content, all that has to be done is to leave it to the individual which feelings he will have; it is an absolute indefiniteness that constitutes the standard and authority, i.e. the caprice and inclination of the individual, to be and to do what pleases him and to make himself the

oracle for what shall be accepted as true as regards religion, duty, right, and what is fine and noble.

Religion, like duty and right, also becomes and should become a matter of feeling and dwell in one's heart, just as freedom in general also sinks into feeling and becomes in man a feeling of freedom. Only, it is quite another matter whether such a content as God, truth, freedom, as simply felt, is supposed to have its warrant in feeling, or whether, on the contrary, such an objective content possesses its own inherent validity before it enters into one's heart and feeling, so that the character, the correction and the warrant of feeling derive from that content. Everything turns on *this difference of attitude*. On this rests the separation of the rectitude and faith of former days, of the genuine religious and ethical spirit which puts God, truth and duty first, from the perversity, the conceit and absolute egotism prevalent in our time which makes self-will, one's own opinions and inclinations the rule for what is religious and right. Obedience, discipline, faith in the old sense of the word, reverence for God and for truth, these are the feelings which go together with the first attitude and proceed from it; vanity, conceit, shallowness and pride are the feelings which proceed from the second attitude, or rather these are the feelings of the merely natural man in whom this attitude has its origin.

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The foregoing remarks could provide suitable material for a lengthy exposition, but I have already dealt with some aspects of this material elsewhere, and moreover this is not the place for it. They may serve only as reminders of the points of view touched on in order to characterize more precisely what constitutes the evil of the *present time* and so, too, what the *need of the time* is. This evil, the *fortuitousness* and *caprice* of *subjective* feeling and its opinions associated with the *culture of reflective thought* which has proved to its own satisfaction that spirit is *incapable of knowing the truth*, has from ancient times been called *sophistry*. This it is that merits the nickname of "worldly wisdom" which Friedrich von Schlegel has raked up again; for it is a wisdom concerned with what is usually called the *world*, of things that are contingent, untrue and temporal; it is the conceit that elevates the vanity, the fortuitousness of feeling and the pleasing of one's fancy to the absolute principle for determining what right and duty, faith and truth, are. Certainly, one often hears expositions of these sophistries called "philosophy"; yet this doctrine itself contradicts the use of the name of philosophy for them, for it is a commonplace with it to declare *that there is nothing in philosophy*. It is right in wanting to know nothing of philosophy; it thereby consciously asserts what it actually wants and is. From the beginning, philosophy has been in conflict with sophistry. All that the latter can take from philosophy is the formal weapon, the culture

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of reflective thought; but it has nothing in common with the content of philosophy since it is characteristic of it to shun completely the objective aspect of truth. Nor can sophistry in its effort to acquire a content have recourse to the other source of truth, that is, of truth in the form of religion as revealed in Holy Writ; for this doctrine recognizes no other ground but its own conceited opinions and discoveries.

p. xxiii But as regards what is *needed* at the present time, the need common to religion and philosophy is a *substantial objective content for truth*. An inquiry on the part of religion into the way in which it is again to procure respect, reverence and authority for its doctrines in face of mere arbitrary opinions and to create for itself a bond of objective faith, doctrine and cultus, such an inquiry which by itself is far-reaching in scope would also have to take fully into account the various tendencies in contemporary thought and opinion. Consequently, such an inquiry would not only be out of place here, but also it would definitely have to be other than purely philosophical in kind. However, in one part of the inquiry the two spheres of religion and philosophy coincide. For this at least can be mentioned, that the spirit of the time has developed to a stage where thinking and the way of looking at things which goes together with thinking, has become for consciousness an *imperative condition* of what it shall admit and recognize as true. It is not a matter of interest here to determine whether only a part of the religious community might no longer be able to exist spiritually without freedom of thought, or rather whether there are whole communities in which this higher principle has manifested itself, for which the form of thought in some stage or other of development is from now on an essential requirement of its faith. There can be very many stages in the development of thought and the return to first principles; for, popularly expressed, thinking means tracing back particular instances, propositions, etc., to an *immanent general principle* which relatively is the *fundamental principle* for the material made dependent on it in consciousness. Thus what at one stage in the development of thought is a fundamental principle, an ultimate basis, requires at another stage to be traced further back to still more general, profounder principles. But the principles are a content of which consciousness is firmly convinced, a content attested by spirit and which is now unseparated from thinking and from the nature of one's own self. If such principles are exposed to the formal reasoning of ordinary reflective thought then the way is opened to the error already mentioned of substituting subjective opinion and caprice for principles, and the reasoning finally becomes sophistry.

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But conviction in religion can remain in the form of what is properly called faith, only it must not be forgotten that faith, too, should not

be conceived as something external, something to be mechanically imparted; on the contrary, if it is to be vital and not servile, it essentially requires the testimony of the indwelling spirit of truth and must be implanted in one's heart. But if principles have penetrated into this religious requirement, then that requirement is no longer separate from the necessity and the activity of thought, and religion demands from this side a *science* of religion—a theology. What in theology is more than—or what in theology deserves to be more than—the general knowledge of religion possessed by every adherent of religion of whatever culture, that knowledge theology has in common with philosophy. Thus the Middle Ages saw the rise of scholastic theology, a science which cultivated religion from the side of thought and reason and strove to grasp intellectually the profoundest doctrines of revealed religion. In comparison with the sublime aim of such a science, it is a very inferior type of theology that places its scientific difference from general religious doctrine in the historical element, the whole compass of which in its endless detail it tacks on to religion. The absolute content of religion is essentially here and now for spirit. Consequently, it is not in the external accretion of the products of historical erudition, but only in the speculative knowledge of that content that the spirit which requires something more than simple faith can find a truth that is freely accessible to it here and now and which alone is capable of satisfying its eternal need, namely, to think, and so to endow the infinite content of religion with the infinite form.

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The prejudice which a philosophical treatment has to contend with nowadays, namely, that the divine cannot be *comprehended*, that, on the contrary, the Concept and a knowledge in terms of the Concept reduces God and the divine attributes to the status of finite objects and precisely in so doing destroys them, with this prejudice the scholastic theology fortunately did not have to contend; to such a level the glory and dignity of conceptual knowledge had not sunk but, on the contrary, was left unimpugned and unspoiled. It has been left to the philosophy of the modern age to misunderstand so badly its own element, the Concept, and to bring it into this discredit. It has not grasped the infinitude of the Concept and has confused it with finite reflection, with understanding; so much so that only understanding is supposed capable of thought, whereas reason is capable only of immediate knowledge, i.e. capable only of feeling and intuition and hence only of knowledge in the medium of sense.

The conception of divine justice in the ancient Greek poets depicts the gods as hostile to those who rise above mediocrity, or are happy or who excel, and as bringing about their downfall. This conception was dispelled by the purer thought of the divine. Plato and Aristotle teach

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that God is *not envious* and does not withhold from mankind knowledge of himself and of truth. For what else would it be but envy if God denied to man a knowledge of God; in doing so he would also have denied to man all truth, for God alone is the true; what else is true, yet may not seem to have a divine import, is true only in so far as it is grounded in God and is known as coming from him; all else in it is transient appearance. According to Plato and Aristotle, just as according to Christian teaching, it is the knowledge of God, of truth, that alone raises man above the animal, that gives him his distinctive character and is the source of his happiness or rather blessedness.

It is the quite peculiar phenomenon of this age at the peak of its culture to revert to that ancient conception of God as not communicating himself and not revealing himself to the human spirit. This assertion that God is envious must, within the bounds of the Christian religion, all the more astonish since this religion is and claims to be nothing else but the *revelation* of what God is, and the Christian community is supposed to be none other than the community into which the spirit of God has been sent and in which that spirit leads the members into the *knowledge of God* just because it is spirit and the divine, holy spirit, not sensation and feeling, not a picture-thinking of sensuous things. And without this knowledge what would the Christian community be? What is a theology without a knowledge of God? Precisely what a philosophy is without that knowledge, sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal!

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When my friend desired me to write a foreword to this, his first published work, I had in the first place to visualize how an attempt at a speculative treatment of religion would fare in the climate of current philosophical opinion. I felt obliged to remind the author in this foreword what kind of a reception and goodwill he could expect in a state of affairs where what goes by the name of philosophy and, indeed, always has Plato on its lips, no longer has even an inkling of the nature of speculative thought, of the contemplation of the Idea; where in philosophy as in theology, the *brutish ignorance of God* and the *sophistry of this ignorance* which puts individual feeling and subjective opinion in the place of religious doctrine and the principles of right and duty, have got the upper hand, and where the writings of Christian theologians like Daub and Marheineke which still preserve Christian doctrine and the right and the glory of thought, and writings in which the principles of reason and ethics are based on the Concept and defended against those doctrines destructive of the substantial ethical ties of mankind and the state and of religion, suffer the meanest disparagement at the hands of shallow and ill-disposed critics.



But my friend's purpose in writing his treatise can best be put in his own words, he wrote to me about it in a letter dated 25 January of this year as follows:

"My book has now acquired an entirely different shape from what it had and was capable of having in the manuscript I sent you, and it will now, I hope, be more to your liking. It really had its origin in my spiritual need. For from my youth up, religion (not an affected piety) had always been for me the highest and most sacred thing, and I held it to be true for the quite simple reason that the spirit of mankind cannot be deceived in this matter. Science, however, deprived me of the element of picture-thinking in which I had been accustomed to see the truth, and what was more natural than that I should strive to overcome the extreme disharmony and extreme despair produced in me by science and so win a reconciliation in the element of knowledge. I then said to myself: if what is presented in Christianity as the absolute truth cannot be comprehended by philosophy in the pure form of knowledge so that the Idea itself is this form, then I want to know nothing more about philosophy. —But then (I continued) science in its modern development as Christian philosophy must itself be the supreme product of Christianity. So it was that the inquiry carried out in this book became my problem, and I have exerted myself to find a solution which would satisfy my need both for religious peace of mind and for the recognition of science."

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Berlin

Easter, 1822

## Notes

1. G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion. Teil 1: Begriff der Religion*, vol. 12 of Hegel, *Sämtliche Werke*, 21 vols., ed. Georg Lasson (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1907ff.), p. iii.

2. G. W. F. Hegel, *Einleitung in die Geschichte der Philosophie*, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1959), p. 192.

# Review of Solger's *Posthumous Writings and Correspondence*

Translated by Diana I. Behler

Review *Solger's Posthumous Writings and Correspondence*, edited by Ludwig Tieck and Friedrich von Raumer, vol. 1, 780 pp., preface xvi pp., vol. 2, 784 pp., Leipzig, 1826. *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik* 1828, nos. 51–52, 53–54, 105–106, 107–108, 109–110.

## First Article

[nos. 51–52] With writings of such rich and varied content, which also touch upon many situations immediately surrounding us, the demand for a review to follow shortly after their appearance is all the more appropriate. Whatever lies in the observations and opinions of an important man about significant recent or even present events, individualities and their works, and the discussion of them within a circle of friends, men most of whom are still living among us, could be drawn to the attention of general interest or constitute a topic of curiosity. The need to engage curiosity is now generally waning. But aside from the piquant details, there lie still more solid points of view which make this collection a monument to the estimable individuality of the man and show the public the final points of his philosophical formation in his last and posthumous works.

The first part of the collection contains, to begin with, excerpts from a diary of Solger from his earlier years and the further progress of his life up until his death, the rich treasure of a collection of letters that remains

locked within the circle of intimate friendship and bears the character of such conversation and communication throughout. The editors, from whom also the larger part of the published letters of Solger's friends stem, supplement the context through the insertion of brief historical notes and have more or less rounded out the collection in a biographical whole with an introduction and a conclusion. The overall picture of Solger's character could not be projected more accurately than by these men who were acquainted with him so intimately and for such a long time. We select the following depiction, which concludes their undertaking in a worthy manner: "In his youth he was slender and flourishing, of average height. His eyes, of the clearest blue, were somewhat protruding, and good-nature and nobility were the foremost expressions of his face. Whenever the subject matter was important enough, a sublime anger could wipe out this good-nature which even won over children. The expression of his physiognomy when he was serious was a completely different one than when he smiled; his friendliness was endearing. Following the nervous disease that fatally attacked him in the year 1807, his sense of humor changed somewhat, and little by little even his build. He became stouter and fuller, the expression of manly power and equanimity took the place of the lively youth. . . . Only a few human beings have been endowed with this magic of language. Even to the uninitiated he spoke clearly and intelligibly about difficult subjects. Just like his entire life, his marriage was exemplary and happy to a degree which is seldom the case. As husband, father, friend, teacher, and citizen, one will always be able to mention and praise his name as a model for imitation."

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We believe it will not be disagreeable for the reader to survey briefly the main data of his life history:

Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand Solger was born on November 28, 1780, in Schwedt, where his father was the director of the then still existent Margravian House—a man who both in his office and in family circles and among his friends, was a highly honorable and distinguished, true German character. A few anecdotes from the early youth of the son have been imparted, of which we repeat an apparently characteristic one. For a long time Solger with his younger brother used the formal form of address, "*Sie*" [you], which in their childish quarrels often gave their relationship a comical solemnity. With his early talent for cutting out animals and human figures from paper, he often entertained the latter. Whenever his brother, however, pestered him on this account at an inconvenient time, Solger tended to make a very serious face and reject the inadmissible demand with great vehemence and call out: "Do you [*Sie*], sir, think that I have nothing else to do but cut out dolls for you?" This "comical solemnity," this seriousness which destroys itself, the

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triviality that takes itself seriously, can be seen as an image of the caprice, whose childishness disappeared by itself through maturity and solidity of character, but it followed Solger's consciousness throughout his entire life as the principle of irony.

Solger first attended school in Schwedt, then from the age of fourteen the *Gymnasium* of the Gray Monastery in Berlin, at nineteen the University of Halle, where he studied law; however, the study of ancient languages, which was even more powerfully stimulated by Wolff's witty lecturing, was at the same time his favorite pastime.<sup>1</sup> He thereby acquired an extraordinary fluency in English and Italian, began to learn Spanish, and by knowing how to manage all of this, took the most cheerful interest in these delights. Here the circle of friends mentioned in the correspondence play a role as well. At Michaelmas, 1801, he went to Jena for half a year, especially to hear Schelling lecture. No further details about this turning point in his scholarly interest and studies there have been cited other than Karl Schelling's later theses (p. 88), which Solger opposed in the animatedly conducted *Disputatorium* organized by his brother.<sup>2</sup> These were similar to theses Solger also drew up in the metaphysically speculative manner of the times for purposes of debate. In the year 1802 he took a trip to Switzerland and France, about which interesting excerpts are given in the diaries. With the beginning of 1803 Solger was appointed to the House of War and Domains in Berlin, but he continued his studies, especially in Greek, with the greatest zeal, and in the year 1804 he published a translation of Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex*. Concerning the work of the translation of all of Sophocles, which is still the most excellent, there is only an explanation on p. 159 of the view that guided him. The substantial preface to this translation is reprinted in the second volume of this collection, pp. 445ff.<sup>3</sup> In the year 1804 Solger attended Fichte's course of lectures on the *Science of Knowledge*, "with infinite pleasure and profit, as I hope" (he writes, p. 131). "Whoever wants to be pulled together, trained, and given a complete workout, should go to him." And, p. 134: "I admire his strict philosophical discourse; —No one else seizes hold of his listener with such power, no one leads him that way without mercy into the keenest school of reflection. It is a genuine delight to have made the acquaintance of both great men in this discipline, him and Schelling, and to compare them." In the year 1806 he bade farewell to politics in order to be able to devote himself entirely to scholarship. The position was left vacant for a long time yet, so that he could immediately step into it again in the event he were to make this decision. From here, where the diaries cease, the excerpts and notes from the writings begin. There now begin compilations on history, especially for a work on Greek mythology, on Indian religious teaching and philosophy, on Pausanias, Plato, and the Greek tragedians. One marvels at the diligence of the man

(as the editors rightly say referring to the mass of his papers which they had before them). One sees that he made comprehensive scholarship his goal, but at the same time this was also supposed to serve as material for his higher philosophical interests and views, to which he always returned from those extrinsic works, or rather in whose occupation he did not cease. Extending through the entirety of his intellectual and life-engaged attitude is a basic feature of his disposition which expresses itself like this on p. 143 in a letter to Krause (p. xvi of the preface), one of the best friends of the deceased, who, distinguished by integrity, knowledge, discernment, and solid judgment, esteemed by all who knew him, was snatched up in his best years: "So I now wish to admit that for me the most urgent, indeed, the only truly serious necessity, is your society. In reality, there is no firm ground and foundation other than this intimate association with friends. . . . It is only in this way that I am able to stand fast, if need be, to lift, and support others." This feeling for communication with his friends and for their participation in his works is prevalent throughout the entire correspondence and strengthens and consoles him up to the end about the difficulties that life otherwise offered him. The misfortune of the state in the year 1806 deeply distressed the patriotic Solger. Yet there is nothing more detailed to be found about Solger's views on and disposition toward this course of events. In the year 1808 he became a doctor of philosophy (p. 158), although it is not indicated where and how. In the fall of 1809 he departed as such for Frankfurt an der Oder, where he soon became *professor extraordinarius*; there he gave some lectures on philology and some on philosophy, and as one sees, he brought a significant revival to these studies. Even the citizenry of this city gained such confidence in him that in the year 1810 the city commissioners elected the professor of philosophy—who was not yet paid a salary and who did not foresee himself being provided for by any means of subsistence for a while—lord mayor, with a salary of 1,500 taler. Viewed superficially, this might remind one of Democritus' fellow citizens. But more is required in order to earn the reputation of the Abdereans for a treatment of a philosopher. For according to Diogenes Laertius, after listening to Democritus' work *Diakosmos*, the Abdereans honored the philosopher of their city with a gift of about five hundred times 1,500 taler, in addition to displays of high esteem.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, one sees that those city commissioners took seriously their election and their offer, which they solemnly extended to Solger by a delegation, and that they had indeed not just wanted to make a nice gesture toward philosophy. But one really should not compare times which are so distant from each other and are characterized by such different circumstances and natures. Solger found that the conscientious occupation with the position that was offered to him was incompatible with the work which constituted what was the most

characteristic and innermost of his intellect. After due consideration, he declined the position and soon received a salary from the government; shortly thereafter (in the summer of 1811), he was drawn to the newly established university at Berlin, where he devoted his brilliant teaching talent as well as his literary activity, mainly to philosophy, until his death (October 25, 1819; on p. 778 there are printing errors about this date).

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The larger part of the correspondence which appears in the first volume and probably all of the hitherto unpublished essays of the second volume fall into this last period of Solger's life. One sees that for him conversations in the letters with his absent friends were an important, detailed matter. His facility for expressing himself in a refined manner made it possible for him to write the many and copious letters without spending too much time on it. This review must, however, limit itself to but a few of the many subjects discussed. It is only meant to emphasize what characterizes the more general tendencies of Solger and the times. At the beginning, it becomes apparent that very early Solger acquired a fluency of expression, and a maturity of style and judgment. It is already excellent in the first essays of the twenty-year-old youth. The published excerpts from the diary of these years carry the imprint of the mature bearing which is already present. The critiques and travel notes on Switzerland and France are not products of an enthusiasm of youth, youthful superficiality and liveliness, but the results of a prudent reflection. The literary judgments are mostly concerned with belletristic writings, criticisms that, if properly selected, would have surely distinguished themselves in a public journal. The first of these writings deal with the works of one of the editors, *Zerbino*, *Eckbert the Fair*, and *Tannhäuser*.<sup>5</sup> One sees already there the inclination toward the literary criticism and style of this later friend (their first personal acquaintance falls into the last period of Solger's stay in Frankfurt); one also sees in the first expressions of his awakened interest that the young man is immediately ensconced in the new characteristic tone and direction of that time. In contrast to what is usual for youthful opinion, the subject matter and content are less powerful and not of predominant influence upon his criticism. This criticism delights chiefly in the formal and subjective features, the extraordinary profusion of imagination, of mood, etc. While, on the one hand, in Schiller's rewriting of *Macbeth* and the witches, he overlooks the old shriveled-up women in which more of the fantastic is supposed to have resided, etc., on the other hand, the newly arisen partiality for Holberg<sup>6</sup> is not lacking (pp. 101, 102), to whom an enchantment is attributed which supposedly rests upon the very cheerful and extremely good-natured Nordic mood; Holberg is found to be especially excellent there where almost all the characters of the play are certain fools and therefore say an

enormous amount of splendid nonsense: "the complete silliness of his servants" is especially praised as "irredeemable."

So we see ourselves placed in the midst of the view of one of the remarkable epochs which can be regarded as one of crisis in German literature, and we want to select a few points of comparison between the crises. The one crisis occurs during Goethe's youth. We find it depicted in its entire characteristic range in his life by Goethe himself who participated so much in its execution. After describing "the perplexity" into which criticism led, the confusion into which "young minds felt themselves displaced by its dislocated maxims, half-understood laws and splintered teachings," Goethe indicates the manner in which he saved himself from this chaotic state and distress. In order to gain a true foundation, feeling, or reflection for his poems, he had to reach into his bosom, and for the observation of an object or occurrence, for poetic depiction, first of all, he had to keep himself within the circle that was capable of touching him—of instilling an interest within him. One ingredient in this powerful conduct is his acquaintance with Shakespeare, whose great influence is further depicted especially in *Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship*,<sup>7</sup> where the poet has Wilhelm proclaim that these Shakespearean dramas are not poems; he says that one rather imagines oneself standing before the opened, colossal books of fate in which the storm winds of the most agitated life howl and strip it violently of all its leaves. Without his noticing it, he found fulfilled and developed all the presentiments which he ever had about the human race and its fates which accompanied him from youth onward. In this way Shakespeare lent a helping hand to the expanded life experience of the poet and did his part to carry the circle of imagination beyond the merely immediate objects and relationships, as beyond the reflections limited to it, and to reach a deeper content, but always out of the well of one's own bosom. For, and this is an important word that Goethe adds in the initially mentioned connection: "The inner content of the treated object is the beginning and the end of art." He then adds further that he and the friends who shared this enthusiasm did not deny the possibility of recognizing the merits of Shakespeare more closely, of understanding them, of evaluating them with insight, but they kept this in reserve for later epochs. At present, they wanted only to participate happily and reproduce actively.

The other crisis has expanded our literary horizon beyond even further appearances and has contributed not only to dissemination of knowledge about Dante, Holberg, the Nibelungs, Calderón, but also promoted, in addition to a renewed enthusiasm for Shakespeare, the study, admiration, and imitation of these remote and heterogeneous configurations. As, however, the first crisis in boredom with what is formal dug for content and brought it to the surface, so it was connected

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inversely with this expansion of taste for forms and foreign characteristics that the sense for content and substance was concentrated in subjective abstraction, in a formless weaving of the mind within itself and that it even had to yield to the enjoyment and appreciation of humor and common wit. Earlier, mention was made of the splendid nonsense and the marvelous silliness, and there are probably still admirers of Shakespeare who cannot recover from the aesthetic enthusiasm for Corporal Nym and Lieutenant Pistol.<sup>8</sup> Thus content and substance, each of its own accord, made themselves sober, thin, without seriousness in their own productions. They were intentionally sacrificed in order to float up into emptiness and with consciousness, in ironic fashion, to pass off the inner truthlessness of the material as the best. On the one hand, we saw the theory of the poetry of poetry, and, on the other hand, the circle of poets developing who made it their object to mystify both themselves and the public with the dawning products of the new poetic poetry with a cometary world made of fragrance and tone without a core. The lyrical form is natural for this ironic sublimation toward meaninglessness and longing, and it creates itself almost out of itself because the playing in unreal tones of the hollow mind is not, for verse and rhyme, embarrassed by content. In the dramatic branch, reality, character, and plot cannot be dispensed with. The inner void, which is demanded by the theory of irony, leads here to what mediocrity hits upon by itself—lack of character, inconsistency and accidentality, boastful dryness. The theory adds only the claim that mediocrity, even with the maxim of unprincipledness and superficiality, is productive. With this point of view, criticism gave itself a new, bold, indeed, often insolent, impetus and impressed a group who wanted to be at the aesthetic apex because a public, as Solger frequently expresses the experience, forms itself around every bold and glossy oddity. But a nation—for we may certainly also speak of a nation in relation to literature and distinguish it from a mere public—the nation, therefore, has since then just as little permitted this strange thing, in terms of external form as well as content, to be imposed upon itself as it had formerly attained a native national poetry after the expulsion of French taste through that first crisis in form and feeling.

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A great many literary phenomena and opinions that belong to the spirit of this time pass before our eyes in this correspondence. Yet the most audacious and flourishing period of irony, *Lucinde*, *Athenäum*, etc., falls already beyond this.<sup>9</sup> Soon there were more serious interests, the war and the political conditions, which bound together the point of view which was hostile to serious content to an ever more particular circle not only externally but also in the interior of individuals. Solger's more profound judgment always fell far short of the standpoint of the *Athenäum*, not to mention *Lucinde*. Even less could he in more mature years participate



in the utmost grotesqueness to which the humor in the Hoffmannesque productions climbed. Just to give a few examples of that tendency, Solger, in his youth, finds in the novel begun by Novalis, *Heinrich of Ofterdingen* (p. 95), a new and extremely daring attempt to depict poetry through life, the idea of a mystical story, a tearing apart of the veil that the finite on this earth holds around the infinite, an appearance of the godhead on earth, of a true myth, which here, however, forms itself in the mind of an individual man. "It distresses me exceedingly that this novel is not continued further and stops right at the beginning of what is most important." The sparkling onset corrupted the young man, but he still did not realize that a conception of this kind is deficient precisely because it cannot be continued and brought to a conclusion. The shallow characters and situations shudder back from the reality toward which they should move if they are to progress. On p. 124 the *Song of the Nibelungs* is declared, according to its outline, to be greater than the *Iliad*. In A.W. Schlegel's lecture on Dante, Solger finds neither the proper solemn awe before this lofty mysticism nor sufficient receptivity for the sublime artlessness.

Solger's close friendship with Tieck is the reason for the frequent mention of Tieck's productions. This section of the correspondence is especially characteristic with regard to the literary and the mystical tendency of the period linked with it. We therefore want to linger here a little longer. First of all, as far as Tieck's products are concerned, the friendship plays a significant role in Solger's evaluation of them, but he occasionally proceeds to open, penetrating criticism. Tieck probably had it printed as a monument to the friendship, when we read on p. 350 that Solger knew of few German dramas which could stand comparison to *Blaubart*,<sup>10</sup> or on p. 428, which Solger wrote in the year 1816: "It is my innermost conviction: upon you (Tieck) rests the salvation of German art; you are the only one who in the midst of the adulterated era stands forth in pure poetic clarity! Your work is the true and divine. It has always emerged ever more pure out of the whole jumble." On p. 294 Solger indeed still considers it an indication of how strong the reflective sense has become that criticism has been leveled against the mingling of a fairy-tale world with the real and everyday one in the Tieck fairy tales. If Solger, as he says, could hardly have imagined this objection, then we have in more recent times seen Tieck himself give up that heterogeneity, abandon the fairy-tale ground and proceed to novellas, where the setting and the external material are taken not from what is often childish and trifling, in any case from what has disappeared from our belief or has been rejected by it in the fairy tale, but from relationships of our world and truth. In later reviews which Tieck wrings from Solger's friendship, the critical sense of the latter modifies itself more closely to the insight into deficiencies which he seeks to point out to the author on the basis of *Zerbino*,

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pp. 388f., and in *Genoveva*,<sup>11</sup> pp. 465ff. What is no longer to Solger's taste is the lack of control—remarkable enough—at bottom the mingling itself, the reproach of which he did not admit earlier but had understood as higher, namely, as the mingling of what is truly poetic with what is merely fabricated, capricious, and intentional. The two friends talk back and forth throughout several letters about *Genoveva*, and the profoundly developed insight of Solger expresses itself definitively therein as opposed to his earlier manner of criticism and the Tieckian point of view. When Tieck, on the other hand (p. 453), says of this poem that it came to him entirely out of his soul, how it surprised even himself and had not been made, but came into being, p. 465, that it was epoch-making in his disposition, that he had been entirely dispassionate with it, then Solger feels that as much as it is in many places and scenes completely permeated by inwardness and love, nevertheless, this disposition was not the state of the poet, but rather a deep longing for it. Otherwise it would penetrate us as more immediately present, indeed, as the only thing which is true and possible. The inwardness appears in an opposition against something different, whereby consciousness is set at odds with itself and is brought to reflection. There is a lack of inner and actual necessity. Furthermore (p. 501), Tieck admits to the criticism that the poem appears disharmonious even to him; but this only leads to the fact that the tones, undertones, feelings, presentiment, forest, air, etc., rise up into harmony and music. With what concerns design, coloring, style, he is dissatisfied and finds the disharmony. The religion, the wilderness, the apparitions are for him the all-encompassing tone of the painting, and he does not want this to be called mannered. One sees that in Tieck's consciousness, it is the tone, that is lyrical and subjective, not the content and inner solidity, that is brought to contemplation.

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Even more definitively, however, there arises in Solger the feeling about that fundamental evil of the Kleistian products, which are often mentioned in the correspondence. The character of the Kleistian works is just as profound as ingenious as has been analyzed and proven earlier in this journal.<sup>12</sup> For as much as Solger respected Kleist's talent, and on p. 559 where he is discussed at length, Solger especially appreciated the energetic and plastic power of the external depiction that is particularly well documented in his stories, nevertheless he is struck by the great emphasis this poet placed upon far-fetched situations and effects, the intentional attempt to go beyond the given and the real and to transport the actual plot into a foreign spiritual and wondrous world, in short, the bent toward a capricious mysticism. The self-deception with which the poetic talent shifted is pertinently mentioned here. Kleist suffers from the common, unhappy inability to place the central interest in nature and truth, and from the drive to seek it in distortions. The capricious

mysticism suppresses the truth of the human psyche through miracles of the psyche, through the fairy tales of a supposedly higher inner spiritual life. Solger justifiably elevates the *Prince of Homburg* by the same author above his other pieces because here everything lies in the character and is developed from it. With this deserved praise, it is not taken into account that the prince is made into a somnambulistic sick person like Kätchen of Heilbronn, and this motif is not only fused with his being in love, but also with his position as a general and in a historical battle. With this, the principle of the character just like the entire situation and entanglement becomes something tasteless, one could say ghoulishly tasteless.

In his letters he had published in this collection Tieck gives us a great deal of the best of what belongs to this circle. One might be curious as to the realization of the character which was supposed to have been the self-reflected quintessence of those tendencies (p. 597)—the character “of a despiser of everything basic and good emerging from *Zerbino*, *Sternbald*, *Tom-cat*, and his other writings, with that hypercriticism of which nothing is the equal.” That Shakespeare is a frequent subject of conversation in these letters was to be expected. A good many of the idiosyncrasies and profundities of Tieck’s way of looking at things are already present here. “In Germany there is no study, truly no genuine study of the poet, and in England, an erroneous one,” Tieck says after his return from England on p. 565. “Since Wieland, we Germans have remained in quite dilatory and complacent admiration.” “One would think that in Germany there was never lacking a genuine study and understanding of Shakespeare, specifically as a poet (see above), just as little as for well-known and famous fruits of this study, which Goethe and A. W. Schlegel, for example, have given us.” Even the Englishmen, one would surmise, understand their Shakespeare. They would at least strongly deride the philistine arrogance of the Continent if, because of a few of their critics going astray and their scholarly mistakes in the most trifling details, we sought to extol our study above their evaluation of the poet. For this, the historical-scholarly study is usually superfluous. The letters at hand furnish an example of the fact that on this side of the Channel too it is easy to be led astray and to fads, so that in the end something odd eventually results from such extensive and unedifying efforts. The specter is already there of Tieck’s well-known whim about the advantage of the external setting which the theater at Shakespeare’s time had over that of the present one.

It is supposed to have been an advantage that the stage was only wide and not, like today, deep. The drawback of the frequent scene changes that become necessary with the production of Shakespeare’s dramas as well as the uncertainty about which city or location one was now placed into, was, as one knows, certainly remedied; the latter was solved by means of a large placard fastened to a pole in front of the painted gate, city

wall, houses, etc., which gave the requisite information; furthermore, the actors, in order to travel from one city to another, had only to go through the curtain separating the stage in such a way that on its other side the other city, also identified by an inscription, was painted, so that no change of scene was bothersome. Indeed, the further circumstance is not considered to be a disadvantage of today's art, namely, that in today's theaters the audience not only in the loges but also on the main floor is protected by means of a roof against rain, wind, and sun. But Tieck writes about that old arrangement on p. 693 that he is not disinclined to believe that even the lack of poets and of meaning arose, for the most part, from the abandoning of the stage scaffolding, "and that in Germany, it hindered us in the production of genuine works." But in this correspondence nothing appears yet about the additional peculiar notions which Tieck has since permitted to venture out into the public about the characters in *Hamlet*, even about Lady Macbeth. Otherwise, many a thing is told about which one could be amazed, as on p. 502, that for many years perhaps Tieck excessively admired Shakespeare's *Pericles* (from which *Zerbino* and *Octavian* are claimed to have originated), on p. 696, that a play of Calderón which he admired ten years ago now appears almost thoroughly bad. Such aberrations of taste can only be understood in terms of the abstract thrust of criticism that does not pay heed to what is objective in art. Solger has been saved from going to the extremes through his classical education and philosophy. But at the same time it has still not emerged whether the aforementioned account contains elements of more solid criticism and is not completely uncanny in many a romantic product (like p. 606, e.g., with *Fortunato*). And in that very same place (still in the year 1818), one finds the evaluation of Shakespeare's *Love's Labor Lost*—this play as weak in the whole as teeming with platitudes in the specific—that among the comic plays the maturity of poetry in this poet expresses itself most distinctly in this work because it is the least determined by a specific tendency (the tendency is indeed only very paltry) and "is based on the purest irony." One can admit the latter in the meaning often linked with it, that it is the purest irony to seek to come across any value in the play, which should be the delusion of any expectation other than just the humor of the matter.

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In comparison, Solger's judgment proves itself especially pertinent, mature, and quick about the many additional phenomena lying outside the field of the romantic, which aroused undeserved attention during the period of this correspondence. One sees with satisfaction how Solger treats them with their very first appearance while they arouse the greatest sensation with a broad public and permit the public to expect the most significant results, until these matters and all their expectations are

ruined without even accounting for it, as through a mere forgetting. Just look at, for example, Solger's early and at the same time mature opinion about the once admired, now completely forgotten nature poetizing of Hiller<sup>13</sup> (vol. 1, p. 128), even more about Pestalozzi<sup>14</sup> (ibid., pp. 135 ff.), which can be instructive even now for many a person as to why the cause of this so noble a man, as an individual, did not produce a revolution in the educational system, nor could it effect any nuance of progress. One is just as delighted by the profound views about many such literary productions that have appeared with great pretentiousness and with even greater admiration, for example, about the *Ancestress* p. 636, about *Sappho* p. 653, etc.<sup>15</sup>

[nos. 53–54] One can still emphasize in Niebuhr's *Roman History* (1811–32) what Solger, being prevented from writing more extensively, only briefly notes on p. 222, since the second edition can now be compared with earlier, more thorough evaluations. Solger states that for him most of the first centuries of Rome appear quite chimerical, especially the view of old poems from which Livy is supposed to have drawn. Schlegel's review in the *Heidelberger Yearbooks*<sup>16</sup> is recognized on p. 222 as one that is seldom found and renews again the highest respect for Schlegel among all the impartial people. "Virtually nothing is left standing of Niebuhr's hypotheses up to Romulus, and everything is refuted with very convincing reasons." Schlegel, from Romulus on, also gets into conjectures to which Solger could not subscribe, but not in imaginary saturnalian heroic poems, the invention of which, for Solger, belongs to the most incomprehensible aberrations. The reproach has been made that the philosophers in recent times write history *a priori*. Solger's philosophical sense prevented him from granting this right to the specialized historians and the philologists as well as to the others.

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Equally interesting are opinions about many events of the times, about conditions and their spirit. Solger's utterances, for example, about the murder committed by Sand and the related mind-set are remarkable enough.<sup>17</sup> To emphasize some of that now, he writes about it on p. 722ff.: "it makes me shudder whenever one gains insight into such a disposition as this Sand. He has certainly been raised as a well-disposed young person for whom one must feel pity. But now, the idiotic stupidity to want to save the fatherland through the murder of the old milksoy! The cold, insolent arrogance to pass judgment upon the supposed evil one, like a petty world judge! The vain hypocrisy with religion, or rather their fine phrases which are supposed to justify the greatest abominations! It is enough to drive one to despair whenever one thinks of it! Nonetheless, all of that is not in the least new to me. I know exactly where everything is coming from. For ten years one has preached to them sufficiently

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that they were the wise and splendid ones from whom the rebirth of the state and the church must proceed. Stupidity, futility, arrogance—these are the spirits which propel them, and those are true spirits of Hell.” —p. 725 on the story of Sand. “It affords us a sad glimpse into the condition of so many young souls. Here one sees a mixture which makes one shudder of original good-naturedness with a narrow-mindedness, stupidity, I would like to call it, an arrogance, an unconscious religious hypocrisy before oneself and others. Could you believe that there are professors here who admire the inane coquettish bombast which the young person has written to his own people? But one remembers only far too well the idle twaddle of the Wartburg speakers<sup>18</sup> and so much of that ilk. Yet, as I said, we do not want to blame anyone but the popular spirit of the times. For a long time already, everything has been assuming this ruinous tendency toward wanton world reform and inane arrogance, and many totally different doctrines have constantly promoted them. The unfortunate intellectual enlightenment which so many have under their skin, the malicious doctrine that the so-called better ones must be and do everything and that everyone who believes in nothing but inane world improvement is one of these better ones, is the proper school of inflated stupid arrogance. One should work against this with all one’s powers and at least assuage one’s conscience.”

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Regarding the Wartburg scenes, it says on p. 720, “in that very place several professors have given silly, childish speeches in order to propagate their shallow enthusiasm.” One should have either forbidden or prevented this early enough or depicted these political-philosophical fools afterward in such a way that they would have appeared in their complete nakedness. One might have perhaps been able to consider it as something salutary if Solger had taken over this depiction and countermanded the glaring mischief by making his views public. It was, however, probably right to wish that for the rest of his life, which was to last only six more months, he would be spared the anticipated virulent enmity because of a servile disposition, etc., and would have kept peace for himself through public silence.

Yet we must set limits on the inventory of what is interesting of which so much of a fresh, equally penetrating and cheerful view of art and life is still found in the letters of Solger and also in those of his friends, especially the one by the editor, von Raumer, in order to proceed on to the side which must chiefly claim our attention. The correspondence nevertheless contains fewer data and explanations about Solger’s training and advances in philosophy than one would initially surmise. The circle of men who converse here in letters had not chosen one and the same scholarly vocation. Each pursues a specific major interest, indeed takes the interest

of an educated man in the work of the other, but does not look into the objects and content further. One can therefore not expect the drama of the development of a philosophy, a reciprocal communication and discussion of philosophical propositions and concepts. The reciprocity is general encouragement or participation, and whenever Solger invites more detailed remarks and criticism about his published writings, it is always the same: one of his friends had not yet had the time to read the text, the other postpones a deeper investigation of the reading until later and, for the time being, limits himself to the criticism of particularities, style, and such. The Tieck letters express a more direct relationship to philosophy. Solger's explications about that are, in contrast to this friend, the most frequent and detailed. He expresses the satisfaction he derives from communicating with Tieck repeatedly and sincerely. "How often (he says, p. 375) it gives me new fortitude and new strength that you recognize my endeavors when everything around me is silent about it. You come to my aid. Even if you are not a philosopher, you are nevertheless acquainted with the philosophies, and what is even more important, you live, through your own profession, in the subject of philosophy. Your approval and evaluation often keep me calm whenever dismay seeks to creep in to me." In these published letters, Tieck shows the public his kind of relationship to philosophy and the course of his disposition and mind. Such a disclosure of an important individual about himself is in itself an interesting portrait of a soul, and all the more, because it represents a type. Tieck's point of view toward philosophy is, in keeping with the times, certainly a negative attitude; yet it is affirmative insofar as it is at the same time linked to the recognition of the affirmative in philosophy on the whole as that which is identical to the essence of religion and poetry, and which to that extent diverges from the usual understanding of the Enlightenment and the theory of faith. But that negative relationship to philosophy simultaneously brings a one-sidedness into that very principle which considers and expresses itself as the mystification of religion and poetry because this principle has remained a product of reflection, not impartial disinterested religiosity and poetry. This mysticism constitutes only a further reflection of the point of view discussed earlier, and as it is the reflection of one part of Solger's philosophical point of view, the illumination of Tieck's disclosure in its main features shall at the same time serve as an introduction for this.

"The course of all thoughts and ideas shall only confirm in me deep prejudices, i.e. but only with other words: faith and eternal love" (pp. 341f.). We see in this the old doctrine which Socrates and Plato initiated that whatever should be considered as true and good for the human being must reside originally in his mind, but, moreover, it only

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becomes faith, in that it has also been called prejudice, has entered into his consciousness in a more or less clearly felt or suspected manner and can also, to the degree that it is not based on insight. Like mysticism, that doctrine deprives everything merely positive of external authority. In relation to the innermost genuine content, philosophy does nothing but confirm it as such, but what it simultaneously effects by that is the purification of that content and the segregation of the counterfeit, of the positive of another kind, which is in it as prejudice. In the same context Tieck says, however, that for him it had “never been a matter of thinking as such”; “the mere pleasure, practice and play of ideas, even of the most daring, is uninteresting to me.” To obtain for faith the philosophical form, i.e. the thinking cognition of the content too, naturally depends entirely upon individual need. But precisely this cognition leads to insight into the nature of thinking and shows that thinking produces something other than merely an exercise and play of ideas, and impedes, without simply denying cognition of it. In the letter of March 24, 1817 (p. 535), Tieck gives a detailed narration, which he calls a confession, about the course of his intellectual direction. Before his acquaintance with Jacobi, with whom he was first able to maintain a dialogue (“from two shores over a chasm, where we probably heard more an echo than our words”), he had not found any dialogical philosophers, and the various systems did not satisfy him (the satisfaction is linked to that which one seeks, and Plato, e.g., was certainly also a dialogical philosopher). “All particularly offended my instinct for religion.” So “the love of poetry, of the peculiar and old,” led him “at first with almost sacrilegious frivolity” (in what the sacrilegious is to have consisted, one does not see), “to the mystics, especially to J. Böhme, who had so taken possession of all my vital powers that from this point I sought only to understand Christianity, the most living word in the image of the struggling and self-revealing power of nature, and now all old and newer philosophy became for me merely historical manifestation” (the reverse happens to philosophical perception, for which mysticism and its formations become historical manifestations). “From out of my wonderland I read Fichte and Schelling and found them easy, not deep enough, and only as silhouettes or panes, as it were, out of that eternal globe full of wonder” (easy, because for the mystical requisite, it was only a matter of the general sense, the abstract idea, as stated above, not of thinking in itself; not deep enough, because in the form of thought and its development, the illusion of depth disappears before that of which thought is ignorant, for one usually finds a content deep only in the state of its concentration and often, as it mostly occurs with J. Böhme, of a fantastic confusion and severity, but fails to recognize the depth in its development). With Böhme, Tieck was carried away

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by the “magic of the most marvelous reverie and the liveliest fantasy.” The equally enormous defectiveness in this mysticism becomes obvious, to be sure, only to the requirements of thought. Elsewhere (p. 392), and indeed outside of and after the ebbing away of that condition, the notion of a connection between reason and understanding also occurs with the elevation of the soul. It is said right there, “to elevate oneself up to the illumination of an enthusiastic soul, and here again to come across reason and understanding too, in the spheres of a highly complex interconnection and the harmonious union of all powers, is granted to only a few, to give information and an account of it, to the fewest—until now, it seems, to no one.” —If Tieck was not satisfied in this direction by Franz Baader, Hamann, St. Martin, etc., what would, for example, prevent one from finding in Plato, not to mention others, the desired union of the enthusiastic soul and the reason and understanding that give information and an account of it? What prevents this is apparently only the ignorance of and lack of familiarity with finding one’s way in the manner whereby thinking reason depicts the genuine capacity of enthusiasm so as to recognize that capacity in it again—or the mistaken demand for also seeing, along with the philosophical mode of cognition, the incompatible melancholy fermentation and phantasmagorism of mysticism. If one is familiar with the nature and manner of thinking, however, then one knows that philosophy only gets its due if one maintains that at least from Plato on—not perhaps none, nor the fewest, but rather the greatest number of philosophies gave information and an account with reason and understanding about that genuine capacity, its interlacing within itself and its coherence, and those for whom the mind has made its home in philosophy have possessed this information and account.

Out of that hypochondriac method Tieck (p. 539) adds that he had “often foolishly tried to give others that feeling of mysticism.” What he adds—“no one was as steeped in Böhme, indeed, he suspects, not even in the philosophers”—is probably not the real reason why he did not succeed, for J. Böhme succeeded in communicating this to Tieck himself; but rather the real reason is the fact that aside from the organ of philosophy, which he misunderstood and scorned, the innate capacity for communication through which he was probably before and after able to communicate feelings of depth did not at that time stand at his disposal. For he indicates about this state of the soul “that for him the joy in poetry, in images, had appeared to him as something objectionable and wrong.” He adds to this portrait that since he now believes that he has found speculation and the inner life, he considered that it was not compatible with worldly pursuits, so there were many hours in which he longed for the seclusion of a monastery to be able to live entirely for his Böhme and

Tauler and the wonders of his soul. "My power of production, my poetic talent seemed to me to be shattered forever." These interesting features lead of themselves to the observation that in reality speculation can be connected just as little as poetic production with such a hypochondria, with this state of lifelessness and lack of form and shape of the mind, even if they are already called inner life, marvels of the soul.

But Tieck emerges again from this state. It is interesting to read what healed him. Just what "frivolity" and "arbitrary act" are supposed to mean in this depiction cannot easily be understood. It was (p. 540) "my old Homer and the Nibelungs and Sophocles" (Homer and Sophocles would certainly be amazed to find the Nibelungs between them), "my dear Shakespeare, a sickness, Italy, an oversaturation with the mystics, probably especially my stirring talent, which in my desperation gave me new frivolity. And almost as frivolously as I had slipped into this field, I again transferred myself through an act of arbitrariness and now again stood on the field of poetry and serenity, and could again work." This reverted capability for work is probably the most genuine evidence of regained health of the mind out of that unfruitful abstraction of inwardness, for work means to renounce this abstraction and to give what inwardness would have had in content, reality and truth. But in his manner of judgment, Tieck did not fully absorb the significance of his return to work. That split remains in his views, and with it, the one-sided and abstract subjectivity remains yet a more genuine, indeed, a higher point of view. For example, to be able to locate the essence of Shakespeare's greatness or poetry in general in its mysticism, about which there is so much talk, it is necessary rather to abstract what makes a poet from the concrete determination and accomplishment of the characters and plots developed. To volatilize the concrete and solidity of his shaping into the abstraction of the mystical and interior is the work of a reflecting mind, not that of criticism promoting and discerning the idea and animation. With inner life as the principle of criticism, with such a view, it is still the same case as before in the state of the subject, which as abstraction is fixed against the developing activity of thought, so it is against the shaping activity of poetry.

Thus even the entire manner of how Tieck's insight into and comprehension of Goethe's poetic nature and production are constituted depends upon this point of view. We should mention it here, insofar as it throws a new light on that point of view even from its own perspective, and since Tieck extracted this relationship from the intimate communication initially intended only for a friend and displayed for the public, the remarks at the same time reveal themselves not as a momentary mood, but as a permanent judgment. He comes to speak of Goethe frequently, and

indeed with ill-humor, to use this word right away, because his evaluation proceeds from this and also toward this. It was cited above from Solger's criticism about *Genoveva* that the intentionality and reflection, the mere longing and not truly present mood of love and inwardness in the poet, had struck him, so that, as Tieck correctly expresses it, what Tieck had considered as enthusiasm appeared to Solger as ill-humor. Aside from the fact that Tieck otherwise takes offense at Goethe (among other instances, p. 488, he is annoyed that Goethe did not even once read *Erwin*),<sup>19</sup> he thinks on p. 485 an author may himself later choose to call "ill-humor" what he had earlier called "enthusiasm." Thus it seems to him that Goethe did this with his *Werther*,<sup>20</sup> and on p. 487 he asks indignantly: "May he, because his overflowing young spirit first showed us what this world of appearances around us is, which prior to him was uncomprehended—may he, just because he proclaims it, turn away from it with a kind of genteel demeanor and be impious and ungrateful toward himself and toward what is most beautiful?" Goethe analyzes in his life, in a manner which is equally interesting and charming, how he, ill with his not yet metaphysical, but rather sentimental hypochondria, with a still high-spirited and vital longing, not yet entangled in abstraction, but in life, worked himself out of that ill-humor and freed himself from it precisely through the production of that novel. Just as with an illness the core of life must still be healthy in order to recover from it, so also the heart and head were still healthy, and their power became poetry that was able to change the ill-humored feeling into the matter and the object and elaborate it into an external efflorescence. Since the ill-humor now became the content of the work, it ceased to be the mood of the poet. He finished up with himself through the work just as the work itself became something finished in itself, a work of art. But with that alone he had not yet finished with the dear public. He describes the agony he attracted from all sides that pursued him in all places and incessantly. One constantly expected that morbidity of spirit from him and even readily wanted to love and prize it in him. And even now, after what became clear from all his works anyway, right from the next one, his *Götz*<sup>21</sup> and after he had even described that crisis and the cure effected by the production, he had to hear the reproach that the sick understanding of the world of appearances was the correct understanding and that he had turned away from such a point of view and thereby had become "impious and ungrateful toward himself." From the reproach of this impiety and ungratefulness, there follows quite naturally the additional whim, the reproach that "this magnificent soul had thrown itself one-sidedly into antiquity essentially out of ill-humor," that Goethe "thereby tears himself away from the fatherland." It would be difficult to say if a poet were

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more deeply rooted in his fatherland than Goethe. But if others rank the foreign and the older, Shakespeare, Calderón, etc., just as high or higher than the national, then one can hardly fault him for that, even if not all indigenous art, the poetry of poetry, among others, does not agree with him and he finds a higher satisfaction in untroubled antiquity. Moreover, it is not a matter of contrasting subjective feelings, but about aesthetic insights based on meaning, study, and reflection. Wholly unfortunate is the opposition on the following p. 488: "I (Tieck) had also seen antiquity, St. Peter's, and could only admire the Strassburg Cathedral all the more." Was Goethe then not one of the first to have had a sense for the Strassburg Cathedral and to have, as it were, discovered a sense for its evaluation and insight?

In mentioning the manner of depiction of the Hindu religion presented by Friedrich von Schlegel (p. 709), Solger says quite rightly, "it is a main point to abandon all transmitted terminology of emanation, pantheism, dualism, etc. No people or person has ever seriously harbored the one-sided and empty concepts which these expressions designate, and they derive from times when one cruelly anatomized the living insight." Thus it would have brought both friends greater success if the expressions of mysticism, inner life, poetry, particularly irony—indeed, even religion and philosophy—had themselves remained out of the picture because then one would have had to speak about the matter and about the content. This manner of evaluating is a decidedly negative tendency against objectivity, one of those tendencies that has proceeded from Fichte's philosophy of subjectivity. Such evaluating does not deal with content, but rather revolves around faded notions that dispose of the matter of religions and philosophies with abstractions of inner life, mysticism, with reflective designations about identity, dualism, pantheism, etc. This style appears, on the one hand, as a refined disposition that takes care of the matter and, on the other hand, as one which stands above it. It is indeed finished with the matter in that sense that it has removed it. It is a step above it because it is indeed outside of it.

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The self-conscious frustration of the objective has called itself irony. Since the most excellent ironical individuality is to be found on our path, let us briefly mention this. In the aforementioned context, Solger notes, first of all, quite appropriately about one part of the work of the expositors of the Indian religion: "They have drawn out the thread, to which I can fasten everything, completely one-sidedly theoretically and dogmatically extracted, so that it is no longer what it was as a living band, and this especially Friedrich Schlegel has done." Throughout his entire public career, the father of irony has given himself the same relation to philosophy noted here. He has, namely, always behaved judgmentally toward it without ever articulating content, philosophical propositions, or

even a developed sequence of them, not to speak of having proven or even refuted them. Refuting requires the assertion of a basis, and with this an engagement in the issue. This would mean, however, condescending from the genteel position or (to use one of his earlier inventions of categories) from the divine insolence and from the heights of irony (one can just as easily say: from the satanical or diabolical insolence of evaluating and disputing, from the position above the issue to condescending to the ground of philosophizing itself and to the issue). Mr. Friedrich von Schlegel has constantly pointed out that he stood on the highest peak of philosophy without ever proving that he has penetrated this science and understood it in a merely ordinary fashion. His discernment and reading have certainly acquainted him with problems that philosophy has in common with religion and that even get in the way of philological criticism and literary history. But the kind of solution he intimates everywhere and only ostentatiously gives one to understand instead of simply stating it or indeed justifying it philosophically, is partly a subjective solution, which may be convenient to him as an individual this way or that, but partly demonstrates the entire demeanor of his remarks, that the requisite of thinking reason, and with it, the basic problem of that thinking reason and a science of philosophy which is conscious and honest toward itself have remained foreign to him.

Tieck's irony remains free of charlatanry in its relationship to philosophy and generally limits itself to dismissing the objective formation of content through thinking, that is, to dismissing the characteristic of philosophy to deduce the abstract universal, what is called mystical; in relation to Solger's philosophy, it limits itself to having a sincere interest and occasionally acknowledging its content, usually to formulate the response to the explicated Solgerian depictions and explanations with a general agreement enclosing them with the often repeated good-natured assurance of understanding Solger, of understanding him completely, of having finally understood him. In the year 1814 (p. 322) he had written that after reading a few dialogues of *Erwin*, he only now believed that he understood Solger fully, just as on p. 320 Solger expresses his satisfaction that in an oral conversation Tieck admitted to him that the drive of enthusiasm for which he had strived in art had only been brought to full consciousness for him through Solger's revelation which will also be repeated elsewhere. Thus Tieck writes still in the same manner in the year 1819 (p. 711) in response to the announcement of philosophical letters which can be found published for the first time in the second volume of this posthumous works: "I believe that I understand you more with every word, and it becomes ever more clear to me that it is this which I have sought."

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## Second Article

- p. 838 [nos. 105–106] What ultimately has been presented in the foregoing article as a reference to the philosophy of Solger may indeed be taken for a reflection of the same in Tieck's friendship. It illuminates, however, in and of itself that the manner of this reflection can only have significance for one side, that of Solger's ideas. For the content we must now turn to Solger's expositions that are offered to us in the collection at hand. These expositions are of such a kind that they provide a much more definitive representation of Solger's basic views than the writings that appeared during his lifetime. In these posthumous writings we see him frequently striving to make his ideas press forward, partly for his friends, partly for his public, in several essays which he worked out for publication in the last year of his life. Nevertheless, these are not systematic expositions, but are intended only to prepare the public and to make an announcement to it, as a "manifesto," as Solger calls the main essay (I, pp. 688ff., 726), in order to explain, for the larger public too, what he takes philosophy to mean and how he stands opposed to present endeavors. They go so far with this ulterior purpose, however, in order to make the profundity of his idea and his speculative capacity in philosophy clear and to authenticate it. With Solger it is not a matter of what is usually otherwise also termed philosophy. Rather, with him we find active the speculative requisite of reason, not to dismiss with complaint and meekness the interest and consciousness of the highest oppositions and contradictions that arise, like courage, but to look them straight in the eye in their entire definitiveness and severity, and in their disintegration to seek and gain only the satisfaction of the mind. Solger does not shy away from the obvious forms that lend themselves to expressing the reconciliation of oppositions, which is then the case when these oppositions are left alone in a concrete manner as they exist in representation and are not reduced to their simple thought determination.
- p. 839

I shall first cite the familiar form in which he expresses the idea, in the letters as well as frequently in the other essays (I, p. 603), namely, that when we have grasped our absolute and eternal relationship to God, we "clearly and without any vacillation recognize that everything which is true and good in our doings and life can only be God Himself. Since God now exists or reveals Himself in our finiteness, He sacrifices Himself and destroys Himself in us, for we are nothing." The following additional determinations should be cited here. In the context (I, p. 511) "that it is not our own essential being which constitutes our truth," it is stated: "We are, for this reason, insignificant manifestations because God has assumed existence in us ourselves and has thereby separated Himself

from Himself. And is this not the highest love that He has placed Himself into nothingness, so that we might exist, and that He even sacrificed Himself and annihilates His nothingness, has killed His death, so that we do not remain a mere nothing but return to Him and may exist in Him?" Then further: "The nothingness in us is itself the divine, inasmuch as we perceive it as nothingness and us ourselves as such." I notice, first of all, in general, that the Concept of logic, which constitutes the foundation for all speculative knowing, is found in this idea, the "sole genuine affirmation" (it is the eternal divine activity which is represented) which is constituted as the negation of negation. Furthermore, one sees this abstract form in its most concrete shape taken in its highest reality, namely, as the revelation of God, and indeed, this not in the formal superficial sense that God reveals Himself in nature, history, in the fate of the individual human being, etc., but in the absolute sense that the unity of the divine and human nature existing in Christ as primordial and divine is brought to consciousness for the human being, and precisely with that, what the nature of God and what the human in truth is, together with the further developing inferences. In connection with what was initially cited, this is certainly expressed thus on pp. 603ff. (as elsewhere p. 511). —"So" (since God exists in our finiteness and sacrifices Himself) "our entire relationship to Him is always the same as that which is established for us in Christ as a type. We should not only remember it, not therefore merely derive reasons for our behavior, but we should experience and realize this event of the divine self-sacrifice in us . . . what takes place in each and every one of us has happened for the whole human race in Christ. What we have of it is not merely a reflection of our thoughts, but the most real reality" (cf. p. 632). One sees that this doctrine of Christianity (including the Trinity, which according to its basic definition is contained in what is cited), found its refuge in speculative philosophy after it had been set aside by the theology in the Protestant church, reigning almost exclusively through exegesis and reasoning, after it had reduced the manifestation of Christ to a mere object of remembrance and moral foundations, and exiled God into an intrinsically indefinite void hereafter as an unknowable and thus unrevealed being outside of reality. It explains, however, that when the negation of negation, as genuine affirmation (which is the entire abstract Concept), receives the completely concrete shape contained in the cited expressions, which it has in the doctrine of Christianity, a detailed scientific explication is required to show the transition from that abstraction to this abundance of content, to gain a concrete shape for the idea of reason just as much as to vindicate the Christian doctrine again for the thinking mind and restore it again to

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its rights against the void of that so-called reason and the pietistic piety which formed a common cause.

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In that transition which, if it is to be carried out philosophically, will be a long road, there appear many difficulties and contradictions which must be resolved. Already in the passages cited such things become manifest. At once we are postulated in it as nothingness (which is the evil), and then again, the harsh, abstract expression about God is used that He annihilates Himself, that He is thus the one who postulates Himself as nothingness, and this furthermore, so that we may exist, and thereupon the nullity in us ourselves is called the divine, insofar as we, namely, perceive it as nullity. This opposition of determinations, that we are originally nothing and arrive at existence only in relationship to God, and again, that only through this connection do we become nothing, would have required an additional exposition to be balanced out. Moreover, what is asserted, which can be seen as the process of eternal love, already immediately contains the presupposition of God, on the one hand, and of us, on the other, and the difficulty is the same whether we are presupposed as existences or as nothingness. With this, the moment of creation in general and of the human being in God's image specifically is missing, and from there, that of the transition from this merely primordial, merely abstractly existent, the not yet fully existing unity of human nature with the divine to what is expressed as appearance and nothingness. Appearance is determined toward the more concrete, which is consciousness and freedom, and the difficulty is that this appearance contains not only the wellspring of evil, that eating of the tree of knowledge of good and evil and thus falling away from being in God's image, but also the principle of the return to the image, so that God Himself is introduced saying: "Look, Adam has become like us and knows what good and evil is" (Gen. 3:22)—the passage which constitutes the other side of the earlier meaning of knowing and is usually regarded far too little in its depth, or hardly even noticed.

The lack of that presupposition noted here does not disappear in the following depiction which occurs in vol. 1, p. 703: "The true and eternal exists simply as that which is, as God, as the good. For us creatures thrown into reality, both" (the true and the appearance) "are inseparable.\* For

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\*This exposition is made in a context in which Solger speaks of contemporary philosophy and, as it might appear according to the initial letter H., perhaps of the reviewer. There the view is mentioned in which higher speculative thinking in its lawfulness and generality is explained as the only real thing, and everything else, even the knowledge of experience, insofar as it cannot be referred back to these laws,



the good would not exist for us if it did not have an appearance it kills, for the sake of which it embodies itself, becomes flesh, because it must annihilate it according to its eternal good nature and thus reconcile existence with itself. The higher mode of existing is to reveal oneself, and to reveal oneself means to annihilate one's nothingness, i.e. to exist through oneself; both are completely the same."

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It might appear that the process of creation is also contained in what has been said, but the same is only mixed, at least more with the process of reconciliation in which finite existence appears presupposed. It means that the inseparability of the good and the appearance or negation is only for us, just as much as that the eternal nature of the good creates its own appearance for itself in order to annihilate it, and that it thus exists only through itself, whereby this inseparability, this existing only relatively for us, would be taken away. But everywhere it remains a significant, insoluble basic conception, as on p. 578, that since we are not capable of thinking and knowing other than in oppositions, "within us contradictory beings the completely void appearance, the true positive nothingness must stand in opposition to the reality or the revelation of the eternal." It is Solger's expressed determination of philosophy not to be caught up in a dualism (e.g., I, p. 510). Because indeed, every drive for truth is already this, to tear oneself away from the dualism of our consciousness, our appearance, or Manichaeism, because all dualism has Manichaeism as its basis.

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is regarded as a disappointing, void, and futile splintering of this. Without analyzing to what degree this depiction contains distortions, I wish to note only what Solger opposes as his opinion. This is the claim that false perceiving and its object both exist, but both exist too much. It immediately becomes clear that this determination would not be opposed to the above, where it is not a matter of a denial of existence by the knowledge of experience, which can hardly have occurred to anyone, but only of the possibility of reducing this to the Concept and testing it against it. If, however, in the sequel to the aforementioned, what is called false perception here is expressed more abstractly than the moment of appearance essential for the revelation of the good itself as that which the destruction of nothingness is, then this concept has already been mentioned before, and the superficial view of each of my writings, already in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which appeared in the year 1807, even more in my *Logic*, which appeared in the year 1811ff., would demonstrate that all forms, be they taken as forms of existence or of thought, are dissolved in the same Concept, which has not only long been explained there as the center of everything, but proven as well. At this most abstract speculative apex, no difference opposed to the philosophy cited would therefore result. But the development of this Concept and the necessity of it is yet another matter, and the fact that Solger did not see his way clear about insight into this lies in what has already been cited from his ideas and will reveal itself even more in what is to follow.

The ending in higher reality and in reconciliation must, however, be completed in that direction, and not begin with the presupposition of a dualism.

This, then, is essentially linked to the fact that in the cited expositions even the representation of God is present as a presupposition. If, as in the above ideas, it is assumed as known what God is, how He is, then one could not at all imagine what philosophizing was still for, because philosophy can have no ultimate purpose other than to perceive God. Were that acquaintance not satisfactory, however, and were more than mere acquaintance required, namely, knowledge, then this means that the justification is not there of itself to say of God that He does this or that, embodies Himself, etc. Because all such determinations could only attain their foundation through the knowledge of its nature, that manner of expressing oneself has, first of all, the advantage of being popular and laying claim to general religiosity, even with being able to come forward with a certain confidence because of the imposing effect which the word “God” has. But in philosophical respect, this manner has disadvantages, in particular that the link between that which is attributed to God, to His nature, i.e. the insight into the necessity of those determinations or actions, does not reveal itself, indeed not even the demand of this necessity, about which it can only be a matter of going beyond believing to philosophizing. Just as disadvantageous for philosophizing itself as for the discourse and understanding is that admixture of such concrete representations as God, sacrificing oneself, we human beings, knowledge, evil, etc., with the abstractions of being, nothingness, appearance, and the like. One is uncomfortably thrown back and forth from one of these heterogeneous grounds to the other. The feeling of the unsuitability of the abstract forms of thought to the abundance that lies in the representations is in itself disturbing, even if one does not possess the better insight into what is unrelated which brings that admixture into the thought process.

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In the first treatise of the second volume—*Letters Concerning the Misconceptions about Philosophy and Their Relationship to Religion* (pp. 1–53), and in the second, *On the True Meaning and Determination of Philosophy, Especially in Our Time* (pp. 54–199)—the other main interest is to determine the relationship of the basic idea indicated to philosophical cognition and to uncover and pursue the errors of cognition and the false surrogates. First of all, one should select out from this the determination also expressed everywhere else by Solger that philosophy and religion have the same content, that philosophy is nothing but thinking about the presence of being in our knowledge and existence or, in other words, about divine revelation (II, p. 116), that thinking which is philosophizing is entirely the same as knowledge through revelation, just observed from another side (p. 174).

Philosophy has previously been given a bad reputation with regard to its relationship to religion. After reason had indeed been opposed to what was once called religion, the reconciliation of both is finally achieved in such a way that so-called reason was drawn over by theology to its side, and through it, the religious content was made ever more thin and empty. This empty conviction, which continually assumes the nature of Christianity, presumes the shriveling up of the objective content into what is subjective, into feeling, and henceforth declares itself against philosophy for the entirely opposite reason, as opposed to the earlier one, for the reason, namely, that the fundamental doctrines of Christianity with which the new theology believes it has dispensed with, rather find their defense in philosophy and that from there, the maintenance or reawakening of philosophy threatens this Christianity of feeling, the death of which it believes to be already able to enjoy in peace. Among the plans with which Solger dealt, he also mentions in volume I, p. 349 the development of how Christianity can be understood and brought to insight from purely speculative reasons.

In general, this essential definition is given for philosophical cognition: "The idea is the positive content of higher knowledge, the true unity of the materials merely related to one another through reason ([I], p. 92f.). The organ of philosophy is thinking. It arises from this that the essence and the inner unity of our knowledge is activity, that activity involves a transition from one to the other and accordingly, an opposition, but the cognition of the opposites in their relationship to each other and their sublation in the original unity wherein they simultaneously become opposites of the same thing (of thinking) with themselves, is thinking." The progression of thinking is mentioned there and its one-sidedness made evident. Solger, however, has not continued on to the higher task, this progression for itself, that is, to comprehend the inner necessity in cognition, to the actual nature of the dialectic.

On the other hand, he expresses his opinion with definite insight and emphatically about the necessity of philosophical cognition emanating from reflection: "Our entire life is divine revelation; every satisfaction through the true, every pleasure in beauty, every reassurance in the good, comes to us from this essentiality, insofar as it is present for us in the given moment. But the same is always only what is essential in the given condition, in the relative linkage for the specific moment, and thus itself falls among the relationships of existence. Pure consciousness cannot reassure itself with these relative forms. It is through philosophy, which faith itself is, but comprehended in its form as insight whenever it occurred in the other as experience, that the Idea becomes known as it is the same in all moments of its revelation, and how it is capable of joining itself to existence and absorbing it in itself through the oppositions that it

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contains as complete unity in itself." So the idea comes to consciousness only in its entire significance since it is otherwise always clouded by special conditions and relationships. That consciousness cannot find itself satisfied in these, therein lies the necessity that it be driven to philosophy. Philosophizing is therefore by no means an arbitrary undertaking, but a necessary and inevitable one. Whoever does not want to decide to philosophize must nevertheless try his luck at it and will now be driven to be satisfied with an unfortunate substitute and thereby degrade faith itself (II, pp. 116ff.). "The human being must philosophize whether he wants to or not" (it is said in vol. 2, p. 112), "and if he does not decide to do it in the correct scientific manner, then philosophy will take revenge upon him through the most groundless and pernicious sophistries." Solger is well familiar with the false surrogates for philosophy, with the shirkings and evasions of finding satisfaction with economizing of thinking. He develops these errors and attacks them behind all the multifarious formations that they assume with warmth and with thorough insight. The pious (it says in vol. 2, p. 37) who want to maintain only the essential and simple in religion about which one need not think, should probably beware of what this essential is; faith without insight loses itself in external facts, miracles, and superstition. Solger points out the one-sidedness of ordinary understanding and the orthodoxy and pietism which are no less caught up in the same things (II, pp. 37ff.). He shows the desolation into which this understanding has deteriorated as enlightening, out of which again another illusory philosophy has emerged, the kingdom of opinions (p. 58), which is especially well characterized as a thinking that models itself according to every form of experience, according to every drifting of time that has invented theories, especially in history, for the moment and for every special purpose, in that it still always needs the recollection of the essential. No one believes it, and everyone plays the hypocrite before himself and others. Just as with this superficiality of consciousness with which they circumvent truth, so also one can find on p. 192 serious pictures of a fantasizing playing around about the depths of the human soul and about other charlatanries elsewhere drawn from profound experience and sketched with a secure hand. These sophistries maintain the rapturous approval of the masses because they are easy to comprehend and make the effort of thinking unnecessary, even impossible.

The series of letters mentioned engages further in the uncovering and combating of the misconceptions about philosophy and its relationship to religion. As much as they contain important and instructive things, such corrections nevertheless do not tend to have as much of an impact as one would expect from their content. One has generally become weary of the philosophers' claims that they have been misunderstood. The

intelligibility in the discourse of abstract ideas, on the one hand, and the capacity to reflect upon philosophical thoughts, on the other, are conditions about which it would at least require a great deal to come to a clear understanding. Yet there is a kind of misunderstanding which one can directly demand not occur, namely, the inaccuracies in what is factual. If it leads to nothing or indeed only to greater confusion to polemicize against other kinds of misconceptions, then philosophy can at least justifiably complain about the false statements of facts, and if one looks more closely, this kind is, contrary to expectation, the most common and extends in part to the unbelievable.

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The chief interest of the second treatise is to demonstrate, on the one hand, the relationship which obtains in the relative manner of cognition, that, namely, the eternal is merely a presupposition, with this, however, it is merely an abstract universal, so that the original identity could become a mere form of unity and linkage, not the divine fact itself but, on the other hand, the true relationship of this divine fact to cognition. According to the aforementioned, this fact is that God is real and present in our existence, that He creates Himself in us and comes to existence within us, and we must experience and recognize this existence of Him in us. The true relationship of this fact to cognition should be this: since thinking is concluded in its progress, the Idea itself as the eternal act of unity comes forward freely in the points of juncture to which it brings and thereby sublates its oppositions and relative determinations and restores itself again as a present entity, so should the presence of God be experienced immediately within us ourselves.

But since it is not the intention of the author in the aforementioned purpose of "a manifesto" to prove the fundamental ideas, but only to explain them with the polemical consideration of imperfect ways of knowing, the advantage then arises for the essay of giving more a series of repetitive assertions and assurances than a development of reasons that could generate persuasion. Likewise with thinking itself the necessity is not demonstrated that it relinquish its reflection, that it proceed to the relinquishing of its oppositions and to their union, and even less the necessity of the transition from a conceived unity to a so-called divine fact and the actual experience of it. It was still too much the author's concern to make his point of view impressive and to secure it against errors for it to have been able to be a concern for his philosophical formation to take the direction toward the interior and reach the logical development of these thoughts and thereby come to a clear understanding for himself and his readers without concern for those external considerations. It is therefore not surprising that the exposition of such deep thoughts still offers unclarified difficulties and contradictions of determinations that make

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the understanding much more difficult than that the nonmethodical manner of discourse could alleviate it.

The two determinations, the relationship of which is completely at stake, are, as mentioned, the development of thinking and the eternal itself. The nature of knowing is (p. 141) contained in the important determination that it is “the conclusion and perfection of thinking, and such that this perfection is never possible through thinking alone, but that at the same time it requires that the substances of thinking in their oppositions be intrinsically one; thus, there may be linked simultaneously with each and every such conclusion (actually since thinking brings back those oppositions to their first intrinsically existing unity) an observation or experience of this essential unity of the substance, and there arises complete knowledge only from both sides of cognition.” One sees, first of all, that thinking is distinguished from its perfection. In consideration of those who present it as a self-deception, presumption, rapture and such, to want to know divine things, or who even say (pp. 141ff.) that human beings may probably once again come so far, but we have not yet reached that point, the relationship of the existence of the eternal and of knowledge will be maintained in such a way that “in full consciousness the eternal being makes itself into substance, establishes itself as its ground, and exists prior to its externalization and revelation.” The manner in which we know this, its existing beforehand, is what is called “faith,” the absolutely certain direct knowledge itself upon which, for us, absolutely everything rests. We can and should in truth know what is now there for us through faith, revelation, and its branching out into the oppositions of existence.

- p. 849 [nos. 107–108] This presence, the reality of the true, the impossibility of knowing and doing anything without this foundation and presupposition, is the one fundamental point. It can be seen as an insignificant discrepancy that in the latter exposition the immediacy of the eternal in consciousness is distinguished from knowing, in the first, however, only from thinking, which is taken with that merely as one of the two moments of knowing, as this was determined there. The other fundamental point, however, outside of the relationship of the foundation and presupposition, is the separation of what is called the experience of the eternal from this knowing or self-concluding thinking. The exposition remains in this assertion with the categories of reality, fact, faith, experience, on the one hand, and of thinking, on the other, and with the assertion of its essential maintenance of separation, without analyzing these categories further. The eagerness to make the assertion emphatic prevents it from looking back upon itself. Most, however, indeed all controversies and

contradictions must allow themselves to be harmonized through the apparently simple means of taking up what is expressed in the assertion, simply observing and comparing it to whatever else one likewise asserts. To know what one says is much rarer than one thinks, and it is with the greatest injustice that the accusation of not knowing what one says is considered the harshest. With this, let us now look at Solger's assertion carefully.

First of all, the correct and important definition of philosophical knowing is always presented, i.e. that it is the thinking of the eternal, insofar as the eternal is contained one and the same in the oppositions of its revelation as (p. 124). It is repeatedly recognized as the true manner of knowing that philosophical thinking dissects the inner unity of knowledge as its substance, but it is just that kind of dissection "through which it engenders itself again as true, essential, and present substance in every true point of linkage" (p. 149 and passim). Is not, I ask, the divine of the original unity itself unmistakably accepted and recognized precisely in this determination of the presence and reality of the eternal? Is the fact of the eternal and the liveliness and the experience of the fact not assumed as existent in the fact that the dissection of the inner unity through thinking is such that this unity remains simultaneously present in it as something undissected, as substance, as one and the same in thinking? What is used from the eternal as fact, presence, or whatever popular representations are otherwise used, or should be especially attributed for a differentiation, cannot be foreseen, all the less since Solger just as often sufficiently contradicts the position through which the original unity would turn into a mere generality, to what is intrinsically indefinite and abstract. It is the constant assertion that the original unity reveals itself, that it is activity, is in itself a transition from one to the other, the dissection in itself, and therefore contains within itself an opposition (see above), that through this alone the eternal joins itself to existence and is present in it, etc. That which prior to the unity is supposed to be attributed to that faith, that experience of the eternal to which philosophical cognition is supposed to lead in the sublation of itself outside itself, into which unity this philosophical cognition moves and continues within itself, as said above, can according to the matter itself no longer be anything characteristic or different. For that, there remains nothing but the empty form of immediacy that should be attributed to what is called fact, experience, faith, in popular representation (in the popular imagination) exclusively against cognition as that which is caught up only in mediations. Solger is not caught up in this last bad notion, however. For him, philosophical knowing is itself expressly the sublation of opposites, and with that, what exists only through another, and just

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as much the sublation of the merely relative perceiving that does not go beyond the standpoint of mediation. The immediacy is itself only the determination of an opposite, the one side of the same. True thinking, as sublating opposites in general, does not permit determination to remain outside of itself by itself. Since it grasps the opposites in their original unity, as mentioned, so it has equally well in this unity the reference to itself, which is immediacy, in fact, immanent within itself. This exposition is to make it clear that, as has been said, it only requires the simple reflection upon that which Solger asserts as the essential nature of philosophical thinking in order to find expressed therein even that which he wants to distinguish from it.

When it is now said further, in the sense of the assumed disparity of the determinations cited on p. 125, "that there is an experience of revelation, i.e. a divine existence that creates as well as annuls existence and a philosophy in juxtaposition that only follows as a consequence of our not ourselves being the eternal; in this both are the same for us in an inconceivable manner," then according to the content, there is nothing to contradict that a deficiency is expressed about philosophy in which the acknowledgment lies that "we are not the eternal." Yet if such things are said, then there is a distortion there, as if this were not everywhere self-evident. Otherwise it would be superfluous to say such things. If in the cognition of revelation the experiencing of revelation is itself also contained, then for that reason it would be a far cry from "our being the eternal," even according to Solger's own determination that the revealing of the eternal and the experiencing of revelation are a particular existence.

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As far as incomprehensibility is concerned, however, this is also one of the many words used indiscriminately without any concept. To be sure, it is present since the experiencing of a divine existence is always transferred outside of knowing. As is shown, this contains in it even what is supposed to be something distinct from it. Comprehensibility and true comprehending, however, are nothing other than just the stated reflection that in the thinking of the eternal as one and the same in the oppositions, even the unity of the experiencing and knowing is contained, even expressed. One could surmise that the assertion of incomprehensibility is revoked by the manner in which thinking is comprised. It is determined there that it must represent the essential and nothingness at the same time, which would only be possible if it behaved indifferently toward both or thought them in their relationship of transition. This indifference would not be that of mere form, such as that which can attach itself to infinitely different substances, but would lie in the complete unity of the substances with one another, and through such a thinking the entire substance would become



directly determined, so that this thinking, which is philosophizing, would be the same as knowledge through revealing. One sees that here the grasping of just such a unity, which earlier was called the incomprehensible, is attributed to thinking. The determinations of our consciousness given in the immediately preceding determinations lead to the same thing if they are analyzed more closely. Consciousness consists precisely in that something contrary to itself attaches itself through its knowing to itself. Since consciousness is certainly not to be taken for a complete flowing over of nature and spirit into each other, which is talked about there, but binds itself to itself expressly through its knowing, that is how it comes to the unity in it which converges with experiencing.

The inconsistency in the observation of this highest point of view obviously derives, as earlier, from the fact that what comprehending, thinking, knowing is, is presupposed only in a vague manner, and that these notions have not themselves been analyzed and recognized. The same can be noticed about another expression, of "being in and of itself." In this connection, on p. 171 and p. 172 where the most profound expositions are to be found, there is mention of the eternal in and of itself, of existence in and of itself. It is immediately apparent that this in and of itself is nothing other than the abstract, untrue; the eternal is of itself unattainable for our knowledge. Since the same is grasped as revealing itself, as activity, there remains nothing concrete left for that eternal without attainability for knowing, i.e. without revealing and activity; there remains only the determination of an abstraction. Similarly, since existence in and of itself is only determined as that which being is not, i.e. the nothingness of being, so it is said itself with this that only the abstract, appearing nothingness is designated by that in-and-of-itself existence taken merely alone, without the link to that in which its in-and-of-itself first consists. I do not want to go any further into the matter that first the eternal appears as the underlying fact which is revealed, and then revelation itself as this fact. Only the analysis of what is fact would be capable of truly determining its relationship to revelation as to being and to comprehensibility. If, moreover, with respect to knowability, it should be a matter of avoiding not only immodesty, but also the appearance of it, then it would probably have been advantageous, in this as in philosophical respect, to leave out the expressions of God's existence in us, the existence of God as penetrating our entire presence, etc. To bring God into immediate connection with the finite carries too large an incongruity with it as not to be striking. But whether God "brings Himself to existence" in us at all or also in our knowing, can, with respect to modesty, make no difference. The fact that in those immediate connections with the finite, God is taken not in His abundance, but

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in a more abstract understanding, announces itself through another disadvantage, that instead of God, also the expressions "the eternal," "the true," "being," or "essential unity" are used alternately. With God, however, we understand still more than merely the eternal, the true, being, etc.

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The reviewer thought that he had to reproduce the comments about the use of undeveloped categories because this usage is of itself present in popular depictions where it sometimes has its disadvantages and sometimes not, according to whether a healthy sense and mind delivers the content, is predominant and maintains the upper hand above the categories of reflection. But it is another matter if the depiction is to be philosophical and thereby, depends on determinations of thought. Even the expositions of as thorough a thinker as Solger have not escaped the seduction of making presuppositions of notions and not analyzing the final categories at stake and with it the disadvantages resulting therefrom. Moreover, with other philosophizing writers, the basic wrong, especially of presupposing as known the categories upon which the validity of everything depends, like immediacy, thinking, knowing, understanding, comprehensibility, etc., is completely predominant. Against this manner, there is no means of reaching an agreement because it is the opposite of wanting to understand its basic determinations. For just that reason it is not even possible to have anything to do with it because it allows nothing but assertions, and naturally only its own, and is ignorant about the fact that what it gives as reasons are themselves assertions.

But with this depiction of Solger's highest determination of the Idea and of the highest rung of his philosophical development, one perhaps finds missing an account of the irony touched upon preliminarily in the previous article, which, because it otherwise is labeled the highest, one can especially expect to meet it here, to find its sense and determination explained and safeguarded against misunderstandings. As it usually occurs, it is to be regarded as more than simply a famous, supposedly refined apparition. In relation to Solger, however, it can never be treated as a principle, and in this sense we want to consider it more closely here. For this purpose we distinguish the speculative moment which lies on one side of irony and is certainly found in the speculative determinations observed. This is, namely, that negativity in general, which in the elevation to its abstract apex constitutes the basic determination of Fichte's philosophy. In the ego = ego not only all finiteness, but also all content in general has disappeared. The highest starting point for the problem of philosophy has indeed been brought to consciousness with this elevation, to develop the particular from the unconditional, the universal—a principle containing the possibility for it because it is itself simply the impulse

of development. But this principle is, first of all, itself a presupposition and exists only in its abstract, and therefore not in its true, one-sided purity. A principle must also prove something; it must not be required that it be accepted on intuition, immediate certainty, inner revelation, or as one may call it in a word, in good faith. The demand for proof, however, has become something obsolete for the very many and at the same time such monochromatic so-called philosophies of the time. The difficulty with this is to unite the mediation of the proof with that unconditional of the universal in the Idea. Through what appears as proof, the abstraction of the universal is at the same time determined as a particular, in which alone the possibility of development lies. In the aforementioned form, negativity has remained only in the one-sided, finite affirmation that it has as ego. In this exclusively subjective affirmation, it has been taken up from Fichtean philosophy by Friedrich Schlegel with a lack of understanding of the speculative and a dismissal of it, and so torn out of the field of thought, that turned directly toward reality, it has flourished into irony, to the negation of the animation of reason and truth and to the degradation of it to the appearance in the subject and to the appearing for others. Fichte himself in the end corrected the one-sidedness of his principle through inconsistency, and with that preserved morality and truth in their rights. For that perversion, innocent Socratic irony had to allow its name to be perverted. It deserved all the less to be drawn into this, since if we leave out the side entirely according to which it was only the charming sophistry of cheerful, well-meaning conversation of Attic urbanity in which Plato and Aristophanes are the great masters of it, if we take it according to the sense in which it is attributed to Socrates in relation to his scholarly manner of teaching, it can appear to have been attributed to Socrates unjustly, be it as accused or as praised. If it is mainly assumed thereby that Socrates began his conversations with the assurance of not knowing anything and caused the others, the Sophists, the learned, and whoever else there was, rather to display their wisdom and scholarship than then was brought to confusion and shame by him through his dialectic, then this success is certainly well known, but it is at the same time usually of such a kind that it remains something negative and without a scholarly result, so that the peculiarity and the great effect of Socrates should be placed in the stimulation of reflection and in the leading back of the human being to his innermost, to his moral and intellectual freedom. The truths, which Socrates did not really teach and which his students gained from him, namely that what is considered true and right for the human being he must draw and confirm from his own interior through reflection, refer entirely alone to that free self-assurance of the mind in general. Accordingly, that preamble in Socrates considered as untrue,

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that lies claiming to know nothing, to possess no knowledge, should, on the contrary, be considered by us as stated completely in earnest, as completely correct and by no means ironic. We do not find it contradicted by his actual teaching and activity.

If, for Solger, irony is, according to his own explanations, by no means the "scornful disregard for everything which essentially and seriously interests the human being about the entire discord in his nature" (II, p. 514 in the review of A. W. Schlegel's *Dramatic Lectures*),<sup>22</sup> but he instead expressly rejects this meaning of it, just as it is in other respects contrary to all his principles, then his definition nevertheless remains not without the admixture of something odd, as I have already noted elsewhere (*Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, p. 150), and which emerges in connection with the speculative ideas explained above in an even more definitive light. What is to be distinguished from the purely abstract attitude of the speculative category of negativity which is discussed is the reflection of this upon the specific, upon the field where duties, truth, principles begin. It is in this transition that irony appears. "When mysticism looks toward reality," it is written in vol. 1, p. 689, "it is the mother of irony, when it looks toward the eternal world, the child of enthusiasm or inspiration." We have seen before what is expressed right there (vol. 3, p. 515ff.), that it is an immediate presence of the divine that reveals itself precisely in the disappearance of our reality. The mood that makes this directly manifest to human events is tragic irony. The comic shows us equally well "the best, indeed, the divine in human nature, as it has unfolded completely in this life of dismemberment, of contradictions, of futility, and we recover from it for just that reason, because it has thereby become completely familiar to us and completely transplanted into our sphere. For that reason the highest and holiest, as it takes shape with the human being, must also be the object of comedy, and the comic, for its part, carries its seriousness, even its harshness, with itself again precisely in irony." It had been said immediately before that the highest for our behavior was there only in limited, finite formation, that for that reason it was as insignificant with us as the lowest and necessarily goes down with us and our insignificant meaning because, in truth, it is only there in God, in whose going down it then is transfigured as divine. If we first take this elevation and its sentiment which is called tragic irony here, then what is necessary has already been mentioned with regard to the relationship of both definitions that relate here to each other, for which philosophical knowledge was the one definition, the point of departure. This elevation in itself whatever its point of departure may be, is nothing other than devotion, and if it is only a matter of popular depiction, then it does not require a large circumlocution in order to make one acknowledge it. In

relation to ancient tragedy too, we may use the term "devotion" because that depiction of art was part and parcel of the cult, and as pure and enhanced devotion may be, it is nevertheless in general an elevation to God out of the occupation of the mind with temporal interests and cares and out of the impurity of the soul. But this is only the Sunday of life; the workdays follow. Out of the cabinet of the interior, the human being steps out of the specific present and work, and the question is: how does the reflection of the divine, which is present in devotion, look in this world? Solger is far removed from the view that the workday and activity in this world are and could only be a godless life; his theology is also morality (see the previous article), and his philosophy is for this reason at the same time worldly wisdom. But in the passage cited, the reflection of the divine in the world, "the unfolding of the same into the world of dismemberment, of nothingness," etc., through which the divine becomes familiar to us and transplanted completely into our sphere, appears only as comic irony, "the highest and holiest" as the object of comedy. Without wanting to go further into the dissection of "the highest and holiest," so much is clear that between the worldly presence of this kind and that elevation above the finite, the middle is missing in which the "highest and holiest" has worldly presence as morality, law, love, and every virtue, as Solger himself views everywhere the state, the entire moral life, as the revelation of God. Here affirmation must receive an entirely different determination than merely that of a subjective affirmation persisting negatively against the concrete. Whenever devotion returns out of its spiritual abode to worldly reality, it carries along the acknowledgment of duties, strengthening, and hearty earnestness to these and to life's profession, and by these fruits, must essentially recognize itself if it is itself of a true, penetrating kind. It may have occurred to others to bring along for this domain too the viewpoint of irony. Certainly the moral laws, deeds, attitudes, etc., must also be considered in the aspect of the finite, "even the highest is for our behavior only there in limited finite formation," and devotion, although it is elevation in a higher region, if it is, as has been said, of the proper kind, is far removed from making that formation merely trivial or contemptible with the abstract category of "finite" and behaving ironically or comically toward it.

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It is rather comical, an unconscious irony, that it is very obvious to Solger in the review of A. W. Schlegel's aforementioned *Dramatic Lectures* (II, p. 514) to find irony mentioned only once, irony "in which he perceives the true central focus of dramatic art, so that even in philosophical dialogue" (more of this later) "it is not to be dispensed with." But irony is also supposed to be the opposite of that view of life in which earnestness and jest, as Schlegel takes them, are rooted. Solger has met up with the

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same: he does not mention irony at all in the speculative expositions of the highest Idea, which he presents in the aforementioned treatise with the innermost mental seriousness, irony which joins itself most intimately with enthusiasm and in which depths art, religion, and philosophy are to be identical. There especially, one would have believed, must be the place where one would find cleared up what the philosophical case might be with the noble secret, the great unknown—irony. If Solger says about the view of life that Schlegel takes that it is the opposite of irony, it is then completely comprehensible that this has not occurred to Schlegel there, even if he had made “approximating remarks” earlier; similarly, the category of irony did not occur to Solger with his speculative and serious expositions, and likewise not in the additional treatises contained in this second volume about the idea of the state and morality, and these, his basic views of life, are the opposite of irony. Where it seriously and truly deals with the concrete, serious, and true, this principle remains of its own doing far away. With Tieck, whose attachment to irony has been noted in the previous article, we see the same thing happening. Several times (e.g., in the novella *The Poet’s Life*) he gives a depiction of the excellence of Shakespeare’s drama *Romeo and Juliet* written with true enthusiasm. Here, where philosophical discussions were not to be expected anyway, one could hope to find the point that constitutes irony in this love and its harsh fate shown by one example; but even there one does not find irony mentioned, and it would easily occur to anyone else.

If we now see that with Solger the kind of subjectivity which irony is leaves unharmed the highest speculative principles as well as the axioms of concrete truth, nevertheless it has to happen, due to the imperfection of form in the highest determinations, that a subjective side emerges in another way—a side which should already reveal itself from the overview of the whole of the moments cited above. The first determination is (II, pp. 144, 175, and elsewhere) that the Godhead creates itself directly in a present reality, a moment which is for us only among the determinations and relationships of existence in which we are constrained. This relative fact should, however, raise itself in us into the experience and reality of God. With that, the omnipresence of God is expressed in everything finite, but with this obligation to experience, we are first of all no farther than what Spinoza said, i.e. that everything must be observed *sub specie aeternitatis*, or it is furthermore the same as the pious soul does to be devout in all natural things and changes, as in the occurrences of the circle of human things, to acknowledge and to experience it in what is higher, i.e. God’s finger and presence. What is indefinite in this attitude becomes a definite content only through cognition. For this to be true, the merely relative manner of cognition is not enough for Solger, i.e. the

so-called explaining from natural causes that proceeds along the finite and stops within the circle of the limited, but also the manner of cognition that makes the eternal merely a presupposition and with it an abstract universal. Furthermore, Solger very nicely distinguishes these modes of cognition from philosophical knowledge as that which, within itself, by recognizing the progress of self-limiting determinations, at the same time sees itself in thought going beyond its finiteness and sees its original unity necessarily emerging out of it. Since Solger, however, separates from this objective being in truth, from the knowledge of opposites, what he calls the experiencing of divine reality, there remains for this only to make "subjective sensation and devotion" a demand, and to bring about the elevation to the consciousness of divine presence in the same way it is produced through the religious excitement of the soul: regardless of whether this consciousness is essential only in relation to itself or whether it is produced in the relation to philosophizing. It is only in such a superficial manner, therefore, that Solger can now seek to bring about this experience of the divine, since he has not recognized that for philosophical cognition it is immanent as an affirmative result as well as a foundation and in the activity of progress.

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In the last chapter of the treatise under consideration, Solger comes to speak about the form of the discourse in which philosophy "should be able to satisfy its established meaning and determination best," which is supposed to be the dialogical form—a blunder that pursued him throughout his entire career, which in spite of the experience of thereby standing rather in the way of the effect of his expounded ideas, we see him stubbornly retaining and only reaping discord from it. That form is entirely connected with the meaning of philosophy of being able to produce the liveliness of the Idea in the subjective only outside of itself. If the exhibited hiatus between scholarly thinking and the existence of truth in the subject becomes a stoppage in knowledge, then a stoppage results in the direction taken toward the empirical quantity in the most pressing interest of efficacy, and out of that results a false evaluation of the public and a discord in the relationship of the author to it. This gloomier feature permeates the entire collection of letters and appends itself conspicuously to the characterization of the philosophical and individual position of Solger. There are times in which religion is a public condition acknowledged and daily attested to by all. Here it cannot occur to philosophy to want to create this firm ground for life and science first, but it will immediately set about acquiring the religious content only for thinking reason and, similarly, procuring satisfaction for its characteristic need. In other situations, however, it can appear as if interest and faith in higher truth as well as in the sensible and temporal truth of daily life were

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acknowledged as expelled or falsified by the vanity of understanding and the dullness of self-conceit, and as if philosophy were, above all, to have the business of just producing again a demand and a pure, not deceitful, interest in supernatural objects and then in philosophy as well.

We see such a gloomy representation of his time recurring only too often with Solger in the correspondence, and the little attention, with which his endeavors to animate a sense for divine things seem to be taken up, increases the bad feeling of his judgment about the public, which he sees only beneath the image he makes for himself out of the more or less distant environment that touches his society. In the year 1815 he writes (I, pp. 345ff.) to the wife of Gröben: "This manner of disparaging everything which is only quite pure and truly beautiful is very well known to me, and I am so sick of it that I often find it among people in whom one otherwise admires a sublime zeal for what is most magnificent. In order to be considered something legitimate in the eyes of the present world and even of the so-called better ones, one must be at least in one direction quite thoroughly closed-minded; one must flatter (compliment) any weak inclination, and always see the true and the good only in a falsified form." And on p. 359 to his brother: "You cannot believe how things are in our societies, even among scholars. One prefers to bore oneself and talk about the silliest things rather than telling the others one's opinion." Earlier it was said: "You should be careful of expressing yourself thoroughly about anything because with that you run the risk of the appearance of omniscience." Such complaints occur too often elsewhere (pp. 410, 421, 462) for one not to feel that this ill-humor is more than a passing mood. Still from the year 1818 (p. 607) we read the following result of his experiences about his acquaintances: "I am living in this large city almost as if on a desert island. Even of those who are motivated by a limited private interest, there are nevertheless only a few. Everything else is, where it does not depend on one's daily bread and one's daily oysters, a further standing swamp. That is how it looks in this 'great' era . . . . What this race perhaps still likes, are things like Müllner's Ravenstone tragedies,<sup>23</sup> hypocritical mindless collections of examples about the fact that there is a God, etc. And if they were only delighted and excited, then there would still be a kernel there . . . . But no! These things have in truth as little an effect as our good things. One has arbitrarily resolved that they should have an effect. It is written above it, after all, that there are excellent virtuous fashionable sentiments in it. One should certainly also want these, and that is the only reason why one foolishly talks oneself into being enthusiastic about it! That is the way it looks in this 'promising era.' " When Solger has the opportunity to speak of the reviewer (p. 686), he expresses his opinion: "I was curious



about what kind of an impression Mr. H[egel] would make here. No one talks about him. Let only the dumbest blind adherent come, the likes of which they would only too gladly like to have, then a great alarm would be sounded and the students would be directed into his lectures for the salvation and rescue of their souls. I occasionally make a great joke of plopping into it quite impudently, and that works all the better as they no longer expect anything noble or virtuous from me. What always makes me the most apprehensive about my success is that I have no new foolishness to propose."

One cannot look without a painful sensation at such a depiction of the farthest-reaching ill-humor and boredom with the mind, the image of which he has made from his experience. If, to be sure, one wants to adhere to what is often the favorite and most celebrated in public commerce, in literary newspapers or even in the theater, etc., then one will perhaps find such depictions not too glaring and such sentiments not unjust. Whatever the case may be with the peculiar spirit of the city in whose aspect Solger lived, who was always considered distinguished by them, one might have wished Solger that the appearances of acquaintances and the social activity and talk had affected him less and that he had held them back from his imagination and sentiment more, even if it certainly will not do to avoid all situations and meetings in which the dullness or crudeness of such appearances happen or bluntly obtrude. In order to lessen the sensitivity to it, however, one would have to add that the matter of superficial social life and literary activity that makes itself most audible is not only for itself, but also often in relation to the individuals themselves who move within it, a superficiality within which they can probably still have a nonapparent seriousness and the need to settle unobtrusively and satisfy thoroughly, but without displaying or laying it out. Where such a need is not present, however, and the entire condition of scholarly and intellectual interest in general has become a glistening superficiality throughout—and Solger has such an aspect before him—then such a thorough leveling is to be left to its fate, the happiness of its conceit. In that Solger allows this picture of his experience to be too powerful in itself, he had to fail to recognize the deeper need present in his and in every epoch and allow himself to be hindered in directing his activity and work only toward the place worthy of it, to seek and expect his effect in that place. He indeed also returns to a serene mood now and then, as on p. 413, where he says about it that almost no one takes notice of *Erwin*: "We therefore have to write to ourselves and to the muses, and, do not forget, to our friends." So it begins also on p. 509 with an expression of better conviction, namely, that true philosophy can operate only quietly, but, it is added, quietly and almost unconsciously, because there "are always very

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few people who can only be brought to recognize the simple and pure as the highest. They want verve and pomp and extraordinary unheard-of splendors, which they nevertheless piece together for themselves out of the tatters of the ordinary present." "Therefore," he then continues, "I always insist on the claim that philosophy present itself best in its entire reality through conversation and that this remains its best means of having a lively effect on people." The initially named quietness, in which philosophy is said to thrive, could more easily have led to the opposite result, i.e. of intentionally having rather those people in mind, though they be few.

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In that mood it cannot be surprising to see Solger making popularity his essential goal. "I especially want, however," it says in vol. 1, p. 335, "to move the world's heart about religion. Heaven help me toward a rather exciting depiction, so that I do not speak entirely into the wind," or still in the year 1813 (p. 593): "I cherish one thought with great love . . . It is that of writing out a popular instructive account about religion, the state, art, and the most general moral relationships from my philosophy, so that the unlearned, women, and the youth growing up could instruct themselves." What he regards as the means for this is cited in the following (p. 316): "I believe to be certain based on experience that in today's world the view toward something higher is still enticed away by art in the first place, and it at first draws people into the interior of things." If such an opinion of desperation were quite correct that times have come so far that one has to make it one's sole object to entice away from people that view toward what is higher, then one would have to despair even more of the efficacy of the means for it of art or philosophy or whatever it might be. The relationship among thinking, living, art, is conceived as follows (p. 620): "I would like to have thinking dissolve entirely into life again; that is why I immediately set down the artistic dialogical form as my goal. I now almost believe that I have undertaken something that the times do not want and do not like. One does not want to live but rather to chat about life, for no one who wanted to accomplish something truly lively in our times, like Novalis, Kleist, etc., could come through." It was shown above that Solger misjudged the particular liveliness, which the nature of the thinking Idea contains within itself. Aristotle had already grasped this nature so deeply and intimately as the highest liveliness. This ancient says (*Metaphysics* XI, 7): "The activity of thinking is life, but God is the activity. The activity existing for itself, however, is his complete and eternal life." But if it is to be a question of the artistic consciousness of the "truly animated," and a modern and German are to be cited as an example and not Goethe perchance, who indeed accomplished the "quite animated" and was also able to "come through," but Novalis! and Kleist! Then one

would perceive from this that only a life is meant which destroys itself through reflective thinking, indeed, which remains divided within itself. Because what reveals itself as the individuality of Novalis is that the need for thinking drove this beautiful soul only as far as longing and was neither able to overcome nor even relinquish abstract understanding. This rather struck the noble youth so much in his heart, with such fidelity, one can say, that transcendental longing, this consumption of the spirit, carried itself out through corporeality, and this has consequently determined its destiny. The reflection remaining in the dissension of the Kleistian productions has been touched upon above. With all the liveliness of the configurations, the characters and situations, there is a lack in the substantial content, which in the last instance decides, and the liveliness becomes an energy of inner strife, and indeed, one that produces itself intentionally, i.e. the irony that destroys and wants to destroy life.

[nos. 109–110] Already in the year 1800 there is a passage in Solger's diary (p. 15) in which he expresses the intention of writing a book in dialogues, and among his unpublished writings (in the second volume of this collection) a speculative essay composed in dialogical form can be found. One cannot seek to deny that the Platonic mastery in dialogue could not in today's times still be capable of being respectably emulated and thereby produce a great effect and recognition. Yet Solger protests expressly against the claim that he had wanted to imitate Plato. But the imitation of a method cannot be called anything but carrying out what is useful and correct in it. But Solger did not take up the plastic form that the dialogue can gain only through the attribute of having dialectics as its soul, but rather changed it into its opposite, into conversation, through which every advantage of this form—its aptness for abstract subject matter, the strict necessity of the course of the discussion accompanied by an external stimulation—has been lost, and only the disadvantage—the exhausting breadth of the discourse, a burdensome excess, the form of the fortuitousness of the enunciated, the disturbance or impossibility of retaining and overseeing the thread of *raisonnement*—has been brought in. One of the friends considers the discussions of *Erwin* (vol. 1, p. 353) to be difficult: "You must, through whatever means there may be, simply make the future ones more understandable." Another says to him later yet (p. 741) and also not in a cheerful context: "Up to now I still understand the Strassburg Cathedral better than your *Erwin*." The best means of making the content of *Erwin* more understandable would have been the straightforward exposition in a coherent discourse. The thoughts of the first part, which deals with the reputation of earlier definitions and points of view about observing the beautiful, could probably be

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clearly and definitively enunciated in a few pages. Thus it would be easy to grasp what is hardly ever achieved with the arduous difficulty of reading through the conversations. In the same connection, the first of the friends says, in order to impress more strongly upon Solger the efforts toward comprehensibility: "It was not Plato's *Parmenides*, *Euthydemus*, *Timaeus*, which essentially founded his reputation; it was not through these difficult dialogues that he had a great impact; it was not for this that he received the epithet of the divine; it was not with what is difficult to fathom that he renewed and gave birth again to the soul; much more with the *Phaedo*, the *Symposium*, and with its great depth, the very understandable *Republic*." For a view at variance with this, I would like to refer to the story that precisely Plato's doctrine, as it is mainly enunciated in the *Parmenides* and the *Timaeus*, became the cornerstone of Alexandrian philosophy, which has essentially promoted the cultivation of the higher Christian system, insofar as it contains the knowledge of the nature of God. The difficulty of those dialogues through which Plato had this great influence lies in the nature of the deep content, but it is this alone that has penetrated into the illumination of Christianity and has shown itself so powerfully within it. The manner in which it is enunciated in those dialogues is suitable to it. It is the most abstract, strictest and farthest removed from all conversational style.

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We have masterpieces of dialogical discourse in modern languages (one only has to refer to Galiani's dialogues, Diderot, Cousin, and Rameau). But here the form is at the same time subordinated to the matter; there is nothing idle. The matter is, however, not a speculative content, but rather a kind that, entirely according to its nature, can be the subject of conversation. In that plastic form of Plato, one of the interlocutors keeps the thread of continuation in his hand, so that all content falls into the questions and only the formal agreement falls into the answers. The instructor remains master and does not give information about questions one addresses to him or answers to objections brought forward. The position is the opposite of the notion one perhaps has about the Socratic method (as one also calls the organization of the Catechism). It is not the ignorant one who asks, and except for that single one inquiring, the people of the dialogue do not behave with the autonomy, which a back-and-forth conversation would provide to assert one's particular views and convictions with reasons, to refute the opposing views, or to look for one's own advantage on the basis of their reasons. Such a procedure of reasoning which may certainly predominate in conversation has been called sophistry by the ancients. With the opposing dialectic of Plato, the form of the dialogue is an extrinsic one that only produces the liveliness not merely to direct attention toward the result or total

representation, but to become stimulated toward agreement for every detail of the course of discussion. The episodic charm likewise brought about with this form is only too often so seductive for many that they do not stop at the introductions, but rather at the so contrasting dryness of the logical abstractions and the development of it, and they do not go wearily into these, but yet still think that they have read Plato and mastered his philosophy. In order that the agreement not be something barren and a dull formalism, however, that relationship carries with it the compulsion that every individual definition and sentence be explained simply and in the strictest connection. Such a plastic form of the course of discussion is only possible, however, through the analysis of the concepts penetrating to the most simple. According to this essential determination of speculative discourse, Aristotle is just as plastic in his developments, so that if one took the form of questioning away from the more solid dialogues of Plato and put the sentences all in a row in direct elocution, one could just as well believe one were reading Aristotelian writings, as one would be able to make Aristotelian writings or chapters into sections of Platonic dialogues through transformation of the sequence of sentences into the form of questions.

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I shall be satisfied with these general comments about the dialogue. It would be tedious to prove them with examples from the philosophical conversations contained in these posthumous writings or to go back for it to *Erwin* and the *Philosophical Conversations* published by Solger in the year 1817. Of that dialogue *On Being, Non-Being, and Knowing* (II, pp. 199–262), it may only be mentioned, as is already evident from the title, that Solger's philosophical career brings itself to a close there in an elevation to the observation of purely speculative objects. With this attempt, there also occurs, aside from the annoyance of the conversational form, the drawback noted earlier, that the abstractions of being and non-being are mingled with the more concrete determinations like knowing. The main points are such inappropriate connections as these, that non-being is knowing, that knowing is a non-being of that specific being into the infinite, but with that, is also the general, etc. But otherwise, the general concept of the evolution of the Idea is that it is in every point a synthesizing, a return to itself as the speculative character of the Concept is on the whole predominant in it. Solger does not shrink back from expressing the unity of being and non-being. It occurs that knowing is completely one with being, i.e. that the one is that which the other is not, and p. 224, that the universal and the particular are necessarily completely one, since precisely the universal is nothing other than the non-being of the entire particular (p. 245). One sees it: there is not lacking the speculative boldness to think the contradiction that according to

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traditional logic is not thinkable and should probably exist even less; nor is there lacking the speculative insight that the Idea essentially contains the contradiction. This contradiction is retained in the quoted statements in its entire crudeness, only so that it appears as something enduring and is not linked to its disappearance, which is its disintegration, and at the same time makes it tolerable for representation as for thinking. But even those crude expressions of contradiction are important in themselves, so that if one hears about the dissolving of the contradiction and the reconciling of thinking out of and within itself, one would be far removed from thinking that such are dissolving and reconciling and anything affirmative, reason and truth in general, could take place without immanence.

In addition to the range of Solger's philosophical meditations, one must also note the philosophy of law and the state, about which three previously printed essays are given in the second volume. Although they are aphoristic, incomplete and are probably intended to serve as the guide for his lectures on this material, one can nevertheless recognize the depth of the ideas sufficiently enough from them, and the basic view is drawn definitively enough to distinguish them completely—according to the general idea as well as to particular categories that are important for law, state, constitution—from that which constitutes current principles about these subjects. The reviewer was pleased to find himself very much in positive agreement with their contents while reading through these essays.

There follow yet a few unpublished essays and speeches given on the occasion of the King's birthday, among them a Latin one. Solger's skill in round, clear, and at the same time thoughtful diction gives these essays their particular value. One should be grateful to the editors that they have published the substantial preface of Solger's translation of Sophocles and the equally important review of A. W. Schlegel's *Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature*, that appeared in the *Viennese Yearbooks*, the latter of which is more interesting in what is occasionally treated there than in the refutations. The end is constituted by ingenious essays from the field of classical studies, to which Solger, both for their intrinsic interest and for their relation to philosophy, at an early time turned his inclination and diligence, which he maintained throughout his entire career. The "Mythological View" is an essay revised by Professor Müller in Göttingen from Solger's notebooks and handwritten collections and, as rich as it is, it still could contain only little of that for which Solger had worked and made manifold preparations. One of the treatises worked out by Solger himself, *On the Oldest View of the Greeks of the Formation of the World*, examines Voss' well-known essay on this subject, where we see how this passionate hobgoblin in his presumption about history and

exactness of dates took the liberty of providing his, which are bare in and of themselves, representations with self-made fabrications. The many materials collected by Solger about the history of religions from reading and meditation were meant for a comprehensive work on this subject. His interest reaches deeply into the various disputed views and methods of dealing with mythology in recent times. Letters from the last months of his life (see vol. 1), in which he collides rather sharply with his friend von der Hagen,<sup>24</sup> still have to do with this subject. Yet among the richness and variety of materials, this contains, like much else, interesting things in terms of its general content or even personality, like the letters to his wife which are full of pure and delicate sentiments, that must be omitted in this review. Of that which has been brought before the public by the intimate circle of personal acquaintances and has been exhibited for evaluation through publication, this review could only take up that which could serve to characterize more closely not so much the personal individuality, with which the reviewer has had the gratification of coming into contact, but rather the scholarly one.

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## Notes

1. Friedrich August Wolf (1759–1824), prominent classical philologist of the time.

2. Karl Eberhard von Schelling (1783–1854), chief medical counsel.

3. All page numbers refer to the original edition of K. W. F. Solger, *Solger's Posthumous Writings*, 2 vols., ed. Ludwig Tieck and Friedrich von Raumer (Leipzig, 1826), cited at the beginning of Hegel's article.

4. Diogenes Laertius: philosopher of late antiquity (second or third century B.C.), who wrote a history of philosophy in ten books with the title *On the Lives of the Philosophers*.

5. *Zerbino*, *Eckbert the Fair*, *Tannhäuser*: poetic works by Ludwig Tieck.

6. Ludvig Holberg (1684–1754), the originator of Danish comedy.

7. Goethe, *Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship*, book 3, chapter 11.

8. Characters in Shakespeare's play *The Merry Wives of Windsor*:

9. *Athenäum*: the periodical of the early Romantic movement in Germany, edited by August Wilhelm and Friedrich Schlegel in 1798–1800. *Lucinde*: a novel by Friedrich Schlegel (1799), famous for its emancipatory tendencies in terms of equality for women.

10. *Blaubart*: a poetic work by Ludwig Tieck.

11. *Zerbino*, *Genoveva*: poetic works by Ludwig Tieck.

12. Essay by H. G. Hotho in the *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik* (*Yearbooks for Scientific Criticism*), vol. 1 (May 1827), pp. 686–724.

13. Philipp Friedrich Hiller (1699–1769), author of spiritual and religious songs.
14. Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi (1746–1827), leading figure in educational theory and practice.
15. *The Ancestress, Sappho*: tragedies by Franz Grillparzer (1791–1872).
16. *Heidelberger Yearbooks: Heidelberger Jahrbücher der Literatur*, a leading periodical of the time dealing with critical and philosophical topics.
17. K. L. Sand murdered August von Kotzebue in 1819.
18. The Wartburg Festival took place on October 18, 1817, in commemoration of the Reformation and the Battle of Leipzig, in which Napoleon was defeated. It was a manifestation of German nationalism.
19. *Erwin: Four Conversations about the Beautiful and Art* (1815), Solger's main work.
20. *Werther: The Sorrows of Young Werther*, a novel by Goethe.
21. *Götz von Berlichingen*: a drama by Goethe.
22. August Wilhelm von Schlegel, *Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature*, 3 vols. (1809–11).
23. Müllner's Ravenstone tragedies: Amadeus Gottfried Adolf Müllner (1774–1829), writer and dramatist known for his dark tragedies of blind fate.
24. Friedrich Heinrich von der Hagen (1780–1856), scholar of German studies known for his work on the minnesingers.



# Review of K. F. Göschel's *Aphorisms*

Translated by Clark Butler

What follows is a translation of Hegel's 1829 review of Karl Friedrich Göschel's book *Aphorismen über Nichtwissen und Absolutes Wissen im Verhältnisse zur christlichen Glaubenserkenntnis.—Ein Beitrag zum Verständnisse der Philosophie unserer Zeit*, which can be translated as *Aphorisms on Non-Knowledge and Absolute Knowledge in Relation to Christian Faith Knowledge: A Contribution to Understanding the Philosophy of Our Time* (Berlin: E. Franklin, 1829). The review was first published in the *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik* (*Yearbooks for Scientific Criticism*) in 1829, numbers 99–102 and 105–106. Hegel's central concern in the review is to endorse Göschel's assertion of basic agreement between speculative philosophy as developed by Hegel himself and biblical Christianity. The correspondence occasioned by the book and the review eventually brought Göschel (1781–1861) into direct communication with Hegel.<sup>1</sup>

The chief difference between Hegel (absolute knowledge) and Göschel (faith and knowledge) is that Göschel moves from biblical Christianity to speculative philosophy, while Hegel proceeds from philosophy to the content of faith. Hegel initially abstracted his central concept of spirit from Christianity and revealed theology. But his systematic philosophy abstracts from any such nonphilosophical, religious presupposition. Not tying philosophy in "Scholastic" fashion to the biblical faith as something given, Hegel claims to move from philosophy to faith without trying, i.e., by the autonomous movement of reason. This movement would not be confirmed if Hegel (absolute knowledge) were to try to lead philosophy explicitly back to faith,

for this would make the autonomy of philosophical reason suspect; what confirms it is for someone like Göschel, coming from the side of faith, to see the agreement of philosophy with faith.

Göschel seeks to show the Christian character of Hegelian philosophy both by comparison with Scripture and by a polemical contrast to the allegedly non-Christian nature of the main rival to Hegel's philosophy in his own time, the philosophy of Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi and his various followers. The reader will judge whether the alleged agreement is merely a clever accommodation to state ecclesiastical authorities, a deep truth, both, or neither. It is at least worth noting that the Jacobian theology which is repudiated as "non-Christian" has something in common with the orthodoxy of the Church Fathers, for example in its insistence on both the transcendence of God and the thus incomprehensible fact of God's personality. Yet, in his understanding of man, Jacobi is more Gnostic than orthodox. Hegel's concept of sin as a turning away of the finite will from the infinite is far more Augustinian than Jacobi's view of it as an illusory limitation of the beautiful soul.

From a purely philosophical standpoint the review has importance in illuminating the relation between the system of philosophy and the Absolute. Hegel never did hold that the Absolute exists solely under the description of being the system of its logically necessary self-construction and self-knowledge. Even in Jena he held that the system is the Absolute only if understood as ever particularized by an empirical reality that cannot be fully deduced from it: "Just as philosophy pushes the sciences [to compensate] for their conceptual deficiency, so they drive philosophy to give up the lack of realization [*Erfüllung*] stemming from its abstraction."<sup>2</sup> The only true panlogism is a concrete one, in which the purely logical system overreaches and embraces the empirical world which is other than it.

Yet, in the present review, Hegel accepts responsibility for the impression of an abstract panlogism, of a "ghostlike" and "eerie" reduction of the Absolute to a weave of logical concepts, which his exposition of the system of philosophy made on Göschel and others. He explains that his exposition left this impression precisely insofar as it functioned as the polemical counterpart to Jacobi's nondiscursive, intuitive approach to the Absolute—i.e. the approach of *Nichtwissen*, translated as "non-knowledge" below. In intention this non-knowledge is a negative theology rather than agnosticism, since it claims immediate knowledge that God is. But since it is ignorant of what God is determinately—to be is to be determinate<sup>3</sup>—in its result it is even atheistic, if taken at its word.

Hegel's "Introduction" to his *Science of Logic* attributes the wrongheaded concept of the system to the *youth* who approaches it without experience, while the right concept is attributed to the *man of experience* who, with the

help of the empirical sciences, rediscovers the thought forms of the *Logic* in the sensory world. In the present review, Hegel goes further, conceding to Göschel that the system not only transcends abstractly logical form through empirical particularization, but also breaks the bounds of a purely cognitive form by taking the form of "love." The Absolute which has been grasped by pure thought can also be "translated" into the aesthetic language of "representation," engaging feeling and not merely conceptual comprehension.

Abstract panlogism is one of the earliest and most enduring interpretations of Hegel's writings, and since his review of Göschel is his most lucid and mature discussion of the matter, it deserves our close attention. Abstract panlogism is the version of the Hegelian system in which Mr. Krug's pen is still waiting to be deduced.<sup>4</sup> Nor is Krug's pen deduced in the system concretely understood, but the reader is led by the eerie style of Hegel's exposition, and not simply by inexperience, to suppose that it ought to be. An example of the abstractly panlogistic style is the habit of taking universals as his subjects of predication. Thus even in the present review he prefers to say that "non-belief" asserts this or that rather than "non-believers," though he recognizes full well that there is no abstractly universal non-belief which does not particularize itself in and through irreducible individual non-believers. Yet the age of Romanticism in which Hegel lived erred more insistently by absolutizing the particular individual apart from the universal than the other way around.

In Jena<sup>5</sup> and even in the above-cited paragraph from the *Encyclopaedia*, Hegel brushed aside Krug's request. But in the present review the hint of arrogance yields to a sincere apology for the fact that his exposition, however polemically justified in the historical situation, has led to a misunderstanding of the identification of the Absolute with the system.

The translation is made from volume 20 of the Glockner edition of Hegel's works.<sup>6</sup> Instead of putting all the emphases appearing in the German text in italics, none of them has been italicized. Hegel's German paragraphs have been broken up.

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Review of See Karl Friedrich G[öschel], *Aphorisms on Non-Knowledge and Absolute Knowledge in Relation to Christian Faith Knowledge: A Contribution to Understanding the Philosophy of Our Time* (Berlin: E. Franklin, 1829); *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik* (1829), nos. 99–100, 101–102, 105–106.

[nos. 99–100] The author prefers to call his reflections on the subjects named in the title "aphorisms" only because he has grasped them neither

according to the more formal method of systematic science nor in their more abstract development. Otherwise his treatment remains deeply connected with the particular subject matters and viewpoints under consideration, and calls for an attentive and thoughtful reader to keep hold of the thread in the thoughts even where the exposition appears to jump about—which, it may be remarked, happens more in the first section than in the one that follows. This writing has the remarkable and quite singular characteristic—it is, as one says, significant as a so-called sign of the times—that the author, of a pious frame of mind, is clearly possessed both by the truth of the original and authentic teachings of the Christian faith and by the needs of thinking reason, and demonstrates a thoroughly practiced culture in such reason.

The center of interest here, in form and content, at once finds itself at the very heart of speculative philosophy. The difference between Christianity and philosophical thought which we are used to representing to ourselves figuratively as an infinite distance, an unbridgeable chasm, is in a single stroke put behind us. At the present depth the supposed gulf simply vanishes. This writing is thus not an “introduction” or “preface” to knowing, to religion and faith. It is not the sort of introduction and preface which, though holding itself apart from the “matter,” is given out by the theory of non-knowledge [*Nichtwissen*] to be the whole of science. On the contrary, what is treated here is the very matter itself. If exhibition of the so-called riddle of the universe is often given out as the highest possible exertion and attainment of mind so that in essence one abstracts from the solution to this riddle, our author early on found satisfaction in the solution long since given by revelation.

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In connection with this solution, this writing is occupied further with the subjective riddle as to how that original unity of Christianity and speculative reason, along with the self-conscious unity of both, can appear beyond grasp of representation. The author seeks to bring both faith as based on original Christianity and rationalistic theology<sup>7</sup> to terms with philosophy—faith insofar as it is captive to mistrust and even hostility to philosophy, and rationalistic theology because it discards both Christian and philosophical knowledge of God and completely misapprehends the *reason* whose name so readily comes to its lips.

The importance of the subjects treated, the mode and manner of their treatment, and—as we should not leave unmentioned—the many-sided relationship of the treatment to the philosophical endeavors of the present reviewer move this same reviewer, in a more developed account, to call the attention of readers to a writing which perhaps otherwise might only be disparaged or at best ignored, and in preliminary fashion to acquaint them with it. The author is concerned to set the unsuspecting Christian clear about “the philosophy of our time,” and to show him the

opposition of this philosophy to the purely finite thinking of rationalistic theologians, and to the understanding by which they make all truth finite. He says on page 2 that "for Christians who have been called to science by their professional circumstances to lightly cast aside the task of appropriating their own time—and thus our task of appropriating ours in connection with the philosophy of our time in its most advanced form—would be a sin."

"This task demands," Göschel adds, "the special attention even of those Christians who for themselves are content with a simple but living faith, and who attain to certainty in the element of representation." The one thing which philosophy, as science, must accomplish is to uncover the form of thought and discern the content of truth in this form. But the truth has also long been present for itself in pious Christian faith, and this faith, trusting in God, requires of the results of thought that they "show their agreement with this faith."

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The way in which this demand used to be evaded, namely, by the pretense that religion and rational thought apprehend respectively two different realms and must be held entirely apart, is scorned by the philosophy of more recent times—indeed it is precisely this philosophy which occasions the present comparison<sup>8</sup> and recognizes the right of faith to satisfaction of its claim. "The philosophy of our time," the author says, "calls itself Christian. It has no wish to pass for an advancement or perfection upon Christianity, but rather presents itself as its fruit and its work. As the common possession of the human species, it proclaims itself the highest product of Christianity. It expresses unconditional respect for the revealed Word of God insofar as that Word is the absolute truth as given, and it is without restraint in railing against every distortion of Holy Scripture, against every way in which it is emptied of its real content, as also against unanchored flight into a purely self-made spirit and purely human understanding."

Nonetheless, it is in this connection most irresponsible to suspect these scientific endeavors without closer examination of finally making the truth of revealed religion, thanks to the concept, a different truth from the one immediately present in representation—"here is expressed definitely and fundamentally the point of the controversy." It is thus remarkable that Christians steeped in the biblical faith come to share nothing with their opponents who, devotees of the understanding, go by the name of "rationalists"—"nothing except their complaint against speculative philosophy." "Rationalism remains consistent and true to itself when it opposes itself as the subjective abstractly sensory wisdom of the understanding (I Cor. 1:21—'For after that in the wisdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God') to speculative philosophy as to objective thought, inasmuch as its standpoint at once distorts speculative results

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and strips them of their validity. So-called supernaturalism as a system of Christian theology is in all connections, and thus also in its connection with speculative philosophy, essentially different from rationalism. It is thus only due to a confusion that individual Christian theologians make common cause with rationalism against philosophy. They themselves become rationalistic when they subordinate speculative doctrines to the abstractly sensory understanding and thus do them injury, distorting them in their innermost essence. The incoherence of such theologians lies in the fact that they thus fall back into a sphere which they themselves consider deceptive and lacking in actuality, and which they recognize as little as the philosophers—a sphere according to which theology as little as philosophy orders itself.” The author shows the thoroughness of his judgment in this simple but telling characterization of the want of understanding, into which Christian theology falls in opposition to itself when it no sooner turns against philosophy than appropriates for itself the rationalistic understanding with its own quite deadly content.

If we inquire more closely into what is common to Christian theology and the rationalistic understanding, we trace the source of their confusions to deficient knowledge of the categories which they use in handling philosophical propositions, whether asserted or contested. The reproach that they know not what they say may appear severe, even entirely out of place. But if ordinary training in reflective thought enables one, whether argumentatively or unctuously, to give an account of a content in its interconnections and grounds, such a knack nonetheless must be distinguished from logical awareness of the worth of the forms in which all connections between the representations in question are made. Yet in a speculative treatment these forms are not only essentially but exclusively at issue. For in this higher sphere of thought—and here we arrive at the deepest point—the untruth of the difference between form and content comes to be known: the pure form itself which becomes the content.

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That the charge of being ignorant of what one says is not unjustified is shown, and in fact quite incredibly so, by the most ordinary of cases built against speculative philosophy as also by the most excellent of these many-sided cases. The unraveling of the assorted attacks, objections, and reservations undertaken by the author in the present writing thus attains such clarity, and is crowned with such success, that anyone clearly aware of the forms of thought confidently distinguishes the ones innocently used in those attacks. Distinguishing them not only facilitates but almost by and for itself brings about insight into their inadmissibility. Forms of division and untruth, the categories of the finite, are useless in apprehending and designating what is in itself one, true. But in the objections against speculation not only are such thought forms always used, but—what is more—these forms of untruth are posited in the place of the speculative

thoughts which supposedly are under judgment, so that a false fact is insinuated in their place.

The author first considers the theory of non-knowledge, and indeed does not shrink from the effort of following its fate as most definitely and tellingly exhibited in the expositions of "Friedrich Jacobi, who presently commands the whole army of those who find themselves at this stage of spiritual development." This effort is painful because one starts out with the presumption that connection and agreement among the representations at least prevail in the case of a respected and famous writer. One is then embarrassed to discover no such agreement, until it turns out upon persistent search and comparison that one is being driven about in completely contradictory determinations, indeed—and this at first cannot even be suspected—in the self-contradiction of asserting the very standpoint against which the most decisive refutation and sentence has been handed down by the theory of non-knowledge itself.

But it is first to be mentioned how, in connection with non-knowledge, the distinction of the standpoints which make up the more immediate object of this writing is introduced. Their relationship is definitely indicated on page 9. "The sort of renunciation of philosophizing which brings matters only to non-knowledge, without reestablishing the faith destroyed by the departed science, is more accurately viewed as only the half of renunciation." "For the unfortunate element in science which destroys faith, and which has thus caused science to be dispatched, has not itself been dispatched. Consistent renunciation rather requires that this unfortunate element likewise be denied recognition, and thus that the influence of this element on objective faith be at once removed."

Accordingly, a second standpoint arises with the following determination (p. 10): "After, through consistency in such renunciation, the one-sided and negative influence of thought—or rather of its isolated elements—on the objective faith standing above thought, and on the supreme authority of faith which thought tried to usurp, has been removed, after faith itself has been made secure as the faithfulness of unconditional trust in revealed truth, reason cannot fail to be brought into the service of faith and under the discipline of the Word as Truth, awakening the given representation to ever greater life and comprehensibility. In this way arises the stage of faith and knowledge, which requires both, subordinating knowledge to faith, so that thought can only use faith and not bring any ill to it—a stage of faith-knowledge which from the standpoint of absolute knowledge (the third standpoint, which possesses the truth in the form of truth) is characterized as the truth as given in representation, through the fabric of which thought is woven, but which remains unpenetrated by thought. For this stage does not go

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so far with thought as with faith, and knows faith independently of its understanding of it."

The author first takes up for consideration the two extremes, with a view to coming to know more intimately and deeply the philosophy of our time in its latest results, namely, in its relationship to Christianity. The writing thus falls into three parts: 1. Non-Knowledge, 2. Absolute Knowledge, and 3. Faith and Knowledge. Our aim is to trace the exposition in its principal moments. But since it is extremely rich in thought and wit, tightly argued and yet fresh and warmly vivid, when we pass beyond general expressions of judgment to foreshortened indications of the content, the latter inevitably loses something of the weight and merit lent to it in the original exposition.

p. 795 In the first section the author indicates the answer which the standpoint of non-knowledge gives to "the ultimate of all questions": What is God? In response to this question non-knowledge exhibits itself in its full innocence. What is first is that God is. What is second and last is that God is God. He is identical to Himself alone, and beyond Him there is nothing identical to Him—all according to the principle of the abstract identity of the understanding. The truth here is an immediate certainty from which everything else follows. God is everything we cannot know. Like the heavens, He is different from and divorced from what He Himself, otherworldly and transcendent, is not. And yet He is also in and with us—is actual, is not an individual, not a single being. And yet He is a person, indeed, personality itself. A person, and yet completely infinite, boundless, everywhere and nowhere.

That all this, sentence by sentence, cancels and contradicts itself does not escape such non-knowledge. But its conclusion is only that God is incomprehensible, unpronounceable, which is already contained in the first proposition above, according to which God is identical to Himself alone. "Instead of leading directly to the necessity and actuality of the revelation of what according to its result is the God hidden in himself," the author continues, "non-knowledge restricts itself to the natural revelation given in conscience, so greatly does it contradict the natural thought." Such so-called immediate revelation in conscience is immediate knowledge, thus a knowledge only of God's abstract self-sameness. It is a self-sameness which withdraws from thought, which for itself is driven to the fullness of the divine essence, and thus to concrete knowledge. This unfortunate process in which the soul is thrown back and forth, this unflagging restlessness in fleeing its own opinions which it nonetheless cannot relinquish, is now followed up more closely.

In the Word as spoken which is Creation, God is the cause, the inventor of measure and form, of law and finite being, of space and time,



of the days, years and places, of language and languages, of the concept and man. He is Himself beyond measure, beyond space and time, etc. He Himself does not speak. In such turns of speech God's reality and independence are wholly dissolved in the infinite essence which lies at the ground of all actuality without itself being either for itself or actual. "It is ever repeated that it is in the interest of science, as it now falls subject to controversy, to dissolve and annihilate [God's] reality, for the object is known only as transcended. (At this point the author quotes as well the second edition of Jacobi's writing *The True Ordination of the Skeptic*.)<sup>9</sup> And yet we see those who deduce their non-knowledge in this way falling into a nihilism which is quite similar."<sup>10</sup>

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The author clearly fixes in mind the misery of the claimed self-sameness, the abstract identity ever insisted upon by those who, as they combat speculative philosophy, have the effrontery to call it a system of identity. He keeps clearly in mind the fact that Jacobi's principle is nothing but such identity, which is now the nihilism of the purely infinite essence, and now, in its positive form, the very pantheism which Jacobi elsewhere has expressed in most definite terms that God is the Being in every determinate being,<sup>11</sup> an immanent and at once entirely indeterminate abstract entity. He shows, further on, how Jacobi proceeds with regard to Christianity: "Christianity," he says on page 21, "is here, as everywhere, the touchstone by which the most secret thoughts of the soul come out of hiding and at once perish. The idea in its pride, all modesty and humility aside, takes offense at the servanthood of the Son of Man. Human pride overcomes the indignation by transferring to ourselves what we find offensive in the alien person. Such traits are more easily tolerated in ourselves. Insofar as we view the alien appearance as an unessential disguise, and posit the essence in the idea, and the idea in ourselves as the voice of innermost conscience, our indignation is overcome." "We ourselves are of that Ideal, and the error of Christianity lies only in transferring it to a single human being."

Furthermore, it is shown exactly how in this theory the understanding, "which has had to content itself with knowing nothing of things divine, still was unable to infer non-being from contradiction and unthinkability, nor deny reality to what contradicts itself; just as the same understanding opts with infallible audacity against form in religion according to the same law of non-contradiction which it itself has shown to be obsolete." "It almost seems as if our natural man felt less timidity before God in his majesty than before God in his lowliness." (Only in his majesty is he the unapproachable God, whom as the beyond man maintains for himself far removed from love and spirit.) The God of the

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understanding is, due to pure infinity, too great an eminence to clothe himself in our flesh and our blood.

"God's love," the author says, "entirely consists in transposing himself in fact and person into his fallen creature, and in being that creature." "The philosophy of non-knowledge has taught that to know God is to abase Him and make Him finite. But since, to be sure, it is impossible to abase God, it is impossible to know Him. Yet now He lowers Himself in revealing Himself, whereupon we in our pride again take offense at His abasement." Those who remain faithful to faith in revelation, but who at the same time assert that God cannot be known, agree with non-knowledge. They assert in a single breath that God has revealed Himself to men in Christ, but has also revealed regarding Himself that He has not revealed Himself, that He has not given Himself out to be known. They suppose that God has made Himself finite for man, has posited finitude in Himself and Himself in finitude, but that He is merely the abstract infinite which must be apprehended as entirely removed from finitude.

The author pursues the answer which Jacobi's expositions give to the question "What is man?" (pp. 30-47) with similar precision into the starts, hesitations, and contradictions in which it exhausts itself. "The question as to what man is stands in such reciprocal interaction with the question as to what God is that to answer the one is to answer the other. For in fact in both questions we ask nothing other than: what is God in relation to man, and man in relation to God?" This is a most important proposition, which those who wish to refer to and acknowledge only man's relation to God, and who thus affirm that one knows nothing of God, do not grasp. Inasmuch as the author grants that Jacobi's expositions show deep insight into the human heart, it is equally noted that often, where the expectation of illumination on the weightiest of subjects is aroused, this illumination dissipates into general observations with which little is gained, indeed even into the "suspension of scholarly activity through the announcement that supper is on the table."

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The beautiful soul in particular, which stands out so greatly in these expositions, is more closely examined. The basic error is then discovered which prevails in the main question, the nature of evil. This error consists in the fact that the goodness of being is derived (again according to the understanding's law of identity) from being, and that, as the author puts it farther on, the heart is of noble birth because—which non-knowledge gladly admits—it has been nobly created. This non-knowledge, which after all knows nothing, nonetheless thus immediately presupposes man's actual being. Merely in order to understand these determinations of the author's, non-knowledge would of course have to understand the essential distinction between what is only original abstract nature, a predisposition, not yet actuality, and actuality.

In explanation it may only be indicated here that the animal is as much as man good by nature, but that the actuality of the animal is limited to goodness by nature, while the actuality of men is to be effected only spiritually. An essential moment of all this lies in the fact that natural goodness is not that by which man would already have his actuality, that this natural goodness is rather the non-goodness of his spiritual being in which alone actuality lies.

The author shows more exactly that the basic error here lies in so mistaking the nature of evil that when it finally comes up for discussion it is posited in finitude, so that the finite reveals itself in knowledge [*Erkenntnis*] as non-knowledge [*Nichtwissen*], and in willing as sensibility. The goodness that we find in our heart we derive from our heart. On the other hand, the evil, or at least the tendency thereto, we do not ascribe to our free act—so high in other regards is our esteem for this freedom—but to our finitude, our sensuousness, which, however, is nothing but the necessary limit to this life of ours. And so we let evil, the finite, the imperfect, the sensuous, flow into one another in a motley display, and in order positively not to emerge from the comfort of our obscurity we take one last step and foist onto God responsibility for evil as the sensuous, finite necessary limit to this life—for which we cannot make amends by measured improvements of evil conditions.

And yet, the author adds, nothing further would be needed for those who in themselves have found nothing to know—assuming non-knowledge to be the simplicity of heart and poverty of spirit praised in the Sermon on the Mount—but for them to submit to instruction by the Word of God. A single earnest, enlightened glance at the third chapter of Genesis would suffice to give them an understanding of themselves and the world. (In the afterword, page 190, the author returns to this chapter, and at the instigation of a statement by this reviewer in these very *Yearbooks*<sup>12</sup> offers interesting and clear elucidations of it.) Since non-knowledge is unacquainted with any deeper needs and thoughts, the already mentioned “beautiful souls” of the Jacobian era, as the author remarks, not only believe nothing and take nothing from the Bible and catechism, but actually know nothing of it. An example is given by the pious Princess Gallitzin already mentioned in another connection,<sup>13</sup> who was first moved through Hamann<sup>14</sup> to acquaint herself with the Bible, which she had never read.

In the second section (pp. 48–115) devoted to absolute knowledge the author immediately fastens onto the general standpoint according to which all spiritual activity—and not just a particular capacity or portion of spirit—shows itself to be spirit by taking up into itself its opposite, quiescent being. It thus strives to transcend the duality separating it from being, so as not to remain lying on the object's surface but to

lodge itself within it. This character of spiritual activity in general, if kept squarely in mind, would cast a less superficial light on psychology than the one in which we are used to seeing it. Conversely, if the most common activities of spirit were regarded with less prejudice and indeed in an entirely empirical manner, the apprehensiveness which the speculative idea awakens in the unpracticed mind would subside as if through an induction, seeing that this idea expresses no more than what gives itself out for all to see in every activity of the soul.

p. 800 Were consciousness familiar with the form of the idea manifested in such employment, it would grasp the idea more easily in its unlimited character, where it no longer is a matter of finite content but of the infinite content of truth. The endeavors of the author are directed to this truth concerning the full range of spiritual activity into which spirit must recollect itself out of those particular activities and their limited contents. If this striving absolutely fails to reach satisfaction, if the problem it assigns itself remains absolutely unsolved, the human spirit in and for itself—i.e. spirit as revealed to man—is not to be blamed (p. 48). It is rather man himself in his abstract naturalness who is to be blamed—the breaking apart of spirit in separate directions, an arbitrary operation with isolated selfish powers, all resulting in a complete separation of being and knowledge, so that being in its desolateness is posited precisely in the fact that it neither knows nor is known.

“Being is untrue and inactual because it is without consciousness. Only spirit, through which the finite and the infinite by themselves separate off from actuality, is true and actual” (p. 49). But those who cling to the opposition of the finite and the infinite, and thus in effect to the finite, neither attain to this process of separation, nor, therefore, to consciousness of actuality. The author now astutely compares non-knowledge and absolute knowledge in regard to their relation to being. They agree in ascribing unknowability to being, differing only in that non-knowledge ascribes actuality as well to this being, while absolute knowledge denies not only being’s knowability but also its actuality. To non-knowledge, being and non-knowledge are identical; to absolute knowledge, non-being and non-knowledge are identical. Non-knowledge has much to say about going beyond nature, but it lies in its very nature not to know what it even means to do so. For to rise above nature would have been to transform non-knowledge into knowledge.

p. 801 [nos. 101–102] After this allusion to the transition from non-knowledge to knowledge—which has its further determination in the proposition that as long as God presents Himself to the subject only as object He cannot be known—the author first considers the question: What is God? “As long as we do not know God, we know absolutely nothing, for what is

outside God and without God?" On the one hand free of the trivialities and caprices of finite reflective thinking, and on the other hand firm in the Christian faith—in the living and at once lived Pentecostal faith growing out of the obedience of ecclesiastical faith—the author proceeds into the innermost night of this object, which lights up into the daylight of knowledge to the mind which has attained to that freedom and that firmness.

The author starts out in this connection from expositions by the present reviewer, laying before the reader "the most compromising and hazardous declarations possible, or those that have been the most decried." The propositions are compared with Scripture, and difficulties and misunderstandings caused by an opining ensnared in finite thinking are taken up and clarified, as are likewise, and indeed even to a greater degree, departures and shifts from the meaning and actual content of the propositions. The author treats the object of speculative thinking with the most lively originality, but equally with the greatest of definiteness in the thought process. The concepts are further confirmed and clarified by the astute, fresh treatment which comes from being independently thought out. There are certain principal propositions along with a few main thrusts which we wish to set in relief from the rest.

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The concept in its immanence determines itself on the basis of the proposition that the absolute substance is every bit as much subject as substance, and that the absolute subject is as much substance as subject. It is then brought forward (p. 62) that Scripture—insofar as it teaches that man by himself, by his own subjectivity divorced from God, can attain to neither God nor to knowledge of God—comes down to nothing less than the knowledge that only through God taken as universal knowledge can man attain to God as universal truth. For particular knowledge is man's own accidental knowledge divorced from God.

Related propositions are developed as follows. The first is: God is not merely eternal being (substance) but also self-knowledge (subject). How ignorant of this express proposition of speculative philosophy must those who would judge such philosophy be to accuse it of pantheism! God is actual only insofar as He is known. His determinate being appears and disappears with his consciousness. But with this reference of being and knowledge to God as the absolute object which is at once absolute subject, Scripture is in agreement.

The second proposition is (pp. 63, 65): God, as being in Himself, is self-knowledge in itself, the self-consciousness of God; as being in the other, God is self-knowledge outside itself—God's consciousness in the world, in individual beings as the creatures of God. But insofar as God knows Himself in His creatures, this being outside Himself is, to be sure, once again transcended, dissolved. For these individual beings

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are according to their being and knowledge preserved in God. They are not God Himself; rather, only God Himself is in oneself. If God is actual in and with His creatures—and this is what Scripture teaches—God’s knowledge is also in them—since He is only insofar as He knows Himself. And this divine knowledge in man is precisely universal reason, which is not my reason, nor a common or general faculty, but rather being itself, the identity of being and knowledge. “God’s being and knowledge [*Wissen*] in me thus contains not only the knowledge [*Erkenntnis*] which God has of me but also the knowledge which I have of Him, but which can become more or less clouded through this I, depending on the degree to which it departs from identity with God’s knowledge of me. On behalf of this second point, the reference of being and knowledge to human beings—substance is just as much subject—the promise again speaks in testimony.”

Comparison of those propositions with Scripture is conveyed more closely in the following (p. 65): “God knows the world, knows humanity, only insofar as He is in it; or, if the world has not remained within Him, only insofar as He from His side transposes Himself into the world. Man knows God only insofar as man is in God; or, should man have fallen, only insofar as he is transposed into God. But man can be in God only through God; and, once he has ceased to be in God, he can be transposed into God only by God, in fact only insofar as God first transposes Himself into him, becomes man, and reveals Himself to man. Only in this revelation, only in Jesus Christ, does man know God, having no name in which to pray to God but that of the Son of Man.” But in how many textbooks of theology does one still meet with the doctrine of the Incarnation, and in how many does one still meet with philosophy?

p. 804

The author now comes to the ever-repeated complaint as to the self-deification of knowledge which is typically deduced from the proposition of speculative knowledge according to which to know God is to be God. If God Himself is man in that He knows man, so is man God in that he knows God. This is said to be the inevitable consequence of absolute knowledge, which it is powerless to hide. The author first shows that, in the exposition whose main lines have just been developed, this consequence is already laid aside. He shows that contained in the fact that man knows God is the fact that God is in man, but also the fact that man is in God—but only that man is in God, not that man *is* God. To determine the matter more closely, God’s being outside Himself and in His creatures is, as previously noted, dissolved: individual beings are in God, preserved in Him according to their being and knowledge. They are not God Himself; rather, only God Himself is in oneself.

Yet it is not from immanence but from “identity”—the term is found in the philosophical exposition—that such a conclusion of self-deification is drawn. One might be reminded by the above formulations—according to which God is “in” man and “man” in God—of Jacobi’s habit of philosophizing in prepositions rather than actually expressing the categories which are merely implicit in those prepositions. It is a style which gives the appearance of considerable definiteness, indeed of pursuing the matter down to the last and simplest of prepositions. But in fact it leaves one’s gaze in a sphere which is nebulous and indeterminate. It obstructs consciousness of the categories in which the understanding is stuck, and foreshortens our alertness to them. Still, even if the forms in use by the author should here and there cause difficulty, it follows from what has already been said that the reproach leaves him untouched. For he employs prepositions—which are of great service as needed abbreviations even in philosophical discourse—only occasionally. Further, these forms reveal themselves as raised into their determinate categories, which in turn are revealed as pursued into the dialectic of their concept.

This attentiveness to the very categories which the understanding employs in its complaints against philosophy is just what such understanding lacks. It is a pleasure to see the acuity with which the author keeps his eye on such thinking as it knocks into its own blind inferences, and with which he seizes and holds fast the twists and turns of its false game. It is no use to have given an exposition of a philosophical concept in its speculative development, nor, beyond that, to have exhibited that an assertion of which philosophy is accused does not arise in that development. For philosophy’s detractors draw their inference and stick to it quite apart from the exposition simply because that is the inference they have drawn. It does not occur to them to doubt their ability to infer correctly. Yet they only show thereby that they have not followed the speculative exposition, since otherwise they would have been able to notice that the forms of inference which they innocently employ are taken up for examination in that exposition, and that an entirely different thought formation is presupposed from the one in which they so naively and trustfully advance.

To return to the path traced by the author, he immediately remarks with regard to the so oft-alleged identity that, since it arises in speculative knowledge, it does not exclude difference but rather essentially contains it as its own determination. It is by a sovereign *willfulness* and caprice of their own that such detractors retain from the text only identity—which to be sure as a written word does stare them in the face—and so attribute it thus made abstract to philosophy. Had they attended to the exposition, they would have seen that quite the opposite of abstract

identity is affirmed. But the author presses in ever more closely on the falsifications of the understanding “which is as slow in thought, and as heavy, as it is frivolous” (p. 69).

From the judgment “God’s knowledge = God’s being” this understanding forthwith infers: “knowing God = being God.” And from there it gets as a final result: “If I claim to know God, I must claim to be God.” In the first inference the first term, “God’s knowledge,” is changed into “knowing God,” while in the second inference the term remains unchanged. And so arises the crude misunderstanding which at once is not attributed to an error of one’s own but to one’s opponent. If such alteration of one part of the proposition is undertaken, the other part must keep pace: in it as well God must be put in the accusative, and therewith being must be transformed into having: “to know God = to have God.” Further, the transition from “to know God = to be God” to the result “If I know God, I must be God” has surreptitiously slipped in. In the knowledge of God it was still undetermined who might know Him, e.g., whether it might be only God Himself. But now the I, this I, is added, and in such a manner that it is presupposed by the predicate “to know God,” and is already there, already set up before God comes on the scene. But since I must know God if I am to know myself, and since I must know myself if I am to be, first of all God must know me before I can know God, and know myself in God.

To this thorough elucidation the author adds the logical determination that I cannot know God insofar as the I that is meant is that of the sensory understanding. Only the I which has transcended this other I—having transcended it negatively through self-externalization and positively through God—knows God. Thus, stated otherwise, I know God only insofar as I am in God, and am not for myself this I.

p. 806

The author has fully attained his aim of showing by instructive example how the abstract understanding based on the senses habitually gets on with speculative truths, how it assigns a different sense to such truths. The speculative concept makes everything depend on the process of self-alienation in the natural being and natural knowledge of man, and it makes this process of spiritual rebirth the sole content of the exposition of true knowing, as also the sole actuality of spirit. But, as thought sleeps, the abstract understanding based on the senses introduces unnoticed the falsification of substituting its own identity in the place of the concept of identity, and likewise the immediate subject—I, this knowing subject, natural birth, immediate natural surmising and knowing—in the place of the concept of subjectivity, and of knowledge and its process.

We cannot go into philosophy’s response to the question as to what man is (pp. 76–116) in the detail it deserves, for we have already gone



on at considerable length. The reply to this question comes to be taken up in its bearing on the more specific question as to how man attains to God. It will immediately be noted that this way of putting the question occurs only to the understanding of non-knowledge which, in keeping with the error cited above, proceeds from the subject taken as first, and thereby immediately cuts short and shrivels up the answer. In absolute knowledge, which proceeds from the Absolute, from substance as the objective Word of God, the question is on the contrary: "How does God attain to man?" Here it becomes principally a question of the difficult concepts of freedom, evil, and sin, and then atonement; and the author has fastened onto the deepest truth of these concepts.

Freedom according to its true concept and essence is the absolute will (p. 84). It is absolutely determined in itself as absolute will. Caprice is the opposite of freedom, the bondage of sin. God is free because He is the power to be Himself. The nature of evil is indicated in the fully determinate character of the difficulty in which it finds itself. Evil is not just the absence of goodness; rather, what is negative attains a positive actuality in feeling, and yet one which itself is purely null. Sin rests on a falling away, confusion, nothing. It is an idle illusion. Evil, because it includes within itself both a positive actuality—hence the good—and nullity, is good turned upside down, set in opposition, distorted. It attains to actuality, but only as stood on its head. Since it is being for itself, its actuality is subjective half-actuality. Actual actuality is being in and for itself. Evil according to what it is in itself is the good, but this is of no concern to evil itself as the will which attaches itself to being for self. Evil is restricted to its subjective being and essence. What the concept of evil demands of us is nothing less than that we think contradiction, which according to ordinary logic—the system of the identity of the understanding—ought be impossible. In fact, evil is to be apprehended even as the existence of contradiction.

p. 807

Immediately connected with evil is the concept of salvation (p. 90), which at once is to be apprehended not only as the transcendence and annihilation of evil, of our separation from God, but also—according to the positive moment already contained in negation—as the evil being's reconciliation with God as with the good. Here the author has the boldness not to recoil from declaring that salvation as reconciliation is the transcendence of the distinction of good and evil. This is developed in the following manner: there is no reconciliation without forgiveness. But to forgive evil implies two things: first that evil be recognized precisely as evil, contrary to the above-mentioned view that man is born good, and second that evil is not evil but only limitation, finitude, sensory existence, and the like. For evil is said to stand in need of forgiveness. Limitation,

finitude, sensoriness need no forgiveness; for them reconciliation and redemption are superfluous, even meaningless. But, second, to forgive evil also implies that evil is recognized as being in itself good, and that it is put on a level with good insofar as evil actually is forgiven.

The author develops these concepts in the course of their justification against the objections of the abstract understanding, and against its mode of apprehending what is speculative. Here as elsewhere, this mode reduces to apprehension of only half the concrete whole, and to distorting the total fact of the concept into merely the half of it. It is as interesting as it is instructive to see how carefully in his analysis the author holds fast these half-truths of abstraction. Error, untruth is always what remains stuck in half-truth. The abstraction from which such half-truth is generated (p. 80) is the absolute discretion of the hard heart which has being for itself, which in its inflexible separateness makes itself into a being, and which proves itself evil and null. This abstraction is thus the sensory mode of understanding which insinuates an abstract, nonliving, sensory, mechanical concept in the place of the speculative concept (p. 84). Here is the sin which distorts and corrupts all concepts.

p. 808

The understanding which proceeds according to the law of identity clears away every difficulty in the concept of evil by removing its contradiction, but with that it at once clears away the very thing itself, the concept of evil, which is contradiction itself. It thus accuses philosophy not so much of the misdeed of spoiling the concept of evil as that of corrupting the concept of good through identifying good with evil. Once again, the author is no laggard in hounding out false appearances, despite their continuing glitter. Driven by the understanding to the most superficial of conceptions (p. 91), the insight dawns that the good on which the understanding insists is itself evil precisely because it is abstract. For what exists in being for itself is only in itself good—which is the deficiency of its determination—and is still held fast as abstract.

Good and evil apprehended as polar opposites, as discrete poles each of which excludes the other and remains for itself, are each equally evil. Thus does the good exist in the formations of the subjective frame of mind of the beautiful soul, and of the abstract law of universal duty. The mere representation of the good is, to be sure, as harmless as it is inactual. The understanding beholds in what it takes to be good only half, its being in itself. Of the speculative idea—in connection with the difference between good and evil—it thus again apprehends only half. If this distinction is said to be in itself null and void, the understanding fixes on this pronouncement, proclaims it as the entire idea, as the complete determination of the difference between good and evil, and gives itself over to moralistic and pious declamations against this determination.

In the first place it leaves the other moment, the determination of being for itself, purposely behind, the determination which includes within it all existing volition, action, morality, imputation, etc. This is the moment in which the difference of good and evil is expressly posited and asserted as essential, in which it is given out in concept as inseparable from being in itself, and is logically shown to be inseparable from it, so that the matter is at once explained as not being completely stated at the level of its being in itself. Beyond the moment of being for itself, the understanding leaves out, in the second place, the third principal moment, namely reconciliation, in which moment alone the first moment, which the understanding has isolated, attains to its meaning and truth—as may truly be said of the second moment as well.

p. 809

As has elsewhere been sufficiently recalled, the statement that good and evil are in themselves the same is—just as it immediately reads—unfortunate and poorly worded, since it encourages misunderstandings. The statement derives more from the understanding, which spouts it profusely in its polemic, than from philosophy. However, the concrete meaning of the proposition—which it acquires only in reconciliation, before and outside of which it is simply untrue and even senseless—has already been extracted in the author's fine exposition.

The reviewer must refrain from highlighting the most interesting further analyses contained in this section on the most sublime of teachings, the doctrine of the trinitarian God, the personality of the three persons to be distinguished in him, the Incarnation of Christ, and so forth. But the reviewer has to make some statement acknowledging what the author says at the conclusion of this section (pp. 113ff.). Maintaining himself at such heights in both Christianity and knowledge, the author gives the philosophy he holds in his gaze—or rather its beginnings, as he says—something to think about. The question, namely, is whether this philosophy would not gain in definiteness and clarity in its progress if it were to attach itself more decisively to the Word of God out of which it has developed; if it were to proceed more definitely and in name (i.e. with the naming of names) from the sin which has become manifest to it as abstraction, without the presupposition of which no understanding of the world is possible, without the recognition of which no self-knowledge is possible, and without the transcendence of which no knowledge of God is possible.

According to this philosophy itself, it is not thought but representation which is highest, i.e. the form, except that it reveals itself as immanent, as an appearance of the essence at once identical with that essence itself. Knowledge, as lying just as much in the truth of absolute reality as this reality lies in knowledge, is affirmed as the being of spirit, which

p. 810

includes within itself and cultivates the concept along with representation and faith. But the formalism of the doctrine itself does not always appear to be heeded here. "For, not to pass over anything in silence, more than once such an ethereal, ghostlike, and eerie feeling came upon us in the realm of this knowledge that we quite earnestly longed for persons and form, and then sought and found refuge nowhere else than in the Word of God. Indeed we have often been refreshed in marrow and bone by a single verse from the Bible as by the power of God. We feel our sensory nature so greatly that we have no wish to forgo grasping with our hands for the sake of grasping in concept."

As becomes apparent from what the author has proffered on behalf of his claims, the present reviewer is in no position to repudiate them. The author has touched on an interesting point—the general transition from representation to the Concept and from the Concept to representation, a two-way transition which is already present in scientific meditation, and which here meets with the demand that it be also expressed in the scientific exposition. Just as Homer distinguishes, with regard to a number of stars, the names that they bear among immortal gods and the names they go by among mortal men, so does the language of representation differ from that of the Concept. Not only does man first come to know the matter by the name assigned to it by representation; what is more, only in this name is he deeply at home with the matter. Thus science is not merely called upon to inscribe its figurations in that abstract conceptual space—more abstract than the space in which abide the immortal gods not of truth but of fantasy—but also to establish and characterize their incarnation, and indeed each incarnation immediately for itself, i.e. the existence which they obtain in spirit as actual, existence as representation.

p. 811

The present reviewer may, at least with a view to apologizing for the imperfection of his works in this respect, recall that it is precisely the beginning, to which the author as well refers, which chiefly imposes the necessity of holding more fixedly to the Concept which is expressed in pure thoughts, and which has often been won in hard battle with representation. This at once means the necessity of attaching oneself to the course of the Concept's development, of holding oneself more strictly in its tracks so as to win self-assurance with respect to it, and of holding off by force the distractions which the many-sidedness of representation as likewise the form of contingency in the connection of its determinations brings with it. Such many-sidedness makes the danger of yielding something in the methodological strictness of thought too close for comfort. But greater firmness attained in the movement of the Concept will license greater unconcern before the temptation

of representation, and at once allow representation to breathe more freely within the overlordship of the Concept; just as for its part the self-assurance already present in holy faith allows one to be at rest over against the Concept, to introduce oneself into the Concept, and to do so with as little fear of its consequences as concern over its coherence, which—in relation to presupposed faith—need not prove itself free.

Seen from the outside, such a form of representation in philosophy will be allowed by faith more than by non-belief. The latter has a perfect right to recall the example of Scholastic philosophy which philosophized with the presupposition of fixed ecclesiastical faith, and so could not advance to the freedom of the thinking Concept. Non-belief, which claims to do its verses in thought and even reason and which justifiably demands satisfaction, will be frightened away from attending to conceptual reason by the express *naming* of the forms of faith, should faith have it understood that the path of philosophy ends up solely in the knowledge of God, even in the Trinity, the Incarnation of Christ, etc. For such results of philosophizing can only be presuppositions already laid out from the start, in fact by giving a backseat to reason. Indeed, the apprehensiveness of non-belief slides into impatience and indignation that one should even attempt in earnest to prove the rationality of such doctrines. Kant's *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* has, to be sure, not aroused the same negative attention, since such earnestness of speculation could not be detected in it, and since the attempt which he made in this direction could immediately be taken according to his own system for an idle and superfluous game.

If the above-mentioned attachment to the form of thought principally lies in a logical elaboration, it must be all the more welcome, in a writing such as the one under review, to see the speculative concept worked up to the point of recognizing its accord with religious representation, and to see the words and symbols of the one translated into the language of the other. Not only is a boost thereby given to the confidence which faith, as in Scholastic theology, once again can have in thinking reason, albeit in a thinking reason henceforth free in its thinking; but, what is more, the above mode of comparison has also implied that the so-called objections made by the thought of non-knowledge as much as by faith when it employs the same one-sided understanding can be analyzed simultaneously.

Expressing the manner in which refutation must proceed, the author imposes on such analysis the condition that “the system must show itself to be a system by stepping out of itself, overcoming this its last abstraction, and declaring itself to be love. For it does not put up resistance to the moment which sets itself over against it, but rather transposes itself into

that moment.” The true refutation of an assertion must occur in the assertion itself, not through the entertainment of opposed propositions lying outside the first proposition. The nature of the Concept is so infinitely powerful that in an untrue proposition the opposite determination is contained and often even already expressed. It is thus only a matter of taking up that proposition, and demonstrating through analysis its inner and indeed unresolved contradiction. To this it may be added that the objections which are raised against speculative philosophy—if in other respects they merit the name of “objections” seeing that the name is not suitable for just any slovenly and purely extraneous bright idea that strikes one—are contained and directly treated within the system.

Objections actually bound with the matter against which they are directed are one-sided determinations. Such determinations, as previously indicated, are in part called forth by falsification of the speculative fact and put forth as a complaint against that fact. But they are also in part advanced as assertions against this fact. Such one-sided determinations, as bound up with the matter, are moments of its Concept which thus arise, in the course of the exposition of it, in their momentary positions. The negation of these moments must be exhibited in the immanent dialectic of the Concept. This negation, insofar as such moments have been posited as objections, assumes the guise of their refutation.

p. 813

Men given to reflective thinking who also place some confidence in such reflection lack the patience to enter into the exposition of the dialectic of the Concept, in which they would find the content of their objection acknowledged and appreciated at its true value. They much prefer to bring forth such determinations merely as they arise from their subjective understanding. The author’s activity as a popularizer in taking up and treating such determinations as objections is therefore most deserving of gratitude. Science might claim such an activity to be superfluous. For what occasions it is only a lack of training in thought, compounded by the vain impatience of deficiently formed thought. Yet it cannot be denied that such men speak out only out of their love for whatever strikes them, inasmuch as they prefer what is accidental in their understanding to the objective course and necessity of science. What they fail to realize is that determinations which appear to gush up from the particularity of their subjective thinking are in fact generated by the nature of the Concept. These determinations must therefore have already been present in the exposition of the Concept, though of course not in a loose and accidental order, but consciously and according to their necessity.

There are many people who—endowed with what is still called goodwill and yet dressed out with the armor of their subjective thoughts and a

habit of allowing one thing or another to impress itself on them—harbor such a feeling of their freedom that they refuse to surrender to the course of science as if bound hand and foot. Since science exists essentially for the sake of instruction, it may also take up this external side of instruction. On the supposition of such goodwill, it may seek to contribute to the elimination of such obstacles. What I say here is occasioned by the good example of our author and what he says. It will serve—with respect to the nature of objections against a scientific course of development as also with respect to their refutation—as an apologetic preface to a few writings which recently have appeared in objection to the philosophical activity of the present reviewer,<sup>15</sup> who has been impelled to render a notice.<sup>16</sup> It will also serve as an introduction to the task of passing judgment on them.

It remains necessary at least to evoke the third section, which is entitled “Faith-Knowledge [*Glaubenserkenntnis*], or Faith and Knowledge” (pp. 116–89). Here the opposition characteristic of modern times between knowledge and faith is taken up in all its twists and turns. Their alleged incompatibility is exposed as null and void, as likewise their alleged separability. In twenty-nine brief sections, the author hunts out the obstinate prejudice of such an opposition, presented as a fixed and unsurpassable truth through all the modifications of the understanding which has elicited it. The author engages in a dialogue with this form of reflection with a mastery of thought as deep as his Christian faith, and with a warm sensibility to boot. Those still captive to this prejudice of the age can be referred to this section. If they are not just boasting but are earnest about the matter, they will direct themselves to it on their own.

p. 814

The author writes on page 112 that if his observations “are not capable of resolving all doubts and misunderstandings, at least they provide the key to resolving a few doubts which have occasioned misunderstandings. These observations may serve to stimulate us to conscientious discipline in learning, which so easily remains attached to the external aspect of things and to one-sided results—foisting on these results a quite altered meaning. These same observations may also stimulate us to love in the course of understanding [*Verstehen*], for without love—i.e. without self-transposition into the other—an understanding [*ein Verständnis*] is as impossible as it would be without the understanding itself [*Verstand*]. But above all these observations may move us to Christian reserve in passing judgment on the misunderstandings of others.”

The author begins by indicating the difference which in part in fact exists between faith and knowledge, and which in part is only falsely assumed to exist. He shows that this distinction justifies no claim to their separability, no true opposition between them. “Knowledge discovers faith in itself, and faith at once discovers knowledge in itself. For faith

is faith-knowledge. Thy faith grows with thy knowledge, thy knowledge with thy faith, like the root with the tree, and the tree with the root."

When knowledge [*Wissen*] of the world is attributed to philosophy understood as "world wisdom"—a label which was once used quite innocently as a synonym for "philosophy" but which more recently has become a term of derision with which it is burdened (Friedrich Schlegel is perhaps an example)—the author shows that such exclusive knowledge [*Erkenntnis*] of the world for itself and without God is but a knowledge of what is untrue, devoid of the light of truth.

p. 815

To know the world can only be to know the truth of the world, the truth of what is for itself untrue. This truth is God. But it is equally the case that only he who knows the world also knows God. 'Anyone who, in the supersensory essence of God, does not also know the nature and person of God at once fails to know God even in his supernatural character. If knowledge [*Wissen*] exists, if we do not wish to sacrifice knowledge to non-knowledge (to nullified knowledge, to knowledge of what is null), this knowledge must like faith be divine and supernatural. Philosophy as supernatural must, like faith, have the Divine Word as its sole basis. And its sole goal must be to cancel nature as fallen, to effect salvation from nature. Both knowledge and faith are supernatural insofar as they raise man above nature as fallen—a goal which nature cannot accomplish by itself. But at the same time both are natural, insofar as they have as their consequence the restoration of nature in its actuality. It is rationalism which exhausts itself in a supersensory realm devoid of content.

The author now retraces the paths which others have followed, exploring their manner of expressing themselves publicly as they endeavor to latch upon a distinction between faith and knowledge. Of the categories only a few can be mentioned by way of illustration.

It has been proposed that the difference lies in thought, which itself is science and its works. The author's reply is that no one wishes to claim that faith can exist without thought, just as any thought which is actual has at once an actual being, life and efficacy identifying it with faith.

It has been proposed that faith indeed does not begin with thinking, and that it delivers truth all at once and in its essence. The truth thereby reaches us without any contribution from us, while knowledge by contrast depends on our own autonomous activity. The author replies on page 135: "We have through Christ such trust in God that we build neither by nor upon ourselves, nor achieve competence on our own to think anything out of ourselves. Rather, our competence to think and grasp something conceptually (λογίτασθαι) comes from God, out of God, and through Christ who is the logos who teaches us logic, and who has lowered himself to our level that we may know and grasp him."



It is shown that all such distinctions, as also the category of immediacy so dearly loved today, vanish into thin air once the indeterminate expressions in which they move are simply reported and made determinate. In particular, one such distinction reads that faith comes from the heart, and knowledge from the understanding. The real error of our time is said to lie in tearing the intellectual faculty loose from its "natural" connection with our sensory and active nature. This reproach, if we follow the author's reply, is in the first place based on the error of licensing a sphere of knowledge alongside that of all being and life. And it derives in the second place from the error of calling the above-postulated connection "natural"—although it is originally quite the contrary of being natural. What is "natural" is rather the division of spiritual powers in man.

A philosophy without heart and a faith without understanding are abstractions from the true life and being of knowledge and faith. Anyone whom philosophy leaves cold, or whom actual faith does not enlighten, should himself look to see where the fault lies—it lies in neither knowledge nor faith, but in himself. Such knowing finds itself still removed from philosophy, and such faith still lies outside faith.

p. 816

Earlier on, the author asserted: "Do not close your mind with such haughty pride to speculation, which you accuse of pride and coldness. Rather, transpose yourself with animation into the concepts of philosophy. First experience them and take them up into your sensibility, and you will then experience their life and truth, i.e. their agreement with the Divine Word of which they are the translation."

In connection with this there is the further question (pp. 146ff.) as to whether human reason has not fantasized drawing from itself the truth which it has in fact lifted from the Bible, so that what is true in philosophy in fact has been pilfered from it. The author replies that the rationalism of natural reason, which takes itself to be an absolute and independent property [of the individual], has nothing to do with speculative philosophy. He further replies that the entire distinction around which the question revolves comes down to the distinction between Holy Scripture and universal objective reason. By such "reason" is to be understood nothing other than the spirit of God—which according to Scripture will be communicated to us in and to faith.

But insofar as a distinction is still maintained and validated, it affects faith as much as it affects knowledge. For no one understands Holy Scripture except through the holy spirit. It is the holy spirit which has itself dictated the Bible, and which opens up the understanding of it to all. Thus it is not the Bible but rather the spirit of its Author, insofar as it becomes the universal and common spirit, which is said to be the beginning and living principle of all faith.

Along with boasting over its own natural reason, rationalism equally boasts over Bible exegesis; its theology is to be purely exegetical, purely biblical. It falls into the illusion or self-deception of not allowing itself to realize that its own spirit is responsible for this exegesis. It spares itself the trouble of investigating more closely the feeling, understanding, and logic which underlie such exegesis; and of establishing it as the spirit of truth. And what it uses to this purpose is the abstractive understanding, so-called natural reason.

If it is said that philosophy does not proceed from the Bible, this is likewise true of faith, which in coming to be does not proceed *from* the Bible but *to* the Bible—in which it lays hold not only of truth but of itself as well. It is said to be a prejudice (to which the fact of philosophy directly opposes itself) to seek the principle and thus concept of philosophy in its starting point, in its beginning, since neither is discovered to be except in its completion (p. 149).

p. 833 [nos. 105–106] The author takes up with equal penetration of mind the categories of the transcendence of God's personality which is allegedly to be effected by philosophy—the categories of God's incomprehensibility. "It is faith," the author says (p. 157), "which, given from above, makes the incomprehensible comprehensible, fathoms the unfathomable, without being held within any finite limit. 'What no eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart of man conceived, what God has prepared for those who love him, God has revealed to us through the Spirit. For the Spirit searches everything, even the depths of God.'"<sup>17</sup>

"If philosophy is self-active in the Concept, and if faith appears to inner experience and conscience, yet the conscience to which appeal is made is not something particular, but is the conscience common to all men. And the spirit which awakens this conscience, which enlightens reason, and which transposes the individual into the universal, is not the strident spirit of one's own self. Just as no one can bestow faith upon another, since everyone must be instructed by God Himself, so there arrives a point in philosophy at which even it cannot be won by learning, cannot be externally forced upon anyone, nor transferred from one individual to another. And is not this precisely the vital point? Even the philosopher celebrates his Pentecost. Without a second birth no one leaves behind the sphere of the natural understanding and enters the speculative summits of the living Concept.

p. 834 "But, according to its innermost essence, truth lies in its own necessity, it contains its own necessitation within itself. Thus truth, we surmise, must at once allow itself to be forced upon one and necessitated, so that we cannot withstand it. It must allow itself to be so thoroughly demonstrated

that there is no possibility of evading it. Yet in general man, to be sure, can evade the truth—the all-powerful truth.

“What is to be understood by that thorough and universally valid demonstration which we find lacking in faith? Is it not to be sought in our own inwardness, rather than in the inner being of the thing? Do we not seek it in the subject rather than in the truth? Is not what we call ‘profound’ in fact self-fabricated, concocted out of our own thoughts—something which, insofar as we have fabricated it, proves and effects nothing, simply because it is nothing? Truth harbors its own necessitation within itself. This necessitation cannot lie in a proof which, as a proof, is distinct from the truth itself. It cannot precisely because it is spirit, and is inaccessible to the isolated understanding, and to its proof. It cannot come to the isolated and fallen understanding of man. From such understanding faith thus makes appeal to a spirit unseparated into parts, i.e. to conscience. It turns away from proof to inner experience. In the same way, speculative knowing cannot be positively forced by a proof of the understanding. Philosophy must experience the fact that its opponents have ears to hear and do not hear, eyes to see and do not see” (pp. 159–62).

The distinction is that through feeling faith leads to the creature’s *dependence* on God, whereas through thought science sets us free. The author replies that if in faith we feel dependent, it is upon *God* we feel this dependence. But by its very nature dependence on God is rather freedom in God, just as to fall outside God is to fall outside freedom. Thus if you *believe* the truth, you shall *know* it, and the truth will set you free. Yet no philosophy in the world can set you free in any other way. In God alone is freedom (p. 169).

This is what the author says in conclusion regarding the peace between knowledge and faith. The distinction between the two cannot be denied. Yet identity makes no exclusion of difference, so that in every case what is other is of course to be found and differentiated, but it is at once known to be inseparably bound up with that in relation to which it is other. Thinking and believing are to be seen as parts of a single living whole, neither of which is self-sufficient by itself, so that in actuality neither can assert itself in separation from the other. Separated, they distort themselves into twisted images of what is most holy. Blessed are we when with a good conscience we can say with the Apostle Paul: “I know in whom I believe.”<sup>18</sup> It is a precious thing for the heart to attain firmness, and it achieves firmness and certainty only when it knows in whom it believes.

The present reviewer greets in this writing the dawn of this peace born of thought and the heart—each as pious as it is forceful—and of

the reconciliation achieved between the two. It is a writing destined to introduce this peace, and which will even prove its efficacy publicly. In it, Christianity witnesses on behalf of philosophy. Such witness serves as authoritative for those capable of recognizing the witness of the spirit only in the authoritative witness of a pious heart (not, to be sure, in a merely personal individual heart). Yet it bears witness just as greatly to the penetrating thought of a mind capable of bringing the categories of the understanding before the tribunal of thought. These categories stand convicted before the evangelical Christ of a double incoherence: on the one hand, the incoherence, into which it falls in league with rationalism, of using against philosophy the common dichotomy of speculative philosophy and faith; and at the same time the incoherence of laying at the doorsteps of philosophy the categories in which “the teaching of the superficial enlightenment of the understanding delights in rhapsodizing verses—an enlightenment which currently lies in its death throes, but all the more forcefully and combatively fights off its impending death” (p. 82).

If the precept “Avoid all appearance of evil!” often prevents good, or at least what would be proper, and even enthrones evil, the risk of an evil appearance of partisanship on behalf of the present reviewer’s own case could not restrain him from speaking of the joyful recognition of the content which this writing gives, and of the advancement which it has afforded and will afford to truth. Nor, in conclusion, could it prevent this reviewer from speaking of his desire to shake the hand of an author who remains personally unknown to him, and to do so out of gratitude for this writing from the standpoint of its closer connection to the reviewer’s own works on behalf of speculative philosophy.

## Notes

1. G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel: The Letters*, trans. Clark Butler and Christiane Seiler (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), pp. 537–45.

2. G. W. F. Hegel, *Briefe von und an Hegel*, 3rd ed., 4 vols., ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1969), no. 55; Hegel, *Hegel: The Letters*, p. 106.

3. G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel’s Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969), book I (The Doctrine of Being), chaps. 1–2.

4. G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature, Part Two of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon, 1970), § 250.

5. See G. W. F. Hegel, “How the Ordinary Human Understanding Takes Philosophy as Displayed in the Works of Mr. Krug,” trans. H. S. Harris in *Between*

*Kant and Hegel*, ed. H. S. Harris and G. di Giovanni (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983). Reprinted in this volume on pp. 226–44.

6. G. W. F. Hegel, *Sämtliche Werke: Jubiläumsausgabe*, 20 vols., ed. Hermann Glockner (Stuttgart: Frommann, 1927–40).

7. Rationalistic theology was known for its naturalistic explanation of miracles and was represented by Hegel's contemporary Heinrich Eberhard Gottlob Paulus.

8. I.e. of representation and thought.

9. I.e. *Die wahre Weihe des Zweiflers*.

10. I.e. to their negative concept of God.

11. I.e. *Dasein*.

12. I.e. *Yearbooks for Scientific Criticism* (*Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik*).

13. Hegel, *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. 20, pp. 265–68.

14. Johann Georg Hamann (1730–1788).

15. Hegel, *Hegel: The Letters*, pp. 536–37.

16. Hegel, *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. 20, pp. 314–93.

17. 1 Corinthians 2:9–10, *Oxford Annotated Bible*, ed. Herbert G. May and Bruce M. Metzger (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962); cf. Isaiah 64:4.

18. “. . . I know whom I have believed.” 2 Timothy 1:12, *Oxford Annotated Bible*.



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